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Abstract
Refinery exchange agreements (REAs) are reciprocal trading agreements 
whereby an oil refiner agrees to supply petroleum products in areas of close 
proximity to their oil refinery to other oil refiners in exchange for the receipt of 
those same petroleum products in locations far removed from their refinery 
from those same oil refiners.
Views as to the competitive effects of REAs have been mixed. While some 
contend REAs are pro-competitive thus leading to reductions in supply costs 
that may eventually be passed on to consumers in the form of relatively lower 
retail petrol prices, others have argued they are anti-competitive and provide a 
means through which oil refiners can engage in tacit collusion in downstream 
markets.
This study identifies those conditions under which REAs are likely to exhibit an 
anti-competitive effect and will fill some of the gap in the literature by 
providing empirical testing as to the likely competitive effects of REAs in the 
Australian context through measuring their impact on capital city retail petrol 
prices as a proxy for their direct effect on capital city wholesale petrol markets. 
While the direct effect of REAs should be measured through their effect on 
wholesale prices, such wholesale price data is not generally available and it is 
contended that retail prices serve as an appropriate indicator for changes in the
level of wholesale prices.
The null hypothesis that REAs have no effect on competition is tested against 
two alternative hypotheses: namely, REAs are either pro-competitive or anti­
competitive. The hypothesis testing is conducted through testing for the average 
price effect, if any, on Australian capital city retail petrol prices arising from a 
before situation where REAs were in operation as compared to an after 
situation where they have been terminated. This is done through testing for 
structural change using exploratory data analysis and through modelling using 
Box-Jenkins autoregressive integrated moving average methodology coupled 
with Box and Tiao intervention analysis to quantify the impact of any structural 
change associated with the termination of REAs.
While capital city wholesale petrol markets are oligopolistic in nature and may 
be prone to sporadic outbursts of co-operation between rival firms, it was found 
they are also arguably competitive in that profits from reductions in production 
costs appear to be gradually competed away and eventually passed on to 
motoring consumers in the form of relatively lower retail petrol prices and as 
demonstrated by the inability of market participants to exercise market power 
on a prolonged or sustainable basis. The implications of this finding is that not 
only were various regulatory interventions doomed to failure because there was 
no apparent competition problem that needed to be rectified, but that it was 
highly unlikely REAs served as a facilitating device for tacit collusion under 
these circumstances.
It is further found that REAs generally lowered the costs of petrol supply which 
were passed on to motoring consumers in the form of relatively lower retail
petrol prices as evidenced by the rise in relative prices following the 
termination of REAs. REAs have been found to be benign at worst, but far 
more likely to be pro-competitive and efficiency enhancing, thereby leading to 
relatively lower retail petrol prices. On this basis, it would appear public policy 
is best served, provided that wholesale capital city petrol markets remain 
relatively competitive, to encourage the re-institution of REAs in Australia.
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
1.1 Introduction
Refinery exchange agreements (REAs) are reciprocal trading agreements 
whereby an oil refiner agrees to supply petroleum products in areas of close 
proximity to their oil refinery to other oil refiners in exchange for the receipt of 
those same petroleum products in locations far removed from their refinery 
from those same oil refiners. REAs have been a feature of the downstream 
petroleum industry in Australia, North America, Europe and Africa.
Views as to the competitive effects of REAs have been mixed. While some 
contend REAs are pro-competitive thus leading to reductions in supply costs 
that may eventually be passed on to consumers in the form of relatively lower 
retail fuel prices, others have argued they are anti-competitive and provide a 
means through which oil refiners can engage in tacit collusion in downstream 
markets. Even amongst some of those who maintain that REAs, on balance, are 
pro-competitive, there is an acknowledgement that they could be misused to 
serve an anti-competitive purpose.
While there are conflicting opinions as to the competitive effects of REAs, 
there has been no rigorous empirical testing and many of the conclusions that 
have been reached so far have been based on conjecture and supposition. 
Therefore, a gap exists in the literature given the lack of robust empirical testing 
on the competitive effects of REAs. The purpose of this study is to identify 
those conditions under which REAs are likely to exhibit an anti-competitive
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effect and to fill some of the gap in the literature by providing empirical testing 
as to the likely competitive effects of REAs in the Australian context through 
measuring their impact on average capital city retail petrol prices as a proxy for 
their direct effect on capital city wholesale petrol markets.
1.2 Structure of the Thesis
This thesis has four parts:
1. Description of the downstream petroleum industry in Australia.
2. Review of the theoretical literature.
3. Testing and interpretation.
4. Conclusions.
1.2.1 An Outline of the Downstream Petroleum Industry in 
Australia
The first part contains one chapter, Chapter 2 entitled Downstream Petroleum 
Industry in Australia, which provides essential background and contextual 
information on the structure and operation of the downstream petroleum 
industry in Australia. It provides an examination of the characteristics of petrol 
as a product and describes the chain of production from the oil refinery to the 
motoring consumer. It also outlines the various regulatory interventions in 
petrol marketing in relation to market structure, price and taxation, as well as 
considers petrol pricing and competition issues. Chapter 2 will also provide 
information that will be used in the construction of data sets and modelling later 
on in the study.
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1.2.2 Review of Theoretical Literature
The second part contains three chapters reviewing the theoretical literature 
relating to two key generic features relevant to the problem, namely market 
power and reciprocity, as well as reviewing the specific literature where these 
come together within REAs.
The exercise of market power is a major issue of contention for the Australian 
downstream petroleum industry. Chapter 3, entitled Market Power, will 
examine academic literature relevant to the exercise of market power within the 
downstream petroleum industry. During the period of this study the Australian 
downstream petroleum industry displayed a high degree of vertical separation 
between the retail and wholesale sectors coupled with some vertical restraints. 
Chapter 3 will examine the literature pertaining to vertical price relationships 
with a particular focus on the downstream petroleum industry and will draw 
conclusions that will provide the theoretical underpinnings for the hypothesis 
testing carried out later in the study. Above the retail sector, the Australian 
downstream petroleum industry could be characterised as an oligopoly in that 
there are relatively few sellers. Chapter 3 will also review the theoretical 
literature pertaining to oligopoly and focus on the problems posed by the 
interdependency of market participants. It will identify those conditions as 
likely to be conducive for rival firms to behave in a co-operative manner 
towards one another, thus leading to tacit collusion and an anti-competitive 
outcome.
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REAs are an example of reciprocal trading agreements. Chapter 4, entitled 
Reciprocity, examines and critically reviews the theoretical literature pertaining 
to the competitive effects of reciprocity. It assesses the conditions under which 
reciprocity is likely to be pro-competitive and/or anti-competitive in order to 
draw out the possible implications for the competitive effects of REAs.
Chapter 5, entitled Refinery Exchange Agreements, examines and critically 
reviews the literature pertaining to the competitive effects of REAs. It assesses 
the various rationales put forward as to why REAs are either pro-competitive or 
anti-competitive and deduces whether they are robust or not.
1.2.3 Testing and Interpretation
The third part of this study consists of two chapters providing empirical testing 
of the hypotheses and the interpretation of the results.
Chapter 6, entitled Statistical Analysis and Modelling o f REAs, tests the null 
hypothesis that REAs have no effect on competition against two alternative 
hypotheses: namely, that REAs are either pro-competitive or anti-competitive. 
The hypothesis testing is conducted through testing for the price effect, if any, 
on average Australian capital city retail petrol prices arising from a before 
situation where REAs were in operation as compared to an after situation where 
they have been terminated as a proxy for the direct effect of REAs within 
wholesale markets. While the direct effect of REAs should be measured 
through their effect on wholesale prices, such wholesale price data is not 
generally available and it is contended that retail prices serve as an appropriate
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indicator for changes in the level of wholesale prices. The hypothesis testing 
will be conducted in two parts. In the first part, a comparison is made of before 
and after situations through testing for structural change using exploratory data 
analysis. In the second part, modelling is conducted using Box-Jenkins 
autoregressive integrated moving average methodology coupled with Box and 
Tiao intervention analysis in order to quantify the impact of any structural 
change associated with the termination of REAs.
Chapter 7, entitled Interpretation, interprets the results of the modelling 
conducted in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 makes observations regarding the pattern 
and nature of competition within the capital city wholesale petrol markets 
considered as well as inteiprets the impact of certain events and various 
regulatory interventions. Finally, Chapter 7 makes findings on the likely 
competitive effects that REAs have had on the various capital city wholesale 
petrol markets considered.
1.2.4 Conclusions
The fourth part contains Chapter 8 entitled Conclusion, which draws out the 
main implications for the conduct of public policy in relation to the downstream 
petroleum industry. It considers the implications of further regulatory 
intervention in capital city wholesale petrol markets. It also considers the 
competitive effects of reciprocity as practised through REAs and their 
implications for the structure of competition law in Australia. Further, it 
examines the role played by the Australian competition law enforcement 
authority in the public debate over the competitive effects of REAs and
5
determines whether such conduct was appropriate. Finally, it makes 
recommendations on the future direction of public policy in relation to REAs.
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Chapter 2: Downstream Petroleum Industry in 
Australia
2.1 Introduction
This Chapter provides background information on the structure and 
operation of the downstream petroleum industry in Australia. It examines 
the characteristics of petrol as a product and describes the chain of 
production from the oil refinery to the motoring consumer. It also outlines 
the various regulatory interventions in petrol marketing in relation to market 
structure, price and taxation, as well as considers petrol pricing and 
competition issues.
This Chapter will demonstrate that petrol is a homogeneous product and that 
price is the main dimension upon which participants compete in the 
Australian downstream petroleum industry. This will provide the basis for 
the method that will be used for the empirical testing conducted in Chapter 6 
as to the competitive effects of REAs. This Chapter will also outline 
information that will be used in the construction of data sets and modelling 
in Chapter 6.
This Chapter will also demonstrate that competition and pricing practices 
are a major concern for the Australian downstream petroleum industry.
2.2 Petrol
This study will focus on the wholesaling and retailing of unleaded petrol.1 
Petrol is not a product that is purchased as an end in itself, but as an
1 Also known as unleaded motor spirit and referred to as gasoline overseas.
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essential input in providing motor vehicle transportation.2 While there are 
substitute products available for petrol, such as liquid petroleum gas (LPG) 
and automotive distillate (diesel), any vehicles using these substitute 
products either have to be purchased with engines compatible with these 
fuels or have to be converted over so that they can operate on such fuels.
Petrol is a product that is generally considered to be inelastic with regard to 
price in that the quantity demanded responds less than proportionately to 
changes in price. A demand function for unleaded petrol estimated for 
Australia between May 1998 and September 2006 based on monthly data as 
part of this study suggests that the short-term price elasticity of demand is 
extremely low at around -0.12, while the long-run price elasticity of demand 
is somewhat higher at -0.38. In other words, the price elasticity of petrol 
increases over time as consumers are able to respond to price incentives 
presented to them over a sustained period through possibly improvements in 
technology related to passenger motor vehicles and/or changes in behaviour. 
Full details on the demand function for unleaded petrol estimated for 
Australia is provided in Appendix 1.
In the 2005-06 financial year, 19,048 megalitres of petrol was consumed in 
Australia. The recent Australian consumption of petrol on a financial year 
basis is provided in table 1 below.
Lowe, J. F. (1976) Competition in the U.K. Retail Petrol Market 1960-73. The Journal o f  
Industrial Economics XXIV, 203-219, p. 204.
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Table 1: Australian Consumption of Petrol
Financial Year Petrol Consumption 
in Megalitres*
1997-98 17,950
1998-99 18,230
1999-00 18,477
2000-01 18,168
2001-02 18,669
2002-03 18,872
2003-04 19,962
2004-05 19,876
2005-06 19,048
Source: Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (2005) Australian 
Commodity Statistics 2005. Canberra; Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics (2006) Australian Commodity Statistics 2006. Canberra.
* Figures include unleaded petrol, petrol containing lead, and lead replacement petrol.
The upstream petroleum industry refers to activities involved in the 
exploration and production of crude oil, whereas the downstream petroleum 
industry refers to the production chain process whereby crude oil is 
converted into products that are eventually supplied to motoring consumers. 
The downstream petroleum industry can be separated into three functional 
levels: refining; distribution and wholesale; and retailing. Each of the 
downstream petroleum industry’s functional levels will be outlined in turn.
2.3 Oil Refining
2.3.1 The Refining Process
Crude oil is an amalgam of many different types of hydrocarbons. 
Hydrocarbons are molecules that contain hydrogen and carbon that come in 
various different lengths and structures; they are useful molecules because 
they contain a lot of energy.
The refining of crude oil involves the separation of crude oil into different 
categories of hydrocarbons, also known as fractions. Therefore, oil refining 
is a joint production process whereby several products are manufactured 
simultaneously. The products manufactured during the refining process
9
include petrol, diesel, aviation turbine fuel, fuel oil, and a number of other 
derivative products.
Different hydrocarbons have different boiling points which allows crude oil 
to be separated into different fractions through distillation. The primary 
refining process commences when crude oil is heated under vacuum 
conditions until it evaporates whereby the vapour flows into a distillation 
tower where it condenses in various stages, with the most volatile or lighter 
fractions condensing at the top, intermediate fractions condensing at lower 
levels, and the heaviest fractions settling near the bottom.3 In order to 
increase the yield of higher value products such as petrol from a given 
quantity of crude oil, further chemical processing of other fractions is 
required. The greater a refinery’s yield of petrol and other higher value 
added products is, the greater will be the refinery’s capital costs.
There are three main chemical processes used in Australia through which 
refineries are able to increase their yield of petrol. One process is known as 
naphtha reforming (also known as unification), whereby the smaller 
hydrocarbons contained in naphtha are combined in the presence of a 
catalyst in order to produce the larger hydrocarbons of petrol.
Another process, which is known as fluid catalytic cracking, is where the
larger hydrocarbons of gas oil are heated in the presence of a catalyst and
broken down into smaller hydrocarbons such as diesel and petrol. Similar to
fluid catalytic cracking, hydrocracking heats heavy oil in the presence of a
catalyst and hydrogen gas to convert it into petrol and kerosene.
3 Scherer, F. M. (1996) Industry Structure, Strategy, and Public Policy. HarperCollins 
College Publishers, New York, p. 113.
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In order to remove impurities from the various fractions, such as sulphur, 
further chemical processing must be undertaken that adds to a refinery’s 
capital costs. In order to remove more impurities further capital investment 
in Australian refineries was made necessary by the Commonwealth 
Government’s clean fuel agenda that introduced new fuel standards for 
petrol and diesel, the first part of which was announced in July 2001 and the 
second part announced in July 2004. These standards will be introduced 
progressively between 2002 and 2009. It is estimated that an investment of 
more than $2 billion in capital upgrades will be necessary in order for 
Australian refineries to comply with these new fuel standards.4
2.3.2 Refining in Australia
Within the time period under consideration in this study there were eight 
major oil refineries operating within the vicinity of five capital cities run by 
four refining companies being Caltex Oil Australia Pty Ltd (Caltex), BP 
Australia Ltd (BP), Mobil Oil Australia Ltd (Mobil), and The Shell 
Company of Australia Ltd (Shell). With the exception of Caltex, the other 
three oil refiners are wholly owned subsidiaries of multinational oil 
companies: the United Kingdom based BP PLC; the United States (US) 
based ExxonMobil Corporation; and the Anglo-Dutch Royal Dutch Shell 
Group. Caltex is an Australian public company that is listed on the 
Australian Stock Exchange with a 50 per cent interest ultimately held by US 
based multinational oil company ChevronTexaco Corporation. The four 
Australian oil refiners are fully vertically integrated downstream, also 
operating in distribution and wholesale, and retailing sectors. The four
4 Campbell, I. (2005) Massive Investment in clean diesel for WA. Media Release, 
Australian Minister for the Environment and Heritage, 2 September.
1 1
vertically integrated refiners are collectively referred to as the oil majors 
and are also known as the refiner/marketers.
Oil refining in Australia has undergone significant rationalisation and has 
become more heavily concentrated since 1980, which has led to eight 
refining companies operating ten refineries contract down to four refining 
companies operating seven refineries (an eighth refinery in Port Stanvac 
was mothballed in 2003).5 In 1982, French refining company Total exited 
Australia, selling its refining and distribution assets to Ampol. In 1984, 
Ampol closed down the former Total refinery located at Matraville in 
Sydney. In 1984, BP acquired the Bulwer Island refinery in Brisbane from 
US refining company Amoco along with its distribution and retailing assets. 
In 1985, BP closed its Westemport refinery near Melbourne. In 1990, Mobil 
acquired the downstream assets of Esso (a subsidiary company of US 
refining company Exxon), and took ownership of the remaining 35 per cent 
interest in the Port Stanvac and Altona refineries that it didn’t already own. 
In 1995 Ampol and Caltex reached an agreement to merge the two 
companies.
The ownership, location, and primary production capacity of the eight 
refineries operating in Australia between 1997 and 2003 are outlined in 
table 2 below.
5 It could be argued that Australia had a ninth refiner in H. C. Sleigh who marketed 
themselves under the Golden Fleece banner. While H C Sleigh did not refine petrol as such, 
it did own a 25 per cent stake in the Kumell lubricating oil refinery in 1980 that was 
majority owned by Caltex. In 1981, H. C. Sleigh sold its petroleum interests to Caltex.
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Table 2: Ownership, Location and Primary Production Capacity of Australian 
Refineries 2003 ______________________________________
Oil Major Location Production Capacity 
in Barrels Per Day (bpd)
Ampol/Caltex Lytton (Brisbane) 105,500
Kumell (Sydney) 124,500
BP Bulwer Island (Brisbane) 88,000
Kwinana (near Perth) 138,500
Mobil Altona (Melbourne) 135,000
Port Stanvac (near Adelaide) 78,000
Shell Clyde(Sydney) 86,000
Geelong (near Melbourne) 119,000
Source: Australian Institute of Petroleum (2003) Downstream Petroleum 2003. Canberra, 
p. 5.
Australian refineries are considered to be relatively small by world 
standards with eight refineries having a total production capacity of 874,500 
barrels per day (bpd). By way of comparison in Singapore, which is the 
major refining centre closest to Australia, there are three major oil refineries 
that have a total production capacity of 1.3 million bpd: ExxonMobil’s 
605,000 bpd refinery; Royal Dutch Shell’s 458,000 bpd refinery; and the 
Singapore Refining Corporation’s 273,000 bpd refinery/1
The Australian refinery industry has been built around supplying virtually 
all domestic demand through a nationwide network of fuel distribution and 
retailing, with the exception of the Northern Territory which usually has 
product imported in from Singapore.6 7 Australian production of petrol is 
provided in table 3 below.
6 Energy Information Administration, United States Department of Energy (2005) 
Singapore Country Analysis Brief. Washington DC. http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs 
/singapor.html [Accessed 16 February' 2006]
7 Department of Industry, Tourism, and Resources (2002) Downstream Petroleum Industry 
Framework 2002. Canberra, p. 5.
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Table 3: Australian Production of Petrol
Financial Year Petrol Production 
in Megalitres*
1997-98 18,589
1998-99 18,705
1999-00 18,652
2000-01 17,887
2001-02 18,000
2002-03 17,984
2003-04 17,375
2004-05 17,913
2005-06 16,528
Source: Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (2005) Australian 
Commodity Statistics 2005. Canberra; Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics (2006) Australian Commodity Statistics 2006. Canberra.
* Figures include unleaded petrol, petrol containing lead, and lead replacement petrol.
All eight Australian oil refineries possessed distillation and naphtha 
reforming capacity. The only oil refinery without the capacity to undertake
fluid catalytic cracking was Port Stanvac, while the only refinery with the
capacity to undertake hydrocracking was Bulwer Island.
Oil refining is subject to large economies of scale (as well as scope) as 
capital costs rise less than proportionately with capacity. Scherer has 
estimated that refineries need a production capacity of 200,000 bpd in order 
to reach the minimum efficient scale.8 9
According to the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(ACCC), the relatively small size of domestic demand for petroleum 
products combined with the need to achieve economies of scale in 
production, assist to explain the high level of concentration in the Australian 
refining sector.10
8 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (1996) Inquiry into the Petroleum 
Products Declaration. Vol. 1, Main Report, AGPS, Canberra, p. 8.
9 Scherer, F. M., op.cit., p. 114.
10 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, op.cit., p. 8.
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In April 2003, Mobil announced that it would be ceasing operations at its 
Port Stanvac refinery and would mothball the refinery. Mobil attributed the 
closure to the fact that the refinery was incurring financial losses on its 
operations and that it couldn’t compete against larger refineries in the Asia 
Pacific region.11 The production of petrol and other fuels at the Port Stanvac 
refinery ceased in early June 2003.12
2.4 Distribution and Wholesale
Petrol in Australia is either sourced from domestic refining operations of the 
oil majors or from imports.
2.4.1 Distribution and Wholesale by the Oil Majors
The oil majors operate wholly owned wholesale or distribution companies
separate from their refining operations through which they distribute 
product to petroleum retailers. The distribution companies of the oil majors 
typically supply their own branded retail service station site network as well 
as other customers in the major metropolitan areas.
Traditionally, the oil majors used to gain access to petrol supply in states 
where they did not possess a refinery through REAs. REAs were negotiated 
on a six month basis whereby product was exchanged between oil majors on 
a litre-for-litre basis. Under the refinery exchange agreement system, an oil 
major could be supplied in a location remote from their refinery network at 
essentially their own cost of production without incurring the significant 
cost of transporting petrol from their own refinery.
11 Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd (2003) Adelaide Refinery. Media Release, 8 April.
12 Byers, D. W. (2003) Letter to the Editor. The Advertiser, Public Affairs Manager, Mobil 
Oil Australia, 14 August: 17.
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From 1 January 2000, REAs in respect of the Mobil Port Stanvac refinery 
located near Adelaide were terminated.13 Prior to 2000, Mobil had entered 
into REAs with each of the other three domestic refiners in regard to the 
Port Stanvac refinery.
According to Mobil, the company had sought to change its refinery 
exchange arrangements from a volume-for-volume basis to a buy-sell 
arrangement under an established price.14 Mobil contended that this new 
arrangement would have more appropriately reflected the Port Stanvac 
refinery’s cost structure.15
Shell and BP rejected Mobil’s revised agreement offer in regard to Port 
Stanvac “because [product] was being offered at a higher price than the rate 
at which they could ship in their own product from interstate”.16 A Shell 
company spokesperson commented on the revised Mobil offer for a refinery 
exchange agreement for the Port Stanvac refinery that:
If an oil company can ship its product in for less than Mobil are 
offering theirs for, you have to wonder just how competitive it was 
and why we would buy it off them. It was Mobil that terminated the 
normal industry refinery exchange of fuels between states and oil 
companies.17
This decision by Mobil resulted in two of the other three domestic refiners 
in Shell and BP deciding to source their product needs for Adelaide from
13 The Australian Financial Review> (1999) Government throws refiners a lifeline. 3 
December: 58; The Australian Financial Review (1999) Mobil to halve Port Stanvac 
Production. 30 December: 3.
14 Platts Oilgram News (2000) Mobil Australia to Slice Runs After Swaps Dispute. 3 
January: 1.
15 ibid.
16 The Advertiser (2000) Oil Change. 4 March: 61.
17 ibid.
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their refineries located interstate. In the case of BP from the Kwinana 
refinery, and in Shell’s case from their Geelong refinery. Only Caltex 
decided to continue supply arrangements with Mobil from the Port Stanvac 
refinery. In the aftermath of the breakdown of REAs in regard to the Port 
Stanvac refinery, Mobil cut its production at the Port Stanvac refinery back
1 Rto 60 per cent of capacity.
The termination of REAs in regard to the Port Stanvac refinery had a 
minimal impact on the operation of REAs in the other capital cities. It is 
reported that Mobil replaced its lost volumes in New South Wales with the 
10 per cent of production normally exported overseas from its Altona 
refinery in Melbourne, while Mobil intended to seek product supply in 
Western Australia through imports.19
The termination of REAs across Australia was prompted by the decision of 
BP to inform the other three domestic refiners that it was withdrawing from 
existing REAs as from 1 July 2002. The refinery exchange system was 
replaced with transactions occurring on purely commercial terms, known as 
buy-sell arrangements. Similar to REAs, buy-sell arrangements are 
commercially negotiated every six months on a bilateral arms-length basis 
between each of the oil majors. The sell part of the buy-sell arrangements 
is relevant to states where the oil majors have refineries and sell to other oil
18 Oil & Gas Journal (2000) Industry Briefs. 17 January: 27; Reuters Wire Senice  (2000) 
Diary -  Asian Oil Refinery Maintenance 2000. 28 June.
19 Platts Oil gram News, op.cit., p. 1.
20 Caltex Australia Limited (2006) Caltex submission to Senate Economics Legislation 
Committee Inquiry into the Price o f Petrol in Australia. Sydney, p. 8.
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majors; the buy part is relevant where the oil majors have no refineries and 
must purchase from local refiners.21
The abandonment of the refinery exchange agreement system was preceded 
by the departure from producing uniform grades of petrol across all states.22 
Product standards for petrol were legislated in Western Australia, 
Queensland, and South Australia which exceeded the then Australian 
standard which were related to the output capabilities of the refineries 
operating in those respective states.21
Similar to REAs, the oil majors also used to operate borrow and loan 
arrangements which involved the provision of product from another 
refiner’s storage over a shorter term than REAs.24 The ACCC identified 
three types of borrow and loan arrangements:
•  Permanent where a refiner possessed no facilities in a region but 
obtained ongoing drawing rights from another refiner’s tanks;
• Temporary where a refiner had storage facilities but due to maintenance 
programs or structural changes, experienced shortages; and
• Emergency or spot when there were unforeseen interruptions or 
shortfalls in supply.25
According to the Commonwealth Government Department of Industry, 
Tourism and Resources, borrow and loan arrangements supported the
21 ibid., p. 8.
22 Consumer Affairs Victoria (2003) Report on Terminal Gate Pricing in Victoria. 
Melbourne, p. 11.
23 ibid., p. 11.
4 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, op.cit., p. xiii.
2;> ibid., p. 24.
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refinery exchange agreement system through evening out any imbalances 
that occurred in the exchanges over time.
In regional areas the oil majors often supply petroleum products through 
distributors who are the primary source of petrol supply to retailers outside 
of the metropolitan area. It is estimated that distributors are responsible for
27some 85 per cent of total petroleum product sales in country areas. 
Distributors typically operate a central storage depot with satellite depots 
and a fleet of tanker trucks. It was estimated there were 140 distributors 
operating in Australia in June 2003, down from approximately 300 in 
1998.29
There are sometimes formal vertical linkages between oil majors and 
distributors, with oil majors often maintaining an equity interest in a 
distributor or entering into a franchise agreement with a distributor. In 
addition, there are independent distributors who may source product from 
the oil majors on either a term/volume supply arrangement or on a spot sale 
basis.30
The oil majors occasionally require imports in order to supplement their 
refinery production during periods of refinery maintenance and shutdown. 31 
The oil majors operate import terminals around the Australian mainland as 
well as in Tasmania.
26 Department of Industry, Tourism, and Resources, op.cit., p. 22.
27 Australian Petroleum Agents and Distributors Association. Membership Profile. 
http://www.apada.com.au/index.html [Accessed 26 March 2006]
28 Department of Industry, Tourism, and Resources, op.cit., p. 7.
29 ibid., p. 7.
30 Walker, J. and Woodward, L. (1996) The Ampol /Caltex Australia Merger: Trade 
Practices Issues. Trade Practices Law Journal 4, March, 21-44, p. 24.
31 Department of Industry, Tourism, and Resources, op.cit., p. 7.
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The oil majors have also entered into a number of bilateral and multilateral 
terminal sharing arrangements between each other around Australia. Joint 
terminalling arrangements between the oil majors have enabled them to 
lower their fuel distribution costs through the sharing of both capital and 
operating costs.32
2.4.2 Distribution and Wholesaling by Independents
The term independent is generally used to refer to market participants that
are not vertically integrated all the way from refining into retailing. In other 
words, any market participants who are not oil majors.
Petroleum products have been imported into Australia by independent 
importers. There are four terminal facilities within the vicinity of Australian 
capital cities that are available for the independent import of petrol. Details 
of the operator, location, and storage capacity of these independent terminal 
facilities is provided below in table 4.
Table 4: Independent Import Terminals
Operator and Location Tank Capacity (megalitres 
in 000’s)
Maximum Import 
Cargo Size
Van Ommeren / VOPAK
Port Botany
Sydney
100 (76 available for petrol) 80
Wickland / Van Ommeren 
/ VOPAK / Trafigura 
Hastings Point 
(near Melbourne)
70 (60 available for petrol) 30
Terminals West (Gull 
Petroleum)
Kwinana 
(near Perth)
58 (53 available for petrol) 30
Fletcher Challenge / 
Neumann Petroleum 
Brisbane
43 (13 available for petrol) 15
Source: Department of Industry, Science, and Resources (1999) Downstream Petroleum 
Products Action Agenda. Canberra, p. 30.
32 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, op.cit., p. 26.
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In 1995, Dutch company Van Ommeren commenced work on constructing a 
petroleum products storage facility in Sydney on Botany Bay. The Sydney 
independent import terminal was opened in September 1996. Ownership of 
the Sydney independent terminal was transferred to VOPAK following the 
merger between Dutch companies Royal Pakhoed and Royal Van Ommeren 
(the parent company of Van Ommeren) to form VOPAK. in March 1998.
The independent import terminal at Hastings near Melbourne was bought by 
US company Wickland Oil (Wickland) from Australian interests in 1995. In 
April 1997, Van Ommeren reached an agreement with Wickland to acquire 
the Hastings terminal. In mid-2001, VOPAK sold the Hastings terminal to 
Trafigura Fuels Australia (Trafigura).
The independent import terminal in Brisbane was previously owned by 
Caltex but was sold to New Zealand conglomerate Fletcher Challenge 
Energy (FCE) in 1996 as part of the undertakings provided to the Trade 
Practices Commission (TPC) for allowing the 1995 merger between Ampol 
and Caltex to proceed. The Neumann Petroleum Group purchased the 
Brisbane independent import terminal from Rubicon, a company formed 
from a spin-off of FCE, in June 2001.
In Western Australia, Terminals West is a fully owned subsidiary of Gull 
Petroleum. Despite owning a terminal, Western Australia’s restrictive fuel 
specifications have precluded Gull Petroleum from importing petrol since
33 The Trade Practices Commission was the predecessor organisation to the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission as Australia’s competition law enforcement 
agency.
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the beginning of 2000 and it sources product from BP’s Kwinana refinery 
for its wholesaling operations.
There have been several major independent wholesalers operating around 
mainland Australia.
On the east coast of Australia, Burmah Fuels previously operated a major 
wholesaling business, importing fuel from overseas through the Sydney and 
Hastings independent import terminal to supply the Sydney and Melbourne 
wholesale markets. The Burmah Fuels wholesaling operation was sold to 
Trafigura in May 2000.
Trafigura used the independent import terminals in Sydney and Hastings in 
order to import petrol from overseas to supply the Sydney and Melbourne 
wholesale markets. Trafigura supplied Woolworths Limited (Woolworths) 
in New South Wales and Victoria and was a partial supplier to convenience 
store operator 7-Eleven.
Under the Commonwealth Government’s fuel standards announced in July 
2001, the levels of methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) and olefins allowed 
in petrol were limited as from 1 January 2004. The level of MTBE allowed 
in petrol was limited to 1 per cent by volume, while the level of olefins was 
limited to an 18 per cent six month pool average with an absolute cap of 20 
per cent. The imposition of these new fuel standards made the business of 
importing petrol from overseas more difficult as while Australian refineries 
did not use MTBE, it was commonly used in Asian refineries.
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The ACCC noted in August 2004, that concern over access to fuel supplies 
arising from the introduction of tighter fuel standards by state and 
Commonwealth governments had a noted impact on the business of 
independent importers. Major independent retail chains changed their 
supply arrangements and sought longer term contracts with domestic 
refiners in order to ensure security of supply, thus making independent 
imports less viable.34
With the implementation of new fuel standards, Trafigura lost Woolworths 
as a customer as Woolworths sought improved security of supply through 
entering into a joint venture with Australian refiner Caltex. However, 
Trafigura continues to wholesale petrol and other petroleum products along 
the Australian eastern seaboard, supplying product from terminals in New 
South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, and South Australia, although it lost its 
lease to use the independent import terminal in Sydney at the end of August 
2004.
Liberty Oil (Liberty) continues to wholesale petrol to retailers in all states 
and territories despite withdrawing from petrol retailing. United Petroleum 
wholesales petrol to retailers in New South Wales, Victoria, South 
Australia, Queensland, and the Australian Capital Territory. Neumann 
Petroleum and Matilda Fuels wholesales petrol to retailers in the south east 
comer of Queensland and northern New South Wales.
34 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2004) No ACCC action over Vopak 
Port Botany lease. Media Release, 24 August.
23
2.5 Retailing
2.5.1 Categories of Retailers
Since 1970, the number of retail service station outlets has been in steady 
decline. In 1970, there were 20,000 retail service station outlets in Australia; 
by 2004, there were an estimated 6,649 retail service station outlets.
There are several different types of retail service station outlets operating in 
Australia:
• Company operated sites, whereby the site is directly operated by 
company employees.
• Commission-agent (CA) sites are owned and operated by oil majors and 
independent chains. CA sites sell branded petrol at a price set by their 
fuel supplier and the operator will usually receive a fixed commission on 
petrol sales.35
• Franchise sites, whereby the franchisee has a formal contractual 
arrangement with the franchisor, usually being either an oil major or an 
independent, generally purchasing fuel at a wholesale price. The 
majority of sites owned by the oil majors during the period of this study 
were primarily operated through franchise arrangements. While 
franchise agreements were originally negotiated with an individual on a 
single site basis, there has been a shift to franchisees covering a number
36of sites which is known as multi-site franchising.
35 Department of Industry, Tourism, and Resources, op.cit., p. 8.
36 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2001) Reducing Fuel Price 
Variability. Canberra, p. 37.
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• Dealer-owned sites, whereby the operator usually enters into an 
agreement with a supplier to earry a supplier’s brand although they can 
also be unbranded. Suppliers to such sites can be either oil majors or 
independent wholesalers.
• Distributor sites, whereby petroleum product distributors own and 
operate retail service station sites. These sites are more common in 
country areas and may carry the branding of an oil major, own branding, 
or no branding.37
• Supermarket sites, whereby supermarket chains have entered into petrol 
retailing.
Table 5 below provides a breakdown over time of the number of retail 
service station sites operating in Australia.
Table 5: Estimate of the Number of Retail Service Station Sites
Type of Service 
Station
1993 1998 2000 2004
Oil Major 
Company 
operated or 
Commission 
Agent
299 316 296 316
Oil Major 
Franchisee
3618 2497 2019 958
Other - Oil Major 
Branded
4899 4856 5047 3895
Independent
Chains
267 479 659 608
Supermarkets - 85 156 872
Sources: Industry Commission (1994) Petroleum Products. AGPS, Melbourne, Report 
No.40, p. 9; Senate Economics Committee (2001) Inquiry into the provisions o f the Fair 
Prices fo r All (Petroleum) Bill 1999 and the practice o f multi-site franchising by oil 
companies. Canberra, p. 10; Australia Institute of Petroleum (2006) Submission to the 
Inquiry into Future Oil Supply and Alternate Transport Fuels. Canberra, p. 18.
37 Department of Industry, Tourism, and Resources, op.cit., p. 9.
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2.5.2 Retail Networks of the Oil Majors and Independents
The four oil majors dominate the retailing of petrol in Australia. It is
estimated that around 90 per cent of retail service station sites in Australia at 
the end of 2000 were part of the branded network of the oil majors. The 
franchisees of the oil majors have tied supply arrangements whereby they 
are required to purchase all of their fuel from their oil major franchisor.
Independent retailers and retail chains refer to retail market participants that 
are not vertically integrated all the way back to the refining stage.
Independent chains such as Burmah Fuels, Liberty, Gull Petroleum, 
Neumann Petroleum and Matilda Fuels, have mainly operated retail service 
station sites located in capital cities and larger regional towns.
Burmah Fuels operated a network of around 120 retail service station sites, 
but exited from retailing during 2000. Burmah Fuels sold 53 retail service 
station sites in Victoria, New South Wales, and Queensland to convenience 
store operator 7-Eleven. While some Burmah Fuels retail service station 
sites were eventually picked up by BP as part of the worldwide acquisition 
of Burmah Fuels’ parent company, Burmah Castrol PTE, the balance of the 
remaining Burmah Fuels’ retail service station sites were sold to other 
parties unrelated to the oil majors.
Convenience chain store operator 7-Eleven had built up a retail network of 
92 convenience stores that were also engaged in petrol retailing in the 
Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane metropolitan areas by 2000. This number 
increased to 145 sites when 7-Eleven picked up 53 retail service station sites 
from Burmah Fuels in August 2000.
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The Liberty chain of retail service stations was established in 1995 and 
operated in New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, 
Western Australia, and Tasmania. In July 2001, Woolworths announced that 
it had entered into an agreement with Liberty to lease 69 Liberty retail 
service station outlets with these sites converted over to Woolworths’ Plus 
Petrol branded sites. While Liberty exited from petrol retailing, its brand 
name is still carried by dealer owned sites and Liberty continues to operate 
as a fuel wholesaler.
Gull Petroleum operates over 70 retail service station sites across Western 
Australia, with over 30 sites located within the Perth metropolitan area. 
Matilda Fuels operates in the Brisbane metropolitan and surrounding areas 
and operates from around 45 retail service station sites. Similarly, Neumann 
Petroleum operates from around 44 retail service station sites located 
throughout southeast Queensland and northern New South Wales.
Woolworths commenced petrol retailing by opening its first Woolworths 
Plus Petrol branded retail service station site in Dubbo in 1996. Woolworths 
steadily expanded its petrol retailing operation and by the end of June 2001 
had opened 166 retail service station sites around Australia. Woolworths’ 
originally announced a petrol pricing policy to match the lowest petrol price 
within a 3 km radius of a Woolworths Plus Petrol retail service station site, 
with consumers receiving a discount docket to access a 2 cents per litre (cpl) 
discount off their petrol purchase if they had spent at least $30 in any 
Woolworths supermarket or Big W store. Discounts on the retail price of
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petrol offered in this manner have become known as shopper docket 
schemes.
In August 2003, Woolworths and Caltex announced plans for the 
establishment of a 50/50 retailing joint venture. Under this arrangement, a 
joint venture company (JVC) would be created to lease all of the 
Woolworths’ Plus Petrol service station outlets, along with Caltex adding 
initially another 120 retail service station sites across Australia, with a 
further 40 Caltex retail service station sites to be added at a later stage. It 
was intended that the JVC would eventually build up its network to around 
450 retail service station sites across Australia.
In May 2003, Coles Myer Ltd (Coles) and Shell announced that they had 
entered into a commercial alliance in regard to the retailing of petrol. Under 
this arrangement, Coles became the operator of Shell’s core retail property 
network of 584 retail service station sites. The alliance began in Victoria in 
late July 2003, with Coles taking over the operation of 151 Shell retail 
service station outlets. At the commercial alliance retail service station sites, 
Coles grocery or liquor customers who spent $30 or more receive a discount 
docket with an offer to get 4 cpl off their next petrol purchase, similar to the 
petrol discount offer provided by Woolworths. Possibly in response to the 
alliance offer, Woolworths increased its petrol discount offer from 2 cpl to 4 
cpl to customers who spent $30 or more in Woolworths or Big W stores.
It is not uncommon for suppliers to provide financial support for retail 
service station operators to compensate them in full or in part for revenue
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shortfalls during periods of petrol price discounting.38 Such financial 
support is known as price support and is usually provided on a lagged 
basis.39 Price support is most commonly provided to the franchisees of the 
oil majors.
2.5.3 Legislative Controls and Codes of Conduct Governing 
Retailing
As a result of a lengthy history of disputation between the oil majors and 
retail service station operators, Commonwealth Government legislation was 
enacted along with a voluntary code of practice for mediating disputes 
between oil majors and retail service station operators, in particular 
franchisees.
There were two pieces of Commonwealth Government legislation that 
impacted on how the oil majors conducted their retailing operations. This 
legislation was introduced to address problems identified by the Royal 
Commission on petroleum conducted in the mid-1970s, including a lack of 
price competition between oil companies at the retail level, insecurity of 
tenure for leasees of oil company owned retail service station sites, and 
dissatisfaction on the part of retailers in regard to wholesale pricing 
arrangements with numerous complaints that oil companies engaged in price 
discrimination against retailers.40
The Petroleum Retailing Marketing Sites Act 1980 (Sites Act) limited the 
number of retail service station sites that an oil major could directly own
38 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Inquiry into the Petroleum Products 
Declaration, Vol. 1, p. xvi.
39 ibid., p. xvi.
40 Royal Commission on Petroleum (1976) Fourth Report: The Marketing and Pricing of 
Petroleum Products in Australia. AGPS, Canberra.
29
and operate. The Sites Act was a policy attempt to curtail the extent of 
vertical integration in the downstream petroleum industry through partial 
divorcement of oil refiners from retailing activities. It was considered to be 
partial divorcement as the oil majors were not compelled to divest 
themselves entirely of retail service station sites, only to relinquish control 
through leasing out the sites.
The underlying philosophy behind the Sites Act was that vertical integration 
in the retailing of petroleum products was anti-competitive. According to 
the Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources:
The Sites Act promotes competition in the retail petroleum market 
by encouraging diversity at the retail level and assisting the 
continuance of a viable, vigorous and competitive small business 
sector in the retail petroleum industry.41
The Sites Act operated through the allocation of a quota of retail service 
station sites that each oil major could operate based on average wholesale 
market share.42 The quotas imposed on the four oil majors is provided below 
in table 6.
Table 6: Quota Allocations of Retail Service Station Sites under the Petroleum Retail 
Marketing Sites Act 1980___________________________
Oil Major Quota
Caltex Australia Ltd 136
BP Australia Ltd 87
Mobil Oil Australia Ltd 87
The Shell Company of Australia Ltd 114
Source: Department of Industry, Tourism, and Resources (2002) Downstream Petroleum 
Industry Framework 2002. Canberra, p. 9.
41 Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources (2002) User Guide to the Petroleum 
Retail Marketing Sites Act 1980. Canberra, p. 1.
42 ibid., p. 9.
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Retail service station sites were exempted from the application of the Sites 
Act if an oil major operated them for four months or less, sold only diesel, 
or if the equity of an oil major in a site was 50 per cent or less.
The oil majors responded to the restrictions imposed upon them under the 
Sites Act through single site and multi-site franchising arrangements.
In terms of trying to limit the involvement of the oil majors in petrol 
retailing, the Sites Act was assessed as a policy failure by the ACCC:
It is doubtful whether the Sites Act constrains oil major involvement 
in the retail sector as this can be achieved through other vertical 
arrangements. The oil majors have used franchising and 100 per cent 
ties to achieve the control at the retail level which the Sites Act 
sought to prevent.43
The Petroleum Retail Marketing Franchise Act 1980 (Franchise Act) set 
minimum conditions regarding the contractual arrangements between 
franchisee retail service station operators and the companies supplying their 
fuel (franchisors). According to Grace, the Franchise Act sought to address 
perceived inequality in the bargaining position between the oil major 
franchisors in relation to their franchisees.44
The Franchise Act applied to all franchise agreements covering retail 
service station sites trading under a supplier’s brand which sold over 
360,000 litres of petrol per year. Because of restrictions imposed on the 
number of retail service station sites that an oil major could operate under
44 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Inquiry into the Petroleum Products 
Declaration, Vol. 1, p. 34.
44 Grace, J. G. (1992) An Overview of Legislation Controlling the Retailing of Petroleum 
Within Australia: Part II. Australian Business Law Review 20, 7-30, p. 20.
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the Sites Act, the Franchise Act was mostly applicable to the oil majors, 
although it did cover all franchise arrangements.
The minimum conditions imposed under the Franchise Act were:
• All information known by the franchisor relevant to the making of an 
informed decision should be provided to the franchisee at least three 
days prior to the franchisee entering the agreement;
• Tenure of three years with two further three-year terms at the option of 
the franchisee (in effect a nine-year term);
• The right to assign and appropriate goodwill;
• Franchisors should not impose unreasonable terms, including increasing 
rents or withdrawing rebates; and
• Price discrimination between like-branded franchisees is prohibited, 
except where the price difference can be justified by differences in the 
costs of supply or the need to meet competition.45
There is also state government legislation that imposes regulation on the 
retailing of petrol throughout Australia. In South Australia, the Motor Fuel 
Distribution Act 1973 requires that all retailers of petrol are licensed. The 
South Australian Retail Outlet Board makes recommendations to the 
relevant South Australian Minister as to whether or not retail sales of motor 
fuel will be authorised from a particular site. The South Australian
45 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Inquiry into the Petroleum Products 
Declaration, Vol. 1, p. 39.
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legislation restricts the entry of new sellers into petrol retailing if their entry 
would provide unfair and unreasonable competition for existing retailers.46
Within the Australian Capital Territory, the Territory Government has 
exercised strong planning controls over the number and location of retail 
service station sites. Local government can also exercise town planning 
controls that can dictate where retail service station sites can be located.
In 1989, the TPC negotiated with oil companies, distributors and retailers 
and reached agreement on a code of conduct for the industry, known as 
Oilcode. The aim of the Oilcode was to reduce the bitter disputes and costly 
court cases that had occurred between oil company franchisors and their 
franchisees.47
Oilcode aimed to provide fair and reasonable conduct in relation to supply 
agreements and for the conciliation of disputes between the oil majors, 
distributors and retailers. It was administered by a committee, the Oil 
Industry Code of Practice Administration Committee (OICPAC). OICPAC 
was comprised of two representatives of the Australian Institute of 
Petroleum (AIP) representing the oil majors, two representatives of the 
Australian Petroleum Agents and Distributors Association (APADA) 
representing distributors, and two representatives of the Motor Trades 
Association of Australia (MTAA) representing retailers, with observers 
from the TPC/ACCC and the Department of Industry, Science and 
Resources.
46 National Competition Council (2001) 2001 NCP assessment. Melbourne, p. 21.10.
47 Grace, J. G., op.cit., p. 27.
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If disputes were unable to be resolved through the conciliation processes 
allowed for under the Oilcode, then parties were still able to pursue matters 
under common law, the Franchise Act, or the unconscionable conduct 
provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (TPA).48
The Commonwealth Government announced in March 2006 its intention to 
repeal the Sites Act and Franchise Act and replace them with a new 
mandatory Oilcode code of conduct. The Sites Act and the Franchise Act 
were repealed on 1 March 2007.
2.6 Government Influence over Petrol Pricing in 
Australia
There have been two direct avenues through which government, at both the 
Commonwealth and state level in Australia, have exerted an influence over 
petrol prices in Australia. Those avenues have been through the taxation and 
subsidisation ot petrol, and through the imposition of some form of price 
regulation.
2.6.1 Taxation and Subsidies on Petrol
There have been various Commonwealth and state government taxes as well 
as state government rebates applied to the price of petrol.
Up until August 1997, all state governments, with the exception of 
Queensland, levied business franchise fees on the sale of petrol. In New 
South Wales, Victoria, and South Australia, the petrol franchise fee was 
levied in two parts. The first part was as a flat nominal fee imposed on
4X Industry Commission (1994) Petroleum Products. Report No.40, AGPS, Melbourne; 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Inquiry into the Petroleum Products 
Declaration, Vol. l,p. 169.
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retailers who purchased their petrol from a licensed wholesaler. The second 
part was a fee payable as a given percentage of the declared value -  in this 
case price per litre as determined by the state government and indexed for 
inflation. The variable component of the amount of petrol franchise fee 
applying in Sydney, Melbourne, and Adelaide is provided in table 7 
below.49
Table 7: Variable Rate of Franchise Fee on Petrol (in cpl) from 30 June 1997 until 5 
August 1997_____ _________________
City Rate (cpl)
Sydney 7.88
Melbourne 7.67
Adelaide 9.85*
Source: Australian Institute of Petroleum (1998) Oil and Australia Statistical Review 1997. 
Melbourne.
*The variable rate of the franchise fee applying on the sale of petrol in Adelaide increased 
from 9.77 cpl to 9.85 cpl as from 1 July 1997.
On 5 August 1997, the High Court ruling on the legality of tobacco business 
franchise fees applied in New South Wales {Ha and Lim v. New South 
Wales and Walter Hammond & Associates Pty Ltd v. New South Wales) cast 
doubt on the constitutional validity of state government business franchise 
fees, including the petrol franchise fee. In this case, the High Court ruled 
that New South Wales tobacco business franchise fees were unconstitutional 
and in breach of section 90 of the Australian Constitution. As business 
franchise fees for petrol were structured along similar lines to tobacco 
business franchise fees, they were also considered to be vulnerable to legal 
challenge, and hence all state governments ceased their collection.
49 It should be noted that the variable component rate of the business franchise fee on petrol 
in Adelaide was higher than applied in the rest of South Australia. Similarly, the variable 
component of the business franchise fee on petrol in Sydney was applied at the highest rate 
applying in New South Wales, where the rate was reduced in relation to the proximity of 
the Queensland border.
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Following the ruling ot the High Court, the state and territory governments 
requested immediate assistance from the Commonwealth Government in 
order to protect their budgets. The Commonwealth Government arranged 
for the collection of these taxes on behalf of the states and territories. On 6 
August 1997, the Commonwealth Government announced safety net 
arrangements whereby it would increase the level of petrol excise levied and 
return the revenue collected (less administrative costs) to the states.50
At the time ot the High Court’s decision, each of the states had differing 
levels ot business franchise fees. Because the Commonwealth Government 
is unable to discriminate between states or part of states under section 51 (ii) 
ot the Constitution, the Commonwealth Government increased its excise 
rate by 8.1 cpl across the board. A condition of the Commonwealth 
Government’s safety net provisions was that petrol prices not increase 
because of this arrangement. To meet the Commonwealth Government’s 
condition, the Victorian and the New South Wales Governments made 
payments to petrol wholesalers equal to the difference between the 
additional 8.1 cpl in Commonwealth Government excise and the former 
business franchise fee on petrol. The New South Wales Government 
provided an interim subsidy of 0.22 cpl on the sale of petrol from August 
1997 until November 1997. The Victorian Government provided a subsidy 
of 0.43 cpl that was finally rescinded on 1 July 2007. While South Australia 
and New South Wales continue to operate fuel subsidy schemes, these relate 
exclusively to petrol retailed outside the metropolitan areas of Adelaide and
30 The arrangement to return the proceeds to the states arising from the 8.1 cpl increase in 
petrol excise was discontinued by the Commonwealth Government with the introduction of 
the goods and services tax in July 2000.
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Sydney respectively, and hence have no impact on the price of petrol sold in 
those cities.51
The Commonwealth Government levies an excise tax on the sale of petrol in 
Australia, set at a particular rate in cpl. Responsibility for paying the excise 
rests with the manufacturer.52 Refiners pass the cost of the excise on to 
buyers of petrol, so the excise is finally passed on to motoring consumers 
through the chain of supply.
From August 1983 until March 2001, petrol was indexed on a biannual basis 
in March and August for movements in the consumer price index.
Indexation was abolished in March 2001 when the Commonwealth 
Government decided to scrap indexation arrangements after considerable 
political pressure was applied around the country by motoring organisations. 
Coinciding with the abolition of indexation of petrol excise, the rate of 
excise was also cut by 1.5 cpl.
There have also been two other changes made to the rate of petrol excise 
aside from those relating to indexation. First, the Commonwealth 
Government increased the rate of petrol excise by 8.1 cpl following the 
decision of state governments to abolish franchise fees on petrol in August 
1997 (further details have been provided above).
51 The New South Wales Government pays subsidies for five zones in Northern New South 
Wales to enable local sellers of petroleum products to compete with subsidised sellers 
across the border in Queensland. The zonal subsidies decrease as the distance from the 
Queensland border increases.
The South Australian Government pays subsidies for two zones -  between 50 km and 100 
km from the Adelaide GPO excluding the Yorke Pennisula (zone 2) and over 100 km from 
the Adelaide GPO (zone 3).
52 Customs duty is levied on comparable imports so that imports and domestic goods are 
taxed at the same rate.
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Second, the Commonwealth Government reduced the rate of petrol excise 
on 1 July 2000 by 6.656 cpl to coincide with the introduction of the goods 
and services tax (GST) in order to offset the impact of the GST on petrol 
prices (further details on the GST are provided below). The rates of excise 
applying to unleaded petrol during the period under examination is provided 
in table 8 below.
Table 8: Rate of Excise on Unleaded Petrol (in cpl)
Date Implemented Unleaded Petrol Excise
3 February 1997 34.697
6 August 1997 42.797
1 February 1998 42.797 (No change)
1 August 1998 43.054
1 February 1999 43.355
2 August 1999 43.485
1 February 2000 44.137
1 July 2000 37.481
1 August 2000 38.118
1 February 2001 39.643
2 March 2001 38.143
Source: Webb, R. (2000) Petrol and Diesel Excises. Parliament of Australia Parliamentary 
Library; Commonwealth of Australia (2001) 2001-02 Budget Paper No.l: Budget Strategy 
and Outlook 2001-02. Auslnfo, Canberra, p. 5-18.
The Commonwealth Government introduced a broad-based GST on 1 July 
2000 which applied to most commodities and services, including petrol. The 
GST is applied on an ad valorem basis at the rate of 10 per cent. The GST is 
applied separately on each transaction within the supply chain.53
Associated with the implementation of the GST, the Commonwealth 
Government also introduced the Fuel Sales Grant Scheme (FSGS) as of 1 
July 2000. The FSGS provided a subsidy to motoring consumers of petrol in 
regional and remote areas by providing a grant payment to petrol retailers in 
defined non-metropolitan zones. The FSGS was paid at the rate ot 1 cpl for
v' As businesses are able to claim GST input tax credits for the amount of GST paid on 
intermediate inputs, the GST is borne only on the final consumption of petrol.
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the non-metropolitan zone and 2 cpl for the remote zone. The FSGS was 
terminated on 1 July 2006.
2.6.2 Regulation of Petrol Prices
The price of petrol was subject to either price control or prices surv eillance 
mechanisms at the Commonwealth or state government level from February 
1940 until August 1998. Price controls were initially introduced by the 
Commonwealth Government to coincide with petrol rationing during World 
War II in order to control inflation and prevent profiteering.54 These 
controls operated through the Commonwealth Government setting a 
maximum wholesale price calculated by a formula based on the landed cost 
of refined petroleum products on the Australian seaboard and the cost of 
distribution.55
When the Commonwealth Government removed price controls over petrol 
in September 1948, all state governments stepped in and filled the breach by 
enacting their own price controls following the formula previously applied 
by the Commonwealth Government in setting a maximum wholesale price. 
These price control regimes were gradually abandoned in all states except 
South Australia. From 1954 until May 1974, the South Australian price 
control system became the de facto price control system for Australia.56
The Commonwealth Government re-engaged in scrutinising petrol prices 
with the enactment of the Prices Justification Act 1973 which established 
the Prices Justification Tribunal (PJT). The purpose of the PJT was not to
54 Grace, J. G. (1991) An Overview of Legislation Controlling the Retailing of Petroleum 
within Australia. Australian Business Law Review 19, 391-403, p. 392.
55 Royal Commission on Petroleum, op.cit., p. 331.
56 ibid., p. 332.
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engage in price control as such, but in price justification. The PJT conducted 
11 inquiries into petrol pricing between 1973 and 1980, most of which were 
triggered by oil company notification of higher prices.57
The role of the PJT in scrutinising petrol prices was replaced in 1981 by the 
Petroleum Products Pricing Authority (PPPA) following the enactment of 
the Petroleum Products Pricing Authority Act 1981. Following the 
enactment of the Commonwealth Prices Surveillance Act 1983, the PPPA 
was subsumed into the new Prices Surveillance Authority (PSA).
Between 1981 and 1983, governments in New South Wales, Victoria, South 
Australia, and Western Australia reintroduced forms of wholesale and retail 
price controls. However, these states agreed to a unified system of prices 
surveillance for petrol operated by the PSA, and all but Western Australia 
withdrew from price controls.58
The PSA eventually merged with the TPC in 1996 to form the ACCC.
All of the refiner/marketer companies operating in Australia were declared 
under the Prices Surveillance Act. Under section 22 of the Prices 
Surveillance Act, declared companies were required to notify the 
PSA/ACCC of proposals to increase wholesale prices above the previously 
endorsed maximum price.59 The PSA/ACCC endorsed individual company 
maximum wholesale prices for the sale of petrol provided the price 
proposed was at or below the Import Parity Indicator price (IPI) calculated
7 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Inquiry into the Petroleum Products 
Declaration, Vol. 1, p. 4. 
s Industry Commission, op.cit., p. 1.4.
59 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (1996) Inquiry into the Petroleum 
Products Declaration. Vol. 2, Appendixes, AGPS, Canberra, p. 26.
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by the PSA/ACCC.60 The calculation of the IPI was composed of three 
components:
• The import parity component -  the landed cost for ex-refinery petrol 
stock from Singapore (incorporating the spot price for fuel61, freight, 
wharfage, insurance and loss, and the Australian/US dollar exchange 
rate);
• The assessed local component -  which reflected influences such as 
downstream terminalling, marketing and distribution costs as well as 
return on assets employed in that sector; and
62• Excise and state government subsidies, and the GST.
Singapore was considered the appropriate benchmark for Australian petrol 
prices as it is the closest major refining and marketing centre. Also because 
Singapore is the third largest refining and marketing centre in the world 
after Rotterdam and Houston, it was considered to be the most likely source 
of imported product coming into Australia.
In its inquiry into the downstream petroleum industry in 1994, the Industry 
Commission concluded that wholesale petrol price regulation within cities 
was “unnecessary because of the vigorous competition observed in those 
markets”. The Industry Commission also opined that the effectiveness of 
competition in some country retail petrol markets was not addressed by
60 ibid., p. 26.
61 The spot price used is based on a 7-day rolling average of spot prices. See: Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission, Inquiry into the Petroleum Products Declaration. 
Vol. 2, p. 27.
62 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2001) Reducing Fuel Variability: 
Discussion Paper. Canberra, p. 10.
63 Industry Commission, op.cit., p. 125.
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wholesale petrol price regulation.64 The Industry Commission recommended 
that wholesale petrol prices should be deregulated.
Similarly, the ACCC opined in 1996 that the regulation of wholesale petrol 
prices did “not serve a very useful purpose”.65 The ACCC contended that in 
rural areas the regulation of wholesale petrol prices had been rendered 
ineffective through the oil majors selling product through distributors who 
were not subject to the regulation. In regard to capital cities, the ACCC 
found that the regulation only restrained petrol prices occasionally and by 
very little. The ACCC also contended the regulation of wholesale petrol 
prices had an adverse effect on capital city retail petrol markets by 
encouraging the oil majors to charge the maximum price allowed rather than 
a lower price.
In July 1998, the Commonwealth Government announced that it was 
revoking the declaration on the refiner/marketers and deregulating 
wholesale petrol prices as from 1 August 1998. Echoing the views of the 
ACCC, the Commonwealth Government asserted that the price regulation 
had resulted in distortions across various markets, resulting in higher retail 
petrol prices:
Price surveillance of petrol prices and the setting of a maximum 
endorsed wholesale price has had an adverse effect on the retail 
petrol market. In the capital cities, the maximum endorsed wholesale 
price has acted as a target for prices at the end of a discount cycle. In
64 ibid., p. 125.
65 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (1996) ACCC recommends end to 
petrol declaration when competitive forces re-structure fuel industry. Media Release, 15 
August.
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the country, the maximum endorsed wholesale price has acted as a 
price floor underwriting the price paid by country consumers.66
While prices surveillance of petrol prices has been removed nationally by 
the Commonwealth Government, the Western Australian Government 
moved back into the field in April 2001 following the passage of the 
Western Australian Petroleum Products Pricing Amendment Act 2000. A 
price cap was imposed on the wholesale price of petrol in Western Australia 
through the determination of a maximum price based on an import parity 
pricing model.
Under the Australian Capital Territory’s Fair Trading (Fuel Prices) Act 
1993, the designated Minister is able to regulate the prices of certain fuels if 
the market were acting in a collusive or anti-competitive manner, although
67the powers under this Act have never been exercised.
At the Commonwealth Government level, the Prices Surveillance Act was 
repealed in 2004 and the powers to direct the ACCC to engage in price 
monitoring and prices surveillance activities were subsumed into the TPA.
The Federal Opposition is proposing to reinstitute some form of prices 
surveillance under the TPA in the event that it is elected to government after 
the next federal election. The Federal Opposition has said that it will
66 Costello, P. and Moore, J. (1998) Petroleum Marketing Reforms. Media Release, Joint 
Statement by the Australian Government Treasurer and the Minister for Industry, Science 
and Tourism, 20 July.
67 National Competition Council, op.cit., p. 21.10.
68 It should be noted that this thesis was completed before the 2007 federal election.
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appoint a Petrol Commissioner to the ACCC who will be given full powers
to monitor and investigate petrol prices under the TPA. 69
2.7. Pricing and Competition Issues
2.7.1 Competition in the Downstream Petroleum Industry
It is arguably the case that petrol is a homogeneous product and that price
forms the main basis upon which wholesalers and the retailers they supply 
compete against each other. This is evidenced by the display of price boards 
at just about every retail service station site location around Australia. The 
critical importance of pricing to retail market competition has been 
acknowledged by the AIP:
For many consumers, petrol is often treated as a commodity product 
generating little brand loyalty, meaning competition is largely based
70on price.
On the demand side, the homogeneous nature of petrol to the consumer has 
been recognised in Australia by the Industry Commission which commented 
that “[t]o the overwhelming majority of consumers petrol is petroT and by 
Access Economics who contended that demand for an individual brand of 
petrol “will be highly elastic due to competitive substitution for other brands 
in response to price discounting” . 71
Evidence of the homogeneous nature of petrol on the supply side comes 
from the very existence of REAs that previously enabled refiners to retail
6<) Rudd, K., Bowen, C. and Swan, W. (2007) Rudd Labor Government to Appoint Petrol 
Commissioner. Media Release, Joint Statement by the Leader of the Opposition, the 
Shadow Assistant Treasurer, Revenue and Competition Policy and Shadow Treasurer, 12 
June.
70 Australian Institute of Petroleum (2006) Submission to the Inquiry into Future Oil Supply 
and Alternative Transport Fuels. Canberra.
71 Industry Commission, op.cit., p. 57; Access Economics (1991) The Right Price.
Canberra, p. 40.
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petrol manufactured by other refiners in Australia. The Royal Commission 
on Petroleum conducted in the mid-1970s also came to the considered view 
that petrol was a homogeneous product despite concerted attempts by 
petroleum marketers to persuade consumers otherwise:
The Commission is satisfied that, although there may be some 
marginal difference between one [petrol] and another, according to 
the inclusion or lack of additives, the virtues attributed by the 
marketers to the [petrol] sold under their various brands is part of a 
market strategy of promoting brand image product differentiation
79where there is no real difference in the product being sold.
In summary, the ACCC has concluded that petrol is a homogeneous product 
on both the demand and the supply side:
Arguably, petroleum products are homogeneous (like grade for like 
grade) in both a technical sense and as perceived by consumers, who 
appear generally unwilling to remain with one brand when another 
brand is marginally cheaper.
Overseas, the homogeneous nature of petrol has been recognised by Lowe, 
Shepard, and the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) amongst others.74
It is possible that competition could occur in retail petrol markets based on 
criterion other than price such as quality of the product and the level of 
service. As petrol is generally considered to be a homogeneous product by 
consumers, it is doubtful if retailers compete against each other on the basis
: Royal Commission on Petroleum, op.cit., pp. 47-48.
73 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Inquiry into the Petroleum Products 
Declaration, Vol. 1, p. 112.
74 See: Lowe, J. F., op.cit., p. 204; Shepard, A. (1990) Pricing Behaviour and Vertical 
Contracts in Retail Markets. The American Economic Review 80, 427-431, p. 427; Federal 
Trade Commission (1999) Statement o f Chairman Robert Pitofsky and Commissioners 
Sheila F. Anthony and Mozelle W. Thompson, BP /  Amoco, Docket No. C-3868.
Washington DC, 15 January.
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of quality for regular unleaded petrol.7? If a consumer is purchasing petrol 
from a retail service station site, it is also doubtful that issues such as 
standard of service would be a significant factor. The vast majority of retail 
service station sites converted over to self-service arrangements during the 
1980s and 1990s after Shell first introduced it in April 1976.
Wholesalers and retailers may also attempt to compete against each other on 
the basis of marketing. Such marketing would probably take the form of 
trying to differentiate their product from that of their competitors. As petrol 
is viewed as a homogeneous product, marketing strategies based around 
product differentiation are likely to meet with only limited success. As the 
Industry Commission recognised in 1994: “the ability of the oil companies 
to benefit from product differentiation is limited by the homogeneous nature 
of the core product”.76
Other factors upon which petrol retailers could compete are on the basis of 
convenience in terms of trading hours and location.
Despite the existence of non-price factors upon which petrol retailers can 
also compete, it is not unreasonable to assume that price is the main 
criterion upon which competition occurs within the downstream petroleum 
industry, given the homogeneous nature of the product and the likely high 
price elasticity of demand for an individual brand of petrol. The ACCC and 
the Industry Commission have both concluded that the price of petrol is the
7~ Despite this, it is arguably the case that retailers do compete against each other on the 
basis of quality in relation to premium unleaded petrol which is marketed as a superior 
product by retailers in comparison to regular unleaded petrol and is also priced at a 
premium to regular unleaded petrol.
76 Industry Commission, op.cit., p. 57.
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main basis upon which competition takes place within the Australian 
downstream petroleum industry.
2.7.2 Relative Petrol Prices in Australia
Several parties have claimed that Australia has some of the lowest retail
petrol prices in the world based on price comparisons produced by the 
International Energy Agency (IEA). According to the Department of 
Industry, Tourism, and Resources in 2002:
it is not well known that amongst the countries of the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development ... Australia has the 
lowest pre-tax petrol price and third lowest post-tax retail prices.77
Similarly, the AIP in 2003 opined that:
Australia continues to have the lowest pre-tax price for petrol in the
78OECD and the third lowest price including tax.
Table 9 below shows that Australia recorded the lowest average petrol 
prices pre-tax, and the third lowest average petrol prices overall amongst 
OECD nations in the June quarter 2001.
7' Department of Industry, Tourism, and Resources, Downstream Petroleum Industry 
Framework 2002, p. 1.
7H Australian Institute of Petroleum (2003) Downstream Petroleum 2003. Canberra, p. 14.
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Table 9: Comparison of Retail Petrol Prices in OECD Countries -  June Quarter 2001
Country Pre-Tax Price 
(cpl)
Price AUS$ (cpl) Tax AUS$ (cpl)
Australia 45.5 92.0 46.5
New Zealand 51.5 89.7 38.1
Turkey 55.4 142.7 87.3
Germany 55.4 181.2 125.8
UK 56.1 214.8 158.7
Canada 58.5 96.6 38.1
France 59.5 187.7 128.3
Ireland 60.6 143.7 83.1
Czech Republic 61.0 139.9 78.9
Poland 62.4 157.7 95.3
Spain 63.0 146.3 83.3
Austria 63.7 161.0 97.3
Switzerland 64.7 158.6 93.9
Belgium 64.8 182.7 117.9
Hungary 65.0 157.9 92.9
United States 66.1 85.8 19.6
Sweden 66.5 188.0 121.4
Norway 66.6 208.2 141.7
Denmark 67.3 197.1 129.9
Italy 67.7 187.3 119.6
Greece 68.0 139.7 71.7
Finland 70.0 197.1 129.9
Netherlands 70.9 207.7 136.8
Japan 80.4 174.0 93.6
Portugal 83.4 155.1 71.7
Mexico 99.5 114.4 14.9
South Korea 189.0 189.0 0.0
Source: Commonwealth Treasury (2002) Treasury Submission to the Fuel Taxation 
Inquiry. Canberra.
While the ACCC has acknowledged that IEA statistics demonstrate “that 
metropolitan prices in Australia are not excessive relative to most other 
countries”, nevertheless it has expressed “some reservations about the 
comparability of some of the data, associated with the removal of taxes and 
the sampling methodology applied” .79
2.7.3 Pricing and Competition in Capital City Retail 
Markets
Retail petrol prices within the capital cities closely follow movements in the 
IPI. The close relationship between capital city retail petrol prices and the
79 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Inquiry into the Petroleum Products 
Declaration, Vol. l ,p.  110.
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IPI is illustrated in chart 1 below which maps average weekly Adelaide 
retail petrol prices against the weekly average IPI.
Chart 1: Weekly Average Adelaide Retail Petrol Prices and the Weekly Average IPI 
from 30 June 1997 to 26 February 2001.
100.0 n
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Source: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission and Informed Sources.
Given the close relationship between capital city retail petrol prices and the 
IPI, retail petrol prices across the capital cities follow each other closely. 
The close relationship between capital city retail petrol prices is illustrated 
in chart 2 below which maps average weekly retail petrol prices for 
Adelaide, Melbourne and Sydney.
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Chart 2: Average Weekly Retail Petrol Prices for Adelaide, Melbourne and Sydney 
from 30 June 1997 to 25 August 2003
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Source: Informed Sources.
Note: Data for Adelaide only runs to 26 February 2001.
There are two main contentious issues surrounding the retail price of petrol 
in Australia. The first issue is the level of price volatility observed in the 
major capital cities of Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Adelaide and Perth. 
Canberra, Hobart and Darwin have not been subject to the same level of 
price volatility as the other capital cities. The second issue is that of the 
price differential between city and country retail petrol prices which will be 
considered in the following section.
The ACCC has observed that retail price volatility is generally confined to 
major capital cities and some strategically located rural towns on major 
highways.80 As a result, there are price cycles observed in these locations 
which follows a recurring sawtooth pattern, notably that prices rise rapidly
80 ibid., p. 67.
50
in a short period of time and then steadily decrease.81 Castanias and Johnson 
have observed that retail petrol price cycles of this nature are consistent with 
the duopoly model of Maskin and Tirole.82 The duopoly model of Maskin 
and Tirole will be further considered in the next Chapter.
According to Harris (Shell), competition at the retail level drives the pump 
price down as individual service stations or brands start to discount their 
price by a small amount in order to attract volume. Other service stations 
in turn quickly match these prices in order to remain competitive with 
highly visible petrol pricing boards allowing both customers and retail 
competitors alike to observe price changes. Harris comments that once 
discounting starts or ends in a particular area, strong competition means that 
it quickly spreads into other regions. ' Harris observes that petrol prices are 
normally discounted for six days or more, and then only go up once a 
week.86
The ACCC has previously identified two main causes of retail petrol price 
volatility:
• The wholesale prices of the oil majors are based on international ex-
refinery bulk spot prices in Singapore and fluctuations in those prices, as
81 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2005) Understanding petrol pricing 
in Australia: Answers to some frequently asked questions. Canberra, p. 6.
82 Castanias, R. and Johnson, H. (1993) Gar Wars: Retail Price Fluctuations. The Review o f 
Economics and Statistics 75, 171-174.
82 Harris, P. C. (2002) Petrol Price Movements: One of the oil companies provides an 
explanation. Motoring Directions Issue 1 2002, 10-12, p. 11.
84 ibid.
85 ibid.
86
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well as in the value of the Australian dollar as compared to the US 
dollar, can eventually flow into retail prices.87
• Varying levels of wholesale price support applied by the oil majors to 
selected petrol retailers.88
Other possible causes of retail price volatility that have been suggested are: 
excess product at refineries; the presence of independent chains; 
competition tor market share; and a response to low demand in the early 
part of the week and higher demand towards the weekend.80
Petrol price volatility and the angst it creates for consumers have provoked 
several political responses across the country. In late 2000, the Western 
Australian Government passed the Petroleum Products Pricing Amendment 
Act 2000, which sought to fix retail petrol prices for a 24-hour period as 
from January 2001.
In March 2001, the Commonwealth Government requested the ACCC 
examine the feasibility of placing limitations on retail petrol price 
fluctuations throughout Australia.90 The ACCC reported back to the 
Commonwealth Government in December 2001 recommending against any 
measures to contain price fluctuations. The ACCC recommended instead
87 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Inquiry into the Petroleum Products 
Declaration, Vol. 1, p. 67.
88 ibid., p. 68.
89 ibid., p. 68.
90 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Reducing Fuel Price Variability: 
Discussion Paper.
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that a greater emphasis should be placed on increasing consumer awareness 
of retail petrol price cycles.91
Opinions expressed as to whether capital city retail markets are competitive 
or not have been mixed. While some have claimed that retail markets in 
capital cities are prone to collusive conduct, others have asserted that they 
are highly competitive. It has also been noted that the Australian public 
remains sceptical regarding the level of competition within capital city retail 
markets, especially when they observe price discounting come to an abrupt 
end coupled with substantial price rises across all outlets within a relatively 
short space of time.
In 1994, the Industry Commission came to the view that there was effective 
competition in most petroleum product markets most of the time. “ 
According to the Industry Commission, the oil majors had to overcome 
considerable difficulties in order to co-operate, either explicitly or tacitly, to
9^
raise prices over any prolonged period of time.
In contrast, the ACCC in 1996 was firmly of the view that markets within 
the downstream petroleum industry were not competitive, contending that 
the oil majors possessed significant market power based on high 
concentration levels, high barriers to entry, and the depth and breadth of 
vertical and horizontal relationships between them.94 The ACCC further
91 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2001) Reducing Fuel Price 
Variability. Canberra.
92 Industry Commission, op.cit., p. XIX.
93 ibid., p. XVIII.
94 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, ACCC recommends end to petrol 
declaration.
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opined the oil majors “exercised strong influence over prices and terms and 
conditions throughout retailing“.95
One reason for differing opinions on the level of competition within capital 
city retail markets largely revolves around differing and conflicting 
interpretations of the price cycles observed. While some regard the price 
cycles and the accompanying price discounting as evidence of vigorous 
competition, others consider some aspects of the price cycle as constituting 
predatory conduct, while the coalescence of the price at the same level at the 
end of a discounting cycle as evidence of collusive conduct.
Claims of anti-competitive conduct in the downstream petroleum industry 
have become commonplace. As the Senate Economics Committee observed 
in 2001:
Suspicion ... often falls on the oil companies which some suspect of 
manipulating wholesale and retail prices and minimising competition 
in order to preserve and enhance their profitability.96
There are two primary sources of complaint regarding anti-competitive 
conduct. On the one hand, consumers, politicians, and motoring 
organisations have often accused the oil industry in general, and the oil 
majors in particular, of price fixing and collusion, whether it be tacit or 
overt. On the other hand, organisations representing retail service station 
operators have accused the oil majors of engaging in predatory pricing by 
setting retail petrol prices far too low and of engaging in price
95 ibid.
96 Senate Economics Committee (2001) Inquiry into the provisions o f the Fair Prices for 
All (Petroleum) Bill 1999 and the practice of multi-site franchising by oil companies. 
Canberra, p. 1.
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discrimination by selling petrol to some customers at lower wholesale prices 
than is otherwise generally available. While there are disagreements over a 
precise definition of predatory pricing, it generally involves temporary 
selling, at prices below its costs, by a firm (or group of firms) to drive out or
97crush a competitor.
Politicians as well as motoring organisations (representing the interests of 
motorists) have regularly made assertions that the oil majors engage in price 
fixing and profiteering. Such claims are regularly made in response to price 
rises that appear to be made simultaneously by oil major branded retail 
service station sites as well as significant retail price rises before public 
holidays and long weekends.
Attacks by politicians on the pricing behaviour of the oil majors is frequent 
and is engaged in by representatives of both major political parties within 
Australia at both the state and federal level. In response to a simultaneous 
price increase across several retail service station sites in Maitland in 
August 2000, the then New South Wales Minister for Consumer Affairs 
John Watkins commented that:
It is very suspicious that all of the petrol stations in Maitland -  
except two independents -  would decide independently to increase 
their prices...
QO
This smacks of price rigging.
97 Yamey, B. S. (1972) Predatory Price Cutting: Notes and Comments. Journal o f Law and 
Economics 15, 129-142, p. 129.
98 The Daily Telegraph (1999) Inquiry into 10c petrol price rise. 5 August: 17.
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In response to a rise in retail petrol prices before Anzac day in 2001, the 
Prime Minister, John Howard, commented:
The public anger at the sharp increase on Anzac Day is palpable and 
understandable and I want that investigated and the ACCC has the 
power to do it...
The ACCC should throw the book at the companies if there’s any 
evidence of collusion.w
Similarly, the then Leader of the Federal Opposition, Simon Crean, in 2002 
insinuated that the oil majors engaged in price fixing before holiday periods:
How do the oil companies justify 10 cent price hikes before Easter?
No market forces can miraculously produce that sort of an outcome; 
the only change in circumstances is that it’s a public holiday.100
Motoring organisations have also accused the oil majors of engaging in 
price fixing and profiteering over the years. In December 1997, the Royal 
Automobile Club of Victoria (RACV) called for the granting of telephone 
tapping powers to the ACCC in order to prove that price-fixing occurs 
amongst oil companies.101 In April 2002, the National Road Motorists 
Association (NRMA) claimed that while sharp rises in petrol prices on 
certain days were not evidence of price fixing, it gave strong cause for 
suspicion.102
90 Australian Associated Press News Wire (2001) Fed -  Public right to be angry at petrol 
price rises says Howard. 27 April.
100 Australian Associated Press Financial News Wire (2002) Crean rejects industry’s cry 
poor claims. 27 April.
101 Herald Sun (1997) RACV urges phone tap power. 22 December: 22.
102 The Sydney Morning Herald (2002) NRMA Chief Suspicious of Patterned Rise in Petrol 
Prices. 25 April: 4.
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Public opinion polling by the Australian Automobile Association, the peak 
body for motoring organisations across Australia, also revealed deep 
suspicion regarding the reason for petrol price rises across metropolitan 
areas:
Motorists have their pet theories for these fluctuations: some put it 
down to the day of the week, school holidays or because it’s pay day 
or pension, while others nominate a phone call from the big oil 
company as the cause. 101
The oil majors are acutely aware of the firmly held public suspicion that 
they engage in price fixing and profiteering. According to Starkey (AIP):
community perception of the industry is that it is not competitive and 
that consumers are being exploited by the companies. 104
The oil majors have often sought to vigorously deny claims that they engage 
in price fixing. According to McGimpsey (BP):
There’s a perception that we (refmer/marketers) collude on a whole 
range of issues... But we are in fact in fierce competition with one 
another. 105
Warburton (Caltex) sought to explain the price cycles in the following 
terms:
There is no price fixing but there is, I repeat, very vigorous price 
following.
In a downward spiral, the profit is driven into negative territory.
103 Cameron, R. (1998) What ‘Battlers’ Have to Say about Fuel Prices and Taxes. Motoring 
Directions 4(2), 9-12, p. 10.
104 Starkey, J. (1996) The Downstream Petroleum Industry -  A Commentary. [1996] 
AMPLA Yearbook, 379-385, p. 381.
105 McGimpsey, R. (1998) The Petroleum Industry’s Distortions and Anomalies. Motoring 
Directions 4(2), 13-15, p. 14.
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Eventually, like a pressure eooker, the pressure on all parties to 
return to profitability causes someone to break and there is usually a 
very willing and rapid following of that first upward movement.106
Several independent observers have claimed that the retail petrol price 
cycles observed are in fact evidence of vigorous competition. According to 
Access Economics: “periodic discounting wars suggest intense competition 
tor market share”.107 Similarly, the Industry Commission opined that petrol 
price discounting “is indicative of strong competition”.108
While the price support offered by oil majors to their franchisees could be 
interpreted as an attempt to help franchisees survive in a competitive retail 
market, some franchisees have argued that the provision of price support is a 
market control mechanism that allows the oil majors to exercise significant 
leverage over their franchisees.1(,) Franchisees claim that if they were able to 
purchase petrol at a realistic wholesale price in the first instance, then they 
would not require price support at all.
Claims of predatory pricing by the oil majors abound. The Industry 
Commission commented that many participants in its 1994 inquiry into the 
petroleum industry alleged that the oil majors engaged in predatory pricing 
practices.110 According to the MTAA111 (representing retail service station 
operators):
106 Asia Pulse Wire Senice  (2002) Caltex Australia Says No Price Fixing in Petrol Prices in 
Urban Areas. 2 May.
107
108
109
110
Access Economics, op.cit., p. 42. 
Industry Commission, op.cit., p. XX. 
ibid., p. 27.
Industry Commission, op.cit., p. 74.
111 The MTAA represents single site franchisees, multi-site franchisees, commission agents, 
branded dealer-owned sites and unbranded dealer-owned sites.
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Australia’s service station operators are frequently victims of
predatory pricing by the oil majors. Independent operators are sold
1 1 ^
fuel at wholesale prices above what is charged at retail by others.
Similarly, the Independent Petroleum Marketers Association of Australia 
(PMAA), representing dealer-owned retail service stations, has opined that:
It is only within this industry that the discount prices available for 
retail petroleum purchases from the oil companies’ chains are truly 
predatory to the wholesale cost prices for the same product available
113from the same oil companies to the independent operators.
Claims of price fixing and collusion often made against oil companies by 
politicians and motoring organisations may appear at face value to be 
inconsistent and contradictory with claims of predatory pricing made by 
service station operators. This apparent anomaly is further explored in the 
next Chapter in examining vertical pricing issues.
2.7.4 Pricing and Competition in Country Retail Petrol 
Markets
While country petrol prices are generally higher than city petrol prices, 
average movements in country petrol prices generally follow average 
movements in city petrol prices through time. The close relationship 
between capital city retail petrol prices and country retail petrol prices is 
illustrated in chart 3 below which maps average monthly Sydney retail 
petrol prices against the average monthly retail petrol prices for the New 
South Wales country towns of Griffiths and Port Macquarie.
112 Motor Trades Association of Australia (2002) Submission by the Motor Trades 
Association o f Australia to the Review o f the Trade Practices Act. Canberra.
113 Independent Petroleum Marketers Association of Australia (2002) Submission to the 
Senate Legal and Constitutional Reference Committee for the Committee ’s Inquiry into the 
Trade Practices Act 1974. Melbourne, p. 5.
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Chart 3: Average Monthly Retail Petrol Prices for Sydney, Griffiths and Port 
Macquarie from May 1998 to September 2006.
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Source: Australian Automobile Association. Issues for Motorists: Petrol Prices. 
http://www.aaa.asn.au/issues/petrol.htm [Accessed 15 March 2007]
One consequence flowing from the petrol price volatility observed in the 
major capital cities is that it can heighten perceptions of the extent of the 
price differential between city and country petrol prices when city petrol 
prices are at the bottom of the price cycle. In its examination of the 
downstream petroleum industry in 1996, the ACCC found that higher retail 
petrol prices generally applied in country areas due to a combination of 
factors:
• Higher freight costs;
• Lower volume of throughputs;
• Less diversity of revenue sources for country outlets;
• Higher retail margins;
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Lower levels of competition;
• The absence of independent retail chains;
• The general absence of wholesale and retail price discounting;
• Regular and sometimes deep wholesale price discounting in capital 
cities which causes differences with country areas to expand;
• The greater potential for oil major clawback of retailers’ margins, which 
could result in operators seeking higher margins;
• The greater likelihood of conscious price parallelism and possibly 
collusion existing between country dealers and distributors; and
• Availability of some under-the-canopy discounts and the extent of oil 
company card sales which can result in retailers applying higher pump 
prices to offset these effects.114
Both the Industry Commission and the ACCC have acknowledged that there 
is an absence of competition in some country retail petrol markets. The 
Industry Commission observed in 1994 there were some country centres and 
smaller country towns where high retail price margins on petrol could not be 
fully explained in terms of extra costs and that this may be the result of 
collusive behaviour - whether it be overt or tacit.115
The ACCC found in 1996 that in many of the larger country centres, 
retailers tended to adopt a live and let live strategy by seeking to avoid price
114 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Inquiry into the Petroleum 
Products Declaration, Vol. 1, p. 94.
115 Industry Commission, op.cit.
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competition that could drive rivals out.116 The ACCC concluded that in 
country retail petrol markets there existed the greater likelihood of 
conscious price parallelism and possibly collusion existing between country 
retailers and distributors.117
Support for the concerns expressed by both the Industry Commission and 
the ACCC in regard to possible collusive conduct in some country areas 
have come from a recent court case where the ACCC successfully 
prosecuted several parties for engaging in price-fixing conduct in breach of 
the TPA in the region of the Victorian country city of Ballarat.118 In this 
case, the ACCC instituted proceedings against 16 companies and 
individuals alleging a number of competitors in the Ballarat region were part 
of a long-standing arrangement to fix retail petrol prices.119 In this case, the 
Federal Court awarded penalties of more than $20 million in May 2005 
against the respondents for price fixing conduct, although two of the 
respondents successfully appealed against the judgement to the Full Federal 
Court.120
The ACCC also initiated proceeding against 18 respondents alleging that 
they fixed retail petrol prices in the Victorian city of Geelong during 1999-
116 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Inquiry into the Petroleum 
Products Declaration, Vol. 1, p. 94.
117 ibid., p. 94.
118 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Leahy Petroleum Pty Ltd & ors 
(Ballarat).
119 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2005) Federal Court orders $23.3 
million in penalties for petrol price-fixing. Media Release, 17 March.
120 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2006) High Court dismisses ACCC 
-  APCO special leave application. Media Release, 5 June.
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2000.121 While the Federal Court dismissed the ACCC action in May 2007,
the ACCC observed that:
There was no dispute by many of the respondents in the Geelong 
proceedings that they communicated about petrol prices. What was 
disputed in court was whether those communications amounted to an
‘arrangement or understanding’ being reached between the parties as
122to how they would price their petrol.
Competition law issues will be further considered in section 2.7.6 below.
Given the focus o f this study is on capital city wholesale and retail petrol 
markets, the competition issues concerning country wholesale and retail 
petrol markets will not be further considered.
2.7.5 Political Response to Pricing and Competition Issues
General consumer dissatisfaction with the setting of wholesale and retail
petrol prices as well as concerns expressed by retailers regarding the 
conduct of the oil majors has prompted a series of inquiries and reports by 
Commonwealth and state government agencies, parliamentary committees, 
as well as other organisations. It is estimated that there have been at least 46 
inquiries into various aspects of the downstream petroleum industry since 
1983. Furthermore, a Royal Commission investigated the downstream 
petroleum industry during the mid-1970s in addition to several inquiries into 
petrol pricing by the PJT prior to 1983. The level of scrutiny as well as the 
accompanying regulation imposed on the downstream petroleum industry 
prompted Starkey (AIP) to observe in 1996 that:
121 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Leahy Petroleum Pty Ltd & others 
(Geelong)
1-2 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2007) Geelong petrol decision 
‘disappointing’. Media Release, 29 May.
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the industry is subject to more scrutiny and investigation and more 
detailed economic regulation than any other industry.123
Arguably, the imposition of price regulation at both the Commonwealth and 
state government level was an attempt to address concerns expressed by 
motoring consumers in relation to perceived anti-competitive conduct in 
retail petrol markets as well as concerns expressed by retailers regarding 
unfair wholesale prices. Similarly, the enactment of the Sites Act and the 
Franchise Act was arguably an attempt to alleviate concerns expressed by 
retailers at their perceived unfair treatment at the hands of the oil majors.
In addition, there have been three main policy reactions within the 
Australian political system in response to concerns expressed regarding 
possible predatory conduct and price discrimination. The first was through 
the prohibition on price discrimination contained in the Franchise Act, 
although this seems to have proven ineffective in terms of mitigating the 
concerns of franchisees.
The second has been attempts to break the tied supply arrangements 
between franchisees from their oil major franchisors. In the early 1980s, 
state governments in Victoria and Western Australia introduced legislation 
allowing branded retailers to source up to 50 per cent of their supply needs 
from non-branded suppliers. Flowever, the effectiveness of such legislation 
was struck down when the oil majors mounted a successful prosecution for 
passing off,] the practice of selling a brand of petrol inconsistent with what is
122 Starkey, J., op.cit., p. 381.
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advertised on the petrol bowser.124 An attempt to enable franchisees to 
source up to 50 per cent of their fuel supplies from a party other than their 
franchisor was resurrected through a private members bill introduced into 
the Commonwealth Parliament in 1999.
The third policy reaction has been the mandating of wholesale price 
transparency. The Victorian Government has introduced provisions 
mandating that declared suppliers of petrol had to set a terminal gate price 
with the aim of increasing the transparency of pricing and to provide access 
to product at terminals at competitive wholesale prices for all distributors 
and retailers. “ The Petroleum Products (Terminal Gate Pricing) Act 2000 
was passed by the Victorian Parliament on 15 November 2000 and came 
into operation on 1 August 2001. The legislation requires declared suppliers 
to set a terminal gate price for the sale or supply of declared petroleum 
products to wholesalers, distributors and retailers. This terminal gate price is 
the base price at which declared petroleum products are first sold into the 
wholesale market in Victoria.
Under the Petroleum Products Act, the terminal gate price is determined by 
adding together:
• The landed international product price;
• Excise and other taxes payable by a declared supplier;
124 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission. Inquiry’ into the Petroleum 
Products Declaration, Vol. 1, p. 43.
125 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2002) Terminal gate pricing 
arrangements in Australia and other fuel pricing arrangements in Western Australia. 
Canberra, p. 4.
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• A margin which represents a reasonable cost for establishing and 
operating a terminal; and
• GST on the total amount.
The Petroleum Products Act places several requirements on the declared
suppliers of declared petroleum products which are:
• Declared suppliers must publicly advertise a terminal gate price for 
declared petroleum products and may only change it once in 24 hours.
• Contracts between suppliers and distributors or retailers will be based on 
the terminal gate price plus additional services, less discounts or rebates.
o The Petroleum Products Act applies to contracts and (contract 
renewals) entered into after 1 August 2001.
o Contracts entered into between 1 November 2000 and 1 August 
2001 become void to the extent that they are inconsistent with 
the Petroleum Products Act. However, the contract otherwise 
remains in force.
o Contracts entered into before 1 November 2000 are not required 
to be in line with the Petroleum Products Act.
• Invoices must identify the terminal gate price plus the price of additional 
services that relate to the load, less discounts or rebates.
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• Declared suppliers must make their optional service charges and any 
return on investment in leased sites available on request to resellers and 
leaseholders respectively.
• Declared suppliers must provide access to product from the terminal at 
the terminal gate price. Access can only be denied in specified 
circumstances.126
Probably in an attempt to thwart a similar legislative response in other parts 
of the country and nationally, the oil majors have also introduced their own 
voluntary terminal gate pricing arrangements. In February 2002, Shell 
introduced terminal gate pricing arrangements in all states and the Northern 
Territory, except in Victoria and Western Australia.127 Similarly, Caltex 
introduced terminal gate pricing arrangements in May 2002 in the same 
states as Shell and the Northern Territory.128 BP introduced terminal gate 
pricing arrangements in June 2002 in Adelaide, Brisbane and Sydney.129 In 
December 2002 the Western Australian Government introduced a similar 
terminal gate pricing system in Western Australia to that operating in 
Victoria, replacing its maximum wholesale price arrangements.
The Commonwealth Government implemented a national terminal gate 
pricing regime mandating price transparency at the terminal gate throughout 
Australia as part of the new Oilcode code of conduct for the downstream 
petroleum industry that came into operation on 1 March 2007. The 
Commonwealth Treasury has argued that the Commonwealth Government’s
126 ibid., p. 51.
127 ibid., p. 5.
128 ibid., p. 5.
I2<) ibid., p. 5.
67
terminal gate pricing arrangements are not as prescriptive as the Victorian 
and Western Australia arrangements and will ensure that customers have the 
flexibility to negotiate individual supply agreements.130
2.7.6 Competition Issues and Law Enforcement
Competition within Australian markets is regulated by the competitive
conduct provisions of the TPA contained in Part IV. Part IV prohibits 
corporations from engaging in certain types of anti-competitive conduct 
described below in broad terms:131
• Agreements which have the purpose or likely effect of substantially 
lessening competition in a market are prohibited under section 45.
• Agreements between competitors which have the purpose of restricting 
the supply or acquisition of goods or services from particular persons or 
classes of persons, known as an exclusionary provision or primary 
boycott, are subject to a per se prohibition under section 45.
• Agreements that fix prices are subject to a per se prohibition under 
section 45A.
• Section 46 prohibits a corporation with a substantial degree of market 
power from taking advantage of that power for the purpose of 
eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor, preventing market 
entry, or deterring or preventing a person from engaging in competitive 
conduct.
1,0 Commonwealth Treasury (2006) Australian Treasury Submission to the Inquiry into the 
Price o f Petrol in Australia. Canberra, p. 18.
131 There is also equivalent state and territory legislation that prohibits the same types of 
conduct engaged in by non-corporations.
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• Section 47 prohibits exclusive dealing that has the purpose or effect of 
substantially lessening competition in a relevant market. A particular 
form of exclusive dealing, known as third line forcing which involves 
the supply of goods or services on conditions that the purchaser acquire 
goods or services from a particular third party, is subject to a per se 
prohibition.
• Section 48 is a per se prohibition against resale price maintenance which 
is the practice of specifying a minimum price below which goods or 
services may not be resold or advertised for resale.
• Section 50 prohibits mergers or acquisitions which would have the 
effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition in a 
substantial market for goods or services within Australia.
Responsibility for the administration and enforcement of Part IV resides 
with the ACCC (and previously with the TPC).
Under the authorisation and notification provisions contained in Part VII of 
the TPA, the ACCC has the power to grant immunity from legal 
proceedings for some arrangements or conduct that might otherwise be in 
breach of Part IV. In order to be granted authorisation, applicants must 
satisfy one of two tests depending on the conduct under consideration:
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• For agreements that may substantially lessen competition, the applicant 
must satisfy the ACCC that the agreement results in a benefit to the 
public that outweighs any anti-competitive effect.132
• For primary and secondary boycotts, third line forcing, resale price 
maintenance and mergers, the applicants must satisfy the ACCC that the 
conduct results in a benefit to the public such that it should be allowed
Ito occur. '
Exclusive dealing conduct (except for third line forcing) gams immediate 
and automatic immunity from legal proceedings under the TPA when 
notification of it is given to the ACCC.134 Immunity for third line forcing 
comes into effect at the end of a prescribed period from the time the ACCC 
receives the notice. The immunity for notification remains unless it is 
revoked by the ACCC.
In its administration and enforcement of Part IV of the TPA, the ACCC, and 
its predecessor, the TPC, have had a long and active history of engagement 
in the affairs of the downstream petroleum industry. The ACCC/TPC have 
litigated numerous matters involving the downstream petroleum industry for 
possible breaches of Part IV of the TPA, mostly for price fixing and resale 
price maintenance, with mixed success as illustrated in section 2.7.4 above.
132 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2003) Summary o f the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 -  and additional responsibilities of the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission under other legislation. Seventh Edition, Canberra, p. 56.
133 ibid., p. 56.
134 ibid., p. 57.
135 ibid., p. 57.
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In the latter half of 1990 the TPC alleged that petrol retailers in the Sydney 
metropolitan area had made an arrangement or arrived at an understanding 
with each other and with the Service Station Association (a New South 
Wales lobby group for petrol retailers affiliated to the MTAA) to fix, control 
or maintain prices, in breach of section 45 and 45A of the TPA. However, 
the action was dismissed in the Federal Court on the basis that the evidence 
did not justify a finding that the arrangement or understanding alleged in 
fact occurred.
In 1994 the TPC/ACCC instituted proceedings against Mobil, BP and Shell 
for allegedly colluding with each other on setting retail petrol prices. In 
this matter the ACCC alleged that from September 1991 to June 1992 that 
Mobil, BP and Shell had conveyed to each other information concerning 
proposed or anticipated petrol price changes at Melbourne and Sydney 
commission agent retail service station sites. The ACCC contended that the 
companies concerned would all increase their prices on receipt of this 
information. However, the Federal Court dismissed the claim in 1997 on the 
basis that the evidence presented of conversations didn’t support a price 
fixing arrangement.
In addition to litigation, the ACCC/TPC has also had other interactions with 
the downstream petroleum industry. The ACCC/TPC have scrutinised 
several mergers and acquisitions within the downstream petroleum industry 
for their compliance with section 50. In one of the most high profile merger
136 Trade Practices Commission v Sen’ice Station Association Ltd and Others (1992) 109 
ALR 465.
137 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Mobil Oil Australia and Ors 
(1997) ATPR1141-568.
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cases ot all time, the TPC sought court enforceable undertakings under 
section 87B of the TPA from the parties for not opposing the 1995 merger 
between Ampol and Caltex. Another example of ACCC involvement in the 
downstream petroleum industry is through the shopper docket schemes 
operated by Woolworths and Coles, which tie petrol discounts to grocery 
purchases, that are subject to notification for third line forcing.
If REAs had an anti-competitive purpose and/or effect, their legality could 
have been challenged under section 45. If section 45 had contained a per se 
prohibition against all horizontal agreements between market competitors 
then REAs would have been illegal. The 1993 Hilmer report into National 
Competition Policy considered the policy question as to whether all 
horizontal agreements between market rivals should be subject to a per se 
prohibition and rejected it on the grounds that a per se prohibition on all 
agreements between competitors would catch much economically efficient 
conduct.138
In a blaze of publicity, the ACCC raided 11 locations in Victoria and New 
South Wales, including the offices of Shell, Mobil and Caltex in April 2002 
following allegations of price fixing by a whistleblower. This investigation 
was later dropped by the ACCC in March 2003. A major issue considered 
by the TPA Review Committee established in 2002 were complaints that 
“the ACCC released information and made comments to the media that was 
neither balanced nor impartial and carried with it the danger that the 
corporation or individual involved might be denied procedural fairness in
138 Hilmer, F. G., Rayner, M. R. and Tapereil, G. Q. (1993) National Competition Policy: 
Report by the Independent Committee o f Inquiry. AGPS, Canberra, p. 48.
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proceedings yet to be determined”, conduct that has been labelled as trial by 
media,139 All four oil majors made submissions to the 2002 Trade Practices 
Act Review Committee outlining their concerns that the ACCC engaged in 
trial by media.
The ACCC rejected accusations it engaged in trial by media, asserting there 
was no basis for such claims.140 Further, the ACCC asserted that if oil 
companies had a bad reputation with the public, then this was the fault of
141the oil companies rather than the fault of the ACCC.
The 2003 report of the TP A Review Committee (Dawson report) 
recommended the ACCC should develop a media code of conduct in 
consultation with interested parties to govern its use of the media, 
particularly in relation to enforcement proceedings.142 Under this media 
code of conduct, the Dawson report further recommended the ACCC 
should: decline to comment on investigations; only comment on the 
commencement of court proceeding by way of a formal media release 
confined to stating the facts; and report the outcome of court proceedings in 
an accurate, balanced and consistent manner with the sole objective of 
ensuring public understanding of the court’s decision.143
Based on a lengthy period of competition law enforcement activity, 
perceptions by motoring consumers of anti-competitive conduct existing 
within the downstream oil industry are probably not totally without
139 Dawson, D., Segal, J. and Rendall, C. (2003) Review o f the Competition Provisions o f 
the Trade Practices Act. Canberra, p. 182.
140 Fels, A. (2002) The Review o f the Trade Practices Act and issues concerning the ACCC 
and the media. Speech to the National Press Club, Canberra, 31 July.
14^  ibid.
142 Dawson, D., Segal, J. and Rendall, C., op.cit., p. 189.
143 ibid., p. 190.
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foundation. Posner has observed that in a market where collusion is 
attractive there will be a history of attempts at express collusion, some of 
which may have been detected by competition law authorities.144 On this 
basis, Posner argues that an industry’s compliance with competition law 
provides some evidence as to whether the prevailing market structure of an 
industry is conducive to collusion and/or anti-competitive conduct.145 On 
the basis of Posner’s reasoning, the downstream petroleum industry is 
certainly vulnerable to collusion and anti-competitive conduct. An 
examination of what factors could make an industry vulnerable to collusive 
conduct is provided in Chapter 3.
2.7.7 Fuel Standards
New fuel specifications introduced on either a regional or national level 
have the potential to raise barriers to entry into wholesale markets thereby 
reducing the level of contestability and thus competition in the affected 
markets. This is particularly so if new fuel specifications are unique and 
align with the production capabilities of a local refiner or refiners.146 Such 
fuel specifications offer local refiners a degree of protection from imports 
from interstate as well as from overseas, and may require fuel to be 
specially produced to meet unique state-specifications which are likely to 
add to production costs.147
144 Posner, R. (1976) Antitrust Law: An Economic Approach. The University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, p. 61.
I4> It should be noted that Posner draws no distinction between tacit collusion and overt 
collusion, and has contended that tacit collusion should be subject to sanction under 
competition law along with overt collusion.
14,1 Department of the Environment and Heritage (2000) National Fuel Quality Standards: 
Regulation Impact Statement. Canberra.
147 ibid.
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The impact arising from new fuel quality standards was described by the 
Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources in the following terms:
Tighter or differing fuel quality standards applying in some 
jurisdictions have enabled higher relative values to be ascribed to
148product that meet these specific requirements.
The Queensland, Western Australian and South Australian Governments’ 
legislated to enact state specific fuel specifications, thereby reducing the 
contestability of their wholesale markets to fuel sourced from outside of 
their state. Similarly, the Commonwealth Government implemented a clean 
fuel agenda for petrol and diesel, the first part of which was announced in 
July 2001 and the second part announced in July 2004. These standards will 
be introduced progressively between 2002 and 2009.
In August 1999, the Western Australian Government announced new fuel 
specifications to apply in Western Australia to reduce the level of benzene 
and MTBE in petrol as from 1 January 2000.14M
After BP decided not to renew REAs in regard to its Kwinana refinery near 
Perth, Shell asserted that the new fuel specifications put BP in a monopoly 
supply situation in Western Australia and accused BP of taking advantage of 
this situation in order to raise its prices to supply competitors.150 According 
to Shell:
148 Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, Downstream Petroleum Industry 
Framework 2002, p. 22.
149 Court, R. (1999) Details of new fuel specification standards for Perth outlined. Media 
Release, Western Australian Premier, Minister for Public Sector Managements, and Federal 
Affairs, 2 August.
150 The Shell Company of Australia Limited (2001) Unique Fuel Quality Specifications 
Causes Higher Petrol Prices. Media Release, 31 December.
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Petrol prices will increase in Western Australia from January 1 as a 
result of price increases imposed by the local BP refinery on all its 
customers.
Shell spokesperson Ian McKenzie said “the reason for these price 
increases is that Western Australia has legislated unique fuel 
standards that differ from anywhere else in the world. Although the 
local BP refinery can manufacture petrol to this standard, most 
refineries in the Asia-Pacific region cannot.”
“This effectively places the local BP refinery in a monopoly 
situation. It is now very difficult to source reasonably priced imports 
to supply the WA market.”
“Shell’s cost of petrol is now 1.9 cents per litre higher in Perth than 
in other major cities as a direct result of the quality premium charged 
by BP. This quality premium is expected to increase over time.”151
BP wrote to the other Australian refiners in October 2001 informing them 
that it was withdrawing from the existing RE As as from the beginning of 
July 2002. “ As from 1 January 2002, BP required the other three refiners 
in Shell, Caltex and Mobil to pay a quality premium for the remaining 20 to 
30 per cent of their product requirements in Western Australia not covered 
through REAs.153 From 1 July 2002, BP would require all retailers to buy 
100 per cent of their product requirements from BP at the same formula.154
According to the Western Australian Government, all unleaded petrol 
supplied from the BP Kwinana refinery (after the replacement of REAs with
l5‘ ibid.
152 Platts Oilgram News (2001) BP Roils Australia’s Fuel Exchange Program. 9 November: 
1 .
15' Platts Oilgram News (2001) BP Maps End of Australian Fuel Swaps: Wants rivals to 
buy 20-30% of product at Jan 1. 3 December: 2.
154 Platts Commodity News (2001) BP Australia to terminate refinery exchange July 2002. 
30 November: 22.
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commercial buy-sell arrangements across Australia as from 1 July 2002) 
attracted a quality premium of approximately 1.7 cpl as a result of the 
Western Australian fuel quality standards, rising to 1.85 to 1.90 cpl after the 
impact of the GST was applied.155
Similar to Western Australia, the Queensland Government in February 2000 
announced new fuel specifications to reduce the amount of sulphur in 
petrol.156 The former independent fuel retailer Woolworths (before it 
entered into its joint retailing venture with Caltex) opined in 2001 that the 
independent importing terminal operating in Brisbane had been rendered 
ineffective due to the Queensland Government’s restrictive fuel 
standards.1?7 Similarly, the Chairman of the Independent Petroleum Group 
commented in 2005 that restrictive fuel standards introduced in Queensland 
had imposed a penalty on importing that had added to the retail price of 
petrol.158
On 1 March 2001, the South Australian Government enacted new 
environmental fuel standards.159 In response, Shell was scathing in its 
assessment of the new environmental fuel standards, claiming that it would
155 Government of Western Australia (2004) Final Progress Report: Implementing National 
Competition Policy in Western Australia. Perth, p. 59.
156 Welford, R. (2000) Boost For Air Quality From Government Fuel Initiative. Media 
Release, Queensland Environment and Heritage/Natural Resources Minister, 7 February.
157 Woolworths Limited (2001) Submission to Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission on: Reducing Fuel Price Variability. Sydney.
158 Impact o f Petrol Pricing Select Committee (2005) Transcript of Proceedings at Yeronga 
on Monday, 28 November 2005, at 9.31am. Queensland Parliament, Brisbane, pp. 1-3.
159 Evans, I. (2001) Clean Fuel Policy Starts Today. Media Release, South Australian 
Environment Minister, 1 March.
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lead to higher petrol prices in South Australia than was the case in the rest 
of the country.160 According to Shell:
Until yesterday, the South Australian fuel market could be supplied 
by a wide range of domestic and international refineries. Yesterday’s 
intervention by the South Australian Government has changed local 
fuel quality specifications so that only the Mobil Port Stanvac 
refinery can cost effectively supply local needs.
This substantially reduces competition from interstate and overseas 
refineries. Mobil has responded by increasing its refinery price for 
fuel, even though the fuel quality has not changed. Shipping fuel into 
Adelaide from alternative sources could cost up to five cents per litre 
more.
This means that our customers in South Australia will ultimately pay 
more for their petrol.161
Caltex was also critical of the new fuel specifications, claiming that it had 
made Mobil “a monopoly supplier”.162 Shortly after the new fuel 
specifications were introduced, the Royal Automobile Association of South 
Australia claimed that the policy had resulted in an increase of retail petrol 
prices by 2 cpl, which would equate to an extra $20 million out of the 
pockets of South Australian motorists each year.163
In July 2001, the Commonwealth Government announced the first part of
new national fuel standards. Possibly the most significant change associated
with these new national fuel standards was the limit imposed on the amount
of MTBE and olefins allowed in petrol that came into effect as from 1
l(’° The Shell Company of Australia Limited (2001) Petrol Prices Fall Except in South 
Australia. Media Release, 2 March.
161 ibid.
162 The Australian (2001) Shell jobs fear over clean fuel. 6 March: 7.
163 The Advertiser (2001) Clean fuel ‘costing us 2c a litre. 10 March: 13.
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January 2004.164 While domestic refiners had phased out the use of MTBE, 
it was still commonly used in Asian refineries. According to news reports, 
only five out of forty refineries focusing on producing petrol in Asia and the 
Arab Gulf were able to meet the new Australian specification.I6>
Independent fuel wholesalers and retailers vigorously opposed the 
Commonwealth Government’s proposed new fuel specifications, arguing 
that it would leave Australian wholesale petrol markets solely dependent on 
the four domestic refiners for supply of product, thus leading to a 
diminution in the level of competition. According to former independent 
petrol retailer Woolworths, the consequences from banning MTBE in 
Australia petrol would have dire ramifications for competition:
If fuel containing MTBE was banned in Australia, the existing 
competition provided by [Woolworths] and other independent fuel 
outlets would disappear. This would return the market solely to the 4 
major multi-national oil companies, resulting in a severe lessening of 
competition from independents and petrol prices would rise 
significantly thus increasing cost to the motorist and businesses.166
News reports also suggested that petrol cargoes exported to Australia would 
be trading at a premium once the new Australian fuel specifications came 
into effect. Whereas petrol cargoes had traditionally been traded at a slight 
discount to the MOPS 95 RON specification, there were predictions that
164 Hill, R. (2001) Hill Announces National Fuel Standards. Media Release, Australian 
Government Minister for the Environment and Heritage, 15 July.
165 Platts Commodity News (2003) Australia’s gasoline imports to trade at premium due to 
new specs. 8 December.
166 Woolworth Limited (2002) Woolworths Plus Petrol and MTBE. 
http://www.woolworthlimited.com.au/news/factsheets/publicdocuments/18-01 -2002 a 
[Accessed 14 February 2005]
167 MOPS is an acronym which stands for Mean o f Platts Singapore and RON is an 
acronym which stands for Research Octane Number.
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petrol exported into the east coast of Australia would be trading at a 
premium ot $0.20 to $0.30 a barrel to the MOPS 95 RON specification as a 
result of the new Australian fuel specifications.168
In response to claims by Consumers Affairs Victoria (CAV) that wholesale 
petrol price margins had increased by at least 2.5 cpl between January 2003 
and April 2006, the AIP claimed that the CAV analysis did not take account 
of the more stringent Australian fuel quality standards. According to the 
AIP:
If the price effect of tougher fuel standards were taken into account 
it would be evident that wholesale margins have not increased since 
2003.169
Similarly, Caltex opined that tougher fuel standards had increased its 
relative wholesale petrol price by about 2.5 cpl since 2003.170
The decision by the Commonwealth Government to limit the amount of 
MTBE and olefins in petrol from the beginning of 2004, may have made 
Australian domestic wholesale petrol markets less contestable to imported 
sources of petrol, which has probably resulted in relatively higher wholesale 
and retail petrol prices.
2.8 Conclusion
The affairs of the downstream petroleum industry are a matter of 
longstanding public controversy in Australia. This controversy has arguably
l6S Platts Commodity News (2003) Australia’s gasoline imports to trade at premium due to 
new specs. 8 December.
169 Australian Institute of Petroleum (2006) Oil companies wholesale margins have not 
increased -  CAV report flawed. Media Release, 25 July.
170 Caltex Australia Limited, op.cit., p. 8.
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been a direct cause for the numerous regulatory interventions as well as 
investigations into the industry. In addition, the setting of retail petrol prices 
is a matter of considerable public interest, drawing commentary and 
reflections from political leaders and motoring organisations alike.
The observation that petrol is a homogeneous product lends itself to the 
conclusion that price must be the main basis on which competition occurs 
within the Australian downstream petroleum industry. This conclusion will 
enable the competitive effects of REAs to be tested through their impact on 
petrol prices that will be undertaken in Chapter 6.
81
Chapter 3: Market Power 
3.1 Introduction
Following on from Lemer, market power has commonly been defined as the 
ability tor a firm to profitably raise the product price above its marginal 
cost. This Chapter will focus on market power issues relevant to the 
downstream petroleum industry.
Due to the restrictions imposed on the oil majors through the Sites Act there 
has been a high degree of vertical separation of the distribution and 
wholesaling level from the retailing level within the Australian downstream 
petroleum industry. In this Chapter the academic literature pertaining to 
vertical price relationships within the downstream petroleum industry will 
be examined. In Chapter 2, an apparent anomaly was identified with claims 
of price fixing and collusion often made against oil companies by politicians 
and motoring organisations appearing to be inconsistent and contradictory 
with claims of predatory pricing made by service station operators. The first 
part of this Chapter will explore this apparent anomaly and seek to provide a 
possible explanation for it. The explanation for this apparent anomaly will 
provide the theoretical underpinnings for the hypothesis testing carried out 
later in the study.
At the refining level as well as the distribution and wholesaling level the 
Australian downstream petroleum industry could be considered to be an 
oligopoly. This opinion has been expressed by Access Economics and Rose
171 Lemer, A. P. (1934) The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement o f Monopoly 
Power. The Review o f  Economic Studies 1, 157-175.
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and is consistent with the views of Walker and Woodward. “ Given this, an 
examination of oligopoly theory will assist in the consideration of whether 
REAs have an anti-competitive effect. Hence, the second part of this 
Chapter will also provide a review of the theoretical literature pertaining to 
oligopoly and the problem posed by the interdependency of market 
participants. In particular, it will focus on those conditions identified in the 
theoretical literature as likely to be conducive for rival firms to behave in a 
co-operative manner towards one another, thus leading to tacit collusion and 
an anti-competitive outcome.
3.2 Vertical Pricing Issues
The Sites Act imposed a high degree of vertical separation between the 
distribution and wholesaling level and the retailing level within the 
Australian downstream petroleum industry. However, the ACCC opined 
that the oil majors used contractual arrangements with franchisees in order 
to circumvent the intent of the Sites Act, resulting in effective de facto 
vertical integration. According to the ACCC:
effective vertical integration is achieved through a number of 
vertical arrangements, such as restrictive contracts, exclusive supply 
agreements and multi-site franchising, that ensure constancy of
1 7 ^demand through exclusive ties to one oil major.
While the oil majors may have been able to exercise considerable control 
over their franchisees through contractual arrangements, the prohibition on 
retail price maintenance contained in section 48 of the TPA prevented the
172 See: Access Economics, op.cit., p. 8; Rose, J. (1999) The ACCC and the Market Power 
of the Oil Majors -  Part 1. Trade Practices Law' Journal 7, 17-30, p. 18; Walker, J. and 
Woodward, L., op.cit., p. 33.
173 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Inquiry into the Petroleum 
Products Declaration, Vol. 1, p. 119.
17^
83
oil majors from exercising direct control over the price of petrol sold by 
their franchisees as well as from oil major branded dealer-owned sites. If 
Williamson is correct in his contention that vertical integration harmonises 
interests or reconciles differences between different functional levels within 
an industry, then the degree of vertical separation afforded to oil major 
franchisees and branded dealer-owned sites that enabled them to exercise a 
high degree of discretion in setting the retail petrol price may have created a 
potential source of conflict with their oil major franchisor/oil major 
supplier. ' Hart and Tirole have observed that “integration removes 
conflicts of interest about pricing”.175
The long history of disputation between the oil majors and their franchisees 
that was outlined in Chapter 2 would suggest that the interests of oil majors 
and their franchisees have not been closely aligned. One potential source of 
conflict between oil majors and their service station operators in franchisees 
and dealer-owned sites could be over the retail petrol price which could 
have implications for the exercise of market power.
Complaints from organisations representing service station operators about 
the retail pricing practices of the oil majors amounting to predatory pricing 
within the Australian downstream petroleum industry have become 
commonplace. Debate has raged over an exact definition of what conduct 
actually constitutes predatory pricing. According to Crane, the definition of
174 Williamson. O. (1971) The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure 
Considerations. The American Economic Review 61, 112-123, p. 117.
I7> Hart, O., Tirole, J. (1990) Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure. Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity, Microeconomics (1990), 205-276, p. 207.
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predatory pricing and its elements has long been, and continues to be,
176debated by the brightest economic and legal minds.
Yamey has observed that predatory pricing has been commonly defined as 
temporary selling, at prices below its costs, by a firm (or concerted group of 
firms) to drive out or crush a competitor. 177 Areeda and Turner have defined 
predatory pricing as “the deliberate sacrifice of present revenues for the 
purpose of driving rivals out of the market and then recouping the losses 
through higher profits earned in the absence of competition. According to
Areeda and Turner, predatory pricing would make little economic sense to a 
firm unless it possessed greater financial resources than its rivals and had a 
very high probability that the losses incurred in the predatory campaign 
would be exceeded by the profits to be earned after the rivals had been 
removed from the market. 179
Organisations representing service station operators have contended that the 
oil majors have embarked on a deliberate strategy of predatory pricing in 
order to force small business service station operators to exit the retail 
market. According to the PMAA:
The retail petroleum industry is unique in that it is the only industry 
where small business participants must directly compete with their 
own petroleum suppliers.
176 Crane, D. A. (2006) The Perverse Effects of Predatory Pricing Law. Regulation Winter 
2005/2006, 26-31, p. 28.
177 Yamey, B. S., op.cit., p. 129.
178 Areeda, P. and Turner, D. F. (1975) Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Harvard Law Review 88, 697-733, p. 698.
179 ibid., p. 698.
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As a result, manipulation and predatory behaviour in this unique 
industry is commonplace. 180
The MTAA has commented that it has “been concerned for many years 
about predatory behaviour” in retail petrol markets. 181
Once small business service station operators have been removed, it is 
maintained that the oil majors will be able to raise their retail prices to 
consumers as a consequence of diminished competition within retail petrol 
markets. According to the PMAA:
The major oil companies are able to sell petrol at a retail price lower 
than the wholesale price offered to other market participants. The 
result of this activity is that there are two wholesale prices, one for 
the passport holders of the oil companies, and one for the rest of the 
market. This practice is eliminating small businesses from this 
market. We believe this action is planned and deliberate. The long­
term benefits for the oil companies are incalculable. In contrast, the 
long-term costs for the Australian consumer will be horrific. 182
Similarly, the MTAA has opined in regard to retail petrol prices that:
MTAA strongly believes that a greater number and diversity of 
competitors is more likely to encourage retail price competition than 
a smaller number of highly vertically integrated larger 
competitors. 183
IH0 Independent Petroleum Marketers Association of Australia, op.cit., p. 5.
151 Motor Trades Association of Australia (2007) MTAA Welcomes Moves to Examine 
Petrol Pricing. Media Release, 15 June.
152 Independent Petroleum Marketers Association of Australia (2001) Response to 
Australian Competition & Consumer Commission Reducing Fuel Variability Discussion 
Paper. Melbourne, p. 2.
183 Motor Trades Association of Australia (2006) Submission to the Senate Economics 
Legislation Committee Inquiry into the price o f petrol in Australia. Canberra, p. 6.
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Concerns expressed by organisations representing retail service station 
operators that the oil majors are engaging in predatory pricing in order to 
drive them from the retail market so they can raise retail prices after their 
departure are not unique to Australia. Similar concerns have been raised in 
the United States regarding the conduct of vertically integrated oil refiners. 
Barron, Loewenstein and Umbeck observe that allegations of predatory 
pricing by large oil refiners have been made repeatedly by retail dealers’
184representatives who have advocated retail divorcement as a solution.
Blass and Carlton observe that proponents of divorcement as well as those 
seeking other restraints have argued that vertically integrated oil refiners can
i o r
and have driven their dealers out of business. According to Blass and 
Carlton:
One dominant theme is that the major oil companies discriminate 
against their own retail dealers by charging them too much for 
[petrol] either relative to the prices charged to independent 
wholesalers or relative to the retail prices set by company-operated 
stations...
Once retail competition from lessee dealers is eliminated, the 
company operations will harm consumers by raising prices. Critics 
conclude that only by imposing restrictions on the majors, 
specifically by preventing them from operating their own stations,
can these predatory practices be curtailed, thereby enhancing
186consumer welfare in the long run.
184 Barron, J. M., Loewenstein, M. A. and Umbeck, J. R. (1985) Predatory Pricing: The 
Case of the Retail Gasoline Market. Contemporary Policy Issues 3, 131-139, p. 131.
1X5 Blass, A. A. and Carlton, D. W. (2001) The Choice of Organisational Form in Gasoline 
Retailing and the Cost of Laws that Limit that Choice. Journal o f Law and Economics 
XLIV, 511-524, p. 521.
186 ibid., pp. 521-522.
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Claims regarding predatory pricing have commonly been cited as one of the 
main competition concerns arising from vertical integration. According to 
McGee and Bassett, it has often been contended that vertically integrated 
firms are able to engage in price squeezes which occur when a vertically 
integrated firm that faces competition at one level, reduces the spread 
between the input prices its competitors pay and the output prices they 
receive. On the other hand, Bork has argued that vertical integration does 
not confer any unique ability on firms to engage in a price squeeze as a 
monopolising technique.1,,x Bork has argued that a price squeeze is nothing 
more than a price-cutting campaign at one level, and that a nonintegrated 
firm can just as easily engage in this sort of conduct as the second level of a 
vertically integrated firm.IK; Similarly, Demsetz has opined that there is 
little theory to support the notion that vertical integration reduces 
competition substantially and that the presumption of vertical integration 
being associated with market foreclosure is highly speculative.190
Claims of predatory pricing within the downstream petroleum industry are 
not new. It was widely believed that the Standard Oil Company used 
predatory pricing as a monopolisation technique in order to obtain its 
dominance over the US downstream petroleum industry in latter part of the 
19th century and early part of the 20th century. According to Crane:
187 McGee, J. S. and Bassett, L. R. (1976) Vertical Integration Revisited. Journal o f Law 
and Economics 19, 17-38, p. 21.
ISS Bork, R. (1954) Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act: The Legal History of an 
Economic Misconception. University o f Chicago Law Review 22, 157-201, pp. 198-199.
189 ibid., p. 199.
190 Demsetz, H. (1992) How Many Cheers for Antitrust’s 100 Years? Economic Inquiry 30, 
207-217, pp. 215-216.
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Among the evils attributed to ... Standard Oil was underpricing 
rivals to maintain a monopoly in oil production. 191
McGee observes that the largest number of complaints regarding the price 
cutting conduct of the Standard Oil Company came from petroleum product
1 92wholesalers and retailers (who were selling kerosene at that time).
However, McGee dismisses claims that the Standard Oil Company ever 
sought to obtain a monopoly over retailing on the basis that it was less 
logical and less consistent with the available facts. Through its dominance 
over the refining sector, McGee contends it was in the interests of the 
Standard Oil Company to keep the retailing sector as efficient and highly 
competitive as possible and exercise any market power at the refining 
level. 194 According to McGee, the Standard Oil Company evidently 
concluded that its interests could usually best be served by letting someone 
else perform the retailing function. 195
Where the possession of market power is profitable for a firm, McGee 
opines that it is far easier to obtain market power through acquisition rather 
than engage in predatory pricing unless there are legal restraints preventing 
acquisition. This is because in order to undercut rival firms on price to lure 
customers away from those rivals, a firm must be prepared to service all 
customers. On this basis, McGee concludes that any firm engaging in
191 Crane, D. A., op.cit., p. 26.
192 McGee, J. S. (1958) Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case. Journal o f  
Law and Economics 1, 137-169, p. 157.
193 ibid., p. 160.
194 ibid., p. 160.
195 ibid., pp. 160-161.
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predatory pricing as a means to obtain market power will end up selling 
more, and therefore losing more, than their rivals. 196
While McGee concedes that it is conceivable that a firm may engage in 
predatory pricing to secure market power, he expresses scepticism that it 
would pay the firm to do so since acquisition is both cheaper and more 
reliable. Furthermore, where entry into a market is quick and relatively 
easy McGee contends that it would be foolish to try to obtain market power
1 Qßthrough predatory pricing.
However, Posner contends that McGee’s proposition that acquisition is a 
more effective avenue to obtain market power than predatory pricing is 
valid only if mergers are assumed to be legal. 199 Posner points out that given 
mergers designed to create market power have generally been rendered 
illegal and given the difficulty of establishing predatory pricing even if it is 
illegal, predatory pricing may in fact still be a cheaper means of achieving 
market power than acquisition.200 In the Australian context, the operation of 
the Sites Act has probably been the major obstacle preventing the oil majors 
from becoming fully vertically integrated.
Posner points out that predatory pricing is an exclusionary practice that 
requires the cooperation of the customer to succeed." In this instance, 
Posner observes that customers may not be sufficiently informed or far­
sighted to realise the cost of taking advantage of the temporarily lower
196 ibid., p. 140.
197 ibid., p. 143.
198 ibid., p. 142.
190 Posner, R., op.cit., p. 185.
200 ibid., p. 185.
201 ibid., p. 184.
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price, or may decide to act as a free rider, taking advantage of the lower 
price in the hope that the refusal of other customers to do the same will 
cause the predator’s campaign to fail.202 Overall, Posner arrives at the 
conclusion that predatory pricing cannot be dismissed as inevitably an 
irrational practice.203
However, scepticism has been expressed regarding claims of predatory 
pricing within petrol retailing in the United States, with the view expressed 
that the pursuit of such business strategies are nonsensical. According to 
Blass and Carlton:
Although the believability of a predation strategy is always 
problematic, it is particularly difficult here to understand the 
economic logic of the predation hypothesis. There is no compelling 
evidence of retail market power in many, if not most, geographic 
areas: entry is easy, competitors are numerous, and brand value is 
not believed to be significant. In such circumstances, there is no 
reason to expect that an integrated refiner could benefit from driving 
out its lessee dealers unless lessee dealers are inefficient, and there is 
no reason to expect consumers to be harmed.204
Similarly, Vita has also expressed scepticism regarding predatory pricing in 
US petrol retailing:
The theory is difficult to reconcile with economic analysis. Predation 
normally is thought of as an action taken against a rival for the 
purpose of eliminating that rival competitor. Thus, it is possible to 
imagine one refiner engaging in predation against another refiner, or 
a retailer preying upon a rival retailer. But it would make little sense
202 ibid., pp. 184-185.
203 ibid., p. 186.
204 Blass, A. A. and Carlton D. W., op.cit., p. 522.
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for a refiner to prey upon its affiliated retailers. These retailers are 
not the refiner’s competitive constraint; other refiners are. Even a 
refiner possessing substantial market power has no incentive to drive 
its efficient dealers out of business -  to the contrary, refiner profits 
will be maximised only when wholesale and retail distribution is 
efficient.205
Barron, Loewenstein and Umbeck tested the hypothesis of whether oil 
refining company operated retail service station sites in the United States 
were engaging in predatory pricing directed against other service station 
retailers in the US state of Maryland.206 They contended that after retail 
divorcement laws were passed in Maryland but before they took effect, oil 
refiners would have no incentive to use company-operated retail service 
stations to engage in predatory pricing since no potential monopoly profits 
could be extracted in the future.207 On this basis, Barron, Loewenstein and 
Umbeck reasoned that retail petrol prices should rise at oil refining company 
retail service station sites after the divorcement laws were passed but before 
they took effect if oil refiners were indeed engaged in predatory pricing. 
However, they found no evidence in support of predatory pricing in the 
retail petrol market and concluded that the reported distress of retail service 
station operators must be due to other factors.208
Based on a study of the impact of sales-below-cost laws on retail petrol 
prices among 40 cities across the United States, Anderson and Johnson 
concluded that the structure of the retail petrol market did not appear to be
205 Vita, M. G. (2000) Regulatory Restrictions on Vertical Integration and Control: The 
Competitive Impact of Gasoline Divorcement Policies. Journal o f Regulatory Economics 
18, 217-233, pp. 217-218.
206 Barron, J. M., Loewenstein, M. A. and Umbeck, J. R., op.cit.
201 ibid., p. 132.
208 ibid., p. 138.
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conducive to successful predatory pricing practices and that laws designed 
to eliminate such practices had resulted in increased prices for consumers.204
In 2002, the FTC commented that it had found no evidence that predatory 
pricing occurs in petrol retailing in the United States:
Since 1996, the Commission has extensively investigated the pricing 
practices of virtually every major oil company, and Commission
staff have found no convincing evidence of predatory pricing in the
? 10retail [petrol] market.
In the Australian context, the Industry Commission cast serious doubt on the 
ability of the oil majors to successfully engage in predatory pricing against 
retail service station operators. According to the Industry Commission:
Even if predatory pricing were successful in fending off a competitor
(or a potential competitor), there would be no guarantee that, first, it
would be possible to engineer a co-ordinated industry response to
raise -  and sustain -  prices to allow earlier losses to be re-couped
and, second, that the higher prices would not attract new entrants
• 2 11which would increase supply and drive prices down again."
Based on its analysis o f retail petrol price data from the early 1990s coupled 
with the risks associated with predatory pricing, the Industry Commission 
expressed doubt regarding allegations of predatory pricing conduct by the 
oil majors.
209 Anderson, R. W. and Johnson, R. N. (1999) Antitrust and Sales-Below-Cost Laws: The 
Case of Retail Gasoline. Review o f Industrial Organisation 14, 189-204, p. 203.
210 Federal Trade Commission (2002) Letter to the Honourable Robert F. McDonnell, 
Commonwealth o f Virginia, House o f  Delegates, Richmond, VA, by the Bureau o f  
Competition and the Office o f Planning. Washington DC, 15 February.
211 Industry Commission, op.cit., pp. 74-75.
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If the oil majors have been engaged in predatory pricing then it appears they 
have been waiting in vain for a considerable period of time in order to reap 
the profit windfall gained when all independent retailers have all finally 
been removed from the retail market. Under these circumstances, it is not 
unreasonable to conclude that the oil majors have probably not been 
engaged in predatory pricing and that there could be some other motivating 
factor to explain the pricing behaviour of the oil majors that is causing 
concern amongst retail service station operators.
Another possible explanation for the alleged predatory pricing behaviour of 
oil companies in the United States has been identified by Shepard who has 
suggested that imperfect competition at the retail level within the 
downstream petroleum industry can lead to double marginalisation.212 
Double marginalisation, which was identified by Spengler, occurs wherever 
there is any market power exercised at successive vertical stages of 
production.“ If market power is exercised at successive vertical stages of 
production, for example in petrol at the distribution and wholesale level and 
the retail level, then the petrol wholesaler will mark up the product in order 
to make a profit and the petrol retailer will then take the wholesale price and 
mark it up again. This double mark up on the product leads to lower total 
sales and lower total profit than if wholesaler and retailer were vertically 
integrated. An additional mark up at the retail level reduces total sales and 
profit at the wholesale level. On this basis, Spengler concluded that vertical
212 Shepard, A., op.cit., p. 427.
212 Spengler, J. J. (1950) Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy. Journal o f Political 
Economy 58, 347-352.
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integration serves to make price structures and factor allocation more ideal 
than they otherwise would be in an imperfectly competitive world.214
Rather than engaging in predatory pricing in order to drive retailers from 
retail petrol markets, an alternative explanation for the pricing conduct of 
the oil majors is that they are doing everything in their power to drive the 
retail petrol price down towards marginal cost in order to maximise profits.
If the oil majors want to exercise market power at a wholesale level, then it 
will be detrimental to their profit maximising interests to have retail service 
station operators attempting to exercise market power at the retail level as it 
will result in double marginalisation.
Borenstein and Bushnell have opined that there is some empirical evidence 
to suggest that double marginalisation is a real concern in the US 
downstream petroleum industry.“ According to Borenstein and Bushnell, 
studies of petrol prices in US states that have divorcement laws that find that 
retail petrol prices are higher in those states provides anecdotal evidence 
that double marginalisation occurs in the downstream petroleum industry.“ 
Barron and Umbeck found that following the introduction of retail 
divorcement laws in Maryland which gave retail service station operators
9 1 7 .the power to set retail petrol prices that retail petrol prices increased.“ Vita 
tested the impact of divorcement laws comparing petrol prices in
214 ibid., p. 351.
215 Borenstein, S. and Bushnell, J. (2005) Retail Policies and Competition in the Gasoline 
Industry. Center for the Study of Energy Markets Working Paper 114, University of 
California Energy Institute, Berkeley, p. 9.
216 ibid., p. 9.
217 Barron, J. M. and Umbeck, J. R. (1984) The Effect of Different Contractual 
Arrangements: The Case of Retail Gasoline Markets. Journal o f Law and Economics 27,
313-328.
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divorcement and nondivorcement US states and found that divorcement 
regulation increased retail petrol prices.218
Given that the Australian downstream petroleum industry is organised along 
very similar lines to that in the United States, it is possible that double 
marginalisation could also be an issue for the oil majors which they will 
seek to prevent. In regard to the Australian downstream petroleum industry, 
Rose has argued that the oil majors want to avoid any problems arising from 
double marginalisation:
The oil majors do not want a retail er/franchisee cartel as an 
intermediary with the consumer. The oil majors will gain nothing... 
Market power in a downstream sector would introduce the chain of 
monopolies problem which is detrimental to the interests of up­
stream suppliers as well as consumers. The higher prices charged by 
colluding dealers and franchisees would reduce demand for the 
refined product and thus cut the profits of the oil majors.2 ' 9
In order to minimise the prospect of double marginalisation, Rose contends 
that the oil majors would seek to maximise competition amongst firms 
operating at the retail level. Rose asserts that the oil majors achieve this 
outcome through utilising multiple sources of distribution for petrol such as
franchisees, company-owned sites, commission agent sites, as well as
221independents in order to minimise distribution and retailing costs.
Through utilising multiple sources of distribution for petrol, Rose observes
218 Vita, M., op.cit.
219 Rose, J., op.cit., pp. 18-19.
220 ibid., p. 19.
221 ibid., p. 19.
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that the oil majors are able to prevent their own franchisees from attempting 
to collude.222
Support for the proposition that the price of petrol at the retail level is driven 
down to marginal cost also comes from Caltex, Shell and BP who all 
informed the Independent Competition and Regulatory Commission (ICRC) 
of the Australian Capital Territory in 2001 that retail service stations did not 
make much profit from selling fuel and often made a loss. Similarly, 
independent wholesaler Trafigura told the ICRC in 2001 that the lack of 
profitability was the reason why it was not interested in owning retail 
service station sites in Australia.224
It is in the interests of the oil majors to push the retail price of petrol down 
to marginal cost in order to avoid double marginalisation and the resulting 
reduction in sales and profit. The frequent and persistent claims and 
accusations from organisations representing service station operators that 
the oil majors are engaging in predatory pricing arguably provides anecdotal 
evidence that the oil majors are behaving in a manner consistent with 
preventing double marginalisation through pushing the retail price of petrol 
down to marginal cost. The concerns expressed by service station operators 
may reflect dissatisfaction that they are only able to earn a competitive rate
7 7  c
of return and are not able to earn any economic profit.
222 ibid., p. 19.
223 Independent Competition and Regulatory Commission (2001) Final Report: Inquiry into 
Motor Vehicle Fuel Prices. Canberra, p. 16.
224 ibid.
^  If economic profits are zero then a firm is only earning the opportunity cost of its factors 
of production -  the value of the inputs in their next best alternative use.
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Rather than engaging in predatory pricing, the oil majors are probably doing 
everything within their power to ensure that the retail price of petrol is as 
close to marginal cost as it can possibly get. On this basis, the nature of 
competition within retail petrol markets would approximate perfect 
competition where price is equated to marginal cost. The implication of this 
finding is that retail petrol prices will convey information regarding the 
oligopolistic interactions of participants in wholesale petrol markets.
3.3 Oligopoly Theory
An oligopoly is a market structure characterised by a few participants. There 
is no single determinate solution to the problem of oligopoly with many 
possible outcomes being postulated. The range of solutions runs the full 
gamut of possible outcomes from that reminiscent of a perfectly competitive 
market to that of a monopoly.
The reason why there is no single unique solution to the problem posed by 
oligopoly is because of the interdependency of market participants. For an 
individual oligopolist the quantity of product which they are capable of 
selling at any given price is dependent on the price charged by their 
competitors, which in turn is affected by the price set by the individual 
oligopolist in the first instance.226 On this basis, it is not possible for an 
individual oligopolist to derive a demand function for themselves based 
only on information pertaining to buyers’ preferences.227 An individual 
oligopolist also needs to know, in turn, how its competitors will respond to
1 6 Fellner, W. (1949) Competition Among the Few. Alfred A. Knoff, New York, p. 11. 
227 ibid., p. 11.
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the prices they set or the amount of product which they have available to 
sell.
The early part of the development of oligopoly theory was dominated by 
debate over the relative merits of alternative solutions for duopoly offered 
by Cournot as compared to Bertrand and Edgeworth.
The first theory of oligopoly/duopoly is attributed to Cournot.“" In this 
model there were two producers of the same product in competition with 
each other who possessed identical costs of production. The critical 
behavioural assumption was that each producer would set a level of 
production independently of the other producer in order to maximise their 
level of profit, whilst assuming that the production of the other producer 
would remain constant. Each producer would then keep adjusting their level 
of production in response to adjustments made by the other producer until 
such time as an equilibrium position was reached, whereby the production 
of each producer was equal. Once a stable equilibrium position had been 
established, if either of the producers departed from it temporarily, they 
would eventually be brought back to this stable equilibrium position through
9 9 9
a series of reactions, constantly declining in amplitude. "
The main conclusions reached by Cournot in his treatment of two duopolists 
competing against each other is that the supply price would be higher than 
under perfect competition and that a stable equilibrium would prevail, with 
both duopolists supplying a determinate quantity of product. Although
228 Cournot, A. (1838) Research into the Mathematical Principles o f the Theory o f Wealth. 
Translated by Nathaniel T. Bacon, The Macmillan Company, New York.
219 ibid., p. 81.
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Cournot recognised that both producers could increase their respective 
profits by cutting back on output until it reached the monopoly level, he 
contended that this would only occur in the event of a formal agreement 
being struck between the two producers.
Coumof s solution to the problem of duopoly was criticised by Bertrand.230 
Bertrand reinterpreted Coumof s adjustment process between the two 
producers back to equilibrium as meaning that “one of the competitors will 
lower his price to attract buyers, and that the other, in order to bring them 
back, will lower his [price] by more” .231 This process would then continue 
“until each of them would no longer gain anything more by lowering his 
price”. “ Bertrand’s objection to Cournot’s adjustment process was that a 
solution was impossible to reach through such an arrangement because the 
price reduction would have no limit. In the event that a jointly determined 
price was adopted, Bertrand contended that if only one of the producers 
lowers their price for the product, they will gain all of the sales and double 
their returns in the event that the other producer allows them to do so. On 
this basis, Bertrand argued that Cournot’s assumption that the level of 
production is the one independent variable entirely under the control of the 
producer was wrong, when it was in fact the price. The main conclusion to 
be drawn from Bertrand is that a stable equilibrium will never exist between 
two duopolists as there is no limit to the fall in the price of the product.
23(1 Bertrand, J. (1883) Review of ‘Theorie mathematique de la richesse social’ and 
‘Recherches sur les principes mathematiques de la theorie des richesses. Journal des 
Savants 67, 499-508, English Translation by James W. Friedman reprinted in Daughety, A. 
F. (ed.) (1988) Cournot Oligopoly: Characterization and Applications. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 73-81.
231 ibid., p. 77.
232 ibid., p. 77.
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Bertrand also criticised Cournot for rejecting the possibility that the two 
producers may collude and set a common price. According to Bertrand, it 
would be in the interests of both producers to fix a common price as this 
would deliver the greatest possible profit.
Similar to Bertrand, Edgeworth contended that when there were two 
producers dealing with competitive groups, then the equilibrium solution 
would be indeterminate.233 Edgeworth maintained that Cournot was 
incorrect in his conjecture that the action of economic forces amongst two 
producers “would tend to a definite position of equilibrium, a determinate 
set of values” .234 According to Edgeworth, this instability was not merely 
due to the desire of one of the producers to ruin their rival through 
undercutting them on the supply price to the market, it also arose from one 
of the producers seeking to maximise their level of profit.
Edgeworth took the model used by Cournot of two producers making an 
identical product. The major alteration made by Edgeworth to the model 
was through the imposition of a capacity constraint upon both producers, 
whereby each producer had a fixed limit as to the amount of product they 
could supply to the market. Like Cournot, Edgeworth assumed that each 
producer behaved independently in trying to maximise their own level of 
profit.
As a starting point, Edgeworth assumed that each producer began by setting 
a price level that would maximise their profit in the event that the market
233 Edgeworth, F. Y. (1897) The Pure Theory of Monopoly. Giornale degli Economisti, 
reprinted in Edgeworth, F. Y. (1925) Papers Relating to Political Economy. Macmillan and 
Co. Limited, London, 111-142.
234 ibid., p. 136.
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was evenly divided up between both producers or that the two producers 
behaved as if they were acting in combination. At this initial point, 
Edgeworth argued that it would be in the interests of one of the producers, 
say producer 2, to lower their price by just a little amount so as to attract 
their rival’s customers. Through undercutting producer 1 by just a little 
amount and by producing up to their maximum capacity, producer 2 could 
increase their level of profit. Although producer 2 would not be able to 
supply the entire level of demand at the newly lowered supply price because 
of their capacity constraint, they would still be able to deprive producer 1 of 
a large part of their customer base. However, producer 1 would then follow 
suit by setting a still lower price.
Through successive steps of producer 1 and producer 2 undercutting each 
other on the supply price, the price would eventually fall to a level such that 
neither producer could increase its level of production because the output of 
both producers was equal to their combined capacity constraint. Although 
Edgeworth recognised that it was certainly not in the interests of either 
producer to lower the supply price any further, he maintained that this point 
did not constitute an equilibrium because it was then in the interests of both 
producers to raise the supply price from this point.
At the lowest possible price set by say producer 2, producer 1 would have 
the opportunity to serve the remainder of the market at a price most 
advantageous to them. In this instance producer 1 need not be concerned by 
the actions of producer 2 because producer 2 was already producing at the 
level of their capacity constraint and had thrown its entire supply on to the
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market. In tum, the best that producer 2 could do would be to follow the 
lead set for it by producer 1 and raise its price in turn.
Edgeworth speculated that the supply price adjustment process on its way 
down may not in fact reach the lowest price possible. This was because one 
of the producers could realise during the downward price adjustment 
process that it may be more advantageous for them to supply “that 
remainder of customers of which he cannot be deprived by his rival (owing 
to the [other producer’s] limitation of supply)”.235 Edgeworth postulated that 
long before the lowest price point was reached, it may be more profitable 
for one of the producers to raise the supply price charged rather than lower 
it any further.
Edgeworth concluded that the price charged by the two producers would be 
in perpetual motion between two points: the maximum price charged that 
would correlate to the point where the two producers behaved as if they 
were in combination with each other and divided up the market equally 
between them; and the minimum price point where it was in the interests of 
neither producer to lower the supply price any further because they could 
not gain any more profit from doing so and could not supply any of the 
additional demand created in any event.
The second part of the development of oligopoly theory saw the move away 
from arguments over the relative merits of competing models of duopoly 
through the development of more elaborate models.
235 ibid., p. 120.
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Hotelling was critical of the prevailing presumption of an essential 
instability within duopoly.236 Instead, Hotelling contended that the 
independent actions of two competitors could indeed lead to an equilibrium 
position much less fragile than had been generally presumed.
According to Hotelling, implicit within the prevailing models of duopoly 
was that all buyers would only deal with the cheapest seller of a product, 
which in turn would lead to an indeterminate solution and instability. On the 
other hand, Hotelling argued this type of instability would “disappear when 
the quantity sold by each [seller] is considered as a continuous function of 
differences in price’1.“37 Instead, Hotelling contended that if a seller raised 
their price relative to its competitor, then they would gradually lose business 
to their rival over time but would not lose all of its business instantaneously. 
It was maintained that some buyers would still prefer to trade with the 
higher priced seller for any number of reasons, particularly where 
transportation costs were lower than in dealing with another seller.
In Hotelling’s model, it was assumed that buyers of a commodity were 
uniformly distributed along a line and that no customer had any preference 
for one of two sellers except on the basis of price plus transportation costs 
being lower. It was also assumed that each seller adjusted their price so that, 
with the existing value of the other seller’s price, their own profit would be 
maximised. An equilibrium position would eventually be reached because it 
was not possible for either seller to increase profit by changing their price.
36 Hotelling. H. (1929) Stability in Competition. The Economic Journal 39, 41-57. 
237 ibid., p. 44.
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A further modification introduced into the model was giving each seller the 
ability to choose their location along the line. This would lead to the 
outcome that both sellers would cluster in the middle of the line in order to 
maximise their business reach, rather than distribute themselves at socially 
optimal points in order to minimise transportation costs accruing to 
customers. From this result, Hotelling drew the observation that “buyers are 
confronted everywhere with an excessive sameness”.“' However, if a new 
seller chose to sell a product exactly like one already on the market, then 
they risked triggering off a price cutting war as described by Bertrand. On 
the other hand, Hotelling asserted that “there is an incentive to make the 
new product very much like the old, applying some slight change which will 
seem an improvement to as many buyers as possible without ever going far 
in this direction” .239
Chamberlin was critical of the prevailing solutions to the problem of 
duopoly and oligopoly because they did not conform “to the hypothesis that 
each seller acts so as to render his profit a maximum” .240 In order for a 
producer to maximise profit in an oligopoly situation, Chamberlin 
contended that a producer would need to take account of their total 
influence upon the prevailing selling price of the product. This included 
both the direct as well as the indirect effect. Chamberlin reasoned that when 
a producer made a direct effect on the selling price of a product by changing 
the selling price, which would in turn elicit a countennove on the part of a
238 ibid., p. 54.
239 ibid., p. 54.
240 Chamberlin, E. H. (1948) The Theory o f Monopolistic Competition. Sixth Edition, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, p. 46.
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rival producer, it would be stupid for that producer to ignore the likely 
countermove or indirect effect in determining their initial course of action.
Chamberlin further contended that if each producer sought to maximise 
their profit rationally and intelligently, they would realise where there were 
only two or a few sellers, that any move on their part would have a 
considerable effect upon their competitors. Hence, it was unlikely that a 
producer was going to accept losses imposed upon them through the actions 
of another producer without retaliation. On this basis, it was asserted that 
since a price cut by any producer would inevitably reduce the profits for 
each producer, producers would in turn be disinclined to reduce their selling 
price and the equilibrium result would be the same as if all the producers 
had combined to form a monopoly. Therefore, Chamberlin concluded that 
when producers collectively took account of their total influence upon the 
selling price, then the outcome was always reminiscent of a monopoly 
situation.
Fellner devised a quasi-bargaining solution to the problem of oligopoly 
when there is no explicit cartel agreement between parties.241 Instead of 
engaging in explicit negotiations in order to arrive at a formal cartel 
agreement, under quasi-bargaining each party tries to find out from the 
responses of the other parties what the ultimate consequences of its own 
patterns of behaviour are.242 According to Fellner, this process is very much 
like making offers and seeing whether they are either accepted or rejected.243 
From this process, each party tries to discover which tacit agreement or
241 Fellner, W., op.cit.
242 ibid., pp. 15-16.
243 ibid., p. 23.
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Convention is most favourable from its point of view while still being 
acceptable to others.244 Once a certain pattern of behaviour becomes 
established, it is as though an offer has been accepted.“ From this process 
of quasi-bargaining a quasi-agreement is struck between the parties. While 
an explicit cartel agreement requires direct contact between the parties, a 
quasi-agreement does not. Whereas a cartel agreement between parties 
results in collusion, Fellner describes the outcome arising from a quasi­
agreement as spontaneous co-ordination.
Similar to Fellner, Kaysen outlined his mutual dependence theory of 
oligopoly, whereby firms could adopt a common course of action in the 
market in order to maximise their collective profits without engaging in a 
formal price fixing arrangement.246 In this case, each firm would recognise 
their interdependence and that any action they took would have 
repercussions through the actions of rival firms. Kaysen asserted each rival 
firm would realise that any price cut would be matched by their rivals, and 
that they could not continue to undersell rivals by cutting prices indefinitely. 
According to Kaysen, the recognition of this mutual dependence would 
mean that no machinery of reporting or enforcement would be necessary to 
secure adherence to a common goal as each rival would recognise that there 
was nothing to be gained by not conforming to it.
In Kaysen’s opinion, the determination of a common goal within an 
oligopoly, in order to arrive at a monopoly price in the absence of explicit
44 ibid., p. 16.
245 ibid., p. 23.
240 Kaysen, C. (1951) Collusion Under the Sherman Act 1. The Quarterly Journal o f  
Economics 65, 263-270.
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communication between the parties, came down to a question of probability. 
This probability increased given the fewer number of firms there were 
supplying a standard commodity, with no close substitutes in an economy 
where tastes and techniques changed little and slowly.
According to Kaysen, the recognition of mutual dependence amongst an 
oligopoly meant that rival firms must in any fixed market situation charge 
the same price for a standard commodity. In the absence of explicit 
communication between the parties in order to arrive at a common goal, 
Kaysen asserted that something else would form the basis of uniformity 
amongst the oligopoly. This was described as “an agreement to agree” .247
This was defined as the recognition by each firm that it may be more 
advantageous for them to follow a single judgment of the changing market 
situation (even though it was not their own and they may sometimes 
disagree with it), than to engage in the struggle which could arise if each 
firm attempted to enforce their own views. The upshot of this was that each 
firm sacrificed its exercise of independent judgment in the market in return 
for a greater degree of certainty as to what their rivals would do.
Kaysen concluded that long continued uniformity of action, taken over a 
period of changing market conditions, could be used to infer, with a high 
degree of certainty, at least the existence of an agreement to agree. Hence, it 
followed from this that parallel conduct by rival firms in an oligopoly could 
form the basis of an inference of collusion in this extended form.
247 ibid., p. 268.
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Another set of theories that have been postulated to explain the pricing 
behaviour within oligopolistic markets is price leadership. Stigler identified 
two different types of price leadership.248 The first was where the dominant 
firm set the price of the product, allowing the minor firms to sell whatever 
quantity of product they wanted at that price and supplying the remainder of 
the market. The second was where a firm was the first to announce price 
changes that were usually followed by the rest of the firms, even though the 
initiating firm may not occupy the dominant position in the market. Under 
this type of price leadership, labelled as barometric, the price leader 
commands adherence by rivals to the price set only to the extent that this 
price reflects market conditions with tolerable promptness.249
In addressing the question of circumstances that give rise to co-operative 
behaviour leading to tacit collusion within an oligopoly, Stigler was critical 
of the prevailing orthodoxy."^' Stigler argued that the prevailing theories of 
oligopoly assumed rather than deduced behaviour which he considered to be 
an unsatisfactory state of affairs:
A satisfactory theory of oligopoly cannot begin with assumptions 
concerning the way in which each firm views its interdependence 
with its rivals. If we adhere to the traditional theory of profit- 
maximising enterprises, the behaviour is no longer something to be
251assumed but rather something to be deduced.“
248 Stigler, G. J. (1947) The Kinky Oligopoly Demand Curve and Rigid Prices. The Journal 
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Rather than assuming the manner in which firms would behave, Stigler 
sought to identify what industry characteristics gave rise to collusion, as 
well as those that made it more difficult to achieve.
In his model, Stigler assumed that collusion takes the form of a joint 
determination ot output and price by ostensibly independent firms. Once the 
form of collusion had been agreed upon, the critical issue was to ensure the 
stability of the collusive agreement. This became an issue of enforcement, 
as it was recognised that any member of the agreement could maximise their 
own individual profit by undercutting other members on the agreed price.
To Stigler, enforcement of the agreement consisted of being able to detect 
significant deviations from the agreed-upon price. It was contended that 
price deviations would disappear once detected, as they would be matched 
by fellow conspirators if not subsequently withdrawn.
Stigler maintained that probably the most effective means of thwarting 
secret price reductions was to fix market shares amongst rivals. Through the 
inspection of output and an appropriate mechanism for the redistribution of 
gains and losses from deviations from the assigned quota, Stigler argued 
that the incentive to engage in secret price-cuts would be eliminated.
Another alternative means of eliminating secret price-cutting was to assign 
each buyer to a single seller. However, where the turnover of buyers was 
large this was recognised as impractical.
According to Stigler, an oligopolist would not consider making secret price 
cuts to buyers whose purchases fell below a certain size relative to their 
aggregate sales. From this, it was deduced that oligopolistic collusion would
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often be effective against small buyers even when it was ineffective against 
large buyers. This was Stigler’s first prediction from his model.
Stigler asserted that the detection of a secret price cut would be made as 
difficult as a cheating firm could possibly make it. The price cut could take 
some indirect form through modifying some non-price dimension of the 
transaction. In the absence of any other means of detecting price cutting, 
Stigler inferred that the basic method of detection must be that a firm was 
getting business to which it would not otherwise gain. Under Stigler’s 
definition of perfect collusion, no buyer changed sellers voluntarily, hence 
there was no competitive price-cutting if there was no shift of buyers 
amongst sellers. This led Stigler to his second prediction that collusion 
would always be more effective against buyers who report correctly and 
fully the prices tendered to them.
The absence of price competition through buyer loyalty leads Stigler to his 
third prediction, that collusion was severely limited (excluding the 
possibility of market sharing) when the significant buyers constantly change 
identity.
Stigler recognised that in the real world normal market conditions would 
consist of both stability and change. Hence, there may be a small rate of 
entry of new buyers as well as some shifting of customers even under an 
effective collusive agreement. These minor reasons for changing buyer 
allegiance could be lumped together under the category of random factors. 
According to Stigler, the key to distinguishing between random factors and 
secret price cutting to explain changing customer allegiance came down to
1 1 1
circumstantial evidence or probability. Stigler believed that there were three 
areas to examine for evidence of secret price-cutting:
1. The behaviour of a firm’s own old customers.
2. The attraction of old customers of other firms.
3. The behaviour of new customers.
In his model, Stigler calculated the maximum additional sales obtainable by 
secret price-cutting from any one rival beyond which a rival firm would 
infer that price cutting was actually taking place. Stigler also found that the 
pooling of information between rivals also substantially reduced the scope 
for secret price-cutting.
A key finding from Stigler’s model is that the aggregate gain in sales to a 
firm from secret price-cutting, thus its total incentive to cheat, is the sum of 
the gains from each rival firm, and is therefore increased roughly in 
proportion to the number of rival firms. In other words, the more rivals there 
are, the easier it is going to be to cheat on a collusive arrangement. Another 
important finding was that the incentive to cheat by secret price-cutting falls 
as the number of customers per seller increased. This reflected that the pay­
off from cheating diminished in the event that buyers are relatively small in 
the size of their overall purchases.
Stigler also extended his model to cover non-price variables as well, subject 
to two critical modifications. The first was that there had to be a definite 
joint profit-maximising policy upon which the rival firms could agree. 
According to Stigler, collusion was less feasible the less clear the basis on
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which it should proceed. The second was that the competitive moves of any 
firm would differ widely among non-price variables in their detectability by 
rivals. Thus, while some forms of non-price competition were easy to detect 
such as advertising, product quality and service, some variants of non-price 
competition could prove more elusive to detect.
Following on from Stigler, Posner has developed a two-stage typological 
approach for the detection of collusion within an oligopoly market, and 
draws no distinction between tacit or overt collusion.““  The first part 
involves the identification of those market conditions which make it 
predisposed towards collusion. The second part involves determining 
whether or not collusion is actually occurring.
Posner identifies several market conditions as rendering a market favourably 
predisposed towards collusion including the following:
1. Market concentrated on the selling side.
2. No fringe of small sellers.
3. Inelastic demand at the competitive price.
4. Many customers with no concentration on the buying side of the market.
5. Standard (homogeneous) product.
6. The principal firms sell at the same level in the chain of distribution.
7. Price competition is more important than other forms of competition.
2<2 Posner, R. A., op.cit.
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8. The industry’s competition law compliance record.
Posner then outlines several conditions exhibited in a market as providing 
evidence of collusive behaviour, including the following:
1. Fixed relative market shares.
2. Exchanges of price information between firms.
3. Demand elasticity at the market price.253
4. The possible inference of collusion from the presence or pattern of 
abnormally high profits.
Moving on from simple models of duopoly, oligopoly theory essentially 
became a theory about the dynamics of tacit collusion between rival firms. 
This was because many of the models of oligopoly were predicting that 
oligopoly resulted in some kind of co-ordinated conduct between firms, 
leading to a tacitly collusive outcome. Stigler’s major contribution, followed 
by Posner, was to challenge this general presumption. Instead, Stigler 
rigorously examined the conditions conducive to arriving at a tacitly 
collusive outcome that was later extended by Posner.
The most significant recent contribution to oligopoly theory has been the 
development of dynamic models taking a game-theoretic approach. 
Although earlier theories of oligopoly contained dynamic elements in their 
derivation, they treated the oligopoly problem in a static framework which 
ignored the time dimension.
" 3 Posner observes that a monopolist would never sell at a price where demand is inelastic 
as it could increase profits by reducing output and increasing the price.
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Nash made his contribution to game theory through the development of non­
co-operative games.264 Nash based his approach around the absence of 
coalitions by assuming that each player acts independently, without 
collaboration or communication with any other player. Friedman has argued 
that oligopoly is an example of a non-co-operative game because 
competition laws generally preclude legally enforceable agreements
255between rival firms.“
Through his development on the theory of non-co-operative games, Nash 
derived a non-co-operative equilibrium concept. A Nash equilibrium is a 
strategy profile such that every player’s strategy is a best response to the 
strategies of all other players.256 It requires that each player plays their best 
response and that expectations regarding the play of their rivals are 
correct.257 In a Nash equilibrium position, it is impossible for any single 
player to increase their payoff through the use of a different strategy, given 
the strategies of all the other players.
An important property of a Nash equilibrium is that no player can have any 
ex post regret.258 Given the strategies deployed by the other players, each 
player is doing as well as they can and no player has any incentive to change 
strategies even if they were given the opportunity to do so.
254 Nash, J. (1951) Non-Co-operative Games. Annals o f Mathematics 54, 286-95, reprinted 
in Daughety, A. F. (ed.) (1988) Cournot Oligopoly: Characterization and Applications. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 82-99.
255 Friedman, J. (1983) Oligopoly Theory. Cambridge University Press, New York, p. 209.
256 Church, J. and Ware, R. (2000) Industrial Organization: A Strategic Approach. Irwin 
McGraw-Hill, Boston, pp. 220-221.
251 ibid., p. 221.
™ ibid., p. 221.
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It was soon recognised that the Nash non-co-operative equilibrium solution 
was a generalisation of the duopoly solution originally derived by 
Cournot.“ The assumptions underpinning both the Nash non-co-operative 
equilibrium solution and the Cournot duopoly solution are exactly the same, 
in that each player is doing the best they can given the strategy engaged in 
by the other player or players. The practical implications of this means that 
the Cournot solution is also the Nash equilibrium in a one-shot (one period) 
game where quantities are used as the strategic variable by players.
Since Stigler (1964), oligopoly theory has been often viewed as the 
problems associated with enforcing a tacitly collusive agreement between 
market rivals. The success or otherwise of such enforcement in turn depends 
on the ability to detect and then punish any firm or firms that choose to 
deviate from the tacitly collusive agreement.
Game theory has demonstrated that players are likely to engage in more co­
operative strategies towards each other if they have repeated interactions 
than it they interacted only once. The significance of this result for 
oligopoly theory was first recognised by Friedman in relation to an infinitely 
repeated game or so-called supergame.260 Friedman contended that a 
Cournot solution was not an entirely satisfactory outcome when each firm 
must realise that a higher level of profits could be simultaneously obtained 
by each firm.
259 See: Hurwics, L. (1953) What Has Happened to the Theory of Games. The American 
Economic Review 43, 398-405, p. 402.
260 Friedman, J. W. (1971) A non-co-operative equilibrium for supergames. Review o f 
Economic Studies 38, 1-12, reprinted in Daughtety, A. F. (ed) (1988) Cournot Oligopoly. 
Characterization and Applications. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 142-157.
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Within Friedman’s model, a tacitly collusive outcome is driven by the 
removal of incentives for firms to cheat and deviate from the profit 
maximising position for the group as a whole. Although a firm can increase 
their single period profit for a period or so and may be tempted to do so, it is 
likely to be dissuaded by the response of the other firms who revert to a safe 
position as one in which no firm has any temptation to move for the sake of 
short term gain. Because of this, firms neither forego profit nor behave in a 
manner that exposes them to being double-crossedr Friedman offers up a 
couple of explanations as to how this tacitly collusive outcome could be 
supported. One explanation is that the market moves of firms are 
interpretable as messages. The other explanation is that tacit collusion 
occurs spontaneously, as all the firms recognise the shortsightedness of 
Cournot type behaviour and instead behave more co-operatively towards 
each other.
The result that a co-operative solution supporting a tacitly collusive 
outcome between rivals in an infinitely repeated game has since become
tagged as the folk theorem. The term folk theorem is employed because this
262result was widely conjectured before it was formally demonstrated.
Within Friedman’s model, no firm ever has an incentive to cheat and defect 
from behaving in a collusive manner because it becomes unprofitable to do 
so. However, Green and Porter develop their model with imperfect 
information, whereby it is possible for collusive behaviour to break down 
between rival firms not because of any cheating, but arising from falling
261 ibid., p. 157.
262 Baker, J. B. (1993) Two Sherman Act section 1 dilemmas: parallel pricing, the oligopoly 
problem, and contemporary economic theory. The Antitrust Bulletin 38, 143-219, p. 154.
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demand.263 It is assumed that the product is homogeneous so that all firms 
face a common price. Within this model, market demand for the product is 
not directly observable and hence firms are unable to detect any demand 
fluctuations. Firms monitor the market price of the product as an imperfect 
proxy for the output of other firms in order to detect any evidence of 
cheating and defection away from collusive conduct on the part of other 
firms. While firms behave monopolistically as the price remains high, a fall 
in price will prompt firms to revert to Cournot behaviour. Green and Porter 
assume that firms agree on a trigger price which they compare to the market 
price when they set their production.264 If the market price should fall below 
the trigger price while the firms have been acting monopolistically, they will 
revert to Cournot behaviour before resuming collusive behaviour. In this 
manner, Green and Porter contend it is possible to observe both Cournot 
behaviour as well as collusive behaviour in an oligopoly over time.
Bemheim and Whinston have constructed a model that allows for
265multimarket contact with repeated interactions between firms.
Multimarket contact enables firms to transfer the ability to tacitly collude 
from one market across to another market, which allows for the pooling of 
their incentive constraints across markets.266 It is observed that when firms 
differ in their costs of production across markets or when economies of 
scale are present, multimarket contact allows for the development of spheres
263 Green, E. J. and Porter, R. H. (1984) Non-co-operative Collusion under Imperfect Price 
Information. Econometrica 50, 87-100.
264 ibid., p. 89.
265 Bemheim, B. D. and Whinston, M. D. (1990) Multimarket contact and collusive 
behaviour. The Rand Journal o f Economics 21, 1-26.
266 ibid., p. 8.
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o f influence? 61 If production is shifted towards the more efficient firm 
within their own sphere of influence, then costs can be reduced and prices 
along with profits increased for all firms engaged in tacit collusion. 
Furthermore, multimarket contact under such circumstances reduces the 
incentives of firms to cheat on the tacitly collusive agreement. In the 
presence of spheres of influence it is observed that geographically-based,
reciprocal trades of output may facilitate the maintenance of collusive
268prices.
The folk theorem has provided some support for those earlier theories that 
hypothesised that oligopoly resulted in co-ordinated conduct between firms 
leading to tacit collusion.
Earlier theories of oligopoly have also been put into a dynamic framework 
through the application of game theory. Maskin and Tirole provide the
269equilibrium foundations for the dynamics of the Edgeworth price cycle.
In the Maskin and Tirole model, two firms take turns in choosing prices and 
a firm’s decision depends only on the other firm’s current price. Each firm 
decides to undercut the other firm on price and steal the entire market share 
for that period. This process continues until the competitive price is reached 
(where price is equal to marginal cost). Once the competitive price is 
reached, each firm will try to induce the other firm to increase its price. 
Eventually, one firm will relent and raise its price at which point the price 
cycle will begin again.
267 ibid., p. 2.
268 ibid., p. 2.
269 Maskin, E. and Tirole, J. (1988) A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, 
Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles. Econometrica 56, 571-599.
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3.4 Conclusion
The potential for double marginalisation provides a possible explanation for 
the conundrum as to how the oil majors can be simultaneously accused of 
both price fixing and predatory pricing. In order to exercise any market 
power at the wholesale level in order to maximise profits, the oil majors 
need to drive the retail petrol price down to marginal cost. In other words, 
the oil majors would want a retail sector that approximates perfect 
competition where price is equal to marginal cost. If the oil majors are 
behaving in a manner consistent with driving the retail price of petrol down 
to marginal cost, then this suggests that retail petrol prices should convey 
information regarding the oligopolistic interactions of participants in 
wholesale petrol markets and that retail petrol prices should closely follow 
and reflect changes in wholesale petrol prices. This is an important finding 
that will underpin the hypothesis testing that is undertaken in Chapter 6.
The development of a comprehensive and unifying theory of oligopoly has 
proven to be elusive. Alternative models of oligopoly can support a 
multitude of outcomes. However, a survey of oligopoly literature reveals 
that co-operative behaviour between rival firms in an oligopolistic market 
leading to tacit collusion is a distinct possibility. Stigler (1964), along with 
Posner, provide a rigorous framework in which to test whether market 
conditions are conducive to tacit collusion or not. In turn, the major 
contribution of game theory to the development of oligopoly theory has 
been to show that a tacitly collusive outcome can be supported in situations 
where there are repeated interactions between market participants over time. 
Consideration of these factors will assist in determining whether market
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conduct within capital city wholesale petrol markets is consistent with tacit 
collusion and whether REAs assist in facilitating tacit collusion (assuming 
that capital city retail petrol markets are competitive).
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Chapter 4: Reciprocity 
4.1 Introduction
This Chapter will examine and critically review the academic literature 
pertaining to the competitive effects of business reciprocity (which shall be 
described as reciprocity hereafter). As REAs are a particular form of 
reciprocity, this Chapter will draw out the implications for the operation of 
REAs from the reciprocity literature. This Chapter will attempt to identify 
under what conditions reciprocity is likely to give rise to anti-competitive as 
well as pro-competitive outcomes.
Views and opinions have been varied as to what exactly constitutes 
reciprocity. The minimalist view has it that reciprocity is simply the practice 
of a firm buying from its own customers.270 An extension on the minimalist 
view has it that reciprocity is the act of demonstrating a preference or 
favouring a firm’s own customers when selecting suppliers.271
Another interpretation has it that reciprocity is a conditional transaction 
between firms, whereby firm A agrees to purchase goods and/or services 
from firm B in return for firm B agreeing to acquire goods and/or services 
from firm A.
It has been postulated that reciprocity also refers to mutual trading between 
firms “that is unexplained by either chance or ordinary cost-quality
70 Anderson, J. F. (1967) Reciprocal Dealing. The Yale Law Journal 76, 1020-1029,
p.1020.
~71 Allen, B. T. (1975) Industrial Reciprocity: A Statistical Analysis. The Journal of Law 
and Economics 18, 507-520, p.505; Hausman, R. M. (1964) Reciprocal Dealing and the 
Antitrust Laws. Harvard Law Review 77, 873-886, p. 873.
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advantages”.272 Finally, it has also been put that reciprocity is the practice of 
a firm using its purchasing power over suppliers to promote, or in some 
cases compel, the sale of its goods and/or services to those suppliers.
For present purposes, there is no need to move beyond a minimalist view in 
defining reciprocity, although reciprocity can also encompass many of the 
characteristics contained in the other definitions.
Views on the competitive effects of reciprocity have been mixed. Serious 
discussion and debate over the competitive effects of reciprocity was 
probably triggered by Stocking and Mueller when they contended that 
reciprocity, when practiced by big business in national markets, resulted in 
an anti-competitive detriment.273 Within the academic literature there are 
three main strands of opinion on the competitive effects of reciprocity:
1. Reciprocity is always anti-competitive;
2. Reciprocity can be anti-competitive under certain conditions; and
3. Reciprocity is not anti-competitive.
Those who contend that reciprocity is always anti-competitive maintain that
it distorts the usual means of exchange based on price, quality and service,
thus foreclosing some participants from the market place. Competition
concerns regarding foreclosure have sometimes been raised in regard to the
operation of REAs. On the other hand, those who hold that reciprocity is
only likely to raise competition issues under certain conditions find that the
272 Blair, R. D. (1973) Reciprocity and Competition: A Problem of Conflicting 
‘Assumptions’. Antitrust Law & Economics Review 6, 77-86, p. 78.
272 Stocking, G. W. and Mueller, W. F. (1957) Business Reciprocity and the Size of Firms. 
The Journal o f Business 30, 73-95.
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existence of market power is a necessary prerequisite for this to occur. 
Alternatively, those who contend that reciprocity does not raise any 
competition issues have generally done so on the basis that it is not possible 
to leverage market power from one market over to another unrelated market 
and thereby extend and increase the overall level of market power.
Some have also argued that reciprocity is pro-competitive because it 
facilitates more flexible pricing than would otherwise prevail in an 
oligopolisic market. On the other hand, critics have countered that 
reciprocity enables a rigid oligopolistic pricing structure to continue even 
under circumstances where it might otherwise breakdown. The pricing issue 
in regard to reciprocity is further complicated when it is practised by firms 
who are competitors in the same market, as is the case with respect to 
REAs. Reciprocity when practiced between market competitors may give 
rise to concerns that it could be used to facilitate collusion. This has been 
one of the main concerns raised in relation to REAs.
Another interpretation for reciprocity is provided by those who take a 
transaction cost approach. In this case, reciprocity can be pro-competitive 
and efficiency enhancing by facilitating the construction of optimal 
production facilities while minimising on the associated transaction costs 
through mitigating the risk of post-contractual opportunistic behaviour. 
However, others have offered a more sinister interpretation, arguing that a 
transaction cost approach to reciprocity could also serve as a means to 
enforce discipline amongst a cartel. It has been argued that the conditions
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imposed on competitors through REAs act in such a manner as to facilitate 
co-operation between competitors which inhibit and stifle competition.
All of the academic literature comes from the United States, which probably 
reflects the pre-eminent position held by the United States in the evolution 
and development of competition law and economics. In addition, the bulk of 
academic literature on reciprocity comes from the 1960s and the early 1970s 
when it was widely considered as being anti-competitive." The decision by 
US law enforcement authorities to cease initiating actions based on 
reciprocity during the 1970s curtailed the debate over the competitive 
effects of reciprocity and has left the topic largely dormant since that 
time.275 In 1982, Baker and Blumenthal commented that reciprocity had 
“withered away”.276 By 2000, Waller had declared reciprocity as a 
“moribund doctrine for enforcement purposes”."
4.2 Is Reciprocity Always Anti-Competitive?
Those who contend that reciprocity is anti-competitive under all 
circumstances have generally relied on three main propositions:
1. Reciprocity undermines the traditional means of exchange for a 
customer who would normally base their decision solely upon the 
criteria of price, quality and service;
274 Cavanagh, E. D. (2001) Reciprocal Dealing: A Rebirth? St Johns Law Review 75, 633- 
648, p. 634.
275 ibid., pp. 634-635.
276 Baker, D. I. and Blumenthal, W. (1983) The 1982 Guidelines and Preexisting Law. 
California Law Review 71,311 -347, p. 339.
277 Waller, S. W. (2000) Can U.S. antitrust laws open international markets? Northwestern 
Journal o f International Law & Business 20, 207-232, p. 219.
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2. Reciprocity forecloses markets on competitors who are not suitably 
diverse in their range of activities; and
3. Reciprocity is conducive to the creation of oligopolistic or monopolistic 
market structures.
Concerns have been expressed that because reciprocity distorts the usual 
means of exchange based on price, quality and service, potentially more 
efficient producers of a particular product may be limited in their market 
participation or excluded from the market altogether. This in turn could 
result in a loss of both allocative and productive efficiency and thus 
entrench a market structure conducive to sub-optimal outcomes.
Stocking and Mueller believed that reciprocal trading arrangements were 
anti-competitive because they enabled large and diversified firms to expand 
their production without resort to price competition at the expense of 
smaller rivals.2™ Thus, reciprocity enabled firms to increase their sales 
whilst being able to avoid price competition: “[i]t is one of several tools in 
the oligopolist’s kit designed to increase sales without resorting to price- 
cutting”.279 The consequence of reciprocity was to facilitate firm expansion 
and thereby achieve greater security. Reciprocity was thus characterised as 
symptomatic of markets where there was imperfect competition, which 
would result in less than optimal outcomes.
Prior to the 1970s, the FTC also took the view that reciprocity was anti­
competitive because it enabled companies to foreclose on a section of a
278 Stocking, G. W. and Mueller, W. F., op.cit., p. 94.
279 ibid., p. 95.
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market and thus exclude other competitors from the opportunity of 
competing for it. The FTC raised concerns that reciprocity could thus be 
used to exclude efficient producers from the market, leading to a loss of 
economic efficiency:
[Reciprocity] transforms substantial buying power into a weapon for 
denying competitors less favourably situated access to the market. It 
distorts the focus of the trader by interposing between him and the 
traditional competitive factors of price, quality, and service an 
irrelevant and alien factor which is destructive of fair and free 
competition on the basis of merit. The efficient producer may 
thereby suffer loss because of a circumstance extrinsic to the worth 
of his product. In this situation, it is relative size and conglomeration 
of business rivals, rather than economic efficiency, that may 
determine firm growth and success, and, ultimately, the allocation of 
resources. Obviously, this practice strikes at one of the basic 
premises of a free enterprise economy.“ 80
Donnern described the detriment arising from reciprocity as denying 
competitors the opportunity of making sales they would otherwise be in a 
position to make:
The vice of reciprocity and the reciprocity effect is that 
disadvantaged competitors -  often small companies and single-line 
companies -  are deprived of sales they would otherwise be able to
9 0 1
make on the basis of price, quality and service.“
Hausman contended that reciprocity was anti-competitive because it 
distorted the operation of the market process from which several adverse
280 Federal Trade Commission (1967) Opinion of the Commission, 15 November, 1962, 
Consolidated Foods Corp. Federal Trade Commission Decisions: Findings, Opinions, and 
Orders January 1, 1963, to June 30, 1963 62, US Government Printing Office, Washington 
DC, p. 952.
281 Donnern, R. W. (1969) The Antitrust Attack on Reciprocity and Reciprocity Effect. 
Antitrust Law Journal 38, 637-651, p. 637.
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consequences flowed.“ “ First, concern was expressed that because 
purchasing decisions could be made on the basis of factors other than price 
and quality, this could potentially result in lower welfare for consumers of a 
product. Second, concern was expressed that reciprocity would distort 
industrial structure by enabling less efficient firms to survive and prosper to 
the detriment of the more efficient. Third, concern was expressed that 
reciprocity could act as a barrier to entry by discouraging potential new 
entrants in the knowledge that would-be customers were tied up and denied 
to them through reciprocal dealing arrangements. It was also further 
presumed that the potential barrier to entry posed by reciprocity may also 
remove any restraining influence over the conduct of those participating in 
such practices.
Mueller asserted that reciprocity injured the competitive process through 
several mechanisms.2*? In the first instance, it was argued that reciprocity 
distorted the market exchange process, thereby encouraging more rigid price 
structures and thus leading to a misallocation of resources. This 
misallocation of resources was further exacerbated in the case of an 
oligopolistic market structure where the larger firms could engage in 
reciprocity to foreclose the market to other competitors. Mueller believed 
that reciprocity could raise barriers to entry in a market by tying up the 
potential customer base, thereby making entry less attractive to
282 Hausman, R. M., op.cit.
283 Mueller, W. F. (1971) The Rising Economic Concentration in America: Reciprocity, 
Conglomeration, and the New American ‘Zaibatsu' System (II). Antitrust Law & Economic 
Review 4, 91-104.
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newcomers.284 The consequence of reciprocity would ultimately be 
increased industrial concentration.
Against those who maintained that reciprocity was always anti-competitive, 
another school of thought held that reciprocity was only likely to result in an 
anti-competitive detriment if a firm was able to exercise market power. In 
this case, concern arose because a firm with market power in one market 
was able to leverage that power over to a second unrelated market and 
thereby extend and enhance its overall level of market power. This set of 
circumstances describes what has become known as coercive reciprocity.
Harsha categorised reciprocity according to the following typology:
1. Resort to coercion whereby one company threatens to withdraw 
patronage if the other company doesn’t reciprocate in its buying.
2. A mutual agreement whereby each company reciprocally agrees to buy 
from the other.
3. Suggestions by one company that the other company should buy from 
the first in view of the first company’s purchases from the other.
4. One company purchases from another, tacitly hoping that the other 
company will thereby reciprocate.285
-S4 ibid., p. 96.
2X5 Harsha E. H. (1963) The Conglomerate Merger and Reciprocity -  Condemned by 
Conjecture? Antitrust Bulletin 9, 201-230, p. 208.
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Harsha queried whether reciprocity was necessarily associated with market 
power, arguing that it also occurred in many other situations where no 
market power was present at all.
Although recognising that reciprocity could undermine what some 
considered to be the generally accepted nature of market exchange, Harsha 
asserted that “it would be nai've not to concede that many other extraneous 
factors do play a part in business purchasing decisions” .286
A major concern with coercive reciprocity was that it would “ripen into a 
mutual reciprocity agreement and be superficially indistinguishable from an 
agreement which is entered into without coercion” .287 Harsha believed that 
instances of flagrantly coercive reciprocity should be easily shown to 
involve companies with substantial market power, or even be in a monopoly 
position.288
Handler was also sceptical of claims that reciprocity was generally anti-
289competitive.“ Handler opined that unless coercion was involved then 
reciprocity was not anti-competitive. Where no coercion was involved, 
Handler believed that it should be left to the market to regulate such 
practices.
Similar to Stocking and Mueller, Dean believed that reciprocity was most 
likely to occur in oligopolistic industries.290 Unlike Stocking and Mueller,
ibid., p. 211. 
ni ibid., p. 212.
288 ibid., p.212.
289 Handler. M (1963) Emerging Antitrust Issues: Reciprocity, Diversification and Joint 
Ventures. Virginia Law Review 49, 433-447.
290 Dean. J. (1963) Economic Aspects of Reciprocity, Competition and Mergers. The 
Antitrust Bulletin VIII, 843-852.
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however, Dean believed reciprocity was just one possible manifestation of 
market power which could only wrought damage if all other avenues of 
expression had been blocked, or if exercising market power through 
reciprocity inflicted more harm than through other means. According to 
Dean, the remedy to any anti-competitive detriment arising from reciprocity 
was to attack its root cause, which is market power, rather than attempt to 
regulate the practice in any manner.
Sichel maintained that the amount of competitive harm wrought by a 
practice depended upon the extent of coercion and the degree of exclusivity 
it engendered.291 It was argued that if a practice was voluntary, where no 
party involved was coerced, and if competitors or potential competitors also 
had the opportunity to engage in similar conduct, then it should be exempt 
from the scope of competition law.“ “ Sichel attributed the existence of 
coercive reciprocity to pre-existing market power and maintained that 
prohibiting reciprocity failed to address the underlying problem.
Similar to Harsha, Finney proposed a typology for reciprocity in order to 
distinguish between significantly anti-competitive reciprocity from other 
varieties. Finney believed that reciprocity could ultimately be narrowed 
down into two main categories:
1. Friendship reciprocity; and
291 Sichel, W. (1968) Business Reciprocity: An Unsettled Antitrust Issue. The Antitrust 
Bulletin 13, 649-658.
292 ibid., p. 652.
293 Finney, F. R. (1969) Reciprocity and Public Policy. Antitrust Law and Economic Review 
2,97-110.
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2. Coercive reciprocity. 294
Friendship reciprocity was defined as “the simple act of purchasing from the 
individual or firm that is also one’s customer”/  ' Finney believed that 
friendship reciprocity was benign in terms of its competitive impact because 
it was unable to present a firm with foreclosure opportunities over its rivals.
On the other hand, coercive reciprocity was distinguished from friendship 
reciprocity on the basis that it “requires unequal strength between the 
initiating firm and its “target” supplier” and could only occur under 
circumstances where the initiating firm had some sort of leverage over the 
target firm.296 It was argued that significant economic effects could only 
occur from coercive reciprocity when the initiating firm did business in 
more than one industry, some of which it did not share with other 
competitors. It was reasoned that coercive reciprocity could only 
significantly foreclose on competition in a market structure where an 
initiating firm had:
1. A buying unit or units with purchasing leverage; and
2. A selling unit or units whose competitors cannot muster comparable 
leverage and are therefore unable to retaliate in kind when
297confronted with reciprocal dealing.
294 ibid., p. 98.
295 ibid., p. 98.
296 ibid., p. 100.
297 ibid., p. 103.
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The key to the competitive impact of reciprocity came down to market 
structure and reciprocity could only inflict harm when the market structure 
was conducive to coercive reciprocity.
Lorie and Halpem came to a mixed assessment of the competitive impact of 
reciprocity.298 Where markets are perfectly competitive, it was reasoned that 
reciprocity would result in no anti-competitive detriment. In conditions 
where markets only depart slightly from being competitive, it was 
maintained that reciprocity would be unlikely to result in any significant 
anti-competitive detriment. Lorie and Halpem argued that reciprocity was 
only likely to result in a significant effect in situations where monopoly, 
monopsony or regulation existed, and only when opportunities for profitable 
price discrimination had been effectively thwarted.
Blair believed that “reciprocity can have little effect on competition if  all of 
the markets involved are effectively competitive”.299 However, Blair 
maintained that there were instances where reciprocal trading could have 
adverse competitive effects. This would occur where reciprocal trading had 
the potential for altering the long-run structure of an industry by reducing 
the number of firms, which would occur where barriers to entry are high.
Allison also adopted a typology approach to reciprocity by identifying three 
different categories:
1. Coercive reciprocity;
298 Lorie, J. H. and Halpem, P. (1970) Conglomerates: The Rhetoric and the Evidence. 
Journal of Law and Economics 13,149-166.
299 Blair, R. D., op.cit., p. 82.
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2. Voluntary reciprocity; and
3. Unilateral reciprocity.300
Coercive reciprocity was viewed as the leveraging of market power as a 
buyer, whereas unilateral reciprocity was considered as the practice of a 
firm buying from those who are also its customers whenever practicable to 
do so. Whereas unilateral reciprocity was viewed as benign, Allison 
considered coercive reciprocity to be detrimental because it could result in 
the loss of allocative efficiency and market foreclosure.
According to Allison, voluntary reciprocity occurred under two types of 
conditions. The first was when neither firm possessed sufficient power as a 
buyer to enforce its own will, which was viewed as harmless in its overall 
impact on competition. The second occurred when both firms were relative 
equals in the possession of market power, which Allison considered could 
inflict about the same amount of damage as coercive reciprocity, resulting in 
the loss of allocative efficiency and market foreclosure. Allison also opined 
that the economic harm done by this type of voluntary reciprocity could 
potentially be far greater than coercive reciprocity, because the effects were 
likely to be felt in two markets rather than just one alone.301
Another school of thinking maintains that concerns regarding the anti­
competitive effects of reciprocity are entirely misplaced. Such views have 
usually been associated with the so-called Chicago school of economics.
300 Allison, J. R. (1981) The Antitrust Implications of Barter. Chicago-Kent Law Review 58, 
89-106.
301 ibid., p. 95.
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In the first instance, it was argued that firms being excluded from the market 
due to the effects of reciprocity did not necessarily result in an anti­
competitive detriment. According to Posner, the primary focus of 
antimonopoly policy should be on the maintenance of competitive pricing,
302and not on particular numbers of competitors.
In the second instance, scepticism has been expressed regarding the 
existence of coercive reciprocity. According to this line of reasoning, a firm 
with pre-existing market power in one market will not be able to leverage 
this market power over to another unrelated market and thereby extend its 
overall level of market power through reciprocity and increase the overall 
level of profits. From this perspective, the use of reciprocity in order to 
exploit market power becomes irrational unless there is some impediment 
(such as regulation) preventing a firm from fully utilising its market power 
directly.
Ferguson argued that firms possessing market power would be much more 
likely to try to exploit it directly, rather than seek to exercise it indirectly 
through reciprocity. Ferguson was sceptical of the economic rationale 
behind any anti-competitive detriment arising from reciprocity, contending 
that a buyer with market power would use their purchasing power directly to 
secure lower prices of the intermediate product that they use rather than 
foist their own product on to suppliers.304
302 Posner, R. A. (1970) Conglomerate Mergers and Antitrust Policy: An Introduction. St 
John ’s Law Review 44, 529-532, p. 531.
303 Ferguson, J. M. (1965) Tying Arrangements and Reciprocity: An Economic Analysis. 
Law and Contemporary Problems 30, 532-580.
304 ibid., pp. 573-574.
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The 1969 Report o f the Task Force on Productivity and Competition largely 
dismissed eompetition concerns arising from the practice of reciprocity by 
arguing that market power in one market could not be leveraged across to 
another market:
The economic threat to competition from reciprocity (reciprocal 
buying arrangements) is either small or nonexistent: monopoly 
power in one commodity is not effectively exploited by 
manipulating the price of an unrelated commodity. The argument 
advanced against the simplistic treatment of vertical mergers -  
essentially that one cannot use the same monopoly power twice -  
also challenges the fears of reciprocity.305
Bork has also criticised the notion that reciprocity could be used to transfer 
and leverage market power from one market over to another unrelated 
market. It was argued that a firm has only so much market power at its 
disposal to exploit and if it has already bargained to secure the best possible 
prices from its suppliers, then it would have no market power left to force 
suppliers to purchase on non-competitive terms.306
However, those who dismiss competition concerns arising from reciprocity 
due to leveraging have not gone unchallenged. A new school of economic 
thinking, which has been labelled as post-Chicago, has challenged the 
presumption that it is impossible to increase market power through 
leveraging and thereby enlarge the overall level of profits.307 The post- 
Chicago school contend that when underlying assumptions are modified,
305 Stigler, G. J. (Chairman of the Task Force) (1969) Report o f the Task Force on 
Productivity and Competition. Reprinted in Antitrust Law and Economics Review 2, 30-31.
306 Bork, R. H. (1970) Antitrust in Dubious Battle. St John ’s Law Review 44, 663-676, p. 
671.
307 Clarke-Smith, J. M. (2002) The Development of Monopolistic Leveraging Theory and 
its Appropriate Role in Antitrust Law. Catholic University Law Review 52, 179-205, p. 199.
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then it is possible for leveraging activity to increase market power and 
profits. Nalebuff has opined that the Chicago School denies the possibility 
of using leveraging to increase profits only under some strong assumptions
308and it does not take into account the dynamic games that firms play.'
Kaplow believes the critics of leveraging theory have been deficient in their 
analysis.309 According to Kaplow, such critics have generally taken a fixed 
sum view of the prevailing degree of market power and have assumed the 
total amount of damage wrought by a firm exercising market power will be 
fixed regardless of the practice. A major deficiency with the fixed sum 
view, in Kaplow’s opinion, is that it assumes a firm with market power is 
only interested in short-run profit maximisation and therefore takes a static 
view of the world. On the other hand, Kaplow contends that firms may seek 
to engage in practices described as monopoly extension, whereby they seek 
to change the structural conditions they face in order to receive a greater 
profit flow in the future. Therefore, if a firm is prepared to take a long-run 
dynamic perspective as suggested by Kaplow, then leveraging becomes an 
entirely rational business strategy to pursue.
Whinston has demonstrated that it is quite feasible for leveraging to increase 
profits where economies of scale exist in the production process and the 
structure of the market is oligopolistic in relation to tying practices.311 
Whinston has concluded that this result raises “the possibility that the use of
m  Nalebuff, B. (2003) Bundling, Tying, and Portfolio Effects: Part 1 -  Conceptual Issues. 
DTI Economics Paper No. 1, London, p. 22.
309 Kaplow, L. (1985) Extension o f Monopoly Power Through Leverage. Columbia Law 
Review 85, 515-556.
310 ibid., p. 524.
311 Whinston, M. D. (1990) Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion. The American Economic 
Review 80, 837-859.
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leverage as an effective and profitable exclusionary device could arise” in 
relation to reciprocity.312
Those who mount the case that reciprocity is always anti-competitive would 
appear to take a fairly doctrinal view about the nature of a market exchange 
transaction. Harsha is probably correct in his assessment that it is naive to 
assume that extraneous factors other than price, quality and service never 
enter into consideration during a market exchange transaction. On this basis, 
those who maintain that reciprocity is always anti-competitive would 
arguably be raising objections to all market exchange transactions not solely 
based on the criteria of price, quality and service.
It would be difficult to make the case against reciprocity in the absence of 
market power, as firms presumably would not rationally choose to enter into 
market exchange transactions on disadvantageous terms. Hence, reciprocity 
is only likely to raise competition concerns where either one or both parties 
to a market exchange transaction are able to exercise market power. 
Therefore, it would appear that the presence of market power on the part of 
one or both parties to a market exchange transaction is an important 
prerequisite in determining whether reciprocity is likely to raise competition 
concerns or not.
Views have been mixed on whether concerns regarding coercive reciprocity, 
and the ability of a firm to leverage market power from one market over to 
another unrelated market, are well founded. Criticisms of leveraging theory
312 ibid., p. 856.
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may be deficient because they fail to take account of a dynamic and longer 
term perspective, focusing instead on a static short-run world.
Resolving the question of whether coercive reciprocity through leveraging 
raises legitimate competition concerns probably falls outside the scope of 
this study. This is because REAs are unlikely to be categorised as coercive 
reciprocity as both parties are trading on roughly equivalent terms, hence 
there would be a greatly diminished scope for the leveraging of market 
power under such circumstances.
The sort of reciprocity most closely approximating that represented by 
REAs is the voluntary reciprocity described by Allison where both firms 
could potentially be in possession of market power. On this basis, the 
possible anti-competitive detriment arising from the existence of REAs is 
the loss of allocative efficiency and market foreclosure in those markets to 
which the agreements apply.
4.3 Does Reciprocity Provide for Flexible Pricing?
Rather than being anti-competitive, some have contended that reciprocity is 
in fact pro-competitive because it provides a means of giving a non­
transparent price reduction in an oligopolistic market, thereby injecting 
some kind of pricing flexibility into a rigid pricing structure with less 
prospect of provoking retaliation. From this perspective, it could be argued 
that because output will increase due to the indirect price cut, the market 
will move more towards a competitive market outcome, and hence 
reciprocity as practiced in this manner is unambiguously beneficial.
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Dean believed that reciprocity was most likely to be found in oligopolistic 
industries where price competition was muted for fear of retaliation.313 On 
balance, Dean concluded that reciprocity was more likely than not to be pro- 
competitive because it could provide a means of non-price competition.
Anderson argued that reciprocity could be a means through which to 
increase profits, not by creating new market power, but by allowing the 
reciprocal trader to capture all of the profits from a position already held 
through delivering an indirect price cut.314 Hence, reciprocity could be used 
in this manner to increase profitability in situations which involved “some 
obstacle to complete freedom in pricing” .315 It was maintained that 
reciprocity could be used as an underhanded means to break oligopolistic 
pricing solidarity and provide a means of cheating with a lower prospect of 
being detected by competitors and thus minimising the risk of provoking 
retaliation. Anderson saw such a development as beneficial as it moved a 
market closer to a perfectly competitive market outcome where price 
equated to marginal cost.
Sichel has characterised reciprocity as a form of non-price competition that 
can be used to boost sales without breaking an oligopolistic pricing structure 
and thus provoking a price war:
In an oligopoly market reciprocity dealings may be thought of as a 
form of non-price competition. Firms in their quest for greater 
profits attempt to increase their volume of sales at the lowest 
possible price. Outright price cuts are very easily met by rivals,
313 Dean, J., op.cit.
314 Anderson, J. F., op.cit.
315 ibid., p. 1025.
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whereas various forms of non-price competition are somewhat more
316disguised and are not apt to be followed as readily.
Stigler opined that reciprocal trading arrangements were unambiguously 
pro-competitive.317 If there were economies to be achieved from the practice 
of reciprocity, then Stigler maintained the practice should spread and that it 
would not injure competition.318 It was also argued that reciprocity helped to 
restore some semblance of price flexibility in a collusive industry where 
prices are fixed:
The case for reciprocity arises when prices cannot be freely varied to 
meet supply and demand conditions. Suppose that a firm is dealing 
with a colluding industry which is fixing prices. A firm in this 
collusive industry would be willing to sell at less than the cartel 
price if it can escape detection. Its price can be reduced in effect by 
buying from the customer-seller at an inflated price. Here reciprocity
319restores flexibility of prices.
In instances where competition was not effective, such as in an oligopolistic 
market in which price competition was considered competitively dangerous, 
Blair argued that reciprocity could serve as a useful device to indirectly cut 
prices. “ Thus, Blair believed that reciprocity should be permitted where it 
resulted in indirect price cuts.
On the other hand, there are those who have been sceptical of the supposed 
benefits of flexible pricing delivered through reciprocity. Although Hale and 
Hale recognised that reciprocity could be used as a means to deliver de facto
316 Sichel, W., op.cit., p. 656.
317 Stigler, G. J. (1969) Working Paper IV: Reciprocity: Report o f the Task Force on 
Productivity and Competition. Reprinted in Antitrust Law and Economics Review 2, 51-52.
318 ibid., p. 52.
319 ibid., p. 52.
320 Blair, R. D., op.cit.
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price cuts to customers, they saw no benefit arising from price reductions 
delivered in this form as it only resulted in lower prices to those customers 
who were also suppliers.321
Perhaps the strongest argument against the alleged benefits of flexible 
pricing delivered through reciprocity comes from those who contend that 
the provision of flexible pricing delivered through this means merely serves 
to entrench the pre-existing oligopolistic pricing structure and prevent it 
from breaking down entirely.
Mueller has argued that reciprocity could further entrench an existing 
oligopolistic market structure, and therefore reinforce price rigidity.322
Smith and Wilson asserted that offering a discount or concession through 
reciprocity without disturbing the formal market pricing was not necessarily 
a good thing because it acted “as a means of prolonging price rigidity in the 
marketplace” .3“3 Similarly, Blake maintained that reciprocal buying assisted 
in the maintenance of a stable oligopolistic pricing structure in 
circumstances where such co-operation might otherwise breakdown:
In an oligopoly market as in a monopoly market, a firm can often 
maximise profits by charging different users prices which vary 
according to individual utilities. Although it can charge no more than 
the oligopoly’s list prices, it can “shade” prices to some purchasers 
by buying from them varying quantities of products they produce, 
also non-competitively priced, thus winning additional sales without
3 1 Hale, G. E. and Hale, R. D. (1964) Reciprocity under the Antitrust Laws: A Comment. 
University o f Pennsylvania Law Review 113, 69-lb.
322 Mueller, W. F„ op.cit.
323 Smith, H. M. and Wilson, T. M. (1972) Reciprocity and the Private Plantiff. Maryland 
Law Review XXXII, 91-127, p. 93.
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threatening the oligopoly price structure. But for this device, list 
prices would tend to be lower and would be subject to more direct 
erosion until a reduction was achieved.324
An entirely different perspective on the pricing outcomes delivered through 
reciprocity emerges when the firms engaging in the practice are in fact 
market competitors. The issue then becomes one of whether the practice of 
reciprocity facilitates and maintains a collusive outcome in the market.
Stocking and Mueller raised concerns that reciprocity when practiced 
amongst rival firms could facilitate collusive conduct:
Such interchanges bring representatives of rival companies into 
continuing close contact with each other and permit an exchange of 
information concerning prices, products, and other market data, 
which may greatly facilitate the stabilisation of prices.325
Similarly, Areeda, Hovenkamp and Elhauge have outlined a threat to 
competition arising from reciprocity which does not involve the foreclosure 
of marketing opportunities.326 In this case, reciprocity may raise competition 
concerns when it occurs between firms which are rivals. Such reciprocity 
may be troublesome because it may limit the extent of competition between 
rivals.327
Considered and reasoned arguments are advanced by both those who 
maintain that the flexible pricing achieved through reciprocity is beneficial, 
as well as those who argue that such pricing flexibility merely serves to
3:4 Blake, H. M. (1973) Conglomerate Mergers and the Antitrust Laws. Columbia Law 
Review 73, 555-592, p. 569.
425 Stocking, G. W. and Mueller, W. F., op.cit., pp. 93-94.
426 Areeda, P. E., Hovenkamp, H. and Elhauge, E. (1996) Antitrust Law: An Analysis o f  
Antitrust Principles and Their Application: Volume X. Little, Brown and Company, Boston. 
327 ibid., p. 449.
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entrench and preserve a collusive oligopolistic pricing structure from 
breaking down entirely. However, the pricing issue changes complexion 
entirely when the firms practising reciprocity are market rivals, as is the 
case in regard to REAs. Any possible benefits arising from more flexible 
pricing could be thrown into doubt when reciprocity is practiced between 
market rivals, because it raises suspicion that it could be used to facilitate 
collusion in order achieve an anti-competitive outcome. A prominent 
concern raised in regard to REAs is they have served as a mechanism to 
facilitate co-operation and collusion between market rivals.
4.4 Transaction Cost Approach
Another possible explanation for reciprocity, even when practised amongst 
market rivals, comes from those who advance a transaction cost approach 
which provides a rationale for reciprocity under certain specific conditions. 
Under this approach, reciprocity can facilitate the construction of optimal 
production facilities which minimise on the associated transaction costs.
Klein, Crawford and Alchian have suggested that one possible explanation 
for reciprocity could be as protection as a means of mitigating against post- 
contractual opportunistic behaviour.328 According to this explanation, an 
investment in a specialised asset creates quasi-rents which provide the 
potential scope for opportunistic behaviour. The quasi-rent value of an asset 
is defined as the excess of its value over its salvage or its value in its next 
best use to another renter. “ The potentially appropriable specialised
32s Klein, B., Crawford, R. G. and Alchian, A. A. (1978) Vertical Integration, Appropriable 
Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process. Journal o f Law and Economics 21, 297- 
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portion of the quasi-rent is that portion, if any, in excess of its value to the 
second highest-valuing user.
Klein et al. observed that there are two possible means by which to protect 
against the problem of post-contractual opportunistic behaviour. The first 
means is to engage in vertical integration by bringing the various stages of 
the production under common ownership. The second means is through an 
economically enforceable long-term contract. Long term contracts used as 
an alternative to vertical integration can be assumed to take two forms:
1. An explicitly stated contractual guarantee legally enforced by the 
government or some other outside mechanism; or
2. An implicit contractual guarantee enforced by the market mechanism of 
withdrawing future business if opportunistic behaviour occurs.331
Because every contingency could not be cheaply specified in a contract or 
even known, it was reasoned that transactors will also rely on an implicit 
type of long-term contract that employs a market rather than legal 
enforcement mechanism. It was maintained that reciprocity could serve as a 
market mechanism to protect an implicit contractual guarantee, whereby 
“[t]he threat of termination of this relationship mutually suppresses 
opportunistic behaviour”.332
Klein et al. observed that appropriable quasi-rents exist in regard to 
specialised assets in the petroleum industry such as oil refineries.
330 ibid., p. 298.
331 ibid., p. 303.
332 ibid., p. 305.
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Expanding on the work of Klein et al., Williamson developed a hostage 
model to explain how long-term trade between rivals is supported by the
333economic equivalent of hostages in order to protect a dedicated asset. 
According to Williamson, dedicated assets had certain properties in that 
they were “discrete additions to generalised capacity that would not be put 
in place but for the prospect of selling a large amount of product to a 
particular customer” .334 It was also observed that “dedicated assets lose 
value if employed in alternative uses (or by or to service alternative
T C
users)”. " It was argued that dedicated assets “are put in place contingent 
upon particular supply agreements and, should such contracts be
33^
prematurely terminated, would result in significant excess capacity”.
In the event of the premature termination of the contract by the buyer, it was 
observed that this “would leave the supplier with a large excess of capacity 
that could be disposed of only at distress prices” .33 One possible solution to 
this problem was to require buyers to post a bond to mitigate against the 
prospect of premature termination. However, this could in turn create a new 
problem with the possibility that “the supplier may contrive to expropriate 
the bond” .338 In order to protect buyers against the possibility of 
expropriation on the part of suppliers, Williamson proposed the introduction 
of “specialised governance structures that have the purpose and effect of
333 Williamson, O. E. (1983) Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support 
Exchange. The American Economic Review 73, 519-540.
334 ibid., p. 532.
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promoting harmonious adaptations and preserving the continuity of
339exchange relations”.
Two possible alternative specialised governance structures were proposed. 
One was for the establishment of institutions convened by knowledgeable 
third parties to conduct arbitration between the parties. The other was to 
expand the nature of the contractual relationship. Under such an 
arrangement, the buyer and the seller devise a m utual reliance rela tion , 
whereby the buyer is no longer required to post a hostage as such, but also 
“invests in specific capital that has value only in conjunction with servicing 
final demands for the product in question” .340 It was concluded that 
“reciprocal trading supported by separate but concurrent investments in 
specific assets provides a mutual safeguard” against the hazard posed by 
expropriation.341 Williamson observed that the hostages created through 
such reciprocal trading arrangements have the property that they are never 
actually exchanged, with each party retaining possession of its dedicated 
assets should the contract be prematurely terminated.342
Williamson recognised that long-term trading arrangements among nominal 
rivals could be puzzling and sought to provide an alternative explanation 
other than that they were engaged in collusion. Following on from both 
Klein et al. and Williamson, Walters has advanced an efficiency rationale to 
explain the practice of reciprocity in situations where one or more parties to 
a transaction may be vulnerable to opportunistic behaviour on the part of
339 ibid., p. 527.
340 ibid., p. 528.
341 ibid., p. 532.
342 ibid., p. 532.
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others.343 In such situations, Walters observed that “reciprocal trading 
arrangements may forestall opportunism problems, promote exchange, and 
enhance efficiency”.344
Walters proposed that the potential for opportunistic behaviour existed 
whenever the following three conditions existed:
1. Trading involves specialised investments, the value of which diminishes 
if the terms of the transactions are altered;
2. There is uncertainty or imperfect information about the future intentions 
or abilities of a trading partner; and
3. Explicit contracts are ineffectual (perhaps because the necessary 
contracts are too difficult or costly to specify or to enforce).345
The presence of any specialised capital implied some vulnerability to 
appropriation which a rational trader would seek to avoid by devising means 
to protect the value of such an asset before creating it.346 There were several 
possible solutions to this problem. One solution could be to internalise all 
functions that might put the firm at risk of opportunistic behaviour, 
however, this could be excessively costly or impossible in some 
situations.347 Another solution could be explicit legal contracts to forestall
343 S. J. K. Walters (1986) Reciprocity Reexamined: The Consolidated Foods Case. Journal 
o f Law & Economics 29, 423-438.
344 ibid., p. 431.
343 ibid., p. 431.
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some types of opportunistic behaviour, however, problems could arise
348through contract specification and enforcement.
As an alternative to internalisation and contracts, Walters proposed that a 
self-enforcing market mechanism could be used to prevent opportunistic 
behaviour and facilitate exchange. One such mechanism was for the posting 
of collateral by the party or parties with the potential for opportunistic 
behaviour. It was reasoned that if the value of collateral exceeded the 
potential gain from opportunism, with the collateral forfeited in the event of 
a breach in the trading relationship, then such an expenditure would forestall 
opportunistic behaviour by imposing a cost on the party that failed to hold 
up its end of the bargain.349 One mechanism that could be used to generate 
collateral was reciprocity:
Reciprocity may generate such collateral. Reciprocal exchange 
involving specialised capital on both ends may assure the transactors 
that neither has an incentive to cheat the other since this would result 
in termination of the trading relationship and a capital loss for the
O C A
cheating firms as well as the cheated firm.
In order to forestall opportunistic behaviour through reciprocity, Walters 
believed it was necessary that:
• Both parties post collateral (in the form of relationship-specific 
investments or sunk costs);
• The amount of collateral is equivalent for each transactor; and
348 ibid., p. 432.
349 ibid., p. 432.
350 ibid., p. 432.
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Each transactor can cancel the collateral posted by the other (via
termination ot the trading relationship) in the event cheating occurs. ’51
However, others have raised the prospect that the transaction cost approach 
to reciprocity could also be used as a means to enforce discipline within a 
cartel in order to prevent it from breaking down.
Cavanagh has expressed reservations about the transaction cost rationale for 
reciprocity, observing that the supposed benefits delivered “would appear to 
be the same as any cartel would produce” .352 According to Ayres, 
Williamson’s hostage model could be extended to keep firms from 
breaching their agreement in a cartel arrangement and that “there remain 
structural settings where credible hostage exchanges may facilitate collusive 
agreements” . 353
The transaction cost approach provides a strong pro-competitive and 
productive efficiency enhancing rationale for reciprocity, even in instances 
where it is practiced between market competitors. Thus, the transaction cost 
explanation for reciprocity provides a legitimate basis for the existence of 
RE As. On the other hand, the transaction cost approach could be vulnerable 
to claims that it is a convenient means through which to impose punishment 
and enforce discipline amongst a cartel.
351 ibid., pp. 432-433.
352 Cavanagh, E. D., op.cit., p. 647.
353 Ayres, I. (1987) How Cartels Punish: A Structural theory of Self-Enforcing Collusion. 
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4.5 Conclusion
Several implications emerge from a survey of the academic literature on 
reciprocity as it relates to the competitive effects of REAs. The presence of 
market power appears to be a necessary prerequisite before reciprocity is 
likely to raise any competition issues. Potential competition concerns over 
the operation of REAs arise not from coercive reciprocity and the leveraging 
of market power, but from potential market foreclosure and the loss of 
allocative efficiency. In addition, reciprocity when practised between 
market competitors, as is the case with REAs, raises suspicion regarding co­
operation and the establishment of a cartel arrangement. On the other hand, 
a transaction cost explanation for reciprocity provides a pro-competitive and 
efficiency enhancing rationale for the existence of REAs. However, the 
transaction cost explanation for reciprocity could be vulnerable to claims 
that it may also serve as a mechanism to punish and enforce discipline 
within a cartel. Thus, the major competition issues to emerge from the 
academic literature on reciprocity for the operation of REAs are foreclosure 
and collusion, as well as the transaction cost rationale. These issues will be 
further explored in Chapter 5 which will review the literature pertaining to 
REAs.
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Chapter 5: Refinery Exchange Agreements
5.1 Introduction
This Chapter will examine and critically review the literature pertaining to 
the competitive effects of REAs. The relevant literature consists of a 
combination of academic literature, the deliberations of courts of law in the 
United States, and official reports by government agencies amongst 
predominantly English speaking countries.
This Chapter will determine whether the various rationales put forward as to 
why REAs are either pro-competitive or anti-competitive are robust and 
identify what conditions have to be satisfied before REAs are likely to result 
in an anti-competitive detriment.
REAs were feature of the Australian downstream petroleum industry from 
at least the mid-1960s until their final abolition in July 2002. According to 
the Royal Commission on petroleum in 1976:
the cost of distribution in Australia has led the marketers to 
distribute by means of product exchange agreements whereunder 
one company will draw a large part of the product distributed under 
its name from the refinery of another company.354
In 1986 the High Court ruled on a dispute between Ampol and Caltex over 
the interpretation of a refinery exchange agreement in regard to the supply 
of leaded petrol between Brisbane and Sydney.355 Caltex had insisted that 
Ampol pay a surcharge on the supply of leaded petrol in Sydney after the 
New South Wales Government had legislated tighter fuel specifications to
354 Royal Commission on Petroleum, op.cit., p. 46.
355 Ampol Ltd v. Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd (1986) 60 ALJR 225.
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operate in that state by mandating a reduction in the amount of lead in 
petrol. Caltex had insisted that tighter fuel specifications had added to the 
cost of production and that this should be reflected by Ampol paying a 
surcharge for the leaded petrol it received in Sydney. The case turned on 
whether the leaded petrol exchanged between Ampol and Caltex were ‘like’ 
products or not. The High Court decided in a majority decision that the 
petrol exchanged between Ampol and Caltex were ‘non-like’ products, thus 
requiring Ampol to pay the surcharge to Caltex.
The matter of O ’Keeffe Nominees Pty Ltd v BP Australia in the Federal 
Court in 1992 involved a private action alleging a breach of section 46 of 
the TPA. In this matter O’Keeffe Nominees Pty Ltd, the owner of the 
Matilda Fuels chain of retail service stations in Queensland, brought an 
action against BP seeking to be supplied with petroleum products on the 
same terms as the oil majors were supplied in Brisbane under REAs. 
O’Keefe Nominees Pty Ltd argued that a lack of competition in the 
downstream petroleum industry was demonstrated by the effect of REAs. 
However, the matter was not fully heard as the case was settled between the
, • 356parties.
In the matter of Mick Skorpos Petrol Discount King v The Shell Company o f 
Australia Limited that was initiated in December 1995 in the Federal Court, 
it was alleged that REAs had anti-competitive effects in several downstream 
petroleum markets in breach of section 45 of the TPA. However, the claims 
in relation to REAs were struck out during the pleading in February 1997.
356 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Inquiry into the Petroleum 
Products Declaration, Vol. 2, p. 76.
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Walker and Woodward have described REAs operating in Australia in the 
following terms:
Where a refiner seeks to compete in a non-home state, it must source 
its fuel under refinery exchange agreements or import it. Refinery 
exchange agreements arc negotiated for periods of six months, 
during which the home state refiner’s capacity is in large part 
allocated to supplying specified quantities to each refiner, limiting 
the amount of discretionary capacity available either to compete in 
its home state or to export and compete interstate. The non-home 
state refiner’s supply is largely fixed by the refinery exchange 
agreement for that period, with increased quantities subject to fines 
or interest payments.
Views and opinions regarding the competitive effects of REAs have been 
mixed, with most of the interested parties arguing they are either pro- 
competitive or anti-competitive. The ambiguity and lack of certainty 
regarding the competitive effects of REAs has prompted Williamson to 
observe that “[t]he phenomenon of petroleum exchanges has puzzled 
economists for a long time.” 358 Similarly, Scherer has commented that 
REAs “engender among ostensibly competing companies rich mutual- 
dependence relationships whose behavioural implications are poorly 
understood” .359
In some quarters, it has been argued that REAs foster competition and are 
therefore efficiency enhancing. This is usually premised on the basis that 
REAs enable oil refiners to secure product supply in locations 
geographically distant from their refinery network, thereby allowing them to
357 Walker, J. and Woodward, L., op.cit., p. 34.
35R Williamson, O. E., op.cit., p. 533.
359 Scherer, F. M., op.cit., p. 120.
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participate and compete in locations where they might otherwise choose not 
to do so, as well as save on transportation costs of hauling product from 
their refinery to a geographically remote location.
Another pro-competitive rationale for the existence of REAs which has been 
postulated is that the bilateral nature of the trading arrangement minimises 
on the associated transaction costs. Under Williamson’s hostage model, the 
reciprocal nature of the trading relationship under REAs ensures that 
transaction costs are minimised through mitigating against the prospect of 
post-contractual opportunistic behaviour.
On the other hand, there are those who have argued that REAs are anti­
competitive based on three principal concerns. The first concern is that 
REAs facilitate an exchange of information between competitors. The 
exchange of information which occurs as a result of REAs could be 
considered as a facilitating practice which makes it easier for parties to 
collude. The absence of reliable information has been recognised as one of 
the factors likely to lead to the breakdown of a collusive agreement. REAs 
may therefore ensure sufficient information flows between rivals to build 
trust and ensure stability amongst parties to a collusive agreement.
The second concern is that REAs may enable oil refiners to constrain the 
amount of product received by their rivals, and thereby achieve a market 
sharing outcome. It has been recognised that one of the most effective 
means to ensure the stability amongst parties to a cartel is to control the 
output of cartel members. REAs enable an oil refiner to exert influence over
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how much product its rival refiners have available to supply in a particular 
location.
The third concern is that REAs can limit competitors or even foreclose on 
potential competitors from participation in the market. For example, an 
independent wholesaler may be unable to secure product supply due to the 
operation of REAs and is thus excluded from the market.
Those who maintain that REAs are anti-competitive conclude that they 
ultimately put upward pressure on product prices. On the other hand, those 
who assert that REAs are pro-competitive and efficiency enhancing 
conclude that they put downward pressure on product prices.
Bertrand, who concluded that REAs were anti-competitive, asserted that 
they were entered into with the express purpose of maintaining upward 
pressure on retail prices as well as to reduce the number of retail participants 
competing on the basis of price.360 Similarly, the Attorney General of 
Hawaii maintained that REAs were instrumental in fostering co-operative 
behaviour amongst refiners participating in the Hawaii retail markets as 
opposed to competitive conduct, thus resulting in higher retail prices than 
would otherwise be the case.361
The TPC first raised concerns regarding the competitive effects of REAs in 
relation to the 1995 merger between Ampol and Caltex. The TPC listed 
REAs as the first feature giving rise to concerns about the competitive
360 Bertrand, R. J. (1981) The State of Competition in The Canadian Petroleum Industry. 
Volume V -  The Refining Sector. Director of Investigation and Research Combines 
Investigation Act, Canadian Government Publishing Service, Hull, Quebec, p. 105.
361 Hawaii, Department of Attorney General (1994) The Attorney General’s 1994 Interim 
Report on the Investigation o f Gasoline Prices. Honolulu.
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nature of the downstream petroleum industry followed by other horizontal 
arrangements such as joint terminalling. In 1996, Walker and Woodward 
(two then employees of the ACCC) asserted that REAs along with joint 
terminalling and borrow and loan arrangements provided the means through 
which the oil majors could engage in tacit collusion in regard to petrol
363prices and output.'
In its 1996 review of wholesale petrol price regulation, the ACCC 
commented that REAs along with borrow and loan arrangements and joint 
terminalling “may have potentially anti-competitive effects” and that it 
needed to be convinced that these arrangements did not breach the TPA.364 
The ACCC inferred that these arrangements should be subject to 
authorisation under the TPA. The ACCC also committed itself to a further 
examination of the competitive effects of REAs along with borrow and loan 
agreements and joint terminalling, and made its support for the deregulation 
of wholesale petrol prices conditional on its concerns regarding these
o z  r
horizontal arrangements being addressed. The ACCC continued to query 
the competitive effects of REAs up until 2000, even going so far as to infer 
that cheaper retail petrol prices could result from the termination of REAs in 
1998.366
362 Trade Practices Commission (1995) Ampol Caltex Merger ‘Likely to Breach Trade 
Practices Act’. Media Release, 2 February.
363 Walker, J. and Woodward, L., op.cit., p. 34
364 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Inquiry into the Petroleum 
Products Declaration, Vol. 1, p. 31.
365 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, ACCC recommends end to petrol 
declaration.
366 Fels, A. (1998) Competition Not Regulation is in Consumers’ Best Interests. Motoring 
Directions 4(2), 16-22, p. 19.
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Although the ACCC had arrived at a mostly negative assessment on the 
operation ot REAs in 1996, by 2002 it had reached an entirely different 
conclusion. In 2002, the ACCC expressed the view that the cancellation of 
REAs in Perth and Melbourne may have been a significant contributing 
factor leading to higher retail fuel prices in those cities.367
The Monopolies and Mergers Commission of the United Kingdom (MMC) 
concluded that as REAs enabled wholesalers to operate extended supply 
networks, that their overall impact was to improve, rather than restrict, the 
competitive process.368 Presumably, this probably means that the MMC 
believed that REAs put downward pressure on product prices.
Rose, who concluded that REAs were unambiguously pro-competitive, 
predicted that replacing them with conventional supply contracts “is likely 
to result in a substantial lessening of competition for the market for refined 
petroleum products in Australia”.369
Several other parties have given more guarded and qualified support for the 
competitive benefits delivered through REAs, while acknowledging their 
potential to facilitate anti-competitive conduct.
5.2 REAs Facilitate Competition and are Efficiency 
Enhancing
Numerous parties have contended that because REAs enable oil refiners to
participate in geographic markets far removed from their own oil refinery
367 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Terminal gate pricing 
arrangements in Australia.
3<>s Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1990) The Supply o f Petrol: A Report on the 
supply in the United Kingdom of petrol by wholesale. Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 
London, p. 290.
369 Rose, J. (1999) The ACCC and the Market Power of the Oil Majors -  Part 2. Trade 
Practices Law Journal 7, 74-87, p. 87.
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locations, that they must be pro-competitive because they allow more rivals 
to participate in a market than might otherwise be the case. This is because 
REAs enable a refiner to be supplied in a distant location from their refinery 
at their own cost of production whilst avoiding transportation costs from 
their refinery. The cost of transportation for a refiner from their refinery to 
another geographic market could be prohibitively expensive and may 
prevent a refiner’s participation from a particular geographic market. Hence, 
REAs may increase market participants while reducing transportation costs 
and eliminating the need for refiners to engage in the unnecessary cross- 
hauling of product. A further advantage attributed to REAs is that it 
prevents the need for refiners to build, maintain and operate a refinery 
within the vicinity of each geographic market in which they operate and 
thus prevents the proliferation of small inefficient refineries unable to fully 
capture the benefits of economies of scale available from oil refining.
The earliest found expression for the view that REAs are pro-competitive 
because they enable more parties to participate in a market than might 
otherwise be the case is contained in the US court decision of Blue Bell Co. 
v. Frontier Refining Co. where the court opined that:
The underlying purpose and effect of the exchange agreements are 
too plain for doubt. In the first place, they were obviously entered 
into in order to facilitate competition, not stifle it. They permitted 
one marketing company to do business at the back door of its 
competitor’s refinery by the exchange of manufactured products.370
370 Blue Bell Co. v. Frontier Refining Co. 213 F.2d 354 (10th Cir. 1954).
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In the US court decision of Thomas v. Amerada Hess Corporation, it was 
argued that the consequences of prohibiting REAs would be to turn the 
areas surrounding each refinery into a natural monopoly where only the 
owner of that refinery could economically afford to compete and that 
competition would be confined to fringe areas between two refineries.371
Several parties have contended that REAs are pro-competitive simply 
because they may increase the number of market participants. In its report 
on the supply of petrol in the United Kingdom, the MMC argued that there 
was a clear benefit served by REAs because they increased the number of 
market participants in a particular locality, which should in turn increase 
competition, help keep prices down, and improve the quality of service.372 
Similarly in Australia, the Industry Commission concluded that REAs had 
facilitated competition between all of the refiners in most of Australia’s 
larger geographic markets and that in their absence, refiners may choose not 
to compete in those markets furthest removed from their refineries.373
Commenting on the operation of REAs in the United States, Ritchie argued 
that they allowed refiners to compete vigorously across the country while 
lowering transportation costs.374 According to Ritchie, the lower 
transportation costs would ultimately be translated into lower costs to 
consumers.' Similarly, Renfrew argued that a refinery exchange 
agreement between refiners with refineries operating in different locations
371 Thomas v. Amerada Hess Corporation. 393 F.Supp. 58 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
372 The Monopolies and Mergers Commission, op.cit., p. 289.
373 Industry Commission, op.cit., pp. 55-56.
374 Ritchie, S. (1976) Petroleum Dismemberment. Vanderbilt Law Review 29, 1131-1165, 
pp. 1144-1145.
375 ibid., p. 1145.
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put each of them in competition with the other while delivering a substantial
376saving on freight costs.
Flaim queried whether the only viable alternative for a refiner to compete in 
a location far removed from their own refinery was to transport product 
across from their refinery.377 Although Flaim believed that REAs were 
preferable to the cross-hauling of product, she commented that it was not 
entirely clear whether they were more efficient than a market where parties 
had to bid openly for the supply of refined product.
Williamson has argued that if REAs could only be justified on the basis of 
transportation cost savings brought about through the avoidance of cross- 
hauling, then the same benefits could also be generated through unilateral 
trade as well:
The usual argument that exchanges are justified because they avoid 
costly cross-hauling ... is not an adequate justification for 
widespread use of exchanges. Were it only that transportation cost
378savings were realised, unilateral trading would suffice.
In Williamson’s opinion, failure to address why bilateral trading 
arrangements through REAs were more beneficial than unilateral trade left 
the agreements vulnerable to suspicion that they were a preferred form of 
contracting for ulterior motives.
The Restrictive Trade Practices Commission of Canada (RTPC) saw it as 
desirable that REAs enabled refiners to obtain product for their retail
376 Renfrew, C. B. (1993) Intercompetitor Co-operation in the Petroleum Industry. Antitrust 
Law Journal 61, 559-577, p. 569.
377 Flaim, T. (1979) The Structure of the U.S. Petroleum Industry: Joint Activities and 
Affiliations. The Antitrust Bulletin 24, 555-572.
378 Williamson, O. E., op.cit., p. 532.
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operations in markets distant from their refineries without having to 
transport the product because of the real-cost savings realised in 
transportation. It also contended that the participation of refiners in 
markets distant from their own refineries could enhance competition in 
those markets. However, the RTPC rejected several reasons advanced for 
the existence of REAs, including the reduction in transportation costs, lower 
unit costs and the promotion of competition in distant markets on the basis 
that such benefits were also available through unilateral trading 
arrangements as well.
In a similar vein, the MMC did not accept the argument that the only 
alternative to REAs was for companies to transport product from its own 
supply source. Instead, it maintained that in the absence of REAs, similar 
transport cost savings would be achieved through other means such as 
normal market transactions.3*1'
Courts in the United States have identified another possible adverse 
consequence in the event that REAs were curtailed. It has been argued that 
the cancellation of REAs would result in a refiner establishing and operating 
a refinery in each location in which they engaged in retailing, thus resulting 
in the needless duplication of refining capacity and the proliferation of sub- 
economic production facilities unable to take advantage of the significant 
economies of scale available in oil refining. In Thomas v. Amerada Hess 
Corporation, the court concluded that:
379 Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (1986) Competition in the Canadian Petroleum 
Industry. Canadian Government Publishing Centre, Supply and Services Canada, Ottawa.
380 The Monopolies and Mergers Commission, op.cit., p. 289.
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Outlawing the exchange agreements would have a tendency to bring 
about a needless duplication of refineries with their accompanying
381drawbacks.
Similarly, in American Oil Company v. McMullin the court opined that:
The arrangement is for the obvious purpose of avoiding the need for 
each company to maintain a refinery in each geographical area in 
which it operates.
On the same theme, Flaim recognised REAs could enable firms to reduce 
the total costs of petroleum acquisition and distribution “because a refinery 
may expand its capacity and have greater refining capacity than is needed to 
supply its own [retailing] operations” due to the large economies of scale
383available in refining.
The Bertrand Report on competition in the Canadian petroleum industry 
also recognised the efficiency enhancing benefits arising from REAs.384 
This was because REAs enabled the more fulsome exploitation of 
economies of scale at the refinery level than would otherwise be the case if 
each market participant had to establish their own refinery within a 
particular geographic market, while not limiting the retail market to only 
those participants with refinery capacity in the immediate vicinity.
Several pro-competitive and efficiency enhancing benefits arising from the 
operation of REAs have been identified. However, the critical flaw in these 
arguments in support of the supposed benefits of REAs is that they ignore
381 Thomas v. Amerada Hess Corporation, op.cit.
382 Amercian Oil Company v. McMullin. 508 F.2d 1345 (1975).
383 Flaim, T., op.cit., p. 560.
384 Bertrand, R. J., op.cit.
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exactly the same kinds of benefits can also be delivered through unilateral 
trading arrangements as well. Hence, these supportive arguments in favour 
of REAs fail to identify why they are a superior and preferred form of 
contracting to unilateral trade. The next section will examine possible 
rationales that have been advanced as to why REAs are a superior form of 
contractual arrangement as compared to unilateral trade.
5.3 The Benefits of Bilateral Trade
In the previous section it was concluded that all of the identified benefits 
achieved from REAs could also be delivered through unilateral trade as 
well. This section examines possible rationales as to why bilateral trading 
arrangements through REAs may be a superior form of contracting 
compared to unilateral trading arrangements.
The MMC has contended that there could be some marginal cost imposition 
if the downstream petroleum industry was forced to abandon REAs in 
favour of other contractual arrangements. According to the MMC, any 
alternative form of contracting to REAs “could well be more complex in 
administrative terms and would have a small cost penalty without producing
385any particular benefit for the consumer”.
Williamson believed that long-term trade between rivals, as is the case 
under REAs, was only feasible if certain conditions were satisfied. First, 
the product in question had to be fungible with Williamson observing that 
fungibility is not true for many differentiated goods and services.387 Second,
383 The Monopolies and Mergers Commission, op.cit., p. 289.
386 Williamson, O. E., op.cit.
387 ibid., p. 531.
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efficiency incentives for long-term trade between rivals depended upon 
“prospective realisation of production cost savings“ .388 For this to occur, 
economies of scale had to be large in relation to the size of geographic 
markets. If economies of scale was not an issue, it was argued that “every
firm would presumably supply everywhere to its own long-term needs“. 1 
However, in those instances where economies of scale are significant, it was 
reasoned that “each market will support only a limited number of plants of 
minimum efficient size” .390 Third, it was necessary for firm-specific effects 
to extend across geographic boundaries. It was argued that fungibility and 
scale economies did not by themselves establish the feasibility of long-term 
trade between rivals in order to deliver gains from trade. For this to occur, 
the value of identical product sold by rivals had to exceed that sold by the 
local supplier, and this was only going to occur where firms “possess valued 
reputations that extend beyond their local market to include distant 
markets” .391
Williamson proposed a hostage model to explain the existence of REAs, 
whereby long-term trade between rivals is supported by the economic 
equivalent of hostages in the form of a dedicated asset. Reciprocity in this 
instance serves to equalise the exposure of the parties, thereby reducing the 
incentive of the buyer to defect from the exchange/ “ In the absence of such 
reciprocity, the supplier would be forced to redeploy dedicated assets at a
389
388 ibid., p. 532.
389 ibid., p. 532.
390 ibid., p. 532.
391 ibid., p. 532.
392 Williamson, O. E. (1989) Transaction Cost Economics. In Schmalensee, R. and Willig, 
R. D. (eds.) Handbook o f Industrial Organisation. Vol. 1, Elsevier Science Publishers B. 
V., Amsterdam, p. 162.
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greatly reduced alternative value.3 )3 The buyer’s commitment to the 
exchange is thus signalled by their willingness to accept reciprocal exposure 
of a dedicated asset, thereby mitigating against the hazards of defection.394
Under Williamson’s hostage model, “long-term exchange agreements 
permit firms to secure product in geographic markets where own-production 
is not feasible because economies of scale are large in relation to their own 
needs’’. Thus under such conditions, it was reasoned that firms with 
whom exchange agreements are reached will construct and maintain larger 
plants than they otherwise would. 396
The RTPC accepted two reasons as to why REAs were a preferred form of 
contracting over unilateral trade: first, an improved degree of security; and 
second, the possibility for improved terms of trade. The RTPC accepted the 
premise that REAs provided an additional measure of security over and 
above that of an ordinary contract. That security was the ability to act 
promptly in response to a supply interruption on the part of the other party 
without waiting to resolve disputes about fault or legal entitlement.397 
According to the RTPC, this extra measure of security was achieved 
through each party holding the other one hostage, facilitating long-term 
planning by making long-term volumes and supply prices more predictable, 
and constituted a cost saving.398
393 ibid., p. 162.
394 ibid., p. 162.
395 Williamson, O. E., Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, p. 
535.
396 ibid., p. 535.
397 Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, op.cit., p. 233.
398 ibid., p. 233.
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The RTPC maintained that a hostage argument is strongest where 
transportation is a viable alternative to REAs. The fact that transportation is 
economically feasible means that the refinery supply-and-demand balance is 
likely to be similar in the market areas covered by the agreement. In a 
situation where the supply-and-demand balance in the affected markets is 
asymmetrical, the RTPC contended that the hostage argument breaks down. 
It argued that a supplying firm in a market where there is high capacity 
utilisation and relatively high wholesale prices might find it advantageous to 
break the agreement.399 This would depend on how much lower the 
wholesale prices in the other market were, where it would have to pay to 
obtain supplies, in comparison to wholesale prices it could obtain by selling 
the same volume in the market in which it possessed a refinery. Thus, if 
there is a significant price differential, it may be advantageous and 
profitable for a refiner to withdraw from REAs.
Rose contended that REAs constitute a superior form of contractual 
arrangement because they generated transaction cost savings.400 According 
to Rose, transaction costs include the costs of discovering the relevant 
market prices, negotiating, and enforcing contracts and that REAs served to 
reduce these transaction costs.401
Following on from Williamson’s hostage model, Rose maintained that 
REAs lower transaction costs due to the problems associated with asset 
specificity. Rose argued that specialised assets are vulnerable to 
opportunistic behaviour on the part of others unless other contracting parties
399 ibid., p. 233.
400 Rose, J. op.cit.
401 ibid., pp. 80-81.
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also have their own specialised asset at risk as part of the contractual 
relationship:
Specialisation (that is, the emergence of relationship-specific 
investments) prevents the other party from walking away without 
loss. Asset specialisation creates openings for opportunistic 
behaviour in which one party to the relationship manoeuvrers to 
extract wealth from the other; and that wealth is wealth that could 
not be extracted in the absence of the interdependence. Specialised 
assets are vulnerable to hold-ups. When one party to the relationship 
refuses to pay the other party more than the highest value of the 
specialised asset elsewhere, we have a hold-up.402
One means of overcoming the problem of asset specificity is for the vertical 
integration of ownership of refineries with retail distribution networks 
within the one firm, as this would “remove the risk to the refiner of a sudden 
costly drop in throughput when a distributor cancels a contract or otherwise 
varies the quantity demanded”.402 In the absence of vertical integration,
Rose maintained that specific assets can be protected from opportunistic 
behaviour through credible commitments; the posting of a bond or an 
equivalent forfeitable asset against malperformance.404
Rose asserted that economies of scale in refining require that a large amount 
of product must be sold through the retail networks of competing refiners, 
otherwise no refiner could sell sufficient quantity of petrol through their 
own retail network to justify building a refinery.405 However, Rose argued 
that once a refinery is actually constructed, other refiners would be in a
ibid., pp. 81-82.
403 ibid., p. 82.
404 ibid., p. 82.
405 ibid., p. 82.
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strong bargaining position because the investment is then sunk. Such 
conditions leave a refiner vulnerable to opportunistic behaviour, whereby a 
contrived termination of a conventional contract or even a small reduction in 
quantity demanded would leave the refiner exposed and perhaps forced to 
sell at distress prices.406
The scope for post-contractual opportunistic behaviour is reduced by REAs 
which are facilitated by comparable asset investment. This leads Rose to 
conclude that REAs are “simple, self-enforcing contracts” .407
Other interpretations have also been offered for the bilateral nature of REAs 
of a more sinister nature. These have suggested REAs are a possible means 
through which to enforce discipline amongst members of a cartel.
Bertrand contended that participation in a refinery exchange agreement was 
made dependent on the payment of an entry fee, namely the investment in 
refining capacity.408 Through this mechanism, it was argued that the 
behaviour of a refiner could be conditioned against pursuing aggressive 
pricing strategies, as a refiner would be more vulnerable and suffer greater 
losses in the event of retaliatory predatory pricing because of the significant 
fixed costs associated with a refinery investment.409
Ayres has suggested that Williamson’s hostage model could be extended to 
facilitate horizontal cartel agreements.410 This would be achieved through 
increasing the ability of the cartel to punish members for any deviation from
406
407
408
409
410
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the agreement. Through means of a refinery exchange agreement, Ayres 
contends that cartel members could inflict targeted punishments by refusing 
to exchange product with a firm breaching the agreement.411 Thus, the 
breaching firm would be punished by its creation of unused excess refining 
capacity and by not being able to use its capacity to supply unanticipated 
short-falls in other markets.412
Potential transaction cost savings provide a justification as to why bilateral 
trading arrangements through REAs may be a superior form of contracting 
arrangement and preferred over the alternative of unilateral trade. On the 
other hand, the nature of bilateral trading arrangements through REAs is 
open to other interpretations and vulnerable to claims that it could also be 
used to facilitate a collusive agreement, whether that be tacit or overt. The 
next three sections will examine arguments advanced as to why REAs could 
facilitate anti-competitive conduct.
5.4 Information Exchanges
The exchange of information between market rivals could be considered as 
a facilitating practice which makes it easier for parties to collude in some 
form. Such an exchange of information has been recognised as a critical 
factor for monitoring the compliance of members to a cartel agreement. 
Without such a flow of information, co-operation might otherwise 
breakdown. Concern has been expressed that REAs facilitate the exchange 
of information that enables oil refiners to co-ordinate their conduct in such a 
manner as to form and maintain a stable cartel agreement.
411 ibid., p. 310.
412 ibid., p.310.
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One of the two principal reasons why Bertrand concluded that REAs were a 
co-ordinating mechanism, which enabled oil refiners to engage in collusive 
conduct, was because of the information exchanges they engendered.413 
Bertrand contended that the detailed information exchanges facilitated 
through REAs helped to maintain stability and build-up trust between 
members of a cartel in Canada:
Product arrangements involved detailed exchanges of information 
among companies at the refinery level. An oligopoly’s stability is 
inversely related to the information available to each of its members 
about the respective strategies of the other. Solidarity and the 
maintenance of oligopoly discipline depend upon the trust that 
develops among members. Trust is engendered if information about 
each member’s activities is so detailed that individual companies can 
be certain that others are abiding by the oligopoly’s rules. 
Comprehensive exchanges of information among companies at the 
refinery level provided what was required for this purpose. In turn, 
the exchanges of product provided a monitoring device as to the 
accuracy of this information.414
Bertrand further contended that the information flows generated by REAs 
could also be used with the intention of discovering information regarding a 
competitor’s intentions. Bertrand maintained that this information could in 
turn be used to anticipate and thwart competition in the retail sector. Hence, 
the information flows brought about through REAs could be used to 
manipulate and condition refiners against engaging in competitive conduct.
However, Bertrand recognised that the information exchanges generated 
through REAs could also be efficiency enhancing while not necessarily
413 Bertrand, R. J., op.cit.
414 ibid., pp. 3-4.
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deleterious to competition. This would be the case if they allowed for the 
greater exploitation of economies of scale at the refinery level than would 
otherwise be the case if each refiner had to establish a refinery within a 
particular geographic market, while not limiting the retail market to only 
those participants with refinery capacity in the immediate vicinity:
some industry communications might be regarded as a necessary by­
product of a process that prevents the massive economies of scale 
that exist at the refining level from causing a similar level of 
concentration to develop in [retailing]. Therefore inter-refinery 
product trades and the accompanying exchange of information need 
not be harmful to competition.415
However, Bertrand concluded that the information exchanges in Canada 
brought about through REAs had gone a lot further than merely to exploit 
economies of scale and had in fact served to reduce competition.
On the other hand, Williamson was scathing in his assessment of Bertrand’s 
contention that the information exchanges engendered through REAs 
assisted in the facilitation of anti-competitive conduct.416 Williamson 
dismissed Bertrand’s contention on the basis that exactly the same sort of 
information exchange would occur in the event of a unilateral trade. On this 
basis, Williamson concluded that Bertrand’s objection was fundamentally 
flawed because it provided the basis to oppose any long-term trading 
arrangement.
413 ibid., p. 4.
4U' Williamson, O. E., op.cit., p. 533.
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The RTPC largely dismissed concerns that REAs facilitated an information 
exchange resulting in collusive conduct for several reasons.417 In the first 
instance, it argued that “a great deal of information, some of it specific and 
some general, will inevitably be known by each firm about each of its 
competitors and about the industry as a whole” through a range of publicly 
available sources, and hence “each firm quite properly knows a fair amount 
about each of its competitors’ refineries” .418 Through this channel, the 
RTPC maintained that “short-term and long-term industry demand and 
supply forecasts abound” .419 In the second instance, the RTPC argued that in 
terms of specific information exchange, it is just not possible to negotiate 
the terms of a supply agreement “without discussing the volumes to be 
supplied, product specifications and times and locations of transfer” .420 On 
this specific point, it concluded that provision of this type of information is 
unavoidable and does no harm to competition.421 Overall, the RTPC was 
dismissive of suggestions that the information exchanges engendered by 
REAs uniquely facilitated collusive conduct because exactly the same sort 
of information would have been exchanged during the course of unilateral 
trading as well.
The FTC has also specifically considered the issue of whether the exchange 
of information facilitated by REAs engenders collusive conduct amongst oil 
refiners.422 While recognising that substantial communication and the
417 Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, op.cit.
418 ibid., p. 235.
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exchange of information between competing refiners involved in the 
negotiation of REAs could facilitate collusion, the FTC concluded that such 
exchanges of information actually helped the market to function efficiently 
by allowing for the greater exploitation of economies of scale than would 
otherwise be the case if each refiner had to establish a refinery in each 
geographic market in which they sought to participate. Furthermore, the 
FTC found no evidence of collusion in regard to the operation of REAs.
While the exchange of information between competitors is generally a 
necessary condition to ensure the maintenance and stability of a cartel, its 
mere existence does not provide sufficient grounds to conclude that 
collusion and anti-competitive conduct is actually occurring. Concerns 
raised in relation to the information exchanges that occur as a result of 
REAs could also be raised in relation to unilateral trading arrangements as 
well. There appears to be nothing unique about the information flows 
generated by REAs as to why they should facilitate collusion and anti­
competitive conduct any more so than unilateral trading arrangements.
Thus, the grounds for concluding that REAs are anti-competitive on the 
basis of the information flows they engender would appear to be weak.
The next two sections examine some of the more substantive reasons put 
forward as to why REAs could be considered as anti-competitive.
5.5 Market Sharing and Price Fixing
Arguably, a more serious charge levelled against REAs is that they allow a 
refiner to constrain the amount of product available to a rival refiner in a 
particular geographic market. Competition concerns arise from the ability of
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a refiner to restrict the amount of product that a rival has available to sell, 
which in turn could inhibit and condition refiner wholesale and retail market 
participants against engaging in competitive conduct, as well as serve as an 
overt act or a de facto means to achieve a market sharing arrangement 
between wholesale and retail market participants. It has been recognised that 
the ability to fix market shares is one of the most effective means to enforce 
discipline and compliance upon members of a cartel. The ability to fix 
market shares is an effective alternative means of achieving the same 
outcome as facilitated through a price fixing arrangement.
Bertrand asserted that REAs in Canada had been used “to create a form of 
market-sharing arrangement between firms”.41' This was achieved because 
of the reciprocal nature of REAs. This meant that any attempt by a rival 
refiner to compete for market share in a location far removed from their 
refinery, and thereby raise the amount of product received under the 
agreement, would immediately be countered and matched by the other 
refiner receiving the same amount of additional product in the location of 
the original refiner’s refinery. Through this mechanism, Bertrand contended 
that REAs imposed an immediate discipline and restraint against refiners 
from engaging in competitive conduct:
Reciprocal agreements specified that the amount of products lifted 
by each company from the other’s refinery would be approximately 
the same. These arrangements, therefore fixed the relative market 
shares in the sense that neither firm could expand in the territory of 
the other and increase its share of both markets. If a company began 
to increase the amount of product it took from the other in the
4-3 Bertrand, R. J., op.cit., p. 569.
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latter’s home territory and, in turn, adopted an aggressive pricing 
policy for marketing purposes, it knew the terms of the exchange 
would facilitate immediate retaliation. ... In the case of reciprocal 
arrangements, the partner losing market share in his home market 
would have the right to increase its product liftings from its partner 
and to create immediately a similar price deterioration in the home 
market of the firm which initiated price competition. Reciprocal 
agreements, therefore, were an extremely effective instrument for 
solving the discipline problem any oligopoly must face in that they 
decreased the reaction time needed to counter aggressive 
behaviour.424
The Attorney General for the US state of Hawaii also arrived at the 
conclusion that REAs resulted in a market sharing arrangement.425 
According to the Attorney General, REAs acted to entrench the existing 
market share of incumbent participants in Hawaii’s wholesale markets. This 
was achieved by dividing the market for product among the incumbents 
according to the incumbent’s projected needs, which were based on the 
incumbent’s historic market shares.
Through limiting the supply of product available in Hawaii to that 
manufactured in Hawaii, the Attorney General concluded that REAs had 
acted in such a manner as to keep the market price artificially high. The 
Attorney General further concluded that REAs became the mechanism 
through which incumbents kept low-priced product out of Hawaii and 
prevented it from being imported from the US mainland.
424 ibid., p. 3.
42:1 Hawaii, Department of Attorney General., op.cit.
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The Attorney General asserted that Hawaii markets were worth competing 
for, arguing that it is worth engaging in vigorous price competition in an 
oligopolistic market in the event that a seller can project a profitable 
outcome from a substantial price reduction. This would occur where a seller 
could expect price competition to increase profits if a price decrease would 
increase sales more than enough to make up for the loss of margin due to the 
decrease in price.
The Attorney General reasoned that a seller’s price decrease in an 
oligopolistic market would ordinarily be matched by other sellers in order to 
preserve their market share, but that a price decrease would increase sales if 
other sellers could not match it because they were less efficient, and if the 
first seller could supply the entire market at the lower price. It was observed 
that three companies who were party to REAs, but did not have refining 
capacity in Hawaii, possessed sufficient refining capacity on the US 
mainland to manufacture enough petrol to supply the entire demand of the 
Hawaii markets.
The Attorney General suggested that if one of the three US mainland 
refiners which wholesaled product in Hawaii was to reduce its wholesale 
price to the price of wholesale petrol in Los Angeles plus the cost of 
transportation, then it would be unlikely that the two Hawaii based refiners 
would continue to sell to such a hostile seller. Under such a scenario, it was 
argued that the seller would have to bring its own supplies over from the US 
mainland provided it was profitable to do so. On this basis, the Attorney 
General asserted that the critical question ultimately came down to whether
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or not it was possible to import petrol into Hawaii for less than the cost of 
production in Hawaii. On the basis that it was possible to import petrol at a 
lower cost than it took to manufacture it in Hawaii, the Attorney General 
reasoned that there must be another factor which precluded this from 
occurring.
A review of the analysis undertaken by the Attorney General was conducted 
by the Bureau of Competition of the FTC (BOC). The BOC did not concur 
with the Attorney General’s analysis, commenting that it did not believe that 
it was clear enough that REAs had been entered into for the express purpose 
and v/ith the effect of maintaining the price of petrol in Hawaii. At best, the 
BOC argued, maintaining the market price was an incidental effect. The 
BOC did not share the view of the Attorney General that participants in a 
refinery exchange agreement used them in order to divide up the market 
between them.
The BOC also believed that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to prove 
that REAs have any actual anti-competitive effects in Hawaii. The BOC 
maintained that even in the event that REAs were eliminated, that it would 
not necessarily lead to lower petrol prices. In the event that REAs were 
banned, the BOC believed that non-refiner incumbents would pursue one of 
three options: to either seek to displace the two Hawaii refiners; abandon the 
Hawaii markets altogether; or buy petrol from the two Hawaii refiners on 
the open market.
The BOC reasoned that the decision by one of the non-refiner incumbents to 
go after the market share of the two incumbent Hawaii refiners was most
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unlikely on the basis that if such a move were resisted by one or both of the 
incumbent refiners, the ensuing price war would result in all participants 
losing out. The BOC further maintained that the final outcome would still be 
a market structure that was characterised as being oligopolistic if not a 
monopoly.
The Attorney General was not entirely satisfied with the analysis conducted 
by the BOC, arguing that the absence of vigorous price competition implied 
an attitude of co-operation amongst incumbent oil companies in Hawaii.
The Attorney General blamed REAs for sustaining this attitude of co­
operation.
In the final analysis, the Attorney General decided that the answer as to the 
competitive effects of REAs ultimately rested on whether or not incumbent 
participants in the Hawaii markets earned excessive profits or not. It was 
reasoned that if excessive profits were being earned in Hawaii, then in the 
normal course of events this should attract new entry into Hawaii in the 
absence of REAs.
A professional economist was engaged to determine whether the incumbent 
oil companies in Hawaii had been earning profits in excess of competitive 
levels. The economist concluded the facts tended to indicate that the 
refineries in Hawaii had not been earning more than a competitive return on 
investment. However, the economist drew attention to one dilemma. This 
was the finding that it would probably have been cheaper to import 
petroleum products from Los Angeles into Hawaii, even after taking
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account of transportation costs, rather than continue to manufacture in 
Hawaii.
In Australia, several parties have also recognised that the ability of a refiner 
to constrain the amount of product available to a rival could be used to 
inhibit and/or stifle competitive conduct. The Industry Commission 
acknowledged that REAs could be used to restrict competition even though 
it concluded, on balance, that REAs were pro-competitive.426 The Industry 
Commission recognised that REAs could impede the expansion of a refiner 
in a geographic location remote from its refinery. In this case, expansion for 
a refiner would depend on convincing a rival refiner to take up more volume 
to expand sales from its refinery in another market or to undertake the more 
costly option of importing product from either interstate or overseas. The 
Industry Commission concluded that the potential for agreements to limit 
competition was smaller the greater the amount of flexibility allowed to 
vary volumes and the opportunity to purchase product rather than exchange 
it.
Walker and Woodward lumped REAs in with a number of other co­
operative arrangements between the oil majors in Australia, which they 
maintained had facilitated collusive conduct.427 REAs were seen as a means 
by which refiners could punish and discipline other refiners for breaking 
cartel solidarity:
the industry is also characterised by refinery exchange agreements, 
joint terminalling and borrow and loan arrangements. These
426 Industry Commission, op.cit., p. 55.
427 Walker, J. and Woodward, L., op.cit.
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agreements, and the inter-dependence that they create, facilitate 
output co-ordination between the majors and provide a means of 
punishing deviations from co-ordinated prices and outputs. The 
refinery exchange agreements constrain the supply elasticity of all 
parties and involve costs for supplying in excess of agreed 
quantities, discouraging cheating on co-ordinated prices and 
outputs.428
Although Williamson put forward his hostage model to provide a pro- 
competitive and efficiency enhancing rationale for the existence of REAs, 
he was not oblivious to the possibility that the restraints contained within 
them could be used to serve other purposes as well, such as a mechanism for 
strategic market division.429 This would be the case where the market 
concerned “exhibited troublesome structural properties” and the requisite 
preconditions existed for the exercise of market power, such as high market 
concentration coupled with high barriers to entry.430 Ayres postulated that 
Williamson’s hostage model could also be extended to enforce compliance 
and discipline amongst a cartel.431
Rose has challenged the contention that REAs could act as a cartel 
enforcement mechanism. ~ Rose maintained that the cost penalties 
contained in REAs for unilateral expansion were of little practical 
significance for competition law and could be simply explained by an 
upward sloping marginal cost (or supply) curve.433
428 ibid., p. 34.
429 Williamson, O. E., op.cit., p. 536.
430 ibid., p. 536.
431 Ayres, I., op.cit.
432 Rose, J., op.cit.
433 ibid., p. 77.
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Furthermore, Rose argued that if REAs were meant to be a cartel 
enforcement mechanism, then they would be far more effective if they 
covered all industry participants, rather than confined to refiners, as cartels 
could be undermined by any price cutters:
A strong reason to consider that a refinery exchange is not a cartel 
enforcement device is the respective attitudes of the majors and 
independents to new membership. If a refinery exchange were a 
cartel enforcement mechanism, the majors would be keen to ensure 
industry-wide coverage. Successful co-ordinated interaction must 
encircle all significant sellers.
The downfall of many collusive endeavours is smaller firms that stay 
outside the collusive arrangement and undercut the cartel’s price.434
The RTPC also examined the question of whether REAs acted to entrench 
existing market shares by examining the evidence upon which Bertrand had 
used in drawing his conclusion.435 After calling into question the nature of 
the evidence upon which Bertrand had drawn his conclusion, the RTPC 
commented that:
Even if reciprocal inter-refinery supply arrangements appear on 
occasion to amount to a form of geographical specialisation, that by 
no means implies an arrangement to share markets or to stabilise 
market shares.436
A major determinant in deciding whether or not REAs can act in such a way 
as to allow a refiner to fix market shares will probably depend on the extent 
to which it is possible for other wholesale market participants to secure
434 ibid., p. 77.
435 Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, op.cit.
436 ibid., p. 246.
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alternative sources of supply from outside a particular geographic market. If 
it proves to be extremely difficult to obtain product from another source 
other than a local refiner in a particular geographic market, then it is quite 
conceivable that REAs could serve as a device for market sharing between 
participating refiners to the agreement. If on the other hand, importation of 
product from outside a particular geographic market is relatively easy and 
inexpensive, then attempts to fix market shares through REAs could fail. 
Ultimately, the degree to which a geographic market is contestable to 
imported product will probably determine the potential scope for REAs to 
achieve a market sharing outcome amongst participating refiners. Even if a 
geographic market is not contestable to imported product, it certainly does 
not follow that REAs will definitely be used for market sharing purposes; 
such a market may only give an indication as to whether or not the potential 
exists, but only the conduct of the participating refiners in a refinery 
exchange agreement will determine whether this actually occurs. Hence, 
geographic markets displaying structural properties that render them 
relatively uncontestable to outside and imported product are likely to create 
conditions conducive for REAs to restrict the amount of product available to 
rivals, which in turn could be used to achieve a market sharing arrangement 
between participating refiners. On the other hand, if a particular geographic 
market is not contestable to imported product, then it may also be more 
profitable for a local refiner to abandon REAs altogether in pursuit of 
greater profits as suggested by the RTPC (when the rationale behind the 
hostage model breaks down).
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5.6 Market Foreclosure
Closely aligned to the possibility that REAs could be used to achieve a 
market sharing arrangement is concern that REAs could be used to limit, if 
not deny outright, the supply of product to independent participants in 
wholesale and the retail markets. Through this means, REAs could act in 
such a manner as to foreclose the market to independents, thereby limiting 
market participation to refiners. Concern has been expressed that with non- 
refiners excluded or limited in their market participation, refiners will adopt 
co-operative as opposed to competitive strategies against each other in 
wholesale and retail markets. Furthermore, concern has also been expressed 
that non-refiners have been excluded from participating in REAs even when 
they have sufficient product to exchange, thus making it more difficult for 
non-refiners to participate in wholesale markets where they cannot secure 
their own source of product supply.
Probably the first party to suggest that REAs could be used for exclusionary 
purposes was the FTC. In 1973, the FTC issued a complaint against the 
eight largest oil companies in the United States alleging that they had 
combined or agreed to monopolise refining, maintained monopoly power 
over refining, and maintained a non-competitive market structure in refining 
in certain regions of the United States.437 Part of the FTC’s complaint 
focused specifically on the operation of REAs, alleging that the oil 
companies had exercised market power in the refining of petroleum 
products by engaging in the acts and practices of:
447 Federal Trade Commission Docket No. 8934 (1973). This action was eventually 
dropped in 1981.
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Pursuing a common course of action in participating in restrictive or 
exclusionary exchanges and sales of [petrol] and other refined 
petroleum products among themselves and with other petroleum
438companies.
The ACCC has expressed concern that REAs could be used to stifle the 
participation of independents in the retail market.439 This was argued on the 
basis that independents would only have access to any residual product that 
a refiner had left-over after all a refiner’s obligations under REAs had been 
honoured.440 Furthermore, the ACCC expressed concern that the expansion 
of independents could be constrained in regions of tight supply.441 Another 
concern raised by the ACCC was that refiners excluded the participation of 
independents from REAs, even where independents had product to 
exchange.
Several participants to the Industry Commission inquiry also referred to the 
exclusionary effects of REAs.442
The RTPC also examined claims that REAs put the squeeze on the amount 
of product available for non-vertically integrated companies to purchase.443 
The RTPC Report was not able to reach a definitive opinion on this question 
and concluded that concerns regarding a supply squeeze for non-refiners 
were not able to be substantiated.
439 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Inquiry into the Petroleum 
Products Declaration, Vol. 1.
440 ibid., p. 24.
44^  ibid., p. 24.
442 Industry Commission, op.cit., p. 55.
443 Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, op.cit.
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The MMC also considered whether REAs had any exclusionary effects in 
limiting the ability of non-refiner wholesalers to access product.444 The 
MMC dismissed concerns that REAs had any exclusionary effects by 
arguing that any wholesaler with sufficient quantity of product to trade 
should be able to participate. It should be noted that out of the three non- 
refiners able to participate in REAs at the time the MMC considered the 
matter, two had substantial refining capacity elsewhere in Europe and the 
other had acquired the wholesale fuels business of a manufacturer which 
produced petrol through a blending process.
Rose has queried the ACCC’s finding that REAs were restricted to 
refiners.445 Rose drew on the finding of the MMC which found that non- 
refiners were able to participate in REAs in the United Kingdom, in contrast 
to the ACCC’s finding in respect to Australia.446 However, Rose failed to 
recognise that all of the non-refining wholesalers allowed to participate in 
REAs in the United Kingdom had access to their own manufactured source 
of supply. As was the case in Australia, there was no participant to REAs in 
the United Kingdom who was not a manufacturer of petroleum products.
Rose was also critical of the ACCC’s concerns that REAs made new entry 
more difficult, and drew attention to ACCC comments that new entry was 
made “more difficult due to savings on cross-hauling arising from the 
refinery exchanges” .447 It was argued that the superior efficiency achieved 
by refiners by virtue of their participation in REAs should not be regarded
444
445
446
447
The Monopolies and Mergers Commission, op.cit. 
Rose, J., op.cit. 
ibid., p. 75. 
ibid., p. 75.
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as a barrier to entry. Furthermore, Rose argued that it was not normally 
expected of incumbents that they assist their competitors in the market place 
through the supply of essential inputs.
Because non-refiners are able to source product from up to four refiners in 
Australia and play them off against each other. Rose reasoned that non­
refiners could still share in the benefits of REAs indirectly through entering 
a supply agreement with any one of the four refiners.
Rose considered the overall attitude of the ACCC on REAs in its 1996 
Report to be contradictory, on the one hand arguing that they were anti­
competitive, and yet on the other hand maintaining that it would be pro- 
competitive if the non-refiners were also allowed to participate.
Rather than being totally dependent on the local refiners in a particular 
geographic market, Rose makes a valid point that REAs potentially create 
many more suppliers of product than might otherwise be the case, provided 
refiners have surplus product available over and above the requirements of 
their retail network.
The debate in the literature has primarily focused on whether REAs have 
any exclusionary effects. Implicit in this debate would appear to be the 
reasoning that any exclusionary effects are in fact anti-competitive. Even if 
REAs are exclusionary in their impact, it does not necessarily follow that 
this would lead to an anti-competitive detriment. As Posner has observed, 
the primary focus of antimonopoly policy should be on the maintenance of
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competitive pricing, and not on particular numbers of competitors.448 Any 
exclusionary effects of REAs are only likely to result in an anti-competitive 
detriment in two situations. The first is that the exclusion of non-refiners 
results in the removal of more efficient participants from wholesale and 
retail markets, thus potentially leading to a reduction in both allocative and 
productive efficiency. The second is if the exclusion of non-refiners from 
the wholesale and retail markets results in the remaining wholesale and 
retail market participants adopting more co-operative stratagems against 
each other rather than engaging in vigorous competition, thus leading to a 
reduction in allocative efficiency. If neither of these two conditions are 
satisfied, then it is unlikely that any exclusionary effects arising from REAs 
are going to result in an anti-competitive detriment.
In relation to concerns that non-refiners are refused entry into REAs, 
Williamson’s hostage model provides a legitimate basis as to why non- 
refiners should be refused entry in that they cannot provide sufficient 
security to a refiner to mitigate against the prospect and threat of post- 
contractual opportunistic behaviour. It appears even the ACCC was aware 
of the fact that non-refiners could not fully reciprocate on the kind of 
services provided by the oil majors within the framework of a refinery 
exchange agreement, but perhaps did not fully appreciate the significance of 
this in regard to minimising transaction costs.449
It is certainly possible that REAs could act in such a way as to limit or even 
exclude altogether non-refiners from participation in wholesale and retail
448 Posner, R. A., op.cit., p. 531.
444 Fels, A., Competition Not Regulation is in Consumers’ Best Interests, p. 19.
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markets. Whether this scenario is likely to occur will depend on the 
willingness of refiners to make product available at fair and reasonable 
prices, as well as the degree to which a particular geographic market is 
contestable to imported sources of product accessible to non-refining 
wholesalers. If a geographic market is readily accessible to imported 
product for non-refining wholesalers, then concerns regarding the 
exclusionary effects of REAs would appear to be eased.
5.7 Conclusions
The fundamental flaw in the traditional arguments used to justify REAs in 
that they enable more refiners to participate in markets and they prevent the 
wasteful cross-hauling of product is that such benefits could also be 
delivered through unilateral trading arrangements as well. Possible 
transaction cost savings provide a reason as to why the bilateral trading 
arrangement provided through a refinery exchange agreement may be 
preferred to a unilateral trading arrangement. Through his hostage model, 
Williamson explains the existence of REAs on the basis of mitigating 
against post-contractual opportunistic behaviour which provides a powerful 
pro-competitive and efficiency enhancing rationale.
On the other hand, those who maintain that REAs are anti-competitive have 
relied on three principal arguments. Possibly the weakest is that REAs 
facilitate the exchange of information flows between market rivals which 
could lead to collusion and anti-competitive conduct. This argument is weak 
because such objections could also be raised in regard to unilateral trading 
arrangements, as in the case of the buy-sell arrangements that eventually 
replaced the refinery exchange agreement system in Australia.
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The objections raised to REAs on the basis of possible exclusionary effects 
and market sharing effects appear to be more substantive. Both of these 
objections are heavily dependent on the extent to which a particular 
geographic market is closed off and impervious to imports. If a geographic 
market is reasonably accessible to imports for both refiners and non-refiners 
alike, then any objections raised in relation to REAs would be difficult to 
sustain.
The objection based on possible exclusionary effects assumes that any 
limitation or exclusion placed on non-refiners from participating in 
wholesale and retail markets will have an anti-competitive effect. This may 
not necessarily be the case.
Arguable the strongest objection raised in relation to REAs is in their ability 
to allow a refiner to constrain the amount of product available to rival 
refiners, and thereby condition them against engaging in competitive 
conduct in order to achieve an overt or tacit market sharing collusive 
arrangement. Even Williamson recognised that REAs could be used for 
market division purposes under certain conditions, and Ayres has suggested 
that Williamson’s hostage model could be used as the means through which 
to enforce discipline amongst a collusive oligopoly.
Careful scrutiny of the literature would suggest that REAs are unlikely to be 
anti-competitive on a wholesale basis. Rather, that REAs could have anti­
competitive effects in highly selective circumstances, particularly where a 
geographic market is relatively inaccessible to imports.
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Although views on the likely impact of REAs largely fall into two distinct 
groups, even amongst some of those who conclude, on balance, that they are 
pro-competitive, there is an acknowledgement that the potential exists for 
REAs to serve an anti-competitive purpose as well. This suggests there is an 
issue worth investigating in relation to REAs.
An obvious gap in the literature is that most of the conclusions drawn in 
relation to REAs have been based on conjecture and supposition. The 
closest to an empirical study would be the report by the Hawaii Attorney 
General. However, to date, no conclusions have been drawn on the basis of 
empirical observation that compares a market with and without REAs in 
place. The purpose of this current study is to address this deficiency to 
arrive at a better informed conclusion on the overall competitive impact of 
REAs in Australia. The empirical testing of the competitive effects of REAs 
will be taken up in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 6: Statistical Analysis and Modelling of 
REAs
6.1. Introduction
The purpose of this Chapter is to test the competitive effects of REAs 
through measuring their impact on petrol prices. As was discussed in 
Chapter 2, since petrol is homogeneous product it is likely that price is the 
main basis upon which competition occurs within the Australian 
downstream petroleum industry.
To undertake a direct analysis of any price effect associated with the 
termination of REAs would require comparison of a refiner’s own delivered 
petrol price to the oil terminal (as REAs allowed the oil majors to be 
supplied at their own cost of production) to the delivered product price 
negotiated under buy-sell arrangements. However, the oil majors are most 
unlikely to be willing to provide this data. Mobil has expressed reticence to 
discuss how it sets it wholesale prices in a public setting because “this is 
commercial confidential information”.450 Similarly, Delpachitra and Beal 
have observed:
Australian [wholesale price] data are not publicly available owing to 
high commercial sensitivity.451
This leaves the search for another indicator that could provide the basis for 
comparison between petrol prices before and after the termination of REAs. 
Another possibility is the so-called terminal gate price (TGP) which is
430 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2007) Transcript of Proceedings at 
Melbourne on Wednesday, 19 September 2007, at 1pm. Petrol Price Inquiry Hearing, p. 84. 
451 Delpachitra, S. and Beal, D. (2002) Petrol Prices Disparity: Did the Removal of Price 
Surveillance Create Price Competition? Economic Papers 21, 56-65, p. 60.
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published by all of the oil majors as well as other major wholesalers. A 
potential difficulty with the TGP is that it may not necessarily be a price at 
which transactions occur within wholesale markets. According to the 
ACCC, the TGP is the spot price at the terminal gate for anyone turning up 
with a truck provided petrol is available and they can meet the necessary 
conditions.452 In relation to the TGP, the ACCC has observed that:
While the oil companies publish their terminal gate prices daily on 
the internet, it is not clear how many sales are made at the published 
terminal gate price.453
Consumer Affairs Victoria (CAV) has opined that because TGPs “are not 
necessarily the prices at which actual transactions occurred, they must be 
treated as notional prices only” .454
Comments by some of the oil majors also lend support to the proposition 
that not too many sales of petrol at the wholesale level occur at the TGP. 
Australia’s largest refiner in Caltex has commented that it makes very few 
sales at the TGP.455 Similarly, BP has commented that it provides discounts 
off the TGP to all of its wholesale customers under contract, and that it has 
made no sales of fuel in recent years on a spot basis.456 In other words, it 
appears that BP has made no sales of petrol at the TGP in recent years.
452 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2006) Senate Economics 
Legislation Committee Inquiry into the price o f petrol in Australia. Canberra, p. 37.
453 ibid., p. 36.
454 Consumer Affairs Victoria, op.cit., p. 43.
455 Caltex Australia Limited (2007) Caltex submission to the ACCC inquiry into the price o f 
unleaded petrol. Sydney, p. 38.
456 BP Australia Pty Ltd (2007) Submission by BP Australia Pty Ltd to the ACCC inquiry 
into the price o f unleaded petrol. Melbourne, p. 22.
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This probably leaves the retail price as the only other possible price measure 
through which to undertake an analysis of REAs. As was concluded in 
Chapter 3, it is arguably the case that retail petrol prices will closely follow 
and reflect changes in wholesale prices because of the motivation on the 
part of the oil majors to avoid problems associated with double 
marginalisation and do this through pushing the retail petrol price down to 
marginal cost. The major advantage of using the retail price is that it is a 
price at which transactions actually occur and is readily observable. Unlike 
wholesale prices, retail prices are publicly available information. This 
Chapter will therefore test for the competitive effects of REAs through the 
price of regular unleaded petrol sold through retail service station outlets to 
motoring consumers in capital cities. It is proposed to use changes in the 
average level of the notional industry margin (NIM) as a proxy for the level 
of competition. Details on the construction of the NIM are described below 
in section 6.3.
An alternative indicator that could serve as a proxy for the level of 
competition is the variance in the level of the NIM. However, as no 
hypothesis will be put forward as to how the variance of the NIM relates to 
competition, this issue will not be considered further.
As price is likely to be the primary basis upon which competition occurs in 
the downstream petroleum industry and capital city retail petrol prices are 
likely to closely follow and reflect changes in wholesale prices, testing for 
the competitive effects of REAs through their impact on retail petrol prices
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(assuming that all other things are equal) would appear to be a sound basis 
on which to proceed.
6.2. Hypothesis Testing
The change that is being tested for is the price effect, if any, on capital city 
retail petrol markets which arises from the termination of REAs. This will 
be tested through determining the effect, if any, from the termination of 
REAs on the average level of the N1M. If the termination of REAs has no 
statistically significant effect on the NIM then there will be no change 
between the mean of the NIM before termination, BEFORE, as compared to 
the mean of the NIM after termination, AFTER. The proposition that the 
termination of REAs has no effect on the mean of the NIM forms the basis 
of the null hypothesis. So the specification of the null hypothesis for the 
mean of the NIM is that:
H0: BEFORE = AFTER
On the other hand, if the termination of REAs does have an effect on the 
average level of NIM then it would be expected that the mean of the NIM 
before termination, BEFORE, will be statistically significantly different 
from the mean of the NIM after termination, AFTER. The proposition that 
the termination of REAs has an effect on the average level of the NIM 
forms the basis of the alternative hypothesis.
The alternative hypothesis is a two-sided test as there could be different 
effects arising from the termination of REAs. If REAs were likely to be pro- 
competitive then the mean of the NIM before termination, BEFORE, will be 
statistically significantly lower than the mean of the NIM after termination,
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AFTER. Alternatively, if REAs were likely to be anti-competitive then the 
mean of the N1M before termination, BEFORE, will be statistically 
significantly higher from the mean of the NIM after termination, AFTER. 
So the specification of the alternative hypotheses for the mean of the NIM 
are:
Hi: BEFORE < AFTER 
H2: BEFORE > AFTER
The starting date for this study is 30 June 1997. This is to ensure that there 
is a sufficient amount of time elapsing before the termination of REAs in all 
of the cities being tested.
In order to test for the effect arising from the termination of REAs, there are 
potentially five capital cities in Australia that could be examined. There 
were refineries in Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Adelaide and Perth that all 
exchanged product under REAs until those agreements were terminated.
It was decided to test for the impact associated with the termination of 
REAs on those capital cities unaffected by restrictive fuel specifications. 
Where the introduction of new fuel specifications preceded the termination 
of REAs, it was decided not to test for the impact as this may have already 
distorted the operation of wholesale petrol markets in those affected capital 
cities. Therefore, it was decided to omit both Brisbane and Perth from this 
study because of legislated fuel specifications enacted in Queensland and 
Western Australia. Details of the fuel specifications operating throughout 
Australia during the period of this study were provided in Chapter 2.
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From 1 January 2000, REAs in respect of the Mobil Port Stanvac refinery 
located near Adelaide were terminated. Hence, the structural change being 
tested for in relation to Adelaide occurred from the beginning of 2000. Prior 
to 2000, Mobil had entered into REAs with each of the other three domestic 
refiners in regard to the Port Stanvac refinery. It was decided to terminate 
the study in Adelaide to coincide with the introduction of the new fuel 
specifications by the South Australian Government in March 2001.
The termination of REAs in Sydney and Melbourne was prompted by the 
decision of BP to inform the three other domestic refiners that it was 
withdrawing from the existing REAs from 1 July 2002. Hence, the structural 
change being tested for in relation to both Sydney and Melbourne occurred 
as from 1 July 2002.
The natural finishing point for this study for Sydney and Melbourne is the 
introduction of a new national fuel specification that came into effect from 
the beginning of 2004 limiting the amount of MTBE and olefins in petrol 
(although data was only available up until the end of August 2003).
6.3. The Data
Based on the conclusions reached in Chapter 3, changes in wholesale petrol 
prices should be fully reflected through changes in retail petrol prices in that 
petrol is arguably retailed at marginal cost. This provides the opportunity to 
identify and measure the effects of potential structural changes in wholesale 
petrol markets, such as that arising from the termination of REAs, through 
their impact on retail petrol prices, ceteris paribus (all other things being 
equal).
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However, a potential difficulty in trying to isolate and measure the 
competitive impact of REAs through retail petrol prices is that the ceteris 
paribus assumption is often violated in that retail petrol prices are subject to 
several other influences aside from potential structural changes affecting 
Australian wholesale petrol markets. These other influences include the 
international price of crude oil, which is the major input in the production of 
petrol, as well as international refining margins, the difference between the 
price of refined petroleum products and crude oil. In order to extricate these 
other influences from the retail petrol price so that the impact arising from 
REAs can be identified, isolated and quantified as much as possible, a proxy 
for wholesale petrol prices that is unaffected by developments in Australian 
wholesale petrol markets needs to be subtracted from the retail price. Hence, 
the NIM has been constructed by subtracting an independently determined 
proxy for the wholesale unleaded petrol price from the retail unleaded petrol 
price. This approach ensures that the influence of other factors such as the 
international price of crude oil and refining margins are removed entirely 
and that the NIM will estimate the total notional margin accruing to petrol 
suppliers at various stages in the supply chain. Thus assuming that petrol at 
the retail level is sold at marginal cost, the level of the NIM should reflect 
developments and changes in capital city wholesale market conditions and 
provide an indication of the returns accruing to the oil majors.
The NIM data is reported in Appendix 2.
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Weekly average retail unleaded petrol price data was obtained from market 
research company Informed Sources*51
The independently determined proxy used for the wholesale unleaded petrol 
price was the IPI calculated by the ACCC. The IPI was used to regulate 
wholesale petrol prices until the end of July 1998 and the ACCC has 
continued to calculate the IPI since that time. Details on the construction of 
the IPI were provided in Chapter 2.
The IPI data was provided to the researcher by the ACCC 458
The ACCC has commented that there are two points to bear in mind in 
relation to the IPI.459 The first is that the IPI is a wholesale price indicator 
and not a retail price indicator. The second is the methodology for 
determining the IPI has not been reviewed for some time which in turn leads 
to two possible shortcomings: first, the 1P1 may not reflect the actual 
product specifications used in Australia; and second, it may not reflect 
efficiencies that have occurred in the Australian downstream petroleum 
industry. Despite these potential shortcomings, the ACCC has maintained 
that the IPI “remains a useful benchmark to assess price movements over 
time” 460
457 Informed Sources collects their data from all the oil majors who transmit their pricing to 
them either every fifteen minutes, hourly or whenever changes occur. Informed Sources 
also obtains this information from electronic card swipes at the service station console. For 
non major players, Informed Sources collect prices manually, through surveying 
independent retail service station sites. This occurs twice a day in Sydney, Melbourne, and 
Adelaide.
45X The IPI was provided to the researcher by the ACCC on a confidential basis, although 
market research companies Economic & Energy Analysis Pty Ltd and FUELtrac produce 
similar price series to the IPI that are available on a commercial basis.
459 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Terminal gate pricing 
arrangements in Australia and other fuel pricing arrangements in Western Australia, p. 27.
460 ibid., pp. 27-28.
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Concerns expressed by the ACCC that the product specification it uses for 
the calculation of the I PI may not reflect the actual product specifications 
used in Australia would appear to be overly cautious. This is because the oil 
majors would all appear to agree that the MOPS 95 RON benchmark used 
by the ACCC for the calculation of the IPI is the appropriate “benchmark 
quote for all commercial traded Australian grade unleaded product”.461
The second concern noted by the ACCC in regard to the calculation of the 
IPI would appear to relate primarily to the determined local component of 
the IPI. In this study an adjustment was made to the IPI to remove the local 
component for two reasons: the first was because of the reservations noted 
by the ACCC that the IPI may not reflect efficiencies that have occurred in 
the Australian downstream petroleum industry; the second was because 
more often than not, the NIM calculated from an IPI including the local 
component provided a NIM that was negative. Persistent ongoing negative 
NIMs are a perverse result as firms cannot continue in business indefinitely 
it they cannot cover their costs of supply and of doing business. This result 
suggests that the local component of the IPI, that has been set at 7.1 cpl, had 
previously been set too high as it appears that competition in capital city 
wholesale markets, flowing into retail petrol prices, had been persistently 
eating into this local component. Furthermore, there was little or no 
additional room for any retailing margin on top of the local component. This 
view is consistent with McKenzie (Shell) who opined in relation to the IPI
461 Fox, K. MOPS 95 -  The Benchmark for Australian Grade Unleaded Motor Spirit. 
http://www.aip.com.au/industry/benchmark.htm. [Accessed 15 November 2005]
200
when it was used to regulate wholesale petrol prices that “in the vast 
majority of cases you weren’t able to achieve 7.1 cents in the market”.462
Rather than have a data series consisting largely of negative NIMs, it was 
considered preferable to remove the local component from the IPI 
altogether. Removal of the local component does not change the relativities 
between the NIM results and arguably ensures that the adjusted IPI is closer 
to a genuine wholesale price benchmark. This adjustment was made by 
subtracting 7.1 cpl from the IPI after an adjustment had been made to 
remove the impact of the GST from both the IPI and the retail price (which 
is described below in section 6.3.1).
The use of the IPI methodology as an appropriate benchmark for wholesale 
petrol prices in Australia would appear to be uncontroversial as it is a 
position supported by the ACCC as well as all of the oil majors.463 The 
argument as to why the IPI methodology is an appropriate benchmark for 
wholesale petrol prices in Australia is that petrol is an internationally traded 
commodity and Australian refineries compete on a regional basis, 
particularly in relation to Singapore, the major refining centre in the Asia- 
Pacific region. According to Caltex:
462 Productivity Commission, op.cit., p. 47.
462 See: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2005) Understanding petrol 
prices in Australia: Answers to some frequently asked questions. Canberra; Caltex Oil 
Australia Pty Ltd (2005) Petrol pricing -  the plain facts June 2005.
http://www.caltex.com.au/pricing_pla.asp [Accessed 1 July 2005]; BP Australia Ltd (2005) 
Retail Pricing May 12 2005. http://www.bp.com.au/conveniences_stores/pricing.asp 
[Accessed 1 July 2005]; The Shell Company of Australia Limited (2005) What Drives 
Prices? http://www.shell.com.au/home /PrintFramework?siteId=au-en&FC3:=/home/au- 
en/html/iwg [Accessed 1 July 2005]; ExxonMobil Australia Pty Ltd. Facts on Petrol 
Pricing, http://www.exxonmobil.com.au/mobil /mn mobil products automotive facts.asp 
[Accessed 13 February 2006]
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Prices for petrol from Australian refineries are not based on the 
actual cost of imported petrol or the crude oil that is refined into 
petrol. Instead, the ex-refinery price of petrol is based on an “import 
parity price” calculation. This is a theoretical calculation based on 
the Singapore market price for petrol, adjusted for Australian fuel 
standards and freight to Australia. The import parity price is not 
regulation but instead determined by market forces.
The reason why Australian petrol prices follow Singapore market 
prices is that Australian refineries must compete against petrol 
imports ... and Singapore is a major source of petrol for
464importers.
The NIM as calculated here has also been described as an importer margin 
as it represents the difference between the retail price paid by consumers 
and the cost of importing the product.465
6.3.1 Adjustments for Taxation and Subsidy Arrangements
There were various Commonwealth and state government taxes as well as
state government rebates applying to the price of petrol over the period 
under examination in the three cities. In order to ensure the calculation of 
the NIM was not impacted, and thus distorted, by taxation and rebate 
arrangements, the following adjustments were performed in relation to tax 
and rebate arrangements.
Details of business franchise fees and subsidies provided by state 
governments have been provided in Chapter 2. In order to account for the 
period in which business franchise fees on petrol applied, the relevant
464 Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd, Petrol pricing -  the plain facts June 2005. 
http://www.caltex.com.au/pricing_pla.asp [Accessed 1 July 2005]
465 Delpachitra, S. B. (2002) Price rigidity in the downstream petroleum industry in New 
Zealand: where does it happen? Energy Economics 24, 597-613, pp. 601-604.
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amount of the variable rate of the business franchise fee on petrol applying 
in respect of Sydney, Melbourne and Adelaide has been added to the I PI (as 
the IPI was provided exclusive of the application of business franchise fees). 
In order to account for the interim subsidy that applied on the sale of petrol 
in Sydney in the calculation of the NIM, 0.22 cpl has been subtracted from 
the IPI between August and November 1997. In order to account for the 
subsidy that applied on the sale of petrol in Melbourne, 0.43 cpl has been 
subtracted from the IPI in Melbourne from August 1997 onwards, which 
was increased to 0.473 from July 2000 to account for the imposition of the 
GST.466
Details on petrol excise have previously been provided in Chapter 2. 
Because petrol excise is applied on the basis of a fixed amount, the amount 
of excise applying to both the IPI and the retail petrol price is always going 
to be exactly the same amount. As a consequence, the impact of petrol 
excise is entirely removed when subtracting the IPI from the retail petrol 
price during the calculation of the NIM. Thus, there is no need to make any 
allowance for petrol excise in the calculation of the NIM.
An adjustment was made to the IPI to remove the impact arising from the 
application of the GST when calculating the NIM. This was in order to 
remove any difference between the amount of the GST applying to the IPI 
as compared to the retail price. Because the GST is applied to each 
transaction in a supply chain on an ad valorem basis, any difference 
between the IPI and the retail price will result in a discrepancy in the
466 The payment of the 0.43 cpl subsidy in Melbourne would have reduced wholesale petrol 
prices by 0.473 cpl after the imposition of the GST as the GST is an ad valorem tax 
charged at the rate of 10 per cent.
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amount of GST applied to the IPI as compared to the retail price. Because 
the amount of GST applying to the IPI and the retail price could differ, the 
level of the NIM could either increase or decrease directly as a result of the 
imposition of the GST, thus leading to a distortion in the calculation of the 
NIM.
In order to adjust for this potential distortion, the approach adopted was to 
equalise the amount of GST applying to the IPI to the amount of GST 
applying to the retail price. This was undertaken by removing the amount of 
GST initially applied to the IPI by calculating one eleventh of the IPI and 
then subtracting that amount from the IPI to arrive at an IPI free from the 
application of the GST. The amount of GST applying to the retail price was 
then calculated by multiplying the retail price by one eleventh, and then 
adding this amount to the IPI free of GST. This adjustment ensures that in 
the calculation of the NIM any impact arising from the imposition of the 
GST is entirely removed.
6.4. Graphical Representations
The NIM has been graphed for all three cities and is provided below in 
Charts 4, 5, and 6 with the arrow representing the point of change between 
BEFORE and AFTER in relation to the termination of REAs.
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Chart 4: Notional Industry Margin for Adelaide (in cpl)
Chart 5: Notional Industry Margin for Melbourne (in cpl)
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Chart 6: Notional Industry Margin for Sydney (in cpl)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
In trend terms, it would appear the NIM in Adelaide is fairly flat until the 
end of 1998 and then it begins trending downwards.
In trend terms in both Melbourne and Sydney, it would appear the NIM is 
heading down until mid-2000, when it then appears to begin heading 
upwards.
The NIM in all three cities oscillates through time. This result is 
unremarkable given that most economic variables, such as commodity 
prices, oscillate with an irregular period and amplitude. Some of this 
oscillation could be due to differences in the length of time it takes for 
changes in Singapore international benchmark prices to flow through into 
Australian retail petrol prices. The IPI is based on a 7-day rolling average of 
Singapore international benchmark spot prices. According to the ACCC, 
there is usually a lag of between seven to ten days between movements in
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the Singapore international benchmark spot price and Australian retail petrol 
prices.467 On the other hand, the AIP contends that it can take between one 
and two weeks before changes in Singapore international benchmark spot
468prices show up in Australian wholesale petrol prices.
In Adelaide, the NIM began initially at a relatively low level at around 5 cpl 
for a period of around four weeks before gradually moving up and spiking at 
8.5 cpl after seven weeks. This initial relatively low level for the NIM may 
be related to the influence exerted by the entrance of independent 
wholesaler and retailer Liberty into the Adelaide retail market at this time 
and reflect the attempt by Liberty to capture market share, with the gradual 
rise and spike indicating that possibly Liberty’s attempt to capture a greater 
retail market share had come to an end. Newspaper reports suggest that 
Liberty undercut its competition in the retail market by 5 cpl, and promised 
at the end of June to be “very competitive over the next four or five weeks” 
with the objective of being “the cheapest in the metropolitan area of 
Adelaide”.469 During the period of price regulation up until the end of July 
1998, the NIM in Adelaide is fairly stable at an average of around 5.9 cpl.
The NIM in Adelaide rises slightly on average during the first period of 
price deregulation from the beginning of August 1998 up until the end of 
1998 to around 6.3 cpl, with a spike occurring in early to mid-September as 
the NIM peaked at 8.9 cpl. This spike may be related to a fire that occurred 
at the Port Stanvac refinery on 2 August 1998 which was responsible for
467 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2007) Petrol Pricing. Media 
Release, 24 January.
468 Australian Institute of Petroleum (2006) Submission to the Inquiry into the Price o f 
Petrol in Australia. Canberra, p. 16.
460 The Advertiser (1997) Newcomer may ignite petrol price war. 1 July.
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closing down the refinery for two months. According to the Department of 
Primary Industries and Resources South Australia, petrol stocks remained 
tight for a period of two months following the fire at the Port Stanvac 
refinery.470
In Melbourne, the last six months of 1997 are characterised as a period of a 
relatively high NIM, at around 6.6 cpl on average, as compared to the first 
seven months of 1998 when the NIM was generally lower, at around 5.0 cpl 
on average. The relatively high level for the NIM during the second half of 
1997 may be related to less vigorous price discounting behaviour observed 
in the retail market during this period. A spokesperson for the RACV 
accused Melbourne petrol retailers of ceasing to discount petrol in late 
November 1997:
Somebody has decided that enough is enough -  and it seems that 
they have all agreed to end discounting for a while.471
Following deregulation, the NIM in Melbourne rises on average to 5.5 cpl 
for the period up until the end of 1998.
In Sydney, the NIM over the period of price regulation up until the end of 
July 1998 appears to be fairly indistinguishable from the initial period 
following deregulation lasting up until the end of 1998, with the NIM 
averaging around 7.1 cpl.
The initial experience of price deregulation prompted the ACCC to observe 
in early 1999 with regard to the entire country, that in the aftermath of
470 Primary Industries and Resources South Australia (1999) PIRSA Annual Report 1998- 
99. Adelaide, p. 41.
471 Herald Sun (1997) Dollar Blamed for Petrol Price Rise. 29 November: 5.
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deregulation, retail prices had gone up, in relative terms, partly in response
to increased retail margins.470
During the first six months of 1999, the NIM in all three cities fell on 
average before stabilising at a lower level for the remainder of 1999. In the 
first half of 1999 the average NIM in Adelaide was 5.5 cpl, before falling to 
4.9 cpl in the second half of 1999. In Melbourne, the average NIM was 4.9 
cpl in the first half o f 1999, and fell to 3.7 cpl during the second half of 
1999. In Sydney, the average NIM was 6.2 cpl in the first half of 1999, and 
fell to 4.7 cpl during the second half of 1999. The pattern in the NIM may 
reflect some kind of gradual adjustment process resulting from the removal 
of wholesale price regulation, or some other structural change that started to 
impact across all three cities during the first six months of 1999.
The NIM in Adelaide then fell again during the period after which REAs 
were terminated for the Port Stanvac refinery from the beginning of 2000 
until the end of February 2001, with the NIM averaging around 4.0 cpl over 
this period. There are two observable spikes in the NIM in Adelaide during 
the post-refinery exchange agreement period. The first spike occurred 
during the final weeks of March 2000 coinciding with media reports of 
discussions between Shell and Caltex regarding plans to merge their 
refineries into a joint venture company.473 The second spike occurred during 
the middle weeks of December 2000 coinciding with a period of unexpected 
refinery shutdowns on the Australian eastern seaboard.
472 Australian Service Station & Convenience Store News (1999) Deregulation Conference 
-  Key players air their differences. March/April: 16-19.
473 The Australian (2000) Shell, Caltex weigh refinery merger. 15 March: 25.
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From the period of mid-1999 until the end of July 2001, the level of the 
NIM in Melbourne is generally fairly stable, with the NIM averaging around 
3.6 cpl over this period, although there are three discemable spikes in the 
NIM during 2000. The first spike occurred during the final weeks of March 
2000 coinciding with media reports of discussions between Shell and Caltex 
regarding plans to merge their refineries into a joint venture company. The 
second spike occurred during and in the aftermath of a blockade of 
Melbourne fuel terminal facilities at the end of September 2000. The third 
spike occurred over the Christmas 2000 and New Year holiday period 
coinciding with a period of unexpected refinery shutdowns on the 
Australian eastern seaboard.
The NIM in Melbourne then rises to 5.1 cpl on average during the period 
coinciding with the implementation of terminal gate pricing legislation in 
Victoria in August 2001. The NIM then rises further, to 6.5 cpl on average, 
from the beginning of July 2002 coinciding with the termination of REAs. 
There is also a noticeable spike in the NIM during the midst of the Iraq war 
in early April 2003. There is also a noticeable trough in the NIM during the 
period of July and early August 2003, coinciding with the roll-out of the 
commercial alliance between Coles and Shell.
From the period of mid-1999 until the end of June 2002, the level of the 
NIM in Sydney is generally fairly stable, averaging about 4.6 cpl over this 
period, although there are two noticeable spikes in the NIM over this period. 
There is a spike in the NIM during mid-March 2000. This spike coincides 
with media reports of discussions between Shell and Caltex regarding plans
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to merge their refineries into a joint venture company. There is another 
spike in the NIM over the Christmas 2000 and New Year holiday period 
coinciding with a period of unexpected refinery shutdowns on the 
Australian eastern seaboard. From July 2002, the level of the NIM rises 
coinciding with the termination of REAs, with the NIM rising to 6.9 cpl on 
average. There is also a spike in the NIM from mid-March 2003 until mid- 
April 2003 coinciding with the period of the Iraq war.
6.5. Exploratory Data Analysis
6.5.1 Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics for BEFORE and AFTER for Adelaide, Melbourne 
and Sydney are provided in table 10 below.
Table 10: Descriptive Statistics for BEFORE and AFTER for Adelaide, Melbourne 
and Sydney_____________________ __________________________________ ______
Statistic Adelaide
BEFORE
Adelaide
AFTER
Melbourne
BEFORE
Melbourne
AFTER
Sydney
BEFORE
Sydney
AFTER
Mean 5.683 4.030 4.635 6.453 5.521 6.870
Median 5.567 4.024 4.559 6.394 5.463 6.490
Skewness 0.522 0.095 -0.077 0.122 -0.060 1.385
Kurtosis 3.391 3.424 2.952 3.695 2.669 5.245
Jarque
-Bera
6.778 0.548 0.286 1.378 1.347 32.296
In regard to Adelaide for the BEFORE period, the distribution of the NIM 
was positively skewed and leptokurtic. The mean and the median were 
relatively close together, suggesting that the mean provides a reasonably 
good indication of the central tendency for the distribution of the NIM. 
However, the Jarque-Bera474 statistic indicates that the null hypothesis o f the 
NIM distribution being normally distributed should be rejected at the 5 per 
cent level of statistical significance, although it would be accepted at the 1
474 The Jarque-Bera is a test statistic for testing whether a series is normally distributed. 
Under the null hypothesis of a normal distribution, the Jarque-Bera statistic follows a chi- 
squared distribution with two degrees of freedom.
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per cent level of significance. For the AFTER period, the distribution of the 
NIM is marginally positively skewed and slightly leptokurtic, while the 
Jarque-Bera statistic raises no concerns that the NIM is not normally 
distributed. Furthermore, the mean and the median are extremely close 
together, suggesting that the mean provides a reasonably good measure of 
the central tendency for the distribution of the NIM.
In regard to Melbourne for the BEFORE period, the NIM is marginally 
negatively skewed while both the kurtosis and the Jarque-Bera statistic 
indicate that the distribution of the NIM is close to normal. The mean and 
the median are also reasonably close to each other, suggesting that the mean 
provides a reasonable indication of the central tendency for the distribution 
of the NIM. For the AFTER period, the distribution is slightly positively 
skewed and leptokurtic, while the Jarque-Bera statistic raises no concerns 
that the NIM is not normally distributed. The mean and the median are also 
reasonably close to each other, suggesting that the mean provides a 
reasonable indication of the central tendency for the distribution of the NIM.
In regard to Sydney for the BEFORE period, the distribution of the NIM is 
marginally negatively skewed and reasonably platykurtic, while the Jarque- 
Bera statistic raises no concerns that the NIM is not normally distributed. 
The mean and the median are very close together suggesting that the mean 
provides a reasonably good indication of the central tendency for the 
distribution of the NIM. For the AFTER period, the distribution of the NIM 
is positively skewed and strongly leptokurtic, while the Jarque-Bera statistic 
suggests that the NIM is not normally distributed. The mean and the median
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are only moderately aligned, suggesting that the mean only provides a rough 
approximation of the central tendency of the NIM. The outliers in the 
AFTER period all coincide with the period of the 2003 Iraq war.
6.5.2 Simple Hypothesis Test
At face value, it would appear that the mean of BEFORE is different to the 
mean of AFTER in all three cities under examination, although the mean of 
BEFORE in Melbourne and Sydney is lower than the mean of AFTER, 
whereas the mean of AFTER is lower in Adelaide than the mean of 
BEFORE. For Adelaide, the mean of AFTER is almost 1.7 cpl lower than 
the mean of BEFORE, whereas for Melbourne the mean of AFTER is 1.8 
cpl higher and for Sydney is 1.3 cpl higher than compared to the mean of 
BEFORE.
The next step was to determine whether the changes recorded in the mean of 
the NIM between BEFORE and AFTER were statistically significant. It was 
decided to test for this using Student’s t-distribution. The critical values and 
the t-statistics for all three cities are reported in table 11 below.
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Table 11: t-Tests for the Mean of BEFORE and AFTER in Adelaide, Melbourne and
Sydney__________ ________________ _______ _ _ _ _ ________________
Statistic Critical values
O f  t 0 .05
t-statistic Probability 
(T < t-statistic)
Adelaide
( a s s u m in g  e q u a l  
v a r i a n c e s )
± 1 .9 7 3 8 .8 3 6 6.464 x 10 '16
Adelaide
( a s s u m in g  u n e q u a l  
v a r i a n c e s )
± 1 .3 1 3 7 .7 7 8 6.564 x 10 “
Melbourne 
( a s s u m in g  e q u a l  
v a r i a n c e s )
± 1 .9 6 7 -7 .1 8 3 4.805 x 10 '12
Melbourne
( a s s u m in g  u n e q u a l  
v a r i a n c e s )
± 1 .9 8 5 -7 .5 5 8 1.932 x 10 '11
Sydney
( a s s u m in g  e q u a l  
v a r i a n c e s )
± 1 .9 6 7 -5 .5 3 2 6.581 x 10_ii
Sydney
( a s s u m in g  u n e q u a l  
v a r i a n c e s )
± 1 .9 8 5 -6 .2 8 0 7.434 x 10'9
The t-statistic for all three cities under examination is statistically significant 
at considerably less than the 1 per cent level. It thus appears that the mean 
o f BEFORE is statistically significantly different from the mean of AFTER 
in all three cities. Based on these results, the null hypothesis that the NIM of 
BEFORE is the same as the NIM of AFTER is rejected, and the alternative 
hypothesis of FI2 in relation to Adelaide, and the alternative hypothesis o f Hi 
in relation to Melbourne and Sydney is accepted.
6.5.3 Conclusions of Exploratory Data Analysis
While t-statistics provide support for the alternative hypothesis of H2 in
Adelaide and Hi in Melbourne and Sydney that BEFORE is statistically 
significantly different from AFTER in all three cities under examination, 
these results should be treated with caution. While these results may reflect 
the impact on the average level of the NIM arising from the termination of 
REAs, these results could also reflect, as well as be distorted by, other 
periods of structural change. An attempt will be made to control for other
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possible periods of structural change in the modelling of the NIM conducted 
in the next section.
6.6. Modelling
After completing the exploratory data analysis which suggested there could 
be a statistically significant difference in the level of the NIM means 
between BEFORE and AFTER, it was decided to build a regression model 
for the NIM in order to quantify the possible impact arising from the 
termination of REAs, as well as to test whether possibly any of the observed 
effect in relation to the termination of REAs could be attributable to other 
factors.
Another means through which to test whether there is a statistically 
significant structural break between BEFORE and AFTER is through a 
Chow test. However, given that there could be several periods of structural 
change that may have to be accounted for, it was decided that it was 
preferable to build a regression model instead.
To build a theoretical model for estimating the level of the NIM would 
require a reasonably complete knowledge and understanding of the NIM 
determination process. Given that the NIM is determined through the 
decisions and interactions of numerous wholesale and retail market 
participants, the information requirements arguably preclude one from 
attempting to build a theoretical model for estimation of the NIM.
In this case, resort must be made to an empirical model using the NIM time 
series. The Box-Jenkins autoregressive integrated moving average 
(ARIMA) methodology will be employed, which is a three-stage iterative
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procedure based on identification, estimation and diagnostic checking for 
constructing the model o f the NIM .475 In the identification stage, data will 
be used and any information on how the series was generated to suggest a 
subclass of parsimonious models to be considered.476 In the estimation 
stage, the tentatively considered model is fitted to data and parameters 
estimated.477 In the diagnostic stage, the fitted model will be examined in 
relation to the data to reveal any shortcomings in order to achieve model 
improvement. This three stage process is repeated until a suitable 
representation is found.
Integration within an ARIMA model refers to whether a time series data is 
stationary or not. Empirical work based on time series data assumes that the 
underlying time series is stationary.476 Time series data is stationary if the 
process generating the data is in equilibrium around a constant value (the 
underlying mean) and that the variance around the mean remains constant 
over time.480 However, any time series data that is not stationary is said to 
be nonstationary. Nonstationary time series data can often be turned into a 
stationary series by taking the first difference of a series as outlined below 
in the case of data series ‘y’:
Ay = yt -  yt-i
41> See Box, G. E. P., Jenkins, G. M., and Reinsei, G. (1994) Time Series Analysis: 
Forecasting and Control. Third Edition, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.
476 ibid.
477 ibid.
478 ibid.
47l) Gujarati, D. N. (1995) Basic Econometrics. Third Edition, McGraw-Hill, New York, p. 
709.
4S(1 Makridakis, S., Wheelwright, S. C. and Hyndman, R. J. (1998) Forecasting: Methods 
and Applications. Third Edition, John Wiley & Sons Inc, Hoboken, p. 136.
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Sometimes nonstationary time series data has to be differenced twice (ie 
taking the first difference of the first difference). If time series data has to be 
differenced once to turn it into a stationary series, then it is said that the 
series is integrated of order 1, denoted by 1(1). Similarly, if time series data 
has to differenced twice in order to make it stationary, then it is said that the 
series is integrated of order 2, denoted by 1(2). If time series data is 
stationary then it is said to be integrated of order zero, denoted by 1(0). If an 
ARIMA model is integrated of order zero, then it is referred to as an 
autoregressive moving average (ARMA) model. Stationarity is generally 
tested for using a unit root test. Unit root tests are considered further in 
section 6.6.1.2 below.
Provided time series data is stationary then it can be modelled in a variety of 
ways. Autogression within an ARIMA model refers to whether time series 
data can be modelled as a function of its previous values. A first order 
autoregressive process or AR(1) for data time series ‘y’ is as follows:
Yt = HYt-i + et
where the value of the autoregressive coefficient p must lie between -1 and 
+1 (otherwise the series is nonstationary) and et is a random error term.
A moving average within an ARIMA model refers to whether time series 
data can be modelled as a function of past error terms. A dependence 
relationship between time series data and its previous error terms is known 
as a moving average. A first order moving average or MA(1) for data series 
‘y’ is as follows:
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yt = Sen + et
where the value ol the coefficient on the lagged error term 8 must lie 
between -1 and +1 (otherwise the series is nonstationary).
Once the identification stage for an ARIMA model has been completed, the 
model is estimated and then subject to diagnostic checking to verify that the 
model is appropriate. Diagnostic checking is performed through 
examination of the residuals to see if there is any pattern that is unaccounted 
for.
In testing for the impact of the termination of REAs on the NIM, the 
intervention analysis of Box and Tiao will be used.481 According to 
Valadkhani and Layton, intervention analysis has been used by many 
analysts in a wide variety of applications.482 Under intervention analysis, an 
indicator (or dummy) variable is included in the model which takes only the 
values of 0 and 1 to denote the non-occurrence and occurrence of the 
intervention as long as the timing of the intervention is known. Intervention 
analysis will be used to control for the termination of REAs as well as for 
other identified events impacting on the level o f the NIM within the model.
It is intended to follow the general ARIMA process of the order (p, d, q) 
which is estimated as:
0p(B)AdZ, = 0o + 0q(B)at + ßD,
481 Box, G. E. P. and Tiao, G. C. (1975) Intervention Analysis with Applications to 
Economic and Environmental Problems. Journal o f  the American Statistical Association 70 
No. 349, 70-79.
482 Valadkhani, A. and Layton, A. P. (2004) Quantifying the Effect of the GST on Inflation 
in Australia’s Capital Cities: An Intervention Analysis. The Australian Economic Review 
37, 125-138, p. 128.
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where ‘0 P(B)’ represents a ‘p’-order polynomial lag operator; cAd’ denotes 
an ordinary difference operator with ‘d’ the number of times the difference 
is applied; ‘Z’ is the NIM; ‘0O’ is a constant; ‘0q(B)’ denotes a ‘q’-order 
polynomial lag operator; ‘a’ is a white noise process; ‘p’ is the number of 
autoregressive terms; ‘q’ is the number of moving average terms; kD’ 
represents the dummy variables with ‘ß' as their coefficients; and ‘t’ the 
time period.
Whilst not providing a behavioural explanation for the time path of the 
NIM, the ARIMA model should capture any underlying systematic time 
series patterns in the data. It is important that such systematic time series 
patterns within the fluctuations in the data be accounted for so that the 
intervention arising from the termination of REAs can be accurately 
gauged.483
6.6.1 Identification
As part of the ARIMA modelling process, appropriate values for ‘p’, ‘d’, 
and ‘q’ need to be chosen. The identification of an ARIMA process is not an 
exact science, but the plotting of the autocorrelation function (ACF) and the 
partial autocorrelation function (PACF) can provide guidance.
Autocorrelation is a measure of the linear relationship between time series 
data, say Yt, with previous lagged values of itself, for example Yt_i and Yt_2. 
The autocorrelations at various lags make up the ACF. A plot of the ACF is 
known as a correlogram.
483 Eviews 6.0 was used in the estimation process.
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Partial autocorrelation measures the degree of association within time series 
data between Yt and Yt-k, when the effects of other time lags -  1, 2, 3, ... 
k-1 -  are removed. The partial autocorrelations at various lags make up the 
PACF and is also plotted and known as a partial correlogram.
The ACF and PACF and the pattern of their associated correlograms 
provides an indication on what sort of autoregressive process and/or moving 
average process could be driving the time series data, or expressed another 
way, what the value of ‘p’ and ‘q’ could be.
6.6.1.1 Correlograms
The first step in the modelling process is to identify the appropriate form of 
the NIM that should be used for modelling purposes, as well as determining 
whether it follows an autoregressive process, a moving average process, or 
some combination thereof. This can be undertaken through the identification 
of the ACF and the PACF and the resulting correlogram and partial 
correlogram (all correlograms and partial correlograms are reported in 
Appendix 3).
In regard to Melbourne and Sydney, the correlogram begins at a reasonably 
high value (0.721 at lag 1 for Melbourne, and 0.810 at lag 1 for Sydney) and 
then decay in a more or less exponential manner. For Sydney, the ACF is 
still individually statistically significantly different from zero at up to 49 
lags, while for Melbourne, the ACF is still individually statistically 
significantly different from zero at up to 28 lags. The pattern of the ACF for 
Melbourne and Sydney could be indicative of either a time series for the 
NIM that is nonstationary or which obeys a low order autoregressive
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process. It is not possible to use the ACF to distinguish between a unit root 
process and a stationary process with an autoregressive coefficient close to 
unity. If the NIM time series for both Melbourne and Sydney are stationary, 
then the PACF dropping off after one lag is suggestive of a relatively 
straight-forward AR( 1) process.
The correlogram for Adelaide, begins at a reasonable high value of about 
0.635 at lag 1, and then decays to 0.348 at lag 2 where it meanders (through 
a mixture of exponential decay and damped sine waves) before gradually 
reducing towards zero. For Adelaide, the ACF is still individually 
statistically significantly different from zero at up to 35 lags. For Adelaide, 
the PACF drops off after one lag although it is still statistically significantly 
different from zero at lags 3, 5, 6, and 13. The long period of decay of the 
ACF may be indicative of a nonstationary time series or a low order 
autoregressive time series.
If the NIM time series for Adelaide is stationary, then the pattern of the 
ACF, which is characterised by a mixture of exponential decay and a 
damped sine wave, is possibly suggestive of an AR(2) process.484 On the 
other hand, the PACF beginning to decay immediately after one lag is 
suggestive of an AR(1) process.
6.6.1.2 Unit Root Tests
The next stage of the identification process is to determine whether the NIM 
is stationary for Adelaide, Melbourne, and Sydney. To determine whether 
the NIM series in each city is stationary, a unit root test using the
4M Box, G. E. P., Jenkins, G. M., and Reinsei, G., op.cit., p. 187.
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Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test485 and the Phillips-Perron (PP) test 
was conducted.486 For both the ADF test and the PP test, it needs to be 
determined whether to include an intercept, an intercept plus a linear trend 
term, or neither an intercept nor a linear trend term.
The ADF test and the PP test were performed using two specifications: the 
first with the inclusion of a constant term; and the second with a constant as 
well as a linear trend term. Table 12 below presents the results.
Fable 12: Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron Tests for NIM in Sydney, 
Melbourne and Adelaide
City ADF test with ADF test with PP test with PP test with
constant constant and constant constant and
trend trend
Sydney -5.809*(0 lags) -5.844*(0 lags) -5.669* -5.659*
Melbourne -5.640*(1 lag) -5.680*(1 lag) -7.234* -7.272*
Adelaide -2.533*(5 lags) -8.985*(1 lag) -6.508* -7.824*
* indicates that the corresponding null hypothesis of a unit root has been rejected at the 1 
per cent significance level.
# indicates that the corresponding null hypothesis of a unit root has not been rejected.
With the exception of the ADF test conducted with a constant in regard to 
Adelaide, none of the tests raise concerns that the NIM is nonstationary in 
any of the cities. The NIM series for Melbourne and Sydney are thus 
stationary.
In regard to Adelaide, it is important to bear in mind that the ADF test is 
biased towards nonrejection of the unit root in the presence of structural 
change. Given the NIM is being used to test for evidence of possible
4Sx The appropriate lag length was chosen using the Newey-West data-based automatic 
bandwidth parameter method in Eviews.
4X6 The ADF and PP tests use different methods to control for higher-order serial correlation 
in the series. The ADF test controls for higher-order serial correlation by adding lagged 
difference terms of the dependent variable. The PP test uses a nonparametric method to 
control for higher order serial correlation in a series.
4X7 See: Perron, P. (1989) The Great Crash, the Oil Price Shock, and the Unit Root 
Hypothesis. Econometrica 57, 1361-1401; Perron, P. (1990) Testing for a Unit Root in a 
Time Series with a Changing Mean. Journal o f Business & Statistics 8, 153-162.
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structural change in relation to the termination of REAs, caution should be 
exercised in not rejecting the null hypothesis of a unit root in relation to the 
NIM series. As previously observed, there could also be other instances of 
structural change impacting upon the NIM series rather than just a single 
episode due to the termination of REAs.
On the basis of the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)488 and the Schwarz 
Criterion (SC)489 for both the ADF and PP tests, one could conclude that the 
correct unit root test specification for Adelaide is the one that includes a 
constant with a linear trend term as opposed to the specification with only 
the constant term. On this basis, the null hypothesis of a unit root for the 
NIM in Adelaide is rejected. This suggests that the NIM in Adelaide does 
exhibit a (negative) linear time trend. On the other hand, utilising the AIC 
and SC results for both the ADF and PP tests in relation to Sydney and 
Melbourne, suggests that neither city displays a linear time trend. Thus, in 
regard to Adelaide, the conclusion is that the NIM series is stationary.
On the basis of the ADF and PP test results, it is concluded that the NIM is 
stationary, or 1(0), in all three cities. Therefore, the ARIMA specification for 
Sydney is identified as (1, 0, 0), for Melbourne as (1, 0, 0), and for Adelaide 
as either a (1, 0, 0) process or a (2, 0, 0) process.
6.6.2 Specification of Dummy Variables
In estimating a model for each of the three cities under investigation, it was 
decided to include a number of dummy variables to account for several
488 The AIC is often used for model selection for non-nested alternatives, with smaller 
values of the AIC being preferred.
489 The SC is an alternative to the AIC for model selection purposes. The SC imposes a 
larger penalty than the AIC for the inclusion of additional parameters in a model.
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other potential periods of structural change. Dummy variables usually take 
two general forms. One form is known as a step function where an 
intervention results in a sudden and permanent change in the time series 
data. Another form is known as a pulse function where an intervention has a 
temporary effect on the time series data before it returns to a steady state.
The specification of the dummy variables used is outlined below. Further 
details on the specification of two of these dummy variables is provided in 
Appendix 4.
6.6.2.1 Regulation and Deregulation o f Wholesale Petrol Prices
The regulation and deregulation of wholesale petrol prices was previously
described in Chapter 2.
In order to account for a possible gradual adjustment process in the 
transition from a period of regulation into deregulation of wholesale petrol 
prices in August 1998, a number of prolonged pulse dummy variables have 
been included as explanatory variables covering the period from June 1997 
until June 1999, to account for changes in the NIM series arising from any 
adjustment process.
The prolonged pulse dummy variable Regulation, covering the period in 
which wholesale petrol prices were subject to regulation, is used in Adelaide 
and Sydney and takes the value of 1 in the period from the week beginning 
30 June 1997 until the week beginning 27 July 1997 and zero otherwise.
In Melbourne, it has been decided to include two prolonged pulse dummy 
variables to cover the period of regulation in order to take account for the
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lack of price discounting observed in the retail market during the second 
half of 1997. The dummy variable Regulation/, takes the value of 1 in the 
period from the week beginning 30 June 1997 until the week beginning 22 
December 1997 and zero otherwise. The dummy variable Regulation2, takes 
the value of 1 in the period from the week beginning 29 December 1997 
until the week beginning 27 July 1998 and zero otherwise.
There are two prolonged pulse dummy variables covering the period of 
deregulation from August 1998 until the end of June 1999 for all three 
cities. The dummy variable Deregulation/, takes the value of 1 in the period 
from the week beginning 3 August 1998 until the week beginning 28 
December 1998 and zero otherwise. The dummy variable Deregulation2, 
takes the value of 1 in the period from the week beginning 4 January 1999 
until the week beginning 21 June 1999 and zero otherwise.
6.6.2.3 Refinery Merger Discussions
A spike is observable across all three cities coinciding with media reports of 
discussions between Shell and Caltex regarding plans to merge their 
refineries into a joint venture company. On 15 March 2000 an article in The 
Australian newspaper reported that:
Oil giants Shell and Caltex are believed to be discussing plans to 
merge their refineries into a joint venture company to help mitigate 
the cost of meeting tough new sulphur emission standards...
Shell spokesman Rob Hart said the company was talking to a 
number of industry players but would not confirm whether the
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discussions included Caltex. A Caltex spokesman was unavailable 
for comment.490
It appears that the normal discounting cycle observed across all three capital 
city retail petrol markets was muted during this period. However, it appears 
the discounting cycle returned to normal shortly after Shell publicly 
announced the outcome of a study on its future manufacturing and supply 
arrangements in New South Wales that began in November 1999.491 The 
outcome of the study was that Shell’s Clyde refinery in Sydney would not 
close in 2001 and was likely to remain operating for the medium term.492
Due to the observed distortion across all three capital city retail petrol 
markets that occurred during this period, it was decided to control for this 
event through the inclusion of a prolonged pulse dummy variable Merger. 
For Adelaide and Melbourne, Merger took on the value of 1 during the 
week beginning 20 March 2000 until the week commencing 27 March 2000 
and zero otherwise, and in Sydney, Merger took on the value of 1 during the 
week beginning 13 March 2000 until the week commencing 3 April 2000 
and zero otherwise.
6.6.2.3 Blockade o f Melbourne Fuel Terminals in Late September 2000 
A brief spike in the NIM occurred during and in aftermath of a blockade of
Melbourne fuel terminal facilities in late September 2000.
In order to account for the period of the Melbourne fuel blockade, a 
prolonged pulse dummy variable Blockade, takes the value of 1 from the
400 The Australian, op.cit.
491 The Shell Company of Australia Limited (2000) Shell Clyde Refinery Future. Media 
Release, 23 March.
226
week beginning 25 September 2000 until the week beginning 9 October 
2000 and zero otherwise. Further details on this event are provided in 
Appendix 4.
6.6.2.4 Christmas 2000
A spike in the level of the NIM occurs in Adelaide, Melbourne and Sydney 
over the Christmas and New Year holiday period during 2000.
This period is treated as an unusual event and will be controlled for. A 
prolonged pulse dummy variable Christmas2000, has been included, which 
takes on the value of 1 from the week beginning 11 December 2000 until 
the week beginning 18 December in Adelaide and zero otherwise, and in 
Melbourne and Sydney which takes on the value of 1 from the week 
beginning 11 December 2000 until the week beginning 1 January 2001 and 
zero otherwise. Further details on this event are provided in Appendix 4.
6.6.2.5 Victorian Terminal Gate Pricing Legislation
Details of the Victorian terminal gate pricing legislation were provided in
Chapter 2. The ACCC reported in 2003 that some oil companies had 
commented to them that the Petroleum Products (Terminal Gate Pricing) 
Act 2000 had imposed administrative costs on them.493
In order to account for a possible change in the NIM due to the Victorian 
Government’s terminal gate pricing legislation, a step function dummy 
variable TG, takes the value of 1 from the week beginning 6 August 2001 
onwards.
493 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Terminal gate pricing 
arrangements in Australia, p. 4.
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6.6.2.6 Iraq War
A spike occurs in the NIM for both the Melbourne and Sydney retail petrol 
markets coinciding with the lead-up to and the period of major hostilities of 
the 2003 Iraq war.
The Iraq war commenced on 19 March 2003, with major combat operations 
finishing on 15 April 2003 when the multinational force mostly took control 
of Tikrit, the last major city in central Iraq.
It appears that the normal discounting cycle observed in the Sydney retail 
petrol market was muted during the period of the Iraq war. The NRMA 
observed that with the conclusion of fighting in Iraq that “[w]e have ... seen 
the return of the weekly discounting cycle in Sydney”.494 A similar impact 
has also been observed in relation to the Melbourne retail petrol market.
Due to the observed distortion in the Melbourne and Sydney retail petrol 
markets that occurred during the period of the Iraq war, it was decided to 
control for this event through the inclusion of a prolonged pulse dummy 
variable Iraq. In Melbourne, Iraq took on the value of 1 during the week 
beginning 24 March 2003 until the week commencing 7 April 2003 and 
zero otherwise, and in Sydney, Iraq took on the value of 1 during the week 
beginning 17 March 2003 until the week commencing 14 April 2003 and 
zero otherwise.
6.6.2.7 Coles Myer and Shell Alliance
A trough in the NIM occurs in Melbourne in the lead-up to and during the 
first few weeks of operation of the commercial alliance between grocery
4,4 National Road Motorists Association (2003) Petrol prices return to pre-war levels. 
Media release, 7 May.
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retailer Coles and Shell at the end of July 2003. Details on this commercial 
alliance were provided in Chapter 2.
It is likely that the NIM trough observed during July and early August in 
Melbourne reflects a period of intensified price discounting activity 
triggered by the commencement of the commercial alliance that had been 
foreshadowed in May 2003. Anecdotal evidence for this contention is 
provided by the fact that the NIM trough reaches its lowest point in the 
week commencing 28 July 2003, when the commercial alliance came into 
operation.
Due to the observed distortion in the Melbourne retail petrol market that 
occurred during the lead-up and commencement of the commercial alliance, 
it was decided to control for this event through the inclusion of a prolonged 
pulse dummy variable Coles, which took on the value of 1 during the week 
commencing 7 July 2003 until the week commencing 11 August 2003 and 
zero otherwise.
6.6.2.8 Termination o f RE As
The main dummy variable of interest is the impact arising from the 
termination of REAs. In order to test for the impact on the NIM in Adelaide, 
Melbourne, and Sydney arising from the termination of REAs, a step 
function dummy variable, exREAs, has been included in all three cities. In 
Adelaide, exREAs takes the value of 1 in the week beginning 3 January 
2000 onwards. In Melbourne and Sydney, exREAs takes the value of 1 in the 
week beginning 1 July 2002 onwards.
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6.6.3 Estimation Process for Adelaide
In diagnostic testing of the residuals from a regression, several tests can be 
performed. The ACF and PACF of the residuals can be checked to ensure 
that there are no significant autocorrelations nor significant partial 
autocorrelations. The Ljung and Box Q statistic tests whether the values 
generated by the ACF of the residuals are simultaneously equal to zero in 
that they are white noise495 or if the residuals are autocorrelated.496 The 
Ljung and Box Q statistic is used as a test for the lack of fit within ARMA 
models, and is often referred to as a portmanteau test. The Breusch-Godffey 
Lagrange multiplier test (LM test) for autocorrelation is used to test for 
autocorrelation in the residuals at various intervals. The Breusch-Godffey 
LM test for first order autocorrelation is also known as Durbin’s m test. The 
White Heteroscedasticity test is a LM test that is a general test for the 
presence of heteroscedasticity in the residuals.497
An ordinary least squares (OLS) regression for Adelaide NIM with an 
ARIMA (1,0,0) specification was initially estimated as equation 1.
However, equation 1 was found to be deficient based on diagnostic tests. 
The correlogram shows autocorrelation in the residuals at lag 2 (reported in 
Appendix 5), while the Ljung and Box Q-statistics of the residuals (reported 
in Appendix 5) and the Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation 
(reported below in table 13) for equation 1 were statistically significant,
495 The residuals will be white noise in the event they do not exhibit autocorrelation and 
they are also independent of one another.
4% Ljung, G. M. and Box, G. E. P. (1978) On Measure of Lack of Fit in Time Series 
Models. Biometrika 65, 297-303.
497 Heteroscedasticity is unequal variance in the residuals. The White Heteroscedasticity 
test is described as a general test because it makes no assumptions about the form of the 
heteroscedasticity.
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suggesting that the model possessed autocorrelation and had been mis- 
specified.
An OLS regression for Adelaide NIM was re-estimated with an ARIMA 
(2,0,0) specification as equation 2. The diagnostic tests of equation 2 
indicate the absence of autocorrelation. The correlograms of the resulting 
residuals for equation 2 are statistically quite acceptable (reported in 
Appendix 5). None of the autocorrelations of the residuals are statistically 
significant. Likewise, none of the partial autocorrelations of the residuals 
are statistically significant, except for that at lag 33 which is likely to be 
spurious correlation. The estimated Ljung and Box Q-statistics (up to 36 
lags) (reported in Appendix 5), and the Breusch-Godfrey LM test for 
autocorrelation up to 4 lags (reported below in table 13) are not statistically 
significant, suggesting that the model does not possess autocorrelation.
Table 13: Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange Multiplier Test for Autocorrelation for 
Equations 1 and 2____________________________________________________
Number 
of Lags
Equation 1 
Obs*R-squared
Equation 1 
Probability
Equation 2 
Obs*R-squared
Equation 2 
Probability
1 lag 7.132* 0.008 0.230 0.632
2 lags 8.332* 0.016 2.419 0.298
3 lags 8.366* 0.039 3.681 0.298
4 lags 8.975 0.062 3.702 0.448
^Statistically significant at the 5 per cent level.
The White Heteroscedasticity test reveals the null hypothesis for the non­
presence of heteroscedasticity has been accepted at the 5 per cent level.
The estimated t-statistics on the constant and all of the explanatory variables 
for equation 2 are statistically significant at less than 1 per cent with the 
exception of Deregulation2 which is statistically significant at less than
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5 per cent. The inverted AR roots have a modulus of less than one, 
suggesting that the estimated model is stationary.
From the OLS modelling, it thus appears that the main variable of interest, 
exREAs, is statistically significant at less than the 1 per cent level for 
Adelaide. This result provides evidence that there has been a structural 
change in the average level of the NIM between the six month period 
preceding the termination of REAs and the period following the termination 
of REAs from the beginning of 2000. Furthermore, it suggests that the step 
function dummy variable exREAs provides a good representation of the 
data.
The results for equations 1 and 2 are reported in table 14 below.
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Table 14: OLS Regressions of Adelaide NIM (t-statistics in brackets)
Variable Equation 1 Equation 2
Constant 4.818
(16.293)*
4.819
(19.531)*
Regulation 1.137
(3.121)*
1.152
(3.813)*
Deregulation 1 1.352
(3.078)*
1.385
(3.767)*
D eregulation 0.716
(1.714)
0.714
(2.020)*
exREAs -0.982
(-2.763)*
-0.989
(-3.316)*
Merger 2.685
(3.415)*
2.746
(3.374)*
Christmas2000 3.962
(5.033)*
3.564
(4.282)*
AR(1) 0.397
(5.844)*
0.478
(6.519)*
AR(2) - -0.207
(-2.748)*
R-squared 0.567 0.586
Adjusted
R-squared
0.550 0.567
AIC 2.801 2.772
SC 2.937 2.926
F-statistic 34.175* 31.962*
W hite’s
Heteroscedasticity
Test
11.623 12.169
Inverted 
AR Roots
.40 .24 +.39i 
.24 -,39i
^Statistically significant at the 5 per cent level.
6.6.4 Estimation Process for Melbourne
An OLS regression for Melbourne NIM with an ARIMA (1,0,0)
specification was estimated as equation 3.
Diagnostic tests performed on the residuals of equation 3 indicate the 
absence of autocorrelation. The correlograms of the residuals (reported in 
Appendix 6) for the estimated equation are statistically quite acceptable. 
None of the autocorrelations of the residuals are statistically significant, 
except for those at lags 6 and 30 and this is most likely spurious correlation. 
None of the partial autocorrelations of the residuals are significant, except 
for those at lags 6, 10, 27 and 30 which are likely to be spurious correlation.
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The estimated Ljung and Box Q-statistics (up to 36 lags) (reported in 
Appendix 6) and the Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation up to 4 
lags (reported in table 15 below) are not statistically significant, suggesting 
that the model does not possess autocorrelation.
The estimated t-statistics on the constant and all explanatory variables are 
statistically significant at less than 1 per cent and the inverted AR root has a 
modulus of less than one, suggesting that the estimated model is stationary.
Table 15: Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange Multiplier Test for Autocorrelation for 
Equation 3__________ ___________________ ________________
Number of Lags Obs*R-squared Probability
1 lag 1.554 0.213
2 lags 1.557 0 .459
3 lags 3.045 0.385
4 lags 3.046 0 .550
However, the White Heteroscedasticity test reveals that the null hypothesis 
for the non-presence of heteroscedasticity has to be rejected at the 1 per cent 
level. While the presence of heteroscedasticity in the regression does not 
cause bias nor inconsistency in the parameter estimates, it does invalidate 
the standard errors, t-statistics, and F-statistics because the standard errors 
and the confidence intervals calculated will be too narrow.
There are two general approaches to addressing heteroscedasticity in 
regression models. One method is to calculate robust standard errors. 
Provided that the sample size is large, then robust standard errors give quite 
a good estimate of standard errors even in the presence of heteroscedasticity 
which then allows statistical inferences to be made about the true parameter
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value.498 The other alternative is to explicitly model to account for the 
heteroscedasticity.
Equation 3 was re-estimated using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
as proposed by White 499 The estimated t-statisties on the constant and all 
explanatory variables from the regression are still statistically significant at 
less than 1 per cent after allowing for heteroscedasticity through the 
calculation heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors.
Equation 3 was also re-estimated using the heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) standard errors as developed by Newey 
and West.500 This will ensure that the standard errors are robust in the event 
of both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation of an unknown form. The 
estimated t-statistics on the constant and all of the explanatory variables 
from the regression are still statistically significant at less than 1 per cent 
after allowing for both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation through the 
calculation o f HAC standard errors.
From the OLS modeling, it thus appears that the main variable of interest, 
exREAs, is statistically significant at less than the 1 per cent level. This 
result provides evidence that there has been a structural change in the 
average level of the N1M between the eleven month period preceding the 
termination of REAs associated with the Victorian terminal gate pricing 
legislation and the period following the termination of REAs from July
498 Engle, R. (2001) GARCH 101: The Use of ARCH/GARCH Models in Applied 
Econometrics. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 15, 157-168, p. 158.
499 White, H. (1980) A heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a 
direct test for heteroscedasticity. Econometrica 48, 817-838.
500 Newey, W. K. and West, K. D. (1987) Hypothesis Testing with Efficient Method of 
Moments Estimation. International Economic Review 28, 777-787.
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2002. Furthermore, it suggests that the step function dummy variable 
exREAs provides a good representation of the data.
The results for equation 3 are reported in table 16 below.
Table 16: OLS Regressions of Melbourne NIM (t-statistics in brackets)
Variable Equation 3 Equation 3
(W h ite ’s
h eterosced astic ity -  
robust standard  
errors)
Equation 3
(H A C  standard errors)
Constant 3.375
(15.960)*
3.375
(15.618)*
3.375
(15.183)*
Regulation / 3.063
(6.334)*
3.063
(6.123)*
3.063
(6.312)*
Regulation2 1.701
(3.931)*
1.701
(4.907)*
1.701
(4.983)*
Deregulation, 2.177
(4.471)*
2.177
(7.494)*
2.177
(6.737)*
Deregulation2 1.389
(3.017)*
1.389
(2.792)*
1.389
(3.011)*
Merger 2.608
(2.736)*
2.608
(7.911)*
2.608
(13.271)*
Blockade 3.654
(4.161)*
3.654
(10.023)*
3.654
(16.120)*
Christmas2000 4.144
(5.031)*
4.144
(4.297)*
4.144
(8.775)*
TG 1.661
(4.460)*
1.661
(3.704)*
1.661
(3.199)*
exREAs 1.529
(3.660)*
1.529
(3.422)*
1.529
(2.902)*
Iraq 3.117
(3.527)*
3.117
(3.139)*
3.117
(5.198)*
Coles -2.745
(-3.694)*
-2.745
(-3.028)*
-2.745
(-3.380)*
AR(1) 0.472
(9.287)*
0.472
(7.824)*
0.472
(7.778)*
R-squared 0.644
Adjusted R-squared 0.630
AIC 3.181
SC 3.334
F-statistic 46.367*
W hite’s
Heteroscedasticity
Test
29.583*
Inverted AR Roots .47
^Statistically significant at the 5 per cent level.
The model is now re-estimated through modelling for the heteroscedasticity.
The autocorrelations and partial autocorrelations of the squared residuals
and their resulting correlograms and the Ljung-Box Q-statistics of the
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squared residuals are used to check for the presence o f autoregressive 
conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) in the residuals. Provided that the 
Gauss-Markov assumptions hold, OLS estimates in the presence of ARCH 
still represent the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE).501 However, in the 
identification o f ARIMA models, the presence of ARCH will lead to models 
that are over-parameterised.502
Inspection of the autocorrelation and partial correlations of the squared 
residuals and the Ljung and Box Q-statistic from the OLS regression 
(reported in Appendix 6) reveals the null hypothesis that the model does not 
exhibit ARCH in the residuals has to be rejected. The autocorrelations and 
the partial autocorrelations of the squared residuals are statistically 
significant at lag 1. The Ljung and Box Q-statistics are statistically 
significant for autocorrelation in the squared residuals at lags 2, 3 and 4 and 
from lag 12 onwards.
The next step is to develop a model that appropriately models the ARCH. It 
was found that the ARCH(l) configuration was the preferred specification. 
ARCH(l) models take the following form:
G t2 =  Oto +  (X iSt-i2
2 • • . 2where ‘a t ’ is the variance at time ‘f , ‘do’ is a constant, and ‘et-i ’ is the 
square of the residual at time ‘t-1 ’ with ‘a f  as its estimated coefficient.
501 Wooldridge, J. M. (2003) Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach. Thomson 
South-Western, Australia, p. 416.
502 Mills, T. C. (1990) Time series techniques for economists. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge.
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The model for Melbourne was re-estimated using the ARCH(l)
specification by the method of maximum likelihood (ML) as equation 4.
Diagnostic tests demonstrate that the outcomes from this ARIMA ARCH 
intervention model are statistically quite acceptable. None of the 
autocorrelations of the residuals are statistically significant, except for those 
at lags 17 and 30 and this is most likely spurious correlation (reported in 
Appendix 6). Similarly, none of the partial autocorrelations of the residuals 
are statistically significant, except for those at lags 6, 27 and 30 which are 
likely to be spurious correlation (reported in Appendix 6). None of the 
estimated Ljung and Box Q-statistics for autocorrelation in the residuals are 
statistically significant (reported in Appendix 6).
Tests fail to detect the presence of any heteroscedasticity. None of the 
autocorrelation nor partial autocorrelation functions of the squared residuals 
are statistically significant, except for those at lags 14, 17 and 20 which are 
likely to be spurious correlation (reported in Appendix 6). None of the 
estimated Ljung and Box Q-statistics for autocorrelation in the squared 
residuals are statistically significant (reported in Appendix 6).
Another method used to detect the presence of ARCH is the LM test for 
ARCH. The LM test for ARCH in the residuals up to eight lags fails to 
identify the presence of ARCH and the results are reported below in table 
17.
503
503 This was estimated using a Bemdt, Hall, Hall and Hausman iterative algorithm.
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Table 17: Lagrange Multiplier Test for Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity 
for Equation 4_______ ___________________ ________________
Number of Lags Obs*R-squared Probability
1 lag 2.504 0.114
2 lags 2.500 0.287
3 lags 4.579 0.205
4 lags 5.318 0.256
5 lags 5.545 0.353
6 lags 6.356 0.385
7 lags 5.729 0.572
8 lags 6.064 0.640
In undertaking ML estimation, it is assumed that the residuals are normally 
distributed. Hence, it is important to test the assumption of the normality of 
the residuals to determine whether this underlying assumption in the use of 
ML estimation has been violated. Based on the Jarque-Bera test on the 
residuals reported below, the null hypothesis that the residuals are normally 
distributed is rejected.
Jarque-Bera = 8.184 Probability = 0.017
If the residuals are not conditionally normally distributed, the ARCH 
parameter estimates will still be consistent provided that the mean and 
variance functions have been correctly specified, but the standard errors will 
be incorrect. In order to rectify for this possible shortcoming, equation 4 
was re-estimated using quasi-maximum likelihood standard errors through 
the method described by Bollerslev and Wooldridge.504
The constant and all of the explanatory variables in the estimated mean 
equation for equation 4 are statistically significant at less than 1 per cent. 
The inverted AR root has a modulus of less than one, suggesting that the 
estimated model is stationary.
504 Bollerslev, T. and Wooldridge, J. M. (1992) Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
and Inference in Dynamic Models with Time-Varying Covariances. Econometric Reviews 
11, 143-172.
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From the ML modelling the main variable of interest, exREAs, is 
statistically significant at less than the 1 per cent level. This result provides 
further evidence that there has been a structural change in the average level 
of the NIM between the eleven month period preceding the termination of 
REAs associated with the Victorian terminal gate pricing legislation and the 
period following the termination of REAs from July 2002. It also suggests 
that the step function dummy variable exREAs provides a good 
representation of the data.
In the variance equation for equation 4, the constant and the estimated 
coefficient on the ‘a t-|2, term are both statistically significant at less than 
1 per cent.
The results for equation 4 are reported in table 18 below.
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Table 18: ML Regression of Melbourne NIM (z-statistics in brackets)
Variable Equation 4
(quasi-maximum 
likelihood standard errors)
Constant 3.391
(18.495)*
Regulation / 2.704
(5.502)*
Regulation? 1.580
(5.572)*
Deregulation / 2.152
(7.862)*
Deregulation2 1.092
(2.589)*
Merger 2.604
(7.952)*
Blockade 3.703
(8.867)*
Christmas2000 4.698
(3.925)*
TG 1.633
(4.347)*
exREAs 1.584
(4.104)*
Iraq 3.298
(2.860)*
Coles -2.701
(-3.500)*
AR(1) 0.444
(8.750)*
a 0 0.991
(7.637)*
et-i2 0.436
(5.201)*
R-squared 0.641
Adjusted R-squared 0.625
AIC 3.202
SC 3.379
F-statistic 39.071*
Inverted AR Roots .44
^Statistically significant at the 5 per cent level.
The ARCH(l) model produces estimates for the constant and for the
coefficients of the explanatory variables very similar in magnitude to those
estimated by the OLS model, with the possible exception of Christmas2000.
6.6.5 Estimation Process for Sydney
An OLS regression for Sydney NIM with an ARIMA (1,0,0) specification
was estimated as equation 5.
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Diagnostic tests performed on the residuals of equation 5 indicate the 
absence of autocorrelation. The correlograms of the residuals (reported in 
Appendix 7) for the estimated equation are statistically quite acceptable. 
None of the autocorrelations of the residuals are statistically significant, 
except for those at lags 18, 19, 20 and 24 and this is most likely spurious 
correlation. None of the partial autocorrelations of the residuals are 
significant, except for those at lags 18, 19, and 20 which are likely to be 
spurious correlation. The estimated Ljung and Box Q-statistics (up to 36 
lags) (reported in Appendix 7) and the Breusch-Godfrey LM test for 
autocorrelation up to 4 lags (reported in table 19 below) are not statistically 
significant, suggesting that the model does not possess autocorrelation.
The estimated t-statistics on the constant and all explanatory variables are 
statistically significant at less than 1 per cent and the inverted AR root has a 
modulus of less than one, suggesting that the estimated model is stationary.
Table 19: Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange Multiplier Test for Autocorrelation for 
Equation 5__________ _____________________________________
Number of Lags Obs*R-squared Probability
1 lag 0 .510 0.475
2 lags 0 .549 0.760
3 lags 0.593 0.898
4 lags 2.092 0.719
The White Heteroscedasticity test reveals that the null hypothesis for the
non-presence of heteroscedasticity has to be rejected at the 1 per cent level.
Equation 5 was re-estimated using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. 
With the exception of Christmas2000, whose estimated t-statistic is still 
statistically significant at less than 5 per cent, the estimated t-statistics on 
the constant and all of the other explanatory variables are statistically
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significant at less than 1 per cent after allowing for heteroscedasticity 
through the calculation of heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors.
Equation 5 was then re-estimated using HAC standard errors in order to 
ensure that the standard errors are robust in the event of both 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation of an unknown form. The estimated t- 
statistics on the constant and all of the explanatory variables from the 
regression are statistically significant at less than 1 per cent after allowing 
for both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation through the calculation of 
HAC standard errors.
From the OLS modelling, it thus appears that the main variable of interest, 
exREAs, is statistically significant at less than the 1 per cent level. This 
result provides evidence that there has been a structural change in the 
average level of the N1M between the three year period preceding the 
termination of REAs and the period following the termination of REAs from 
July 2002. Furthermore, it suggests that the step function dummy variable 
exREAs provides a good representation of the data.
The results for equation 5 are reported in table 20 below.
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Table 20: OLS Regressions of Sydney NIM (t-statistics in brackets)
Variable Equation 5 Equation 5
(W h ite ’s
h eterosced astic ity -  
robust standard  
errors)
Equation 5
(H A C  standard  
errors)
Constant 4.496
(26.820)*
4.496
(21.915)*
4.496
(24.686)*
Regulation 2.557
(7.862)*
2.557
(9.560)*
2.557
(8.312)*
Deregulation I 2.605
(5.929)*
2.605
(8.453)*
2.605
(7.420)*
D eregulation2 1.600
(3.855)*
1.600
(4.506)*
1.600
(3.498)*
M erger 2 . 8 6 8
(4.124)*
2 . 8 6 8
(3.566)*
2 . 8 6 8
(6.161)*
Christmas2000 3.028
(4.325)*
3.028
(2.165)*
3.028
(4.576)*
exREAs 2.130
(6.841)*
2.130
(7.649)*
2.130
(6.374)*
Iraq 2.727
(4.062)*
2.727
(3.221)*
2.727
(3.714)*
AR(1) 0.546
(11.374)*
0.546
(10.251)*
0.546
(9.283)*
R-squared 0.721
Adjusted
R-squared
0.714
AIC 2.779
SC 2.884
F-statistic 100.897*
White’s
Heteroscedasticity
Test
41.041*
Inverted AR Roots .55
^Statistically significant at the 5 per cent level.
The model is now re-estimated through modelling for the heteroscedasticity. 
Inspection of the autocorrelation and partial correlations of the squared 
residuals and the Ljung and Box Q-statistic reveals the hypothesis that the 
model does not exhibit ARCH in the residuals has to be rejected (reported in 
Appendix 7). The autocorrelations and the partial autocorrelations of the 
squared residuals are statistically significant from lags 1 to 5. The Ljung and 
Box Q-statistics are statistically significant for autocorrelation in the 
squared residuals from lag 1 onwards.
The next step was to develop a model that appropriately models the ARCH.
It was found that the Generalised ARCH (GARCH) with a GARCH(1,1)
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configuration was the preferred specification. GARCH (1,1) models take the 
following form:
2 2 2 crt = a 0 + cti£t-i + ß ia t-i
where ‘a t2’ is the variance at time ‘f , ‘oto’ is a constant, ‘et-i2’ is the square 
of the residual at time ‘t-1’ with ‘a f  as its estimated coefficient, and ‘a t-i ’ 
is the variance at time ‘t-1 ’ with ‘ß f  as its estimated coefficient.
The model for Sydney was re-estimated using the GARCH(1,1) 
specification by the ML method as equation 6.505
Diagnostic tests demonstrate that the outcomes from this ARIMA ARCH 
intervention model are statistically quite acceptable. None of the 
autocorrelations of the residuals are statistically significant (reported in 
Appendix 7). Similarly, none of the partial autocorrelations of the residuals 
are statistically significant except for that at lag 30 which is likely to be 
spurious correlation (reported in Appendix 7). None of the estimated Ljung 
and Box Q-statistics for autocorrelation in the residuals are statistically 
significant (reported in Appendix 7).
Tests fail to detect the presence of any heteroscedasticity. None of the 
autocorrelation nor partial autocorrelation functions of the squared residuals 
are statistically significant except for that at lag 15 which is likely to be 
spurious correlation (reported in Appendix 7). None of the estimated Ljung 
and Box Q-statistics for autocorrelation in the squared residuals are 
statistically significant (reported in Appendix 7). The LM test for ARCH in
505 This was estimated using a Marquardt iterative algorithm.
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the residuals up to eight lags fails to identify the presence of ARCH and the 
results are reported below in table 21.
Table 21: Lagrange Multiplier Test for Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity 
for Equation 6_______________________________________
Number of Lags Obs*R-squared Probability
1 lag 0.017 0.898
2 lags 0.327 0.849
3 lags 0.584 0 .900
4 lags 1.229 0.873
5 lags 1.402 0 .924
6 lags 1.497 0 .960
7 lags 1.895 0.965
8 lags 1.944 0.983
However, based on the Jarque-Bera test on the residuals reported below, the 
null hypothesis that the residuals are normally distributed for equation 6 has
to be rejected.
Jarque-Bera = 9.956 Probability = 0.007
In order to rectify for this possible shortcoming, equation 6 was re-estimated 
using quasi-maximum likelihood standard errors through the method 
described by Bollerslev and Wooldridge.
The mean equation for equation 6 using the quasi-maximum likelihood 
standard errors shows that the estimated constant and all of the estimated 
explanatory variables are statistically significant at less than 1 per cent with 
the exception of Christmas2000 which is not statistically significant at 5 per 
cent level. The inverted AR root has a modulus of less than one, suggesting 
that the estimated model is stationary.
In the variance equation for equation 6, the estimated coefficients on both 
the ‘a t.i2 ’ term and the ‘et-i2’ term are statistically significant at less than 1
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per cent, while the constant term is not statistically significant at the 
5 per cent level.
An important feature of the variance equation for equation 6 is that the sum 
of the ‘a f  and ‘ß f  coefficients is only marginally less than 1, which 
indicates that the modelled variance demonstrates persistence in that it takes 
a long time to die out asymptotically. Bollerslev, Engle and Nelson have 
observed in relation to GARCH(1,1) models that in most empirical 
applications with finely sampled data that the sum of the ‘a f  and ‘ß f 
coefficients of close to one “is found to provide a good description of the 
data”.506
From the ML modeling the main variable of interest, exREAs, is statistically 
significant at less than the 1 per cent level. This result provides further 
evidence that there has been a structural change in the average level of the 
NIM between the three year period preceding the termination of REAs and 
the period following the termination of REAs from July 2002. It also 
suggests that the step function dummy variable exREAs provides a good 
representation of the data.
The results for equation 6 are reported in table 22 below.
506 Bollerslev, T , Engle, R. F„ and Nelson, D. B. (1994) ARCH Models. In Engle, R. F. 
and McFadden, D. L. (eds.) Handbook o f Econometrics: Volume 4. Elsevier Science 
Publishers B. V., Amsterdam, 2959-3038, p. 2669.
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Table 22: ML Regression of Sydney NIM (z-statistics in brackets)
Variable Equation 6
(quasi-maximum 
likelihood standard 
errors)
Constant 4.601
(21.678)*
Regulation 2.446
(9.029)*
Deregulation / 2.549
(7.803)*
Deregulation2 1.578
(4.936)*
M erger 3.712
(3.481)*
Christmas2000 3.129
(1.861)
exREAs 2.077
(7.703)*
Iraq 3.828
(3.122)*
AR(1) 0.587
(13.519)*
c t0 0.033
(1.494)
St-12 0.143
(2.904)*
t f . - l 2 0.833
(13.829)*
R-squared 0.715
Adjusted R-squared 0.705
AIC 2.607
SC 2.748
F-statistic 70.589*
Inverted AR Roots .59
^Statistically significant at the 5 per cent level.
With the exception of the Merger and the Iraq explanatory variables, the
GARCH(1,1) model produces estimates of the constant and for the
coefficients of the explanatory variables very similar in magnitude to those
estimated by the OLS model.
6.7 Sensitivity Analysis
The sensitivity of the models for all three cities has been tested by OLS by
excluding the autoregressive terms using HAC standard errors to account
for likely autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. The results have been
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reported in Appendix 8 as equations A8.1 for Adelaide, A8.2 for Melbourne 
and A8.3 for Sydney.
The estimated models remain robust with the constant and all coefficients 
on the explanatory variables statistically significant at less than the 1 per 
cent level. The modelling shows that the main variable of interest, exREAs, 
is statistically significant at less than the 1 per cent level for all three cities. 
These results provide further evidence that there has been a structural 
change in the average level of the NIM between the period preceding the 
termination of REAs and the period following the termination of REAs and 
suggests that the step function dummy variable exREAs provides a good 
representation of the data for all three cities.
It is also important to note that the R-squared (and adjusted R-squared) is 
not higher than the Durbin-Watson statistic reported for all three cities, 
which suggests that these models are not cases of spurious regression 
according to the criterion suggested by Granger and Newbold.507
It was noted in section 6.4 above that the NIM for Melbourne and Sydney
appeared to be trending upwards from around mid-2000. In this case, there
is the possibility that the dummy variables picking up the impact associated
with the Victorian terminal gate pricing legislation in Melbourne and the
abolition of REAs in regard to Melbourne and Sydney could be picking up
pre-existing trends, thus casting doubt over the validity of the results. Any
such trend from mid-2000 could be associated with the introduction of the
GST. A further sensitivity analysis was conducted through the inclusion of a
507 Granger, C. W. J. and Newbold, P. (1974) Spurious Regressions in Econometrics. 
Journal o f Econometrics 2, 111-120.
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new dummy variable GST for all three cities to determine whether the 
results for exREAs could simply be reflecting a pre-existing trend in the 
data. For Adelaide, GST takes the value of 1 from the week beginning 3 July 
2000 onwards. For Melbourne, GST takes for the value of 1 from the week 
beginning 3 July 2000 until the week beginning 30 July 2001 and zero 
thereafter. For Sydney, GST takes the value of 1 from the week beginning 3 
July 2000 until the week beginning 24 June 2002 and zero thereafter.
These sensitivity analysis models have been estimated by OLS using 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors and FIAC standard errors to 
account for any autocorrelation and (likely) heteroscedasticity in the 
models/ These results have been reported in Appendix 8 as equations 
A8.4 for Adelaide, A8.5 for Melbourne and A8.6 for Sydney.
The coefficient on the GST explanatory variable is not statistically
significant at the 5 per cent level for any of the three cities. This suggests
that there is no structural break from mid-2000 onwards from the previous
period in regard to any of the three cities. In addition, the sign on the
coefficient of the GST explanatory variable in all three cities suggests that
any time trend in the NIM from mid-2000 onwards was probably negative if
it did exist. The impact associated with the termination of REAs in regard to
Adelaide remains statistically significant at less than the 5 per cent level
under the heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors specification and at less
than 1 per cent under the HAC standard errors specification. The impact
associated with the termination of REAs in regard to Sydney remains
508 The White Heteroscedasticity test of the model for Adelaide did reveal that the null 
hypothesis for the non-presence of heteroscedasticity had to be rejected at the 5 per cent 
level.
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statistically significant at less than the 1 per cent level under both model 
specifications, while the impact associated with the Victorian terminal gate 
pricing legislation and the termination of REAs in regard to Melbourne 
remains statistically significant at less than the 1 per cent level under both 
model specifications. The implication of these results is that the main 
variable of interest, exREAs, is not picking up trends that started before the 
abolition of the REAs.
A further sensitivity analysis is provided for Sydney in which the Victorian 
terminal gate pricing legislation step function dummy variable, TG, has 
been included in the model for Sydney. These equations have been 
estimated by OLS and are reported in Appendix 9 as equations A9.1 and 
A9.2. These equations suggest that there was no structural change between 
the period beginning July 1999 to the end of July 2001 and the period 
beginning August 2001 to the end of June 2002. Once again, it would 
appear that the main variable of interest, exREAs, is not picking up trends 
that started before the abolition of the REAs in Sydney. The reason for the 
specification of equations A9.1 and A9.2 is outlined in Chapter 7.
6.8 Conclusion
From the exploratory data analysis and modelling exercises, it appears that 
the termination of REAs is associated with a statistically significant effect at 
less than the 1 per cent level upon the average level of the NIM in Adelaide, 
Melbourne and Sydney.
In Adelaide, this effect would appear to be negative and associated with a 
reduction of around 1.0 cpl in the NIM on average. In contrast to Adelaide,
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the effect in Melbourne and Sydney would appear to be positive. Therefore 
the null hypothesis that BEFORE is equal to AFTER in respect of Adelaide 
is rejected and the alternative hypothesis of H2 is accepted.
The magnitude of the effect in Melbourne is associated with an increase in 
the NIM of between 1.5 to 1.6 cpl on average. The magnitude of the effect 
in Sydney is associated with an increase in the NIM of around 2.1 cpl on 
average. Thus, in relation to both Melbourne and Sydney, the null 
hypothesis that BEFORE is equal to AFTER is rejected and the alternative 
hypothesis of Hi is accepted.
In this chapter it has been demonstrated that there is a statistically 
significant effect on the average level of the NIMs associated with the 
termination of REAs. The next Chapter will provide an interpretation of 
these results.
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Chapter 7: Interpretation
7.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3 it was surmised that the retail sector of the downstream petroleum 
industry in capital cities was probably retailing petrol at marginal cost due to 
the motivation on the part of the oil majors to avoid the problem of double 
marginalisation, an outcome reminiscent of a perfectly competitive market. 
Under these conditions, movements and changes in retail petrol prices as well 
as in the NIM should therefore provide insights into the nature of competition at 
the wholesale level.
This Chapter will interpret the results of the modelling undertaken in Chapter 6. 
It will do this through examining the constant and the coefficient on each of the 
explanatory variables estimated in the modelling (with the exception of the 
autoregressive terms) and consider possible explanations for these results.
While the primary focus is upon interpreting the explanatory variable 
measuring the effect associated with the termination of REAs, interpretation of 
the constant along with the other explanatory variables may also provide useful 
insights into the pattern and nature of competition within the wholesale petrol 
markets of Adelaide, Melbourne, and Sydney as conveyed through retail petrol 
prices and changes in the NIM. This information could in turn be beneficial in 
ensuring that the impact upon wholesale petrol markets arising from the 
termination of REAs is correctly interpreted.
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The interpretation of the explanatory variables measuring the effect associated 
with the termination of REAs will enable conclusions to be drawn on the likely 
competitive effects of REAs in the three capital city under consideration. At the 
conclusion of this Chapter, it is intended to demonstrate that the operation of 
REAs had a pro-competitive impact on wholesale petrol markets in Melbourne 
and Sydney and that the operation of REAs in the Adelaide wholesale petrol 
market was unlikely to have been associated with any anti-competitive 
detriment.
7.2 Competition in Capital City Wholesale Petrol 
Markets
As was previously observed in Chapter 2, retail petrol prices in Adelaide, 
Melbourne and Sydney closely follow each other, and in turn follow 
movements in the IPI. On this basis, it is reasonable to assume that the capital 
city retail petrol markets of Adelaide, Melbourne and Sydney, and their 
associated capital city wholesale petrol markets, behave in a similar manner.
While the wholesale petrol markets under consideration may be considered 
oligopolistic in nature, as outlined in Chapter 3, there are many alternative 
theories to explain the conduct of firms in an oligopolistic market. It is 
therefore important to try to ascertain which theory or theories of oligopoly 
could be relevant in trying to explain the behaviour and conduct of firms 
operating within the Adelaide, Melbourne, and Sydney wholesale petrol 
markets.
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One possibility is for wholesale market participants to behave in a tacitly 
collusive manner as described by Chamberlin, Fellner and Kaysen.509 In this 
situation, wholesale market participants would recognize their interdependence 
and decide it is against their interests to engage in price competition, striking a 
tacitly collusive arrangement instead. The public comments of politicians and 
motoring organisations, along with firmly held and widespread public 
suspicions, provide anecdotal support for this proposition. In addition, the firms 
operating within the capital city wholesale markets engage in repeated 
interactions against each other over time, with game theory suggesting this will 
increase the probability that firms will decide to adopt more co-operative 
strategies against each other than if they only interacted once as first identified 
by Friedman.510 Furthermore, the interaction of the oil majors is not simply 
confined to one geographic market but to several geographic markets around 
Australia, thus increasing the incentives to engage in co-operative behaviour 
with rival firms while reducing the incentives to cheat on any tacitly collusive 
agreement struck as suggested by Bemheim and Whinston.511
Walker and Woodward have observed that the downstream petroleum industry 
exhibits several of the characteristics identified by Stigler as making it easier to 
facilitate tacit collusion between rival firms. “ Petrol, as outlined in Chapter 2, 
could be considered as a homogeneous product, thus minimising the scope for
509 Chamberlin, E. H., op.cif, Fellner, W., op.cit', Kaysen, C., op.cit.
510 Friedman, J. W., op.cit.
511 Bemheim, B. D., and Whinston, M. D., op.cit.
512 Walker, J. and Woodward, L., op.cit., p. 33.
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product differentiation and non-price competition and thereby providing a clear 
basis upon which a tacitly collusive agreement could be struck, namely the 
price of petrol. The eventual consumers of the product in motoring consumers 
are all relatively small purchasers of the product, thus making it a lot less 
attractive for firms to cheat on any tacitly collusive agreement struck by 
offering secret price cuts to any customer. The display of petrol price boards at 
retail service station sites would make it relatively easy to detect and punish any 
defection from any tacitly collusive agreement struck. Indeed, the former 
Chairman of the ACCC, Professor Allan Fels, expressed concern that the 
display of petrol price boards at retail service station sites was a means through
SITwhich the oil majors could signal to each other.
The downstream petroleum industry also displays several other conditions 
identified by Posner that arguably make it positively predisposed towards 
collusion (whether that be tacit or overt).514 As was concluded in Chapter 2, 
price competition appears to be the main basis by which firms compete. 
Furthermore, as outlined in Chapter 2, the downstream petroleum industry has a 
chequered history in relation to competition law compliance, having been 
subject to numerous investigations, in addition to several successful as well as 
unsuccessful prosecutions for breaches of Part IV of the TPA, suggesting that it 
possesses some predisposition towards anti-competitive conduct.
513 7.30 Report (1999) Petrol Prices. ABC Television, 9 August.
514 Posner, R. A. Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective.
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On the other hand, the downstream petroleum industry also exhibits several 
characteristics identified by Posner that would appear to mitigate against 
collusive conduct. In the first instance, wholesale markets, at least in most of 
the capital cities, possess a fringe of small sellers (independents). Posner 
observed that any part of the market outside of the colluding circle would 
impose a limit on the power exercised by the colluding circle over the market
515price.
Furthermore, as observed in Chapter 6, retail petrol prices in Adelaide, 
Melbourne and Sydney were often consistently below the level of the IPI, the 
standard previously used to regulate wholesale petrol prices in Australia. This 
suggests two possible explanations. The first is that capital city wholesale petrol 
markets were relatively competitive in that market participants engaged in price 
competition in order to either build and/or maintain market share. This first 
explanation is consistent with the conclusions reached by the Industry 
Commission that “the petroleum product markets have a structure conducive to 
vigorous competition and not consistent with the persistence of monopoly 
power”.516 The second explanation is that the IPI was consistently set at a level 
below the wholesale profit-maximising price if the oil majors had struck a 
tacitly collusive agreement.
The first explanation appears to be far more plausible than the second 
explanation because, as outlined in Chapter 2, the retail demand for petrol is
515 ibid., p. 56.
516 Industry Commission, op.cit., p. 61.
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highly price inelastic. Posner has observed that a monopolist would never sell at 
a price where the demand is inelastic, as they could simply increase their 
revenues and profits by reducing their output and raising the product price. 517 If 
there was indeed a tacitly collusive agreement adhered to within the wholesale 
petrol markets under consideration flowing through into retail petrol prices, 
then one would never expect falls in retail prices to occur while petrol demand 
remained price inelastic unless any tacitly collusive agreement struck had 
collapsed. Arguably the most significant piece of evidence mitigating against 
the existence of tacit collusion within wholesale petrol markets is the fact that 
the demand for petrol is significantly price inelastic at the prevailing retail 
market price. While Green and Porter5 ls have proposed a model of oligopoly 
where it is possible for tacit collusion to occur in concert with price instability 
as co-operation breaks down, this model seems inappropriate to explain 
behaviour in capital city wholesale petrol markets because the price cycles 
observed at the retail level, conveying information about prices at the wholesale 
level, are periodic and therefore predictable.519
Walker and Woodward have observed that attempts to engage in the co­
ordination of prices within the downstream petroleum industry have met with 
only limited success.520 This would also accord with the viewpoint proffered by
517 Posner, R. A., op.cit., p. 69.
518 Green, E. J. and Porter, R. H., op.cit.
519 Castanias, R. and Johnson, H., op.cit., p. 171.
520 Walker, J. and Woodward, L., op.cit., p. 34.
258
Shell in 2001 that “there is simply no evidence of the petroleum industry
•>1 521engaging in monopolistic pricing”.
Aside from competition in wholesale petrol markets, there may be several other 
factors that may have precluded the setting of a monopoly wholesale petrol 
price. As oil refining is a joint production process of various petroleum 
products simultaneously, profit maximising from overall refinery production 
may result in an oversupply of petrol. Wholesale price regulation, which 
benchmarked Australian wholesale petrol prices to an import parity price from 
Singapore, could have thwarted attempts to set a monopoly wholesale price at 
least up until the end of July 1998. Fear of even further government 
intervention and price controls could have provided sufficient moral suasion 
against attempts to set a monopoly wholesale price. Even if these factors may 
have thwarted the setting of a monopoly price for wholesale petrol to some 
extent through a tacitly collusive agreement, it would still have been irrational 
for firms to ever lower wholesales petrol prices, flowing through into lower 
retail petrol prices and the level of the NIM, if there were any inclinations 
towards co-operation amongst wholesale market participants given the price 
inelastic demand for retail petrol.
Therefore, the most plausible explanation for reductions in retail petrol prices, 
as well as for falls in the level of the NIM, is that they did represent genuine 
attempts by wholesale market participants to compete and build market share
521 The Shell Company o f Australia Limited (2001) Shell submission to the Review o f the Prices 
Surveillance Act 1983. Melbourne.
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through price discounting at the expense of rivals. If this is indeed the case, 
there are possibly elements of at least three static oligopoly theories present in 
capital city wholesale petrol markets as reflected through the normal weekly 
price cycles observed in capital city retail petrol markets. First, wholesale petrol 
prices are possibly in a continuous state of peipetual motion between a high and 
low point as proposed by Edgeworth as reflected through price volatility in 
capital city retail petrol markets. Second, wholesalers who don’t drop their 
prices in response to price discounting at the retail level gradually lose business 
to their rivals over time rather than losing all of their business instantaneously 
as suggested by Hotelling. Third, barometric price leadership provides a 
possible explanation as to why there is a uniform increase in retail petrol prices 
at the end of a discounting cycle, with other wholesalers deciding to raise their 
prices in response to a wholesale price rise by one of their rivals. In terms of a 
dynamic theory of oligopoly, capital city wholesale petrol markets could be 
reminiscent of the model proposed by Maskin and Tirole as previously
522suggested by Castanias and Johnson.
7.3 Wholesale Petrol Markets of Adelaide, Melbourne 
and Sydney
The impacts upon the competitive environment that occurred over the period 
under consideration will now be discussed. This is done by interpretation of the 
constant term and the coefficients on the explanatory variables and their 
statistical standing from the estimated regressions conducted. The shift effects 
associated with the blockade of Victorian oil terminals in late September 2000, 
3:2 Castanias, R. and Johnson, H., op.cit.
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tight supply conditions across the Australian eastern seaboard during the 
Christmas and New Year period in 2000, merger discussions between Shell and 
Caltex in March 2000, the impact of impaired retail discounting behaviour in 
Melbourne during the second half of 1997, the impact of the 2003 Iraq war, the 
impact from the entry of Coles into petrol retailing in July and August 2003, 
wholesale petrol price regulation and deregulation, the Victorian terminal gate 
pricing legislation, and the impact associated with the termination of REAs and, 
after the constant term, they are each discussed in turn with conclusions drawn 
for overall interpretation.
For Adelaide, Melbourne and Sydney, the constant term is statistically 
significant at less than the 1 per cent level under all model specifications.
The constant term provides a measure of the average base level of the NIM 
after specific events being accounted for through the other dummy variables are 
removed from consideration. It also arguably provides an indication of the level 
of price competition in each of the wholesale petrol markets being examined, as 
a more intense level of price competition at the wholesale level would 
presumably equate to a lower average base level for the NIM.
Comparisons of the constant term across the three cities would suggest that 
Melbourne was generally the most competitive wholesale petrol market because 
it recorded the lowest value for the NIM at around 3.4 cpl. This finding is 
consistent with the ACCC’s conclusion in 1996 that the Melbourne retail petrol 
market had the lowest average capital city margin above an import parity
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terminal gate price between March 1994 and March 1996.523 It is also 
consistent with the ACCC’s observation in 2001 that Melbourne had long been 
regarded as the most competitive of the major capital cities for petrol.524
The value of the constant terms would suggest that the Adelaide and Sydney 
wholesale petrol markets were roughly equivalent in terms of their 
competitiveness, with the constant term for the NIM estimated at around 4.8 cpl 
in Adelaide and estimated at between 4.5 cpl and 4.6 cpl in Sydney. This is also 
consistent with the ACCC’s previous finding in 1996 that the Adelaide and 
Sydney retail petrol markets had similar average capital city margins above an 
import parity terminal gate price between March 1994 and March 1996.525
7.4 Blockade and Christmas2000
The Blockade and Christmas2000 explanatory variables are statistically 
significant at less than the 1 per cent level under all model specifications for 
Melbourne. The Christmas2000 explanatory variable is statistically significant 
at less than the 1 per cent level under the OLS specification for Adelaide. In 
regard to Sydney, while the Christmas2000 explanatory variable is statistically 
significant at less than 1 per cent level using HAC standard errors, it is only 
statistically significant at the 5 per cent level using heteroscedasticity-robust 
standard errors and not statistically significant at the 5 per cent level under the 
GARCH(1,1) specification using quasi-maximum likelihood standard errors.
523 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Inquiry into the Petroleum Products 
Declaration, Vol. 1, p. 64.
524 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Reducing Fuel Price Variability, p. 14.
525 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Inquiry into the Petroleum Products 
Declaration, Vol. 1, p. 64.
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These explanatory variables represent events when the normally observed retail 
price discounting cycle was muted or impaired to some extent.
In Melbourne, the coefficient on the Blockade explanatory variable suggests 
that the blockade of fuel terminal facilities which occurred in late September 
2000 was associated with an average increase of around 3.7 cpl in the NIM 
during the period from the week beginning 25 September 2000 until the week 
beginning 9 October 2000.
In Adelaide, the coefficient on the Christmas2000 explanatory variable was 
associated with an average increase in the NIM of around 3.6 cpl in the week 
beginning 11 December 2000 until the week beginning 18 December 2000. In 
Melbourne, the coefficient on the Christmas2000 explanatory variable was 
associated with an average increase in the NIM of around 4.1 cpl to 4.7 cpl in 
the week beginning 11 December 2000 until the week beginning 1 January 
2001. In Sydney, the coefficient on the Christmas2000 explanatory variable 
was associated with an average increase in the NIM of around 3.0 cpl to 3.1 cpl 
in the week beginning 11 December 2000 until the week beginning 1 January 
2001.
The Blockade and Christmas2000 explanatory variables probably both 
represent periods of a negative supply shock, whereby wholesale petrol prices 
rose, flowing into higher retail petrol prices, in order to ration the unanticipated 
lower quantity of petrol available. In relation to Blockade, the level of the NIM 
probably remained high for a further two weeks after the blockade was lifted as
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wholesale market participants sought to increase margins in order to recover 
and make up for the period of lost sales and revenue.
7.5 Merger, Regulation/ and Iraq
The Merger explanatory variable in relation to all three cities is statistically 
significant at less than the 1 per cent level under all model specifications. The 
Regulation/ explanatory variable in regard to Melbourne and the Iraq 
explanatory variable in regard to both Melbourne and Sydney are all 
statistically significant at less than the 1 per cent level under all model 
specifications. These explanatory variables also represent events when the 
normally observed retail price discounting cycle was muted or impaired to 
some degree.
In Adelaide, the coefficient on the Merger explanatory variable was associated 
with an average increase in the NIM of around 2.7 cpl in week beginning 
20 March 2000 until the week beginning 27 March 2000. In Melbourne, the 
coefficient on the Merger explanatory variable was associated with an average 
increase in the NIM of around 2.6 cpl in week beginning 20 March 2000 until 
the week beginning 27 March 2000. In Sydney, the coefficient on the Merger 
explanatory variable was associated with an average increase in the NIM of 
around 2.9 cpl to 3.7 cpl in week beginning 13 March 2000 until the week 
beginning 3 April 2000.
In Melbourne, the coefficient on the Regulation/ explanatory variable in the six 
month period from the week beginning 30 June 1997 until the week beginning
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22 December 1997, was associated with the NIM that was around 2.7 cpl to 
3.1 cpl higher on average than compared to the period from the beginning of 
July 1999 following wholesale petrol price deregulation and was around 1.1 cpl 
to 1.4 cpl higher than compared to the following seven month period from the 
week commencing 29 December 1997 until the week commencing 27 July 
1998 during the period of wholesale petrol price regulation.
In Melbourne, the coefficient on the Iraq explanatory variable was associated 
with an average increase in the NIM of around 3.1 cpl to 3.3 cpl during the 
period from the week beginning 24 March 2003 until the week commencing 7 
April 2003. In Sydney, the coefficient on the Iraq explanatory variable was 
associated with an average increase in the NIM of around 2.7 cpl to 3.8 cpl in 
the week beginning 17 March 2003 until the week beginning 14 April 2003.
Unlike the explanatory variables Blockade and Christmas2000, the explanatory 
variables Merger, Regulationi and Iraq do not appear to be associated with any 
reported negative supply shocks. One possible explanation is that the Merger, 
Regulationi and Iraq explanatory variables could represent periods when the 
normally observed competitive process of retail price discounting cycles broke 
down to some extent and gave way to more co-operative strategies and 
behaviour being adopted by market participants towards rival firms at the 
wholesale level. While these three episodes are still far removed from any 
serious attempt to set a wholesale monopoly profit maximising price through a 
tacitly collusive agreement, it does suggest that it is possible for sporadic 
periods of co-operation to break out between rival firms at the wholesale level
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with the normally observed retail price discounting cycles in Adelaide, 
Melbourne and Sydney becoming either muted or failing to occur for a period.
7.6 Coles
For Melbourne, the Coles explanatory variable is statistically significant at less 
than the 1 per cent level under all model specifications. The coefficient on the 
Coles explanatory variable was associated with an average reduction in the 
NIM of around 2.7 cpl in the week beginning 7 July 2003 until the week 
beginning 11 August 2003.
The Coles explanatory variable probably represents a period when the normally 
observed retail price discounting cycle in Melbourne became even more intense 
over a period of several weeks. One possible explanation for this is that the 
period leading up to the introduction of the commercial alliance between Shell 
and Coles may have triggered a more intense round of price discounting 
behaviour by rival wholesalers as they sought to protect and preserve their 
wholesale market shares from encroachment from the discount petrol offering 
of the commercial alliance at the retail level. If this is indeed the case, then it 
demonstrates that wholesale market participants are capable of making strategic 
moves in response and in order to counter the previously announced initiatives 
of a rival firm.
7.7 Regulation and Deregulation of Wholesale Petrol 
Prices
For both Adelaide and Sydney, the explanatory variable Regulation is 
statistically significant at less than the 1 per cent level under all model
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specifications. For Melbourne, the explanatory variable Regulation2 is 
statistically significant at less than the 1 per cent level under all model 
specifications.
The Regulation 1 explanatory variable was previously considered above in 
section 7.5 and given that it records a period when the normally observed 
process of retail price discounting cycles was muted within Melbourne, it is 
arguably the case that the Regulatiori2 explanatory variable is generally more 
representative of the impact upon the NIM associated with the regulation of 
wholesale petrol prices within Melbourne.
For Adelaide, the coefficient on the Regulation explanatory variable suggests 
that the regulation of wholesale petrol prices was associated with a NIM that 
was around 1.2 cpl higher on average than compared to the period from the 
beginning of July 1999 following wholesale petrol price deregulation. For 
Melbourne, the coefficient on the Regulation2 explanatory variable suggests 
that the regulation of wholesale petrol prices was associated with a NIM that 
was around 1.6 cpl to 1.7 cpl higher on average than compared to the period 
from the beginning of July 1999 following wholesale petrol price deregulation. 
For Sydney, the coefficient on the Regulation explanatory variable suggests that 
the regulation of wholesale petrol prices was associated with a NIM that was 
around 2.4 cpl to 2.6 cpl higher on average than compared to the period from 
the beginning of July 1999 following wholesale petrol price deregulation.
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The average level of the NIM initially rose in both Adelaide and Melbourne 
while it remained relatively unchanged in Sydney in the aftermath of the 
removal of wholesale petrol price regulation in August 1998 until the end of 
1998. For all three cities, the Deregulation/ explanatory variable is statistically 
significant at less than the 1 per cent level under all model specifications. For 
Adelaide, the coefficient on the Deregulation/ explanatory variable is 
associated with a NIM that is around 1.4 cpl higher on average than compared 
to the period from the beginning of July 1999 following wholesale petrol price 
deregulation and is around 0.2 cpl higher on average than compared to the 
previous period of wholesale petrol price regulation. For Melbourne, the 
coefficient on the Deregulation/ explanatory variable is associated with a NIM 
that is around 2.2 cpl higher on average than compared to the period from the 
beginning of July 1999 following wholesale petrol price deregulation and is 
around 0.5 cpl to 0.6 cpl higher on average than compared to the previous seven 
month period during wholesale petrol price regulation. For Sydney, the 
coefficient on the Deregulation! explanatory variable is associated with a NIM 
that is around 2.5 to 2.6 cpl higher on average than compared to the period from 
the beginning of July 1999 following wholesale petrol price deregulation and is 
either the same or around 0.1 cpl higher on average than compared to the 
previous period of wholesale petrol price regulation.
While the average level of the NIM rose in the immediate aftermath of 
wholesale petrol price deregulation in Melbourne and Adelaide but remained 
relatively unchanged in Sydney, during the first half of 1999 the average level
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of the NIM fell in Adelaide, Melbourne and Sydney and then fell even further 
again during the second half of 1999. The explanatory variable Deregulation 
associated with the first six months of 1999, is statistically significant at less 
than the 1 per cent level for Melbourne and Sydney under all model 
specifications, while it is statistically significant at less than the 5 per cent level 
for Adelaide under the OLS specification.
For Adelaide, the coefficient on the Deregulation2 explanatory variable is 
associated with a NIM that is around 0.7 cpl higher on average than compared 
to the period from the beginning of July 1999 following wholesale petrol price 
deregulation and around 0.5 cpl lower on average than during the period of 
wholesale petrol price regulation. For Melbourne, the coefficient on the 
Deregulation2 explanatory variable is associated with a NIM that is around 
1.1 cpl to 1.4 cpl higher on average than compared to the period from the 
beginning of July 1999 following wholesale petrol price deregulation, and 
between 0.3 cpl to 0.5 cpl lower on average than compared to the final seven 
month period of wholesale petrol price regulation. For Sydney, the coefficient 
on the Deregulation2 explanatory variable is associated with a NIM that is 
around 1.6 cpl higher on average than compared to the period from the 
beginning of July 1999 following wholesale petrol price deregulation and 
between 0.8 cpl to 1.0 cpl lower on average than during the period of wholesale 
petrol price regulation.
The eventual fall in the average level of the NIM following wholesale petrol 
price deregulation from the second half of 1999 was around 1.2 cpl on average
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in Adelaide, between around 1.6 cpl to 1.7 cpl on average in Melbourne, and 
between around 2.4 cpl to 2.6 cpl on average in Sydney, than compared to the 
period of wholesale petrol price regulation.
The eventual fall in the average level of the NIM following the transition from 
wholesale petrol price regulation to deregulation lends itself to two possible 
explanations. The first explanation is that the reduction in the average level of 
the NIM was directly associated with the deregulation of wholesale petrol 
prices. A second alternative explanation is that there was some other structural 
change that occurred in the wholesale and/or possibly retail petrol markets in 
Adelaide, Melbourne, and Sydney that was responsible for the eventual 
reduction in the average level of the NIM.
There is one possible candidate in regard to Melbourne and Sydney for an 
alternative explanation for the fall in the average level of the NIM following 
deregulation. The ACCC opined in 1996 that petrol imports by independents 
were “likely to provide the domestic industry with greater international price 
discipline'’.5-6 While higher levels of imports by independents may provide an 
alternative explanation for the eventual fall in the average level of the NIM 
following deregulation, it is unlikely to be the main reason. This is because 
there were already independent import terminals at Hastings (near Melbourne) 
and Sydney able to receive imported petrol from overseas prior to January 1997 
so any impact on the average level of the NIM arising from independent
’26 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Inquiry into the Petroleum Products 
Declaration, Vol. 1, p. 57.
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imports was arguably already present during the sample period for regulation. 
Furthermore, even if it was assumed that increased imports by independents 
was the major reason behind the eventual fall in average level of the NIM 
observed in Melbourne and Sydney following deregulation, it does not explain 
why the average level of the NIM also fell in Adelaide which did not possess an 
independent import terminal. In Adelaide, independent operators were 
completely dependent on the oil majors for their petrol supply.
Hence, the shortcoming with the second alternative explanation is the inability 
to identify any structural change that occurred simultaneously in the Adelaide, 
Melbourne, and Sydney wholesale and/or retail petrol markets during the 
course of 1998 and/or 1999. In the absence of any alternative explanation for 
the reduction in the average level of the NIM during the first half of 1999 in 
Adelaide, Melbourne, and Sydney, it is concluded that this change was most 
probably associated with the deregulation of wholesale petrol prices.
The coefficients on the dummy variables accounting for the impact of 
regulation on wholesale petrol prices in Adelaide, Melbourne and Sydney 
suggests that it resulted in relatively higher retail petrol prices than would have 
otherwise been the case in all three cities. One possible explanation for this is 
that the regulation of wholesale petrol prices increased the costs of production 
for petrol wholesalers, namely the oil majors, which was in turn passed on to 
retail customers in the form of relatively higher retail petrol prices. One obvious 
means through which production costs would have increased is through the 
regulatory compliance cost burden imposed. The regulatory compliance costs
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incurred could have included the cost of hiring, training, and maintaining staff 
to meet the compliance burden, the purchase and maintenance of reporting and 
information technology systems, and obtaining advice from external sources 
(such as legal advice) to assist with the compliance requirements.527
There are several possible explanations for the rise in the level of the NIM in 
Melbourne, and to a lesser extent in Adelaide, immediately following the 
deregulation of wholesale petrol prices. In regard to Adelaide, the most obvious 
explanation, as outlined in Chapter 6, is that it was related to a fire that occurred 
at the Port Stanvac refinery on 2 August 1998 which was responsible for 
closing down the refinery for two months and which left petrol stocks in 
Adelaide low in the two months following the fire. Hence, the small rise in the 
average level of the NIM in Adelaide could be related to a negative supply side 
shock.
One possible reason for the rise in the average level of the NIM in both 
Melbourne and Adelaide could be due to a less intense retail price discounting 
cycle in Melbourne and Adelaide during the period from August 1998 until the 
end of December 1998 associated with negotiations between the two 
Melbourne refiners in Shell and Mobil towards establishing a refining joint 
venture. As was considered in section 7.5 above, it may be possible for sporadic 
periods of co-operation to break out between rival firms and replace the 
normally observed retail price discounting cycles. On 28 August 1998, Shell
27 Regulation Taskforce (2006) Rethinking Regulation: Report o f the Taskforce on Reducing 
Regulatory Burdens on Business. Report to the Prime Minister and the Treasurer, Canberra, 
January, p. 9.
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and Mobil announced a proposal to form a joint venture of their refining assets 
to be jointly owned by the two companies. This could have lead to an impetus 
towards more co-operative behaviour between the two refiners in the wholesale 
market, thus leading to less intense wholesale market competition within 
Melbourne and Adelaide that ultimately flowed through into relatively higher 
retail prices and an increase in the average level of the NIM. The Shell and 
Mobil refinery joint venture was eventually abandoned in late January 1999.
Another possible explanation in regard to both Melbourne and Adelaide is that 
the removal of wholesale price controls could have prompted wholesale market 
participants to raise their margins with impunity as the controls that had 
previously operated in order to constrain their pricing behaviour had been 
rescinded. One potential shortcoming with this explanation is the extent to 
which the regulation of wholesale petrol prices acted as a serious constraint 
upon the conduct of wholesale market participants. As was observed in Chapter 
6, capital city retail prices were more often than not below the regulated 
wholesale price level. This suggests that the regulation of wholesale petrol 
prices did not act as a serious constraint upon the pricing behaviour of 
wholesale market participants, and hence the removal of the regulation was 
unlikely to trigger a significant increase in the level of the NIM. In any event, 
the magnitude of the increases in the average level of the NIM recorded in 
Melbourne and Adelaide suggests that wholesale petrol prices would still have 
been well within the permissible limits allowed for by the wholesale petrol 
price regulation even if it had continued.
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One possible explanation for the eventual fall in the average level of the NIM 
following the deregulation of wholesale petrol prices is that it reduced 
production costs which were eventually competed away by wholesale market 
participants during the first half 1999 and passed on to consumers in the form 
of relatively lower retail petrol prices. One means through which the 
deregulation of wholesale petrol prices may have reduced production costs is 
through the removal of regulatory compliance costs as considered above. In 
addition, it is possible that there could have been a reduction in production 
costs associated with dynamic efficiency gains resulting from innovation and 
rising levels of productivity.5“8 The removal of regulation may have generated 
greater innovation and creativity as management attention was no longer 
diverted by the regulatory compliance obligations associated with wholesale 
petrol price regulation.
The pattern of an initial rise in the average level of the NIM in Melbourne and 
Adelaide followed by an eventual reduction in the average level of the NIM in 
Adelaide, Melbourne, and Sydney is suggestive of some sort of gradual 
adjustment process whereby wholesale market participants took time to adjust 
and learn how to behave in their new operating environment. In measuring the 
effects of regulatory changes, Joskow and Rose consider that it is ideal to use a 
fairly lengthy time series in order to avoid basing conclusions on possible
x2x Joskow, J. L. and Rose, N. L. (1989) The Effects of Economic Regulation. In Schmalensee, 
R. and Willig, R. D. (eds.) Handbook o f  Industrial Organization. Vol. II, Elsevier Science 
Publishers B. V., Amsterdam, 1449-1506, p. 1456.
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transitional responses.320 It needs to borne in mind that wholesale petrol prices 
had been regulated nationally by the Commonwealth Government since the 
early 1970s, and prior to this, had been subject to a de facto national regime of 
price regulation through the determinations of the South Australian prices 
commissioner since the 1950s.530
The eventual reduction in the average level of the NIM following the 
deregulation of wholesale petrol prices is suggestive that capital city wholesale 
petrol markets are competitive to some extent, if not immediately in the short 
term, then at the very least in the medium term, in that wholesale prices, as 
reflected through changes in relative retail petrol prices, eventually adjusted to 
changes in the cost structure at the wholesale level. If capital city wholesale 
petrol markets were not at least competitive in the medium term, then you 
would not expect to see the average level of the NIM fall following wholesale 
petrol price deregulation, with wholesale market participants, principally the oil 
majors in this case, simply pocketing any reduction in production costs 
associated with deregulation, as it would be irrational for them to do otherwise 
if they were participating in a tacitly collusive agreement given that petrol 
exhibits very strong price inelastic demand at the retail level.
The eventual reduction in the average level of the NIM in Adelaide, Melbourne, 
and Sydney following wholesale petrol price deregulation suggests that the 
Commonwealth Government’s rationale for the removal of the regulation, in
529 ibid., p. 1458.
530 Royal Commission on Petroleum, op.cit., p. 332.
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that it had an adverse effect, thus leading to relatively higher retail petrol prices, 
may in fact have had substance. The lower average level of the NIM following 
wholesale petrol price deregulation suggests that motoring consumers in 
Adelaide, Melbourne, and Sydney enjoyed relatively lower retail petrol prices 
on average than would have otherwise been the case if wholesale petrol price 
regulation had continued and were unambiguously better off as a result. An 
important policy implication from this result is that it suggests that not only was 
the regulation of wholesale petrol prices an ineffectual policy instrument in 
terms of constraining the pricing behaviour of the oil majors in setting 
wholesale petrol prices, but that the regulation probably imposed increased 
production costs that were ultimately paid for by motoring consumers through 
relatively higher retail petrol prices.
These findings that the deregulation of wholesale petrol prices was associated 
with a relative reduction in retail petrol prices in Adelaide, Melbourne, and 
Sydney are at odds with the previous findings of Delpachitra and Beal who 
concluded that the deregulation of wholesale petrol prices had benefitted oil
531companies more than consumers and had not increased price competition.
One fundamental problem with the study conducted by Delpachitra and Beal is 
that the majority of the sample used to represent the period following wholesale 
petrol price deregulation, 3 January 1997 to 16 April 1999, was actually still 
within the period covered by the regulation of wholesale petrol prices. The 
regulation wasn’t removed until 1 August 1998.
531 Delpachitra, S. and Beal, D., op.cit., p. 64.
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7.8 Victorian Terminal Gate Pricing Legislation
The TG explanatory variable, associated with the period in Melbourne from 
August 2001 onwards when the Victorian Government’s terminal gate pricing 
legislation came into effect, is statistically significant at less than the 1 per cent 
level under all model specifications.
The coefficient on the TG explanatory variable is associated with an increase in 
the NIM of between 1.6 cpl to 1.7 cpl on average. This result is consistent with 
the findings of a study by CAV that found that the NIM in Melbourne had risen 
by almost 1.5 cpl in the 14 month period from November 2001 following the 
introduction of the Victorian Government’s terminal gate pricing legislation as 
compared to the previous 14 month period.' “ Similarly, the ACCC in 
examining the period between 1 July 2000 and 30 September 2002, found that 
in the period following the enactment of the Victorian terminal gate pricing 
legislation in August 2001, average retail petrol prices in Melbourne were 1.0
533cpl higher in relation to the IPI.'
One possible explanation for the TG explanatory variable is that the Victorian 
Government’s terminal gate pricing legislation resulted in increased production 
costs for designated petrol wholesalers under the legislation. One obvious 
source through which production costs could have increased is through 
regulatory compliance costs. The estimated rise in the average level of the NIM 
following the introduction of the terminal gate pricing legislation may be
532 Consumer Affairs Victoria, op.cit.
533 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Terminal gate pricing arrangements in 
Australia, p. 5.
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attributable to increased production costs associated with the legislation being 
passed on to motoring consumers in the form of relatively higher retail petrol 
prices. There is some anecdotal evidence in support of this proposition.
According to the ACCC, some oil companies had commented to them that the 
terminal gate pricing legislation had imposed administrative costs upon them.534 
In 2004, Mobil opined that the terminal gate pricing legislation had imposed “a 
number of conditions upon the petroleum products market that restrict the 
competitive operation of the market”.535 In particular, Mobil complained that 
the terminal gate pricing legislation specifies a formula that must be used by all 
declared suppliers and “inhibits suppliers from developing innovative forms of 
wholesale pricing”.536 In 2006 Caltex opined that the Victorian terminal gate 
pricing legislation had added to administrative costs.537
On the other hand, both the ACCC and CAV identified other factors that could 
have been responsible for the rise in the average level of the N1M following the 
enactment of the Victorian terminal gate pricing legislation. While the ACCC 
had observed that relative retail petrol prices had risen since the Victorian 
terminal gate pricing legislation had come into effect, it was unable to 
“conclude with certainty” that this increase could be attributed to the legislated
534 ibid., p. 4.
535 ExxonMobil Australia Pty Ltd (2004) Submission to the Productivity Commission Inquiry 
into National Competition Policy. Melbourne.
53(j ibid.
537 Caltex Australia Limited (2005) Caltex submission to Queensland Parliament: Impact of 
Petrol Pricing Select Committee. Sydney, p. 17.
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terminal gate pricing arrangements/ 38 The ACCC nominated the exit of Liberty 
from the retail market in Melbourne and the cessation of REAs as other factors 
that may have contributed to the rise in the relative retail price of petrol 
following the introduction of the Victorian terminal gate pricing legislation. 
Given the impact arising from the termination of REAs has been explicitly 
accounted for in the modelling for this study, this matter will be considered in 
the following section.
CAV observed that the rise in the average level of the NIM in Melbourne 
coinciding with the terminal gate pricing legislation was also associated with an 
increase in the average level of NIM in other mainland capital cities, namely 
Brisbane, Perth, Adelaide and Sydney. CAV insinuated that the increase in the 
average level of the NIM in Melbourne was associated with some wider 
structural problem in regard to mainland capital cities across the nation and 
called on the ACCC to investigate the increase in the average level of the NIM 
across the mainland capital cities.
Comparisons of the average level of the NIM between Melbourne as compared 
to Adelaide, Brisbane and Perth are arguably misplaced because of restrictive 
fuel specifications operating in South Australia, Queensland, and Western 
Australia, that probably raised barriers to entry to wholesale petrol markets in 
those states thus leading to higher relative wholesale and retail petrol prices, 
whereas there were no restrictive fuel specifications operating in Victoria at that
538 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Terminal gate pricing arrangements in 
Australia, p. 5.
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time. It has been acknowledged in several quarters that restrictive fuel 
specifications have been responsible for delivering a price premium to local 
refiners in several Australian states. Therefore, any comparison between the 
Melbourne wholesale petrol market as compared to the Adelaide, Brisbane and 
Perth wholesale petrol markets is arguably invalid on the basis that like is not 
being compared with like. Even CAV acknowledged this point to some extent 
in that it attributed part of the increase in the average level of the NIM that 
occurred in Perth to a product premium that was progressively introduced by 
local Perth refiner BP in response to progressive changes to fuel specifications
539operating in Western Australia.
Arguably, the only valid capital city wholesale petrol market with which to 
compare Melbourne to was Sydney. This is because like Melbourne and 
Victoria, there were no restrictive fuel specifications operating in regard to 
Sydney and New South Wales.
It was decided to test whether there was a similar impact on the average level of 
the NIM in Sydney coinciding with the introduction of the Victorian terminal 
gate pricing legislation in order to determine whether there is any evidence in 
support of the proposition that there was some wider structural change affecting 
other mainland capital cities in the same way as had been observed in relation 
to Melbourne. This was performed through re-estimating a regression for the 
NIM in Sydney with the intervention variable, TG, as had previously been used 
in relation to Melbourne. The results of this test are reported in Appendix 9 as
5?9 Consumer Affairs Victoria, op.cit., p. 58.
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equations A9.1 and A9.2. The test results show that there is no statistically 
significant effect on the average level of the NIM in Sydney coinciding with the 
introduction of the Victorian terminal pricing legislation. On this basis, claims 
of there being some wider structural change occurring in mainland capital cities 
responsible for raising the average level of the NIM in Melbourne would appear 
to be without substance.
Another possible explanation for the rise in the average level of the NIM which 
coincided with the enactment of the Victorian Government’s terminal gate 
pricing legislation suggested by the ACCC was the exit of retail market 
participant Liberty through the leasing of its retail service station site network 
to Woolworths. This presumably would be on the basis of a reduction in the 
level of competition and price discounting in the Melbourne retail petrol 
market.
As Liberty was also a participant in the Sydney retail petrol market as well as 
the Melbourne retail market, and assuming that Liberty adopted a similar 
retailing strategy in Sydney as it did in Melbourne, then any impact on the 
average level of the NIM in Sydney associated with the withdrawal of Liberty 
from the Sydney retail petrol market would presumably have also shown up in 
the test performed for identifying structural change in Sydney coinciding with 
the introduction of the Victorian terminal gate pricing legislation reported in 
equations A9.1 and A9.2. As there was no statistically significant effect 
observed, the proposition that the increase observed in the average level of the
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NIM in Melbourne is associated with the exit of Liberty from petrol retailing 
would also appear to be without substance.
It would thus appear that the rise in the average level of the NIM following the 
enactment of the Victorian terminal gate pricing legislation was attributable to 
the enactment of the legislation. This suggests that motoring consumers in 
Melbourne may have paid around 1.6 cpl to 1.7 cpl relatively more on average 
in retail petrol prices for the mandating of transparent wholesale petrol pricing 
arrangements in Victoria, leaving Melbourne motoring consumers 
unambiguously worse off.
It is interesting to note that the estimated average impact of the Victorian 
Government's terminal gate pricing legislation on the NIM in Melbourne is 
very similar in magnitude to the estimated average impact on the NIM arising 
from wholesale petrol price regulation in Melbourne (during normal retail price 
discounting cycles). Given the regulatory intervention imposed through the 
Victorian Government’s terminal gate pricing legislation is similar in nature to 
that previously imposed through the regulation of wholesale petrol prices, it 
should probably come as little surprise that the estimated impact of these two 
regulatory interventions should be similar on the average level of the NIM and 
upon relative retail petrol prices in Melbourne.
This finding is consistent with the view put forward by the Industry 
Commission in 1994 that the effect of terminal gate pricing implemented
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through regulation “would be to re-instate price regulation, but at the terminal 
gate rather than the wholesale level”.540
7.9 Impact from the Termination of REAs in 
Melbourne and Sydney
For Melbourne and Sydney, the exREAs explanatory variable is statistically 
significant at less than the 1 per cent level under all model specifications.
The coefficient on the exREAs explanatory variable for Melbourne, is 
associated with an increase in the NIM of around 1.5 cpl to 1.6 cpl on average 
following the period in which REAs were terminated as compared to the 
previous 11 month period during the operation of the Victorian Government’s 
terminal gate pricing legislation. The coefficient on the exREAs explanatory 
variable for Sydney, is associated with an increase in the NIM of around 2.1 cpl 
on average following the penod in which REAs were terminated as compared 
to previous three year period. Hence, the termination of REAs in Melbourne 
and Sydney coincided with an increase in the average level of the NIM.
The increase in the average level of the NIM in Melbourne associated with the 
termination of REAs was marginally smaller than the increase in the NIM 
associated with the enactment of the Victorian Government’s terminal gate 
pricing legislation and the increase in the NIM associated with wholesale petrol 
price regulation under the OLS specification (during normal retail price 
discounting cycles) while about the same under the ARCH specification. The 
increase in the average level of the NIM in Sydney associated with the
540 Industry Commission, op.cit., p. XXVIII.
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termination of REAs was around 0.3 to 0.5 cpl smaller in magnitude than the 
increase in the NIM associated with wholesale petrol price regulation.
There are two possible explanations for the rise in the average level of the NIM 
recorded in both Melbourne and Sydney. The first explanation is that the rise in 
the average level of the NIM arises as a consequence of the termination of 
REAs in both Melbourne and Sydney. The second explanation is that there was 
some other structural change that occurred in the wholesale and/or possibly 
retail petrol markets in Melbourne and Sydney from mid-2002 coinciding with 
the termination of R.EAs that was responsible for the rise in the average level of 
the NIM. The shortcoming with the second explanation is the inability to 
identify any alternative source of structural change that occurred 
simultaneously in the Melbourne and Sydney wholesale and/or retail petrol 
markets from mid-2002. In the absence of any alternative explanation for the 
rise in the average level of the NIM from mid-2002 in Melbourne and Sydney, 
it is concluded that this change was most likely brought about through the 
termination of REAs.
The fact that the average level of the NIM rose following the termination of 
REAs would appear to refute concerns in relation to both Melbourne and 
Sydney that REAs were associated with attempts by market participants to 
engage in tacit collusion with the objective of raising prices in order to reap 
monopoly profits. The concerns expressed by Walker and Woodward that 
REAs served as a device to achieve a tacitly collusive outcome would appear to 
be ill-conceived based on these results for Melbourne and Sydney.
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The results for Melbourne and Sydney instead provide support for the 
proposition that REAs were unlikely to have been associated with an anti­
competitive detriment in situations where the wholesale petrol markets are 
relatively contestable to imported sources of petrol by independents. Both 
Melbourne and Sydney possessed independent import terminal facilities 
through which independent operators did source imported petrol for 
wholesaling and retailing purposes.
One possible interpretation of these results is that the increase in the average 
level of the NIM could be associated with an increase in transportation costs 
incurred by refiners following the breakdown in REAs, resulting from refiners 
reverting to transporting petrol from their own refineries to service wholesale 
and retail markets rather than sourcing product from local refiners. However, as 
REAs were largely replaced by buy-sell arrangements between refiners, it is 
unlikely that there would have been any significant increase in transportation 
costs incurred following the termination of REAs.
As there was no apparent cost increase incurred in the chain of production 
associated with the termination of REAs to explain the increase in the average 
level of the NIM observed in Sydney and Melbourne, another possible 
explanation is that the abandonment of REAs resulted in an increase in 
transaction costs. This is consistent with those who have taken a transaction 
cost approach to explain reciprocity, whereby reciprocity facilitates the 
construction of optimal production facilities through mitigating against the 
potential for post-contractual opportunistic behaviour. Rose has suggested that
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the transaction cost savings generated through the use of REAs include the cost 
of discovering the relevant market prices, negotiating, and enforcing
541contracts.
The lower average level of the N1M recorded during the period for which REAs 
were in operation suggests that REAs had a pro-competitive effect on 
Melbourne and Sydney wholesale petrol markets that flowed into relatively 
lower retail petrol prices. Hence, it appears that motoring consumers enjoyed 
relatively lower retail petrol prices than would have otherwise been the case and 
were unambiguously better off as a consequence of REAs.542 These results in 
relation to Melbourne and Sydney would also suggest that the ACCC’s 
previously expressed concerns that REAs had exclusionary effects that could 
result in an anti-competitive detriment were erroneous at least in these 
instances.
7.10 Impact from the Termination of REAs in Adelaide
For Adelaide, the exREAs explanatory variable is statistically significant at less 
than the 1 per cent level under the OLS model specification.
The coefficient on the exREAs explanatory variable for Adelaide is associated 
with a decrease in the NIM of almost 1.0 cpl on average following the period in 
which REAs were terminated as compared to the previous six month period.
541 Rose, J., op.cit., pp. 80-81.
542 It is estimated that the benefit o f REAs to motoring consumers o f unleaded petrol in 
Melbourne and Sydney combined was around $100 million in the last 12 months that REAs 
were in operation. This estimate assumes the petrol consumption o f motoring consumers in 
Melbourne is approximately equal to motoring consumers in the rest o f Victoria, and that the 
petrol consumption of motoring consumers in Sydney is approximately equal to motoring 
consumers in the rest o f New South Wales (including the Australian Capital Territory).
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Unlike the case with Melbourne and Sydney, the termination of REAs in 
Adelaide coincided with a decrease in the average level of the NIM.
The decrease in the average level of the NIM in Adelaide associated with the 
termination of REAs was around 0.2 cpl smaller in magnitude than the increase 
associated with wholesale petrol price regulation.
There are two possible explanations for the fall in the average level of the NIM 
recorded in Adelaide. The first explanation is that the fall in the average level of 
the NIM arises as a direct consequence of the termination of REAs. The second 
explanation is that there was some other structural change that occurred in the 
wholesale and/or possibly retail petrol markets in Adelaide from the beginning 
of 2000 coinciding with the termination of REAs that was responsible for the 
fall in the average level of the NIM. The shortcoming with the second 
explanation is the inability to identify any alternative structural change that 
occurred in regard to Adelaide from the beginning of 2000. In the absence of 
any alternative explanation for the fall in the average level of the NIM from the 
beginning of 2000, it is concluded that this change was most likely associated 
with the termination of REAs.
The fall in the average level of the NIM in Adelaide following the abandonment 
of REAs is arguably a perverse result in that it runs counter to the increased 
supply costs that would most probably have been incurred by all four oil majors 
operating within the Adelaide wholesale petrol market.
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Mobil would have incurred increased supply costs from its refinery production 
process at Port Stanvac flowing from the loss of economies of scale following 
the decision of both Shell and BP to source product from outside of Adelaide, 
resulting in Mobil cutting back production at the Port Stanvac refinery to a 
reported 60 per cent of capacity. Presumably Caltex, who continued to source 
petrol from Mobil in Adelaide, was most likely charged some sort of premium 
above the previous price it incurred under the refinery exchange agreement 
system which was essentially its own cost of production. With the decision by 
BP and Shell to reject Mobil’s revised refinery exchange agreement offer in 
regard to the Port Stanvac refinery, BP and Shell would have incurred increased 
supply costs through shipping product from refineries at Kwinana in Western 
Australia and from Geelong in Victoria instead of receiving product at their 
own cost of supply under the refinery exchange agreement system. In addition, 
all four oil majors would have also lost some or all of the applicable transaction 
cost savings generated through the use of REAs, such as those identified by 
Rose.543
Mitigating against the increased petrol supply costs incurred by Mobil arising 
from the termination of REAs for the Port Stanvac refinery was possible 
financial assistance from the South Australian Government. Financial 
assistance from the South Australian Government may have been provided but 
never made public. It was reported that the South Australian Government was 
working on an assistance package for the Port Stanvac refinery during late 1999
543 J. Rose, o p .c i tpp. 80-81.
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and early 2000.544 The Industry Commission reported in 1996 that the South 
Australian Government regarded details of selective assistance it provided to 
firms as commercial-in-confidence and that significant sanctions applied to any 
politician or official who publicly revealed commercial-in-confidence 
information about assistance packages provided to specific firms by the South 
Australian Government.^45 It is possible that Mobil could have been a recipient 
and beneficiary of such discrete industry assistance payments from the South 
Australian Government.
Conversely, there is unlikely to have been any mitigating factors offsetting the 
likely higher petrol supply costs incurred by Caltex, BP and Shell following the 
termination of the previous refinery exchange agreement system.
The perverse result that the average level of the NIM actually fell in Adelaide 
following the termination of REAs, even though petrol supply costs for all four 
oil majors would most probably have risen, is suggestive of some sort of 
strategic response on the part of one or more oil major following the 
termination of the previous refinery exchange agreement system in regard to 
Adelaide, as may have been the case with the Coles explanatory variable in 
regard to Melbourne. If the fall in the average level of the NIM was due to 
some sort of strategic response on the part of one or more oil major in the
544 The Advertiser {1999) Stanvac rates ‘a done deal’. 23 December: 32; The Advertiser (2000) 
Stanvac refinery rates slashed. 4 March: 8.
545 Industry Commission (1996) State, Territory and Local Government Assistance to Industry. 
AGPS, Melbourne, Report No.55, p. 334.
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Adelaide wholesale petrol market, then it is important to try to identify the most 
likely explanation for the nature of any such strategic response.
One possible explanation for the likely nature of the strategic response is the 
rationale behind the alternative hypothesis, H2, in that the decrease in the 
average level of the NIM in Adelaide following the termination of the refinery 
exchange agreement system could provide evidence that REAs were associated 
with an anti-competitive detriment that resulted in relatively higher wholesale 
and retail petrol prices. This would have been the case in the event that the 
previous refinery exchange agreement system, as it operated in regard to the 
Adelaide wholesale petrol market, provided the means through which the oil 
majors were able to arrive at a tacitly collusive agreement. Given the ability for 
a home refiner to capacity constrain other parties under a refinery exchange 
agreement, any such tacitly collusive agreement would most likely have been 
struck on the basis of a market sharing arrangement. In this case, the reduction 
in the average level of the NIM could thus be interpreted as a breakdown in any 
such tacitly collusive agreement struck between the oil majors and a reversion 
to a competitive pricing stratagem at the wholesale level. This scenario is 
consistent with the view expressed by Walker and Woodward that REAs 
“facilitate output co-ordination between the [oil] majors”.546
Unlike Melbourne and Sydney, the Adelaide wholesale petrol market exhibited 
an important structural characteristic which was identified in Chapter 5 as being 
a necessary pre-condition for REAs to have an anti-competitive effect in that it
:>4<’ Walker, J. and Woodward, L., o p .c i tp. 34.
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was closed off and impervious to petrol imports by independents. The Adelaide 
wholesale petrol market was not contestable to independent imports of petrol 
due to the absence of an independent import terminal in Adelaide and was only 
accessible to petrol imports by the oil majors who each possessed import 
terminal facilities.
If the operation of REAs had facilitated the means to achieve a tacitly collusive 
outcome, then the modelling of the NIM for Adelaide suggests that the level of 
market power exercised through the operation of REAs was of the order of 
around 1.0 cpl on average. However, the proposition that the fall in the average 
level of the NIM for Adelaide provides evidence that REAs resulted in some 
sort of anti-competitive detriment within the Adelaide wholesale petrol market 
appears to be implausible. As previously outlined, the retail demand for petrol 
is price inelastic at any recent price level, suggesting that retail petrol prices, 
and by implication wholesale petrol prices, are far removed from a profit- 
maximising monopoly price that would be the ultimate goal and objective of 
any tacitly collusive oligopoly. On this basis, the fall in the average level of the 
NIM for Adelaide being associated with some kind of anti-competitive 
detriment through the operation of REAs is therefore rejected. This opens up 
the search for another possible explanation for the likely nature of the strategic 
response.
Another possible explanation for the likely nature of the strategic response is 
that Mobil sought to punish the other oil majors, in particular BP and Shell, for 
rejecting their revised refinery exchange agreement offer in regard to the Port
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Stanvac refinery and terminating the agreements. This explanation also appears 
to be implausible for a number of reasons. As the operator of the only refinery 
near Adelaide, Mobil arguably had to incur the greatest financial burden and 
penalty of any of the four oil majors arising from the breakdown of REAs in 
regard to the Port Stanvac refinery through the loss of economies of scale in the 
oil refining process. Indeed, Mobil had sought to renegotiate the REAs in 
regard to the Port Stanvac refinery in order to generate additional revenue from 
the other participating oil majors. It is extremely unlikely that Mobil would 
have sought to exacerbate the increased costs of production incurred through 
the loss of economies of scale in oil refining through the termination of REAs 
with BP and Shell still further with a deliberate strategy of reducing its 
wholesale petrol prices, and by implication the average level of the NIM.
Rather than pursuing a policy to lower its wholesale petrol prices and thereby 
reduce the average level of the NIM in Adelaide, Mobil was most probably the 
main policy advocate behind the decision by the South Australian Government 
to introduce new restrictive fuel specifications for the state which most likely 
had the effect of increasing the average level of the NIM for Adelaide as well as 
forcing Shell to seek petrol supplies from Mobil in Adelaide once more.
A further explanation is that one or some combination of the other oil majors in 
Caltex, BP and/or Shell embarked on a deliberate strategy of reducing 
wholesale petrol prices that in turn brought down the average level of the NIM 
in Adelaide. There could have been several motivating factors behind such a 
move.
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One or more of the oil majors other than Mobil may have sought to lower 
wholesale petrol prices in order to increase market share in the Adelaide 
wholesale petrol market at the expense of rivals. One or more of the oil majors 
other than Mobil may have attempted to punish Mobil for attempting 
unsuccessfully to renegotiate the REAs in regard to the Port Stanvac refinery 
and sought to apply pressure on Mobil’s profitability through reducing 
wholesale petrol prices in order to persuade Mobil to return to the previous 
refinery exchange agreement arrangements.
In addition, one or more of the oil majors other than Mobil may have reduced 
wholesale petrol prices in Adelaide in order to increase pressure on the 
profitability and future viability of the Port Stanvac refinery in an attempt to 
force its closure. Conduct of this nature could arguably border on predation. 
There had been a question mark surrounding the commercial viability of the 
Port Stanvac refinery since the mid-1980s and it was widely considered to be 
the most likely candidate for closure amongst Australia’s major oil refineries.547 
The Port Stanvac refinery was arguably the most primitive of Australia’s major 
oil refineries in that it was the only one not to possess a catalytic cracking 
capacity and had been subject to persistent speculation regarding its imminent 
closure since 1999 and was eventually mothballed in 2003. The removal of the 
only local refiner near Adelaide in Mobil may have given the other three oil 
majors the opportunity to increase their wholesale markets share in Adelaide, as 
well as South Australia, at the expense of Mobil. The closure of the Port
547 See: Australian Financial Review (1985) BP Begins Closure o f Plant at Westemport. 31 
January: 9.
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Stanvac refinery would also probably result in increased production 
opportunities for other Australian oil refineries. In order to make up for any 
product shortfall in Adelaide and across South Australia, the oil majors other 
than Mobil could expand production at their Australian refineries, thereby 
lowering production costs through increased economies of scale associated with 
a higher throughput, thus improving the financial viability of other Australian 
refineries.
The lower average level of the NIM recorded during the period after which 
REAs were terminated is arguably a perverse result given that it probably 
occurred while increased petrol supply costs were most probably incurred by all 
four oil majors participating in the Adelaide wholesale petrol market. While 
this could superficially be taken as evidence that REAs were associated writh 
some kind of anti-competitive detriment in the Adelaide wholesale petrol 
market ultimately resulting in relatively higher retail petrol prices to motoring 
consumers, such a conclusion appears implausible. This is because there was 
presumably scope to generate far greater profits than an average price premium 
of around 1.0 cpl if REAs had indeed served as a mechanism to achieve a 
tacitly collusive agreement given the price inelastic nature of petrol at the retail 
level. This perverse result is suggestive of some kind of strategic response on 
the part of one or more of the oil majors following the termination of the 
previous refinery exchange agreement system in relation to Adelaide.
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7.11 Conclusion
While wholesale petrol markets in Adelaide, Melbourne, and Sydney are 
oligopolistic in nature and may be prone to sporadic outbursts of co-operation 
between rival firms, they are also arguably competitive in that profits from 
reductions in production costs appear to be gradually competed away and 
eventually passed through to motoring consumers in the form of relatively 
lower retail prices. Against this backdrop, it is extremely improbable that REAs 
would be associated with any anti-competitive detriment.
Indeed, results for Melbourne and Sydney suggest that REAs actually lowered 
the costs of petrol supply, the benefits of which were eventually passed through 
to motoring consumers in the form of relatively lower retail prices as evidenced 
by the rise in the average level of the NIM following the termination of REAs. 
Under these circumstances, it would appear that REAs were unambiguously 
pro-competitive and ultimately of benefit to motoring consumers.
On the other hand, results for Adelaide suggest that REAs were actually 
associated with relatively higher wholesale and retail petrol prices given the fall 
in the average level of the NIM following the termination of REAs. This result 
for Adelaide would appear to be perverse given that petrol supply costs for all 
four oil majors operating in Adelaide most probably increased. While this could 
be interpreted as evidence of some kind of anti-competitive detriment 
associated with the operation of REAs in the Adelaide wholesale petrol market, 
it is far more likely to represent some kind of strategic response on the part of 
one or more of the oil majors following the termination of REAs. This is
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because there would appear to have been far greater scope to increase the 
average level of the NIM through the operation of REAs than the 1.0 cpl 
suggested through the modelling of the Adelaide NIM if REAs had indeed 
served as a means through which to achieve a tacitly collusive outcome given 
the highly price inelastic nature of petrol at the retail level.
While the operation of REAs appears to have had a pro-competitive effect on 
wholesale petrol markets in Melbourne and Sydney by delivering relatively 
lower retail petrol prices to motoring consumers and unlikely to have been 
associated with any anti-competitive detriment in the Adelaide wholesale petrol 
market, it appears that regulatory interventions by governments in wholesale 
petrol markets do in fact tend to be associated with relatively higher retail petrol 
prices for motoring consumers given the estimated impact on the average level 
of the NIM following wholesale petrol price deregulation and the enactment of 
the Victorian terminal gate pricing legislation.
The implications for the conduct of public policy arising from these findings 
will be considered in Chapter 8.
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Chapter 8: Conclusion
8.1 Introduction
This Chapter will draw out the main implications for the conduct of public 
policy arising from the findings contained in Chapter 7. It will make policy 
recommendations on the suitability of further regulatory interventions in capital 
city wholesale petrol markets based on findings in relation to competition and 
the exercise of market power in those markets. It will also consider the policy 
implications for competition law and policy arising from the competitive effects 
of reciprocity as practiced through REAs. Further, it will consider the policy 
implications of the conduct of the ACCC in its consideration of REAs. Finally, 
it will summarise the main policy findings as well as make a policy 
recommendation in the event the downstream petroleum industry seeks to re­
institute REAs in the future.
8.2 Competition, Market Power and Regulatory 
Intervention
The finding from Chapter 7 that capital city wholesale petrol markets are 
competitive to some extent, if not immediately in the short-term, then at the 
very least in the medium term, throws up several implications for these 
markets. In particular, it suggests that firms operating in these markets are 
unable to exercise market power on a sustainable or prolonged basis.
Given that retail demand for petrol is highly price inelastic, thus making it 
beneficial and profitable for wholesale market participants to engage in tacit 
price collusion, fluctuations in retail petrol prices coupled with fluctuations in
297
the NIM suggest the exercise of market power by the oil majors in capital city 
wholesale petrol markets is generally fleeting and transitory in nature and 
immediately undermined by any price discounting behaviour. The exercise of 
market power within capital city wholesale petrol markets appears to have only 
persisted during those instances where the normal retail petrol price cycles have 
become muted or impaired to some extent through a diminution of price 
discounting behaviour, which has been found to be very much an exceptional 
event. There were probably four cases of this that were explicitly accounted for 
in the modelling for this study: the first occurring in the Melbourne retail petrol 
market during the second half of 1997; the second occurring in Melbourne (and 
less likely in Adelaide) from August 1998 until the end of 1998 in the 
immediate aftermath of wholesale petrol price deregulation; a third occurring 
across all three cities in March 2000 while Caltex and Shell were engaged in 
discussions concerning a joint venture of their refinery operations; and a fourth 
occurring in both Melbourne and Sydney during the period of the 2003 Iraq 
war.
As observed in Chapter 7, this conduct is still far removed from any serious 
attempt to set a monopoly profit maximising price through a tacitly collusive 
agreement. Vigorous competition on the basis of price discounting within 
wholesale petrol markets that manifests itself through regular price cycles at the 
retail level would appear to be the normal course of events. The only exceptions 
to this appear to be some rare intermittent periods when market participants
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probably decide to temporarily abandon price competition at the wholesale 
level in favour of co-operation for a period of time.
The finding that any market power exercised by the oil majors is transitory 
within capital city wholesale petrol markets is in marked contrast to the views 
of the ACCC which opined in 1996 that the oil majors possessed significant 
market power.548 According to the ACCC, this power was derived from high 
concentration levels, high barriers to entry, and the depth and breadth of vertical 
and horizontal relationships between the market participants.549 It could 
arguably be the case that the ACCC misinterpreted the ability of the oil majors 
(in concert with other wholesale market participants) to co-operate briefly by 
co-ordinating their activity through the curtailment of the retail price 
discounting cycle by raising wholesale prices, which ultimately manifests itself 
through the ratcheting up of retail petrol prices within a short space of time, 
with the ongoing exercise of market power on a sustained basis. At the time the 
ACCC made these remarks, it was still engaged in litigation against three of the 
four oil majors (Mobil, Shell and BP) for alleged price fixing in Melbourne and 
Sydney.
On the other hand, the conclusion reached here that the oil majors appear only 
to have been able to exercise market power on a transitory basis is much more 
in keeping with the views of the Industry Commission and Rose. The Industry 
Commission concluded in 1994, with some limited qualifications in relation to
548 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, ACCC recommends end to petrol 
declaration.
549 ibid.
299
small country towns, “the petroleum product markets have a structure 
conducive to vigorous competition and not consistent with the persistence of 
monopoly power” .550 Rose contended the ACCC was in error when it 
concluded the oil majors exercised co-ordinated market power, which he 
attributed to its misunderstanding of the competitive implications of REAs.551
The inability of the oil majors to exercise market power on a prolonged basis 
leads to several policy implications. First and foremost, it is that competition 
within capital city wholesale petrol markets is arguably the best discipline and 
market regulator of wholesale petrol prices. While petrol is highly price 
inelastic at an aggregate level within retail markets, individual brands of petrol 
are probably also highly price elastic due to the opportunities for competitive 
substitution between competing brands. The consequence of this is that 
wholesalers, and the retailers they supply, cannot afford to relax on a particular 
price level and are unable to completely ignore the price discounting behaviour 
of competitors if they want to at least retain business or even attract additional 
business.
In the second instance, the inability to exercise market power on a prolonged or 
sustainable basis in capital city wholesale petrol markets suggests the case for 
regulatory intervention on competition grounds, in so far as it has related to 
keeping retail petrol prices relatively low, has generally been weak. Regulatory 
interventions based on competition grounds through the setting of maximum
550 Industry Commission, Petroleum Products, p. 61.
551 Rose, J., The ACCC and the Market Power o f the Oil Majors -  Part 1, pp. 17-18.
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allowable wholesale petrol prices, as well as mandated transparency of terminal 
gate petrol prices, have arguably been a policy failure because they have been 
associated with relatively higher retail petrol prices. Rather than promote 
competition through protecting the community from some sort of anti­
competitive detriment, it appears these regulatory interventions may in fact 
have had the diametrically opposite effect in that they were associated with 
relatively higher retail petrol prices than would have otherwise been the case. 
These regulatory interventions have probably resulted in a pass-through of 
regulatory compliance costs from wholesalers on to retailers who in turn have 
passed it on to motoring consumers without delivering any measurable or 
identifiable benefit.
It would thus appear that previous regulatory interventions in capital city 
wholesale petrol markets, based on competition grounds, have been ill- 
conceived, without necessarily addressing any clearly identified competition 
problem. This suggests future regulatory interventions on competition grounds 
in capital city wholesale petrol markets should be avoided in the absence of 
some sort of clearly identified and defined anti-competitive detriment. Even if 
an anti-competitive problem can be identified, any regulatory intervention 
directed towards addressing it should be subject to a cost-benefit analysis as to 
its likely impact so as to ensure the costs imposed through regulatory 
intervention are not greater than the competition problem it is supposed to be 
addressing. In the absence of any cost-benefit analysis, there is the prospect and 
danger that any future regulatory intervention runs the risk of imposing a far
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greater regulatory compliance cost burden, that would probably be passed 
through to retailers and ultimately on to motoring consumers in the form of 
relatively higher retail petrol prices, as to outweigh the amount of anti­
competitive detriment of the originally perceived problem.
The finding that capital city wholesale petrol markets are competitive to some 
extent, if not immediately in the short-term, then at the very least in the medium 
term, probably runs very much contrary to public opinion, which is arguably 
riddled with strongly held preconceived notions that wholesale and retail petrol 
markets are highly anti-competitive. The high level of public scepticism 
regarding the competitiveness of capital city wholesale and retail petrol markets 
creates a policy environment conducive for ill-conceived regulatory 
interventions based on populist grounds. This at the very least suggests that 
regulatory interventions based on competition grounds within wholesale and 
retail petrol markets should be treated with extreme caution and carefully 
considered, in order to avoid creating a situation where the cure is far worse 
than the disease. Arguably, governments at both the Commonwealth and state 
levels should resist future regulatory interventions in capital city wholesale 
petrol markets on competition grounds if they are genuinely concerned about 
keeping the level of retail petrol prices relatively low for motoring consumers, 
unless there is a clearly identifiable competition problem leading to a 
deterioration in the level of competition that can in fact be rectified.
However, it appears that policy positions providing for further regulatory 
intervention within capital city wholesale petrol markets, that have previously
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been associated with relatively higher capital city retail petrol prices, are being 
recycled by both the Commonwealth Government and the Federal Opposition.
Similar to the Victorian terminal gate pricing legislation which was associated 
with relatively higher retail petrol prices in Melbourne, the Commonwealth 
Government has implemented a national terminal gate pricing regime 
mandating price transparency at the terminal gate throughout Australia as part 
of the new Oilcode code of conduct for the downstream petroleum industry that 
came into effect on 1 March 2007. There is the possibility that a national 
terminal gate pricing regime could impose regulatory compliance costs on 
suppliers that could end up being passed on to motoring consumers in the form 
of relatively higher retail petrol prices, as was probably the case with the 
Victorian terminal gate pricing legislation. Although this could be mitigated to 
an extent if the Commonwealth Treasury is correct in its contention that the 
Commonwealth Government terminal gate pricing arrangements are not as 
prescriptive as the provisions operating in Victoria.552
Similar to the previous system of prices surveillance that regulated wholesale 
petrol prices and was associated with relatively higher retail petrol prices across 
all three capital cities considered, the Federal Opposition is proposing to 
reinstitute some form of prices surveillance under the TPA in the event it is 
elected to government after the next federal election. As was probably the 
situation with the previous system of prices surveillance that regulated 
wholesale petrol prices, there is a danger that any new price monitoring system
552 Commonwealth Treasury, op.cit., p. 18.
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tor wholesale petrol prices could impose regulatory compliance costs on 
wholesalers that could ultimately be passed on to motoring consumers in the 
form of relatively higher retail petrol prices.
In conclusion, the available evidence suggests the invisible hand of the market 
place proposed by Adam Smith553 has arguably been a far more effective means 
of organising economic activity within capital city wholesale petrol markets 
than the visible hand of government through regulatory intervention which has 
been associated with relatively higher retail petrol prices. The general inability 
ot wholesale market participants to exercise market power on a sustainable or 
prolonged basis has probably meant government attempts to intervene in capital 
city wholesale petrol markets has resulted in a pass-through of regulatory 
compliance costs on to motoring consumers without providing any identifiable 
nor offsetting benefit whatsoever, particularly in the presence of inelastic 
demand. Therefore, in the absence of any clearly defined and identifiable anti­
competitive detriment, governments at the Commonwealth and the state level 
should probably resist the urge to do something by engaging in further 
regulatory interventions in capital city wholesale petrol markets of the kind 
previously adopted or used.
8.3 Reciprocity and Implications for Competition Law
As previously outlined, REAs are an example of a voluntary reciprocal trading 
arrangement. In Chapter 4, it was seen that views were mixed as to the
55:1 See: Smith, A. (1999) An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes o f the Wealth o f Nations. 
Penguin Books, London, Vol. 4, ch. 2, p. 32.
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competitive effects of reciprocity with three main positions being postulated: 
reciprocity is always anti-competitive; reciprocity is anti-competitive under 
certain circumstances; and the practice of reciprocity is either benign or even 
pro-competitive in its effect. In regard to voluntary reciprocity, Allison 
contended that this could result in an anti-competitive detriment when both 
firms were relative equals in the possession of market power.334
In Chapter 7, it was concluded that REAs were unlikely to have been associated 
with any anti-competitive detriment in any of the three capital city wholesale 
petrol markets under consideration. On this basis, it would appear that those 
who have contended that reciprocity always results in an anti-competitive 
detriment are probably in error. Furthermore, in relation to Melbourne and 
Sydney, the reciprocity as practiced through REAs likely served a pro- 
competitive puipose by lowering the cost of petrol supply which was probably 
eventually passed on to motoring consumers in the form of relatively lower 
retail petrol prices. The results for Melbourne and Sydney appear to provide 
support for the reservations expressed by the Chicago school that reciprocity 
could result in an anti-competitive detriment. Instead, reciprocity appears to 
have served a pro-competitive purpose in these instances and delivered a 
benefit to consumers resulting in relatively lower retail prices than would have 
otherwise been the case.
Stocking and Mueller as well as Areeda, Hovenkamp and Elhauge have 
previously raised concerns that reciprocity when practiced amongst rival firms
554 Allison, J. R., op.cit.
305
could facilitate collusive conduct.5vS Given the reciprocity as exhibited in REAs 
has been found to be either probably benign at least in its effect on competition 
in regard to the Adelaide wholesale petrol market and even pro-competitive in 
regard to its effects on the Melbourne and Sydney wholesale petrol markets, 
this may allay concerns reciprocity, even when practiced between market rivals, 
may necessarily lead to co-operation and collusive outcomes that could in turn 
stifle the competitive process.
In Chapter 4, it was contended that reciprocity would only be likely to raise 
concerns regarding anti-competitive conduct and detriment in the presence and 
exercise of market power, while it was argued that reciprocity would be 
unlikely to be associated with any anti-competitive detriment in the absence of 
market power. One possible explanation as to why this voluntary form of 
reciprocity as practiced through REAs does not appear to be associated with 
any anti-competitive detriment may be related to the inability of market 
participants to exercise market power in capital city wholesale petrol markets 
on a sustainable or prolonged basis.
If the reciprocity of REAs did not provide the means by which to facilitate a 
tacitly collusive agreement, then presumably it must have provided some other 
tangible benefit to participants, otherwise the oil majors probably would not 
have chosen to engage in such arrangements. One potential source of tangible 
benefits delivered by participation in the reciprocal trading arrangements
55:> Stocking, G. W. and Mueller, W. F., op.cit; Areeda, P. E., Hovenkamp, H. and Elhauge, E., 
op.cit.
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engendered through REAs is from possible transaction cost savings, as 
proposed by Williamson. The transaction cost rationale to explain reciprocal 
trading arrangements, in that reciprocity allows for the construction of optimal 
production facilities while mitigating against the prospect of post-contractual 
opportunistic behaviour, would appear to hold merit in relation to the operation 
of REAs at least in regard to Melbourne and Sydney, as suggested by the rise in 
relative retail petrol prices and the NIM following termination of the 
agreements. It is also possible REAs delivered transaction cost savings to 
participants in regard to Adelaide, but the quantification of any evidence in 
support of this was hindered through the possible strategic response by one or 
more of the oil majors following the termination of REAs in relation to the Port 
Stanvac refinery as discussed in Chapter 7.
One of the objections raised to reciprocity on competition grounds was that it 
foreclosed markets on competitors who were not suitably diverse in their range 
of activities. This objection to reciprocity is similar to one of the ACCC’s main 
objections to REAs, which had interpreted the conduct of the oil majors in 
refusing to enter into similar supply swap arrangements with independents as 
they had with other refiners, as possible evidence for the anti-competitive 
exclusionary intent of REAs, with the supply of product to independents being 
either constrained or cut off altogether as a consequence. It would appear that 
the oil majors may have possessed a legitimate reason to exclude independents 
from their reciprocal trading arrangements through REAs provided by the 
transaction cost rationale for reciprocity. While reciprocal trading arrangements
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between refiners through REAs may have generated transaction cost savings to 
the oil majors, on the other hand, product swap agreements between oil majors 
and independents could not generate similar transaction cost savings.
The fact independents could not provide a like-for-like service in a fuel swap 
arrangement with the oil majors as compared to the REAs amongst the oil 
majors was explicitly recognised by the ACCC when the then Chairman of the 
ACCC, Professor Allan Fels, wrote in 1998 that:
The oil majors have not generally entered refinery exchange agreements 
with independent operators because the independent operators cannot 
reciprocate in the kind of services that the majors offer.556
Presumably the full significance and implications following on from the 
inability of independents to fully reciprocate on the full service offered by the 
oil majors through participation in REAs and the associated transaction cost 
savings achieved was not fully comprehended nor appreciated by the ACCC. 
The oil majors may not have assisted their cause in the policy debate 
suiTounding the competitive merits of REAs by their failure to refer to the 
potential transaction cost savings generated through reciprocity in these 
instances, although the oil majors were not alone in either ignoring or being 
oblivious to the transaction cost saving rationale for reciprocity, as both the 
ACCC and the Industry Commission also failed to consider it at least publicly.
A major policy implication is that reciprocal trading arrangements, even when 
practiced between market rivals, can deliver pro-competitive benefits and 
556 Fels, A., Competition Not Regulation is in Consumers’ Best Interests, p. 19.
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should definitely be allowed to proceed under these circumstances. Reciprocal 
trading arrangements within Australia, even between market rivals, has been 
made possible due to the flexibility that exists within the structure of 
Australia’s competition law as set out under the TPA. While certain horizontal 
agreements between market rivals to fix, maintain and control prices, as well as 
those containing exclusionary provisions, are subject to a per se prohibition 
under the TPA, section 45 of the TPA only prohibits other horizontal 
agreements between market rivals if they fail a competition test which is that 
they have the purpose or would have or be likely to have the effect of 
substantially lessening competition.
If reciprocal trading arrangements between market rivals had been made subject 
to a per se prohibition under the TPA, then the benefits that were probably 
delivered to the oil majors and eventually passed on to motoring consumers in 
the form of relatively lower retail petrol prices from REAs would never have 
been generated. This finding would appear to vindicate the position taken by 
the 1993 Hilmer report into National Competition Policy which considered the 
policy question as to whether all horizontal agreements between markets rivals 
should be subject to a per se prohibition.'^7 The Hilmer report rejected this 
proposal on the grounds that a per se prohibition on all agreements between 
competitors would catch much economically efficient conduct.558 It would 
appear the concerns expressed by the Hilmer report have turned out to be 
correct as they relate to REAs. Furthermore, it thus appears the design of the
5~7 Hilmer, F. G., Rayner, M. R. and Tapereil, G. Q., op.cit., p. 48.
558 ibid., p. 48.
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TPA in relation to agreements between competitors has served the community 
well in relation to the reciprocity as practiced through REAs.
Reciprocity should preferably be allowed to continue unfettered in 
circumstances where market power cannot be exercised on any sustainable or 
prolonged basis as it is likey to be benign at worst, and therefore unlikely to be 
associated with any anti-competitive detriment under these circumstances.
8.4 Implications for Competition Law Enforcement
The ACCC, and its predecessor body the TPC, had queried the legality of REAs 
as well as other horizontal arrangements (such as joint terminalling and borrow 
and loan) under the TPA on several occasions from the mid 1990s to 2000. The 
TPC had listed REAs as the first feature giving rise to concerns about the 
competitive nature of the downstream petroleum industry in 1995 in relation to 
the proposed merger between Ampol and Caltex.559 The TPC went on to list the 
other horizontal arrangements such as joint terminalling as the second feature 
giving rise to competition concerns.560
Two then employees of the ACCC in Walker and Woodward asserted in March 
1996 that REAs, along with joint terminalling and borrow and loan 
arrangements, were essentially a means through which the oil majors could 
reach a tacitly collusive agreement and provided a mechanism through which to
559 Trade Practices Commission, op.cit.
560 ibid.
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enforce discipline amongst the oil majors from any attempts to deviate from a 
tacitly collusive agreement.561
Similarly, the ACCC suggested in 1996 that RE As could result in exclusionary 
effects resulting in an anti-competitive detriment. The ACCC inferred that the 
oil majors should seek authorisation for participation in REAs as well as for 
participation in other horizontal agreements. According to the ACCC:
there is a need to be satisfied that [horizontal agreements] do not 
contravene the TPA and, on balance, do have net public benefits.562
The ACCC was arguably inferring there was a prima facie case against REAs 
as well as the other horizontal agreements for a possible breach of the TPA. In 
1996, the ACCC made its consent for the deregulation of wholesale petrol 
prices conditional on its concerns regarding the competitive effects of REAs, in 
addition to other horizontal arrangements, being addressed.
In 1998, the then Chairman of the ACCC, Professor Allan Fels, hinted motoring 
consumers would probably benefit from more competition with the flow-on 
effect of relatively lower petrol prices in the event of the elimination of REAs 
altogether:
Competition would be likely to increase, with the overall benefit to 
consumers that this would be likely to bring, with the removal of these
561 Walker, J. and Woodward, L., op.cit., p. 34.
562 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Inquiry into the Petroleum Products 
Declaration, Vol. 1, p. 31.
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refinery exchange agreements, although further analysis of this issue 
could be required.563
Again in 2000, the then Chairman of the ACCC, Professor Fels, reiterated 
previous concerns regarding the operation of REAs, as well as other horizontal 
agreements, in testimony before a Senate Committee:
Although there are some efficiency benefits involved in these 
arrangements, we are still concerned that they may facilitate co­
ordinated behaviour between the refiners and marketers.'364
Based on the inference of quantitative modelling assessing the competitive 
impact arising from the termination of REAs undertaken for this study, it 
appears that the ACCC’s concerns regarding the possible exclusionary effects 
of REAs, resulting in an anti-competitive detriment, were probably misplaced 
and in error. Rather than providing the means by which to engage in co­
ordinated conduct, thus leading to a tacitly collusive outcome, it is far more 
likely that REAs delivered transaction cost savings to oil major participants that 
were eventually passed on to motoring consumers in the form of relatively 
lower retail petrol prices at least in Melbourne and Sydney. Similar benefits 
arising from the operation of REAs in Adelaide may have also been observed if 
there were not possibly other strategic considerations and gamesmanship on the 
part of one or more oil major being exhibited.
563. Fels, A., Competition Not Regulation is in Consumers’ Best Interests, p. 19.
564 Senate Economics Committee (2000) Hansard. Inquiry into the Provisions o f the Fair Prices 
and Better Access for All (Petroleum) Bill 1999 and the Practice o f Multi-Site Franchising by 
Oil Companies, 12 April, Canberra, p. E 214.
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Based on the public statements by the ACCC, arguably the ACCC’s preferred 
outcome may have been for the deregulation of wholesale petrol prices to occur 
in concert with the elimination of REAs. If the ACCC had managed to achieve 
this outcome, then the modelling from this study suggests that the benefits 
received by motoring consumers in Melbourne and Sydney from relatively 
lower retail petrol prices would have been marginal at best, possibly even 
bordering on a zero-sum game. While on a superficial level, a similar outcome 
achieved in the Adelaide retail petrol market would have been associated with 
relatively lower retail petrol prices, the observed quantitative impact arising 
from the termination of REAs in Adelaide has previously been discounted due 
to an apparent strategic response on the part of one or more of the oil majors.
Just as it appears the ACCC may have erred in its suggestion that REAs may 
have resulted in an anti-competitive detriment, it may have also erred in its 
suggestion that other horizontal agreements give rise to an anti-competitive 
detriment. Given the interpretation of the modelling from this study, it appears 
the oil majors may have been completely justified in their actions to resist the 
pressure applied by the ACCC to seek authorisation for their horizontal 
agreements, including REAs.
While the ACCC looked upon REAs and other horizontal arrangements with 
suspicion that they were possibly a facilitating device for tacit collusion, 
another government agency in the Industry Commission concluded in 1994 that 
REAs and borrow and loan operated in a way that reduced costs and was to the
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advantage of petroleum product users.565 Unlike the ACCC, the Industry 
Commission recommended the deregulation of wholesale petrol prices with no 
conditions attached whatsoever. Based on the modelling conducted for this 
exercise, this would have represented the optimal policy response for keeping 
capital city retail petrol prices relatively low.
It is probably a useful thing for governments to have access to a range of 
differing and alternative views when deliberating on the course of public 
policy. In the case of REAs, it certainly appears that the Industry Commission 
was much closer to the mark than was the ACCC. The Industry Commission 
arguably came to the task of assessing the downstream petroleum industry 
much closer to a state of tabula rasa, as opposed to the ACCC which likely 
brought with it some strongly held pre-conceived ideas in its role as both a 
price regulator of the industry as well as a competition law enforcer that had 
engaged in numerous litigious actions against participants within the industry 
over a number of years and was therefore less favourably predisposed to 
consider the industry in an impartial and dispassionate manner. The 
Commonwealth Government would have been better served, in this case, by 
listening to the views of the Industry Commission, rather than the ACCC, in 
relation to both wholesale petrol price deregulation and REAs.
The ACCC insinuated and inferred the oil majors were engaging in tacit 
collusion facilitated through REAs as well as through other horizontal
565 Industry Commission, Petroleum Products, p. 63.
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agreements over the course of several years. This conduct on the part of the 
competition regulator raises several issues.
In the first place, if the ACCC was indeed of the view that REAs had served the 
purpose of a facilitating device by the oil majors to engage in tacit collusion, 
then it did possess the necessary means at its disposal to test its opinion before a 
court of law for a possible breach of the TPA. The ACCC could have tested its 
inference regarding the anti-competitive effects of REAs under section 45 of 
the TPA, which prohibits contracts, arrangements, or understandings between 
market rivals subject to a competition test that they have the purpose or would 
have or be likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening competition. If 
the ACCC had possessed the courage of its persistent inferences over the course 
of several years then it should have initiated proceedings against the oil majors 
for a possible breach of section 45 of the TPA.
Probably the more appropriate course of action for the ACCC to have taken 
would have been to investigate REAs and launch legal action afterwards, if 
necessary, rather than continue to infer and insinuate that they were a 
facilitating device for tacit collusion over several years. Indeed, after its report 
on the downstream petroleum industry in 1996, the ACCC commented that by 
1997 it would have had the chance to investigate REAs, thus allowing for 
wholesale petrol prices to be deregulated:
the ACCC will have an opportunity by then to examine arrangements
within the industry which give rise to some current concerns about anti-
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competitive effects, eg refinery exchange, borrow and loan, and joint 
terminalling arrangements.. ,566
It would appear not much ever came from any follow-up inquiries by the 
ACCC on the competitive effects of REAs due to be completed by 1997, as the 
ACCC continued to infer and insinuate about the anti-competitive effects of 
REAs for several more years to come.
The 2003 Dawson report on the TPA considered complaints “the ACCC 
released information and made comments to the media that was neither 
balanced nor impartial and earned with it the danger that the corporation or 
individual involved might be denied procedural fairness in proceedings yet to 
be determined”, conduct that has been labeled as trial by media.567 Rowe from 
the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry summed up the concerns of 
business in regard to possible trial by media by the ACCC when he commented:
the ACCC does have considerable powers to regulate industry and it 
should use those powers responsibly. But it should not go about seeking 
to damage company’s reputations on the basis of allegations and our 
concern is that too often we see publicity given to these cases before the 
companies have had a chance to respond to the allegations, before we’ve 
seen the outcome in court and before we know whether the facts are 
right or wrong.568
566 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, ACCC recommends end to petrol 
declaration.
567 Dawson, D., Segal, J. and Rendall, C., op.cit., p. 182.
568 Lateline (1999) Fels faces foe. ABC Television, 9 May.
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Similarly, all four oil majors made submissions to the 2002 TPA Review 
Committee outlining their concerns regarding the ACCC engaging in trial by 
media. According to Shell:
in Shell’s experience, the Commission is cavalier in its use of the media 
at the beginning of investigations, before any charges have been brought 
(let alone breaches found), while becoming quite “camera shy” when 
investigations lead nowhere or charges are not sustained. The 
Commission’s behaviour demonstrates a lack of understanding, 
disinterest or, at worst, disregard for the serious business and 
reputational damage to particular companies or industries that can be 
caused by such use of the media.
Shell also submits that, whilst this may be well received in the tabloid 
press, it is poor public administration, and not appropriate conduct for a 
regulatory agency.560
In response to accusations the ACCC was engaging in trial by media in 2002, 
the then Chairman of the ACCC, Professor Fels, repudiated such claims 
commenting that “there is no basis for this”.570 Further, he went on to deflect 
criticism from the oil majors, claiming that they were entirely to blame for their 
own poor public image:
If oil companies have a bad reputation with the public, this not the fault 
of the ACCC. It is the fault of the oil companies.671
509 The Shell Company o f Australia Limited (2002) Submission to the Commission o f Inquiry 
into the Trade Practices Act 1974. Melbourne, pp. 8-9.
570 Fels, A., The Review o f the Trade Practices Act and issues concerning the ACCC and the 
media.
571 ibid.
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After the release of the Dawson report in 2003, Professor Fels went on to claim 
“hardly any of the ACCC publicity relates to matters that have not already been 
to trial and settled” and suggested that if the ACCC had in fact engaged in trial 
by media over the years, then there would have been court reprimands.572
It would appear that claims of trial by media waged against the oil majors in 
relation to REAs and other horizontal arrangements by the ACCC over a 
number of years are not without foundation, given the ACCC made numerous 
and arguably erroneous claims regarding such arrangements over the course of 
several years without ever testing any of these claims before a court of law. As 
outlined in Chapter 5, while the ACCC recognised by 2002 that REAs may 
have been a contributing factor to relatively lower retail petrol prices, and 
therefore by implication, may not have been associated with any anti­
competitive detriment, it was also arguably deficient in failing to acknowledge 
that its previous claims in regard to REAs may have been wrong. Given 
continuous and erroneous insinuations and inferences over several years that 
the oil majors could be engaging in tacit collusion through REAs and other 
horizontal arrangements, it is probably disingenuous of the ACCC to absolve 
itself entirely of any culpability in relation to the poor public standing of the oil 
majors. Given the ACCC’s public comments in regard to REAs over a number 
of years, the conclusions of the Dawson report that the ACCC “needs to 
exercise care in publicising individual matters to ensure that there is no
s72 Fels, A. (2003) Competition Policy: A Report Card for the last 12 years and an Agenda for 
the Future. Speech to the National Press Club, Canberra, 30 June.
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unfairness to the parties involved” would appear to be entirely justified in the 
case of REAs.573
The Dawson report went on to recommend that the ACCC should develop a 
media code of conduct in consultation with interested parties to govern its use 
of the media, particularly in relation to enforcement proceedings.574 Probably 
one matter which the Dawson report overlooked in arriving at its 
recommendations was the continual public airing of suspicions by the ACCC 
over several years of possible anti-competitive conduct without the instigation 
of court proceedings, which was the case in regard to REAs. If the ACCC is not 
going to investigate nor instigate court proceedings against certain conduct, 
then natural justice at the very least dictates that the ACCC should refrain from 
public comment in regard to the competitive merits of such conduct. In the 
absence of any investigation, nor the commencement of court proceedings, then 
an ACCC media code of conduct should be extended to include refraining from 
public comment on suspicions of anti-competitive conduct.
8.5 Conclusions
Capital city wholesale petrol markets, despite being oligopolistic in nature, are 
probably competitive as a result of the demonstrated inability of market 
participants to exercise market power on a prolonged or sustainable basis. The 
implications of this finding is that not only were various regulatory 
interventions doomed to failure because there was no apparent competition
573 Dawson, D., Segal, J. and Rendall, C. op.cit., p. 189.
574 ibid., p. 189.
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problem that needed to be rectified, but that horizontal agreements between the 
oil majors, particularly REAs, were highly unlikely to serve as a facilitating 
device for tacit collusion under these circumstances.
In regard to the enforcement of competition law, public policy is probably best 
served by having the competition law enforcement authority investigate 
potential breaches of the law rather than conduct a running public commentary 
over the course of several years regarding its suspicions. It could be argued that 
the ACCC publicly maligned the oil majors over the course of several years 
based on its suspicions that PJEAs were anti-competitive, when in fact its 
suspicions were most probably wrong. The oil majors did have grounds for a 
legitimate grievance against the ACCC given its public comments over a period 
of several years. Under these circumstances, it may have been prudent and 
preferable for the ACCC to have refrained from public comment altogether in 
regard to REAs.
Rather than providing the means to engage in tacit collusion, REAs have been 
found to be benign at worst, but far more likely to be pro-competitive and 
efficiency enhancing, thereby leading to relatively lower retail petrol prices 
than would have otherwise been the case. On this basis, it would appear public 
policy is best served, provided wholesale capital city petrol markets remain 
relatively competitive, to encourage the re-institution of REAs between the oil 
majors operating within Australia.
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Appendix 1: Australian Unleaded Petrol Demand
A l.l Introduction
This Appendix will outline the data and process used to estimate a demand 
function for unleaded petrol in Australia. From this demand function, the short- 
run and long-run price and income elasticity of demand for unleaded petrol 
have been estimated.
A1.2 Model
Petrol demand functions have usually been estimated as a function of both the 
real price of petrol and real income. Dahl and Sterner contend that petrol 
demand functions that do not include some form of price and income measures 
in the model are mis-specified.57'^
The model specification used is dynamic and is known as the lagged 
endogenous model where the amount of unleaded petrol demanded in period /
(D ,), is a function of the real price of unleaded petrol in period t (P ,), real 
income in period t  (Y ,)  and the amount of unleaded petrol demanded in the 
previous period. The model is outlined in equation Al . l  below:
D t flagged endugcnous^Pt, T/, D t-i) (Al. l)
Assuming log-linearity provides the following lagged endogenous model for 
estimation purposes, which is equation A 1.2 below:
D t = ß 0 + ß iP t , + ß 2 Yt + ß 3D t.j + e, (A 1.2)
575 Dahl, C. and Sterner, T. (1991) Analysing gasoline demand elasticities: a survey. Energy 
Economics 13, 203-210, p. 204.
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where the log of unleaded petrol demand is a function of the log of the real 
price of petrol, the log of real income, and the log of the quantity of unleaded 
petrol demanded during the previous period and et is the assumed random error 
term. According to Dahl and Sterner, the inclusion of a lagged dependent 
variable in the model tends to improve the statistical fit of petrol demand 
functions considerably.576
A feature of the lagged endogenous model is that the coefficients ßj and /?? can 
be interpreted as the short-run price elasticity of demand and the short-run 
income elasticity of demand respectively, while ßi divided by (1 - ßß  and /?2 
divided by (1 - /??) can be interpreted as the long-run price elasticity of demand 
and the long-run income elasticity of demand respectively.
A1.3 Data
Monthly time series data has been collected and constructed from May 1998 
until September 2006. Monthly data on real income in per capita terms has been 
constructed from a combination of quarterly national accounts data577 and 
quarterly demographic statistics57* published by the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (ABS).
576 ibid., p. 204.
'77 Australian Bureau o f Statistics (2007) Australian National Accounts: National Income, 
Expenditure, and Product, December 2006. Cat. no. 5206.0, Canberra. 
http://www.abs.gov.aU/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/5206.0Dec%202006? 
OpenDocument [Accessed 11 March 2007]
578 Australian Bureau o f Statistics (2007) Australian Demographic Statistics, September 2006. 
Cat no. 3101.0, Canberra. http://www.abs.gov.aU/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/ 
3101.0Sep%202006?OpenDocument [Accessed 30 March 2007]
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Estimates for monthly real gross domestic income (in 2004-05 dollars) have 
been calculated using a smoothing equation to evenly distribute quarterly real 
gross domestic income across each of the three months in each quarter (see 
equations A 1.3.1-3 for example).
Month, 9 = Month, , + -----------------------------
'~2 2 (A 1.3.1)
Month,)
3 3
Months = Month(_2 + ----------------------------
2 (A 1.3.2)
f O ^ T L - Month)
Month, = Month, , H------------------------------
2 (Al.3.3)
Monthly estimates of real gross domestic income have been divided by monthly 
estimates of the Australian resident population in order to produce monthly 
estimates of real income in per capita terms (in 2004-05 dollars).
Quarterly estimates of Australia’s resident population have been converted into 
monthly estimates by evenly distributing quarterly growth in the population 
between the three months of each quarter.
Monthly estimates of real per capita income is shown below in Chart 7.
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Chart 7: Monthly Real Per Capita Income in 2004-05 Dollars
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Monthly current price data for unleaded petrol has been sourced from the 
Australian Automobile Association which publishes price data for capital cities 
and major country towns that runs from May 1998 to the present.579 An average 
current price for unleaded petrol in Australia has been constructed by taking a 
weighted average of capital city prices using the same weights as used by the 
ABS in the construction of 15th series of the consumer prices index (CPI).580 
The average current price for unleaded petrol in Australia has been converted 
into a real or constant price series (in 2004-05 dollars) by deflating it by a 
monthly price index series derived from the CPI.581 Quarterly index numbers 
from the CPI have been taken as the assumed index number for the middle 
month of the quarter and the two months in between have been assumed to
579 Australian Automobile Association. Issues for Motorists: Petrol Prices. 
http://www.aaa.asn.au/issues/petrol.htm [Accessed 6 September 2006] 
sn Australian Bureau o f Statistics (2005) Information Paper: Introduction o f the 15th Series 
Australian Consumer Price Index 2005 (Reissue). Cat. no. 6462.0, Canberra.
581 Australian Bureau o f Statistics (2007) Consumer Price Index, Australia, December 2006. 
Cat. no. 6401.0, Canberra, http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/
6401.0Dec%202006?OpenDocument [Accessed 11 March 2007]
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follow a trend. The only exception to this has been in relation to the September 
quarter 2000 covering the period of the introduction of the goods and services 
tax (GST), whereby the increase that occurred in the month of August 2000 was 
assumed to follow the same trend as occurred between the middle months of the 
March 2000 and June 2000 quarters, with the remainder and bulk of the 
increase in the index assumed to occur in July 2000 coinciding with the 
introduction of the GST. The estimated average Australian monthly retail price 
for unleaded petrol in real terms is provided below in Chart 8.
Chart 8: Average Australian Monthly Retail Price for Unleaded Petrol in 2004-05 Dollars 
(in cents per litre)
120 - -  120
110 - -  110
May-98 May-99 May-00 May-01 May-02 May-03 May-04 May-05 May-06
In the estimation of average Australian monthly retail prices for unleaded petrol 
in real terms, no allowance has been made for the price differential that usually 
exists between city and country retail petrol prices. Country petrol prices are 
generally higher than city petrol prices. However, the estimated real prices will 
still provide a reasonable approximation for two primary reasons. First, capital 
cities have generally accounted for in excess 60 per cent of registrations for
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unleaded petrol motor vehicles, suggesting that the bulk of unleaded petrol is 
consumed within the capital cities.582 Second, average movements in country 
unleaded petrol prices generally follow average movements in city unleaded 
petrol prices over time as is demonstrated in chart 3 in section 2.7.4.
Monthly data on the volume of unleaded petrol sold in Australia has been 
sourced from various monthly editions of Australian Petroleum Statistics 
published by the Commonwealth Government Department of Industry, Tourism 
and Resources. The volume of unleaded petrol consumed on a per capita 
monthly basis was estimated using the monthly data on the volume of unleaded 
petrol sold in Australia and dividing it by the estimated monthly Australian 
resident population. The derived monthly per capita consumption of unleaded 
petrol is provided below in Chart 9.
Chart 9: Estimated Monthly Per Capita Consumption of Unleaded Petrol (in litres)
May-98 May-99 May-00 May-01 May-02 May-03 May-04 May-05 May-06
5X1 Australian Bureau o f Statistics (2003) Motor Vehicle Census: 31 March 2003. Cat. no. 
9309.0, Canberra.
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A1.4 Stationarity
Graham and Glaister have highlighted that several studies have expressed 
concern over the previous lack of recognition of the nonstationary nature of 
variables used in estimating petrol demand functions. The stationarity 
properties of the three variables under consideration, the log of the volume of 
unleaded petrol consumed on a monthly per capita basis, the log of monthly 
real income on a per capita basis, and the log of an average monthly real price 
for unleaded petrol across Australia, were tested using the Phillips-Perron (PP) 
test.584
The PP test was performed using two specifications: the first with the inclusion 
of a constant term; and second with a constant as well as a linear trend term. 
Table 23 below presents the results.
583 Graham, D. J. and Glaister, S. (2002) The Demand for Automobile Fuel. Journal o f  
Transport Economics and Policy 36, 1-26, p. 17.
584 The PP test was preferred to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test because o f the high 
number o f lags that had to be used to control for autocorrelation in the D, and Y, terms, thus 
compromising the reliability o f the ADF test. The ADF test controls for higher-order serial 
correlation by adding lagged difference terms of the dependent variable. The PP test uses a 
nonparametric method to control for higher-order autocorrelation.
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Table 23: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test for UPD„ Y„ and P,
Variable PP test with constant PP test with constant and 
trend
D, -3.0994* -6.5130#
(0.0298) (0.000)
AD, -30.4264#
(0.0001)
-
Y, -3.0047* -3.9950*
(0.0378) (0.0118)
A Y, -7.9269# -7.8450#
(0.0000) (0.000)
P, -1.3168* -2.5652*
(0.6194) (0.2970)
A P, -8.7694# -8.6744#
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Note: Figures in brackets are the corresponding probabilities.
* indicates that the null hypothesis of a unit root has been accepted at the 1 per cent level.
# indicates that the null hypothesis of a unit root has been rejected.
The test for P, shows that the null hypothesis for the presence of a unit root is
accepted, while for APt the alternative hypothesis of a stationary time series is
accepted. On this basis, it is concluded that Pt is integrated in the first order or
Id).
The results for Dt and Y, are less certain. While for Y, the null hypothesis for the 
presence of a unit root is accepted at 1 per cent, it is not accepted at 5 per cent. 
As an additional test, Y, was tested using the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt- 
Shin (KPSS) test.585 The results of the KPSS test for Y, are presented below in 
table 24.
583 The KPSS test performs the test that a series is stationary as the null hypothesis against the 
alternative hypothesis for the presence of a unit root.
328
Table 24: KPSS Test for Y,
Variable KPSS test with constant KPSS test with constant and 
trend
Y, 1.2970# 0.3849#
A Y, 0.0803* 0.0777*
* indicates that the null hypothesis of stationarity has been accepted.
# indicates that the null hypothesis of stationarity has been rejected at the 1 per cent level.
The KPSS test rejects the null hypothesis that Yt is stationary at the 1 per cent 
level, while it accepts the null hypothesis that A Y, is stationary. On the basis of 
the KPSS test, it is concluded that Y, is 1(1).
In the case of D, the PP test with a constant accepts the presence of a unit root 
at the 1 per cent level, but not at the 5 per cent level. On the other hand, the PP 
test with both a constant and linear trend term for D, accepts the alternative 
hypothesis that the series is stationary. In choosing between which specification 
of the PP test to accept as the best representation for Dh it was decided to resort 
to the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz Criterion (SC), with 
smaller values being preferred. On basis of the AIC and SC, it was found that 
the PP test with just the constant term was the preferred specification.
As an additional test, D, was also tested using the KPSS test with the constant 
specification. The results of the KPSS test for/)/ are presented below in table 
25.
Table 25: KPSS Test for D,
Variable KPSS test with constant
A 1.0363#
AD, 0.3314*
* indicates that the null hypothesis of stationarity has been accepted.
# indicates that the null hypothesis of stationarity has been rejected at the 1 per cent level.
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The KPSS test rejects the null hypothesis that D, is stationary at the 1 per cent 
level, while it accepts the null hypothesis that A D, is stationary. On the basis of 
the KPSS test, it is concluded that D, is 1(1).586
Estimates of relationships between nonstationary variables could lead to 
spurious regression by suggesting significant relationships between wholly 
unrelated variables.587 Granger and Newbold proposed a simple test to identify 
potential spurious regression where an R-squared or adjusted R-squared was 
coupled with an extremely low value for the Durbin-Watson statistic.
A standard approach for addressing the problem of nonstationary data has been 
to specify models as relationships between differences.588 However, the major 
drawback from this approach is that a model based solely on difference terms 
can only capture the short-run dynamics in a process and therefore fails to 
identify any long-run relationships between the variables.
While Dt, Y, and P, are non-stationary, given that all three variables are non­
stationary of the same order 1(1), it is possible that the linear combination of 
these three variables could in fact be stationary. Granger coined the term
589cointegration to describe a stationary combination of nonstationary variables.
S6 While not reported, D, was also tested using the KPSS test with the constant and linear trend 
specification. It was found that while the null hypothesis that D, was stationary was rejected at 
the 5 per cent level, it was accepted at the 1 per cent level.
587 Granger, C. W. J. and Newbold, P. (1974) Spurious Regressions in Econometrics. Journal o f 
Econometrics 2, 111-120.
588 The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences (2003) The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic 
Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2003 -  Information for the Public: Statistical Methods for 
Economic Time Series. Stockholm, http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates 
/2003/public.html. [Accessed 14 September 2006]
580 Granger, C. W. J. (1981) Some Properties of the Time Series Data and Their Use in 
Econometric Model Specification. Journal o f Econometrics 16, 121-130.
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Where a linear combination of nonstationary variables are cointegrated then 
ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis can still provide a satisfactory framework 
for evaluating econometric evidence. >9°
A1.5 Estimation
For using time series data of a monthly duration, Dahl and Sterner observe that 
problems of seasonal variation are inevitable.591 In order to account for seasonal 
variation, 11 seasonal dummy variables for each of the 12 months excluding 
May have been included in both models. The effect of any seasonal variation in 
regard to May will be reflected in the constant term. The 11 monthly seasonal 
dummy variables should be interpreted as any seasonal variation from the 
month of May.
Dahl has argued that a lagged endogenous model using monthly or quarterly 
should not be relied upon for estimating long-run elasticities.v)2 However, in 
contrast, Epsey has found that long-run estimates derived from models using 
monthly or quarterly data were not significantly different from models using 
annual data.593 On this basis, Epsey has concluded that there is no reason to 
expect differences in the long-run estimates of elasticity due to the periodicity 
of the data, and that a properly specified model with a dynamic structure should
590 Stock, J. H. and Watson, M. W. (1988) Variable Trends in Economic Time Series. The 
Journal o f Economic Perspectives 2, 147-174, pp. 164-165.
591 Dahl, C. and Sterner, T., op.cit., p. 205.
392 Dahl, C. (1986) Gasoline Demand Survey. The Energy Journal 7, 67-82, p. 69.
593 Espey, M. (1998) Gasoline demand revisited: an international meta-analysis of elasticities. 
Energy Economics 20, 273-295, p. 289.
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be able to capture the same long-run effects using monthly, quarterly, or annual 
data.5,4
A1.6 Results
An ordinary least squares regression for the lagged endogenous model has been 
estimated with 100 observations.545 As the model exhibited signs of first order 
autocorrelation (according to Durbin’s m test), the model was re-estimated 
using the heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) standard 
errors as developed by Newey and West.546 This will ensure that the standard 
errors are robust in the event of both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation of 
an unknown form.
The results are reported below in table 26 as equation A 1.4.
594 ibid., p. 289.
595 Eviews 5.0 was used in the estimation process.
5% Newey, W. K. and West, K. D. (1987) Hypothesis Testing with Efficient Method of 
Moments Estimation. International Economic Review 28, 777-787.
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Table 26: OLS Regression for Unleaded Petrol Demand in Australia (HAC t-statistics in 
brackets)_____________________________________________________
Variable Equation A1.4 
(HAC standard errors)
Constant -1.991
(-2.726)*
Y, 0.470
(3.492)*
P, -0.115
(-2.105)*
D ,j 0.697
(11.283)*
June -0.069
(-3.226)*
July -0.006
(-0.256)
August -0.003
(-0.181)
September -0.048
(-2.688)*
October 0.017
(1.059)
November -0.051
(-3.114)*
December 0.006
(0.271)
January - 0.111
(-4.496)*
February -0.054
(-2.596)*
March 0.107
(5.644)*
April -0.036
(-1.767)
R-squared 0.875
Adjusted R-squared 0.855
AIC -3.420
SC -3.029
F-statistic 41.687*
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.476
Durbin’s m test 11.367*
^Statistically significant at the 5 per cent level.
The R-squared and adjusted R-squared for equation A1.4 indicates the model
fits the data quite well. Equation A 1.4 has reasonably high R-squared and
adjusted R-squared values with the Durbin-Watson statistic being high enough
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to suggest that the equation is not spurious on the basis of the criterion outlined 
by Granger and Newbold.597
The estimated coetficients on the log of the real price of unleaded petrol and the 
log ol real per capita income have the expected a priori signs and the t-statistics 
indicate that these explanatory variables are statistically significant at less than 
the 5 per cent level.
Granger has suggested two methods for testing whether a cointegrating 
relationship exists within an equation: the first is through testing whether the 
residuals from the equation are stationary; and the second is through testing 
whether the Durbin-Watson statistic is significantly greater than zero.598 In the 
first instance, a unit root test using the Dickey-Fuller test, which in this instance 
is known as the Engle-Granger (EG) test, was performed on the residuals from 
equation A1.4 to determine whether they are stationary.599 The results are 
reported below in table 27.
Table 27: Engle-Granger Test of the Residuals from Equation A1.4
Variable EG test with Constant EG test with Constant and 
trend
et -12.604 -12.574
The critical values for the EG test at the 1 per cent level with 100 observations 
is -4.07. On the basis of the EG test, the alternative hypothesis that the residuals
597 See: Granger, C. W. J. and Newbold, P., op.cit.
598 Granger, C. W. J. (1986) Developments in the Study of Cointegrated Economic Variables. 
Oxford Bulletin o f Economics and Statistics 48, 213-228.
599 The lag length for the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test conducted was undertaken using the 
Schwarz Information Criteria in Eviews 5.0 which was zero, resulting in the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test becoming a Dickey-Fuller test.
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from equation A I.4 do not contain a unit root and are stationary is accepted at 
less than the 1 per cent level.
Cointegration can also be tested for through the Cointegrating Regression 
Durbin Watson (CRDW) test which involves examining the Durbin-Watson 
statistic of the cointegrating regression. The CRDW test rejects non­
cointegration if the Durbin-Watson statistic is too big. According to Engle and 
Granger, the critical value of the Durbin-Watson statistic at the 1 per cent level 
of significance for 100 observations is 0.511.600 The Durbin-Watson statistic for 
equation A1.4 is significantly above the critical value at the 1 per cent level of 
significance. Thus, from examining the Durbin-Watson statistic for equation 
A 1.4 it is concluded that a cointegrating relationship exists between the main 
variables of interest in the equation.
A1.7 Interpretation
The properties of equation A 1.4 are quite acceptable and generally consistent 
with previous findings in relation to petrol demand functions.
Demand is much less price inelastic in the long-run (-0.38) than it is in the 
short-run (-0.12) which is consistent with the findings of numerous other 
studies. The short-run estimate of price elasticity of demand of -0.12 is
600 Engle, R. F. and Granger, C. W. J. (1987) Co-Integration and Error Correction: 
Representation, Estimation, and Testing. Econometrica 55, 251-276.
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consistent with findings by Sterner and Dahl that dynamic petrol demand 
functions generally produce results in the range o f -0.1 and -0.3.601
Within the Australian context, the short-run price elasticity of demand obtained 
o f -0.12 is similar in magnitude and consistent with previous estimates by 
Donnelly in the order of between -0.10 to -0.12, although these estimates are 
quite dated.602
Results show a short-run income elasticity of demand of 0.47, rising to 1.55 in 
the long-run. This suggests that while unleaded petrol is a normal good in the 
short-run, it becomes a superior good in the long-run.603 The short-run estimate 
for income elasticity of 0.47 is consistent with findings by Sterner and Dahl that 
dynamic petrol demand functions generally produce results in the range of 0.15 
to 0.5.604
Within the Australian context, the short-run income elasticity of demand of 
0.47 is much higher than previous estimates by Donnelly that ranged from 0.12 
to 0.18, although as previously observed, Donnelly’s estimates are somewhat 
dated.
The estimated long-run income elasticity of 1.55 is generally higher than 
estimates obtained from overseas studies. Graham and Glaister have found that
601 Sterner, T. and Dahl, C. (1992) Modelling transport fuel demand. In Sterner T. (ed.) 
International Energy Economics. Chapman and Hall, London, p. 77.
602 Donnelly, W. A. (1982) The Regional Demand for Petrol in Australia. The Economic Record 
58,317-327.
603 A normal good is a good for which demand will increase as income increases. On the other 
hand, a superior good will make up a larger proportion o f consumption as income increases.
604 Sterner, T. and Dahl, C., op.cit., p. 77.
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the long-run income elasticity of demand is generally higher than 1 and in range 
of between 1.1 and 1.3.605 However, estimates in excess of 1.3 are not 
uncommon, with some studies arriving at estimates in excess of 2.606
In regard to the model, it was found that the short-run elasticities for income 
and price were about a third of the long-run values. This is also consistent with 
the findings of Dahl and Sterner.607
605 Graham, D. J. and Glaister, S., op.cit., p. 10.
606 See: Sterner, T., Dahl, C. and Franzen, M. (1992) Gasoline Tax Policy, Carbon Emissions 
and the Global Environment. Journal o f  Transport Economics and Policy 26, 109-119; Espey, 
M., op.cit., p. 278.
607 Dahl, C. and Sterner, T., op.cit., p. 207.
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Appendix 2: NIM Data
Table 28: Notional Industry Margins for Adelaide, Melbourne and Sydney in the week 
commencing (WC) __________ _________ ___________
Date Adelaide M elbourne Sydney
W C  30 Jun 1997 5.3 7.5 8.1
W C  7 Jul 1997 4.9 6.1 7.4
W C  14 Jul 1997 5.0 7.1 6.4
W C  21 Jul 1997 4.5 6.9 7.2
W C  28 Jul 1997 5.4 3.7 6.5
W C 4  Aug 1997 6.0 7.1 6.3
W C  11 Aug 1997 6.2 7.5 6.2
W C  18 Aug 1997 8.5 8.6 6.7
W C  25 Aug 1997 8.5 8.1 7.8
W C  1 Sep 1997 6.5 6.5 6.8
W C 8  Sep 1997 7.3 6.6 6.5
W C  15 Sep 1997 8.2 6.7 7.2
W C  22 Sep 1997 7.7 6.4 6.8
W C  29 Sep 1997 6.7 6.0 6.2
W C 6  Oct 1997 5.9 5.1 5.5
W C  13 O ct 1997 6.5 5.1 6.0
W C  20 Oct 1997 6.2 6.2 6.6
W C  27 Oct 1997 4.1 4.0 5.6
W C  3 Nov 1997 4.7 4.6 5.8
W C  10 Nov 1997 3.9 5.1 5.7
W C  17 Nov 1997 4.9 7.4 6.3
W C  24 Nov 1997 6.1 8.9 6.9
W C  1 Dec 1997 7.1 7.9 6.7
W C  8 Dec 1997 5.4 7.7 6.9
W C  15 Dec 1997 6.3 6.8 8.2
W C  22 Dec 1997 6.7 7.4 8.5
W C  29 Dec 1997 6.3 7.1 8.1
W C  5 Jan 1998 6.1 7.0 8.0
W C  12 Jan 1998 6.1 4.5 7.0
W C  19 Jan 1998 4.9 5.4 7.3
W C  26 Jan 1998 4.6 5.6 6.9
W C 2  Feb 1998 4.7 6.8 6.9
W C  9 Feb 1998 6.6 5.2 8.7
W C  16 Feb 1998 6.4 6.1 8.7
W C  23 Feb 1998 6.6 5.0 8.5
W C  2 M ar 1998 6.0 5.4 8.2
W C 9  M ar 1998 5.9 4.7 8.9
W C  16 Mar 1998 5.3 4.5 8.4
W C  23 Mar 1998 5.4 4.5 8.3
W C  30 Mar 1998 6.0 4.3 7.7
W C 6  Apr 1998 5.2 5.4 8.1
W C  13 Apr 1998 6.1 5.2 7.6
W C  20 Apr 1998 6.7 4.0 6.5
W C  27 Apr 1998 5.8 4.2 6.6
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W C 4 M ay 1998 4.9 4.8 6.3
W C  11 May 1998 6.0 3.6 6.0
W C  18 May 1998 5.0 4.1 6.0
W C  25 May 1998 5.8 4.5 6.9
W C  1 Jun 1998 6.5 5.2 7.5
W C  8 Jun 1998 6.2 5.3 7.1
W C  15 Jun 1998 7.0 5.0 6.8
W C  22 Jun 1998 6.6 4.3 6.6
W C  29 Jun 1998 5.9 5.7 6.3
W C  6 July 1998 5.0 4.8 6.8
W C 13 July 1998 5.2 4.6 7.1
W C  20 July 1998 4.7 5.4 7.5
W C  27-Jul-1998 5.1 4.3 7.3
W C  03-Aug-1998 4.4 5.2 7.0
W C  10-Aug-1998 6.0 6.4 8.1
W C 17-Aug-1998 5.9 6.0 7.7
W C  24-Aug-1998 4.9 5.4 7.1
W C 31-Aug-1998 5.4 5.8 7.6
W C  07-Sep-1998 8.9 5.5 7.5
W C 14-Sep-1998 8.2 5.0 6.8
W C 21-Sep-1998 5.8 4.5 5.4
W C  28-Sep-1998 5.5 4.3 5.4
W C 05-O ct-1998 6.2 4.7 6.0
W C  12-Oct-1998 6.6 4.7 7.0
W C  19-Oct-1998 6.8 5.3 7.2
W C  26-O ct-1998 6.7 5.5 7.1
W C  02-NOV-1998 7.1 6.0 7.1
W C 09-Nov-1998 7.0 5.6 7.7
W C 16-Nov-1998 6.7 6.5 8.2
W C 23-Nov-1998 6.3 6.2 8.3
W C 30-Nov-1998 7.6 6.6 8.4
W C 07-Dec-1998 6.1 6.4 7.9
W C 14-Dec-1998 4.9 4.8 7.7
W C 21-Dec-1998 5.3 5.3 7.2
W C 28-Dec-1998 5.4 5.5 7.0
W C 04-Jan-1999 5.6 4.7 6.9
W C 11-Jan-1999 6.0 4.3 6.7
W C  18-Jan-1999 5.4 5.6 7.1
W C 25-Jan-1999 5.7 5.9 7.4
W C 01-Feb-1999 5.6 6.0 7.5
W C 08-Feb-1999 5.0 4.0 7.2
W C 15-Feb-1999 4.5 6.1 6.6
W C  22-Feb-1999 4.2 6.9 6.1
W C 01-M ar-1999 5.3 5.5 5.9
W C 08-M ar-1999 7.5 2.6 5.9
W C  15-M ar-1999 6.6 5.7 5.4
W C  22-M ar-1999 4.3 7.0 5.0
W C 29-M ar-1999 5.3 6.6 5.3
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W C 05-A pr-1999 5.4 3.8 4.7
W C 12-Apr-1999 5.4 6.3 5.7
W C 19-Apr-1999 6.3 6.1 6.1
W C 26-A pr-1999 5.4 4.2 6.2
W C 03-M ay-1999 5.1 4.3 5.4
W C 10-M ay-1999 5.9 4.1 6.1
W C 17-M ay-1999 6.6 3.6 7.4
W C 24-M ay-1999 7.0 3.6 7.4
W C 31-M ay-1999 5.6 3.0 7.0
W C 07 -Jun -1999 4.9 5.5 6.7
W C 14-Jun-1999 5.1 2.3 5.6
W C 21 -Jun -1999 4.8 3.4 4.6
W C 28 -Jun -1999 5.0 2.9 5.2
W C 05-Ju l-1999 5.5 4.5 5.3
W C 12-Ju l-1999 6.0 5.4 4.7
W C 19-Ju l-1999 5.7 4.7 4.8
W C 26-Ju l-1999 4.5 6.0 4.6
W C 02-A ug-1999 6.2 5.5 4.8
W C 09-A ug-1999 5.5 3.7 4.2
W C 16-A ug-1999 4.7 2.8 4.8
W C 23-A ug-1999 4.6 2.8 5.1
W C 30-A ug-1999 4.5 2.9 4.7
W C 06 -S ep -1 9 9 9 4.9 2.0 4.2
W C 13-S ep -1999 5.3 4.3 4.6
W C 20 -S ep -1 9 9 9 3.7 4.2 5.0
W C 27 -S ep -1 9 9 9 3.4 3.8 4.9
W C  04-O ct-1999 4.5 3.3 5.1
W C 1 1-O ct-1999 4.8 3.0 5.2
W C 18-O ct-1999 4.2 1.3 4.9
W C 25-O ct-1999 4.6 2.9 4.2
W C O I-N ov-1999 5.6 2.1 4.1
W C 08-NOV-1999 4.2 2.7 4.1
W C 15-N ov-1999 4.1 3.1 3.8
W C 22-NOV-1999 3.6 2.4 4.2
W C 29-N ov-1999 5.2 4.1 4.9
W C 06-D ec-1999 6.2 5.0 5.8
W C 13-D ec-1999 5.9 5.0 5.3
W C 20-D ec-1999 4.5 5.2 5.1
W C 27-D ec-1999 4.5 4.1 4.6
W C 0 3 -Jan -2 0 0 0 5.3 5.9 5.4
W C 10-Jan-2000 3.7 5.7 5.0
W C 17-Jan -2000 3.1 2.4 3.3
W C 2 4 -Jan -2 0 0 0 2.3 1.5 2.9
W C 3 1 -Jan -2 0 0 0 3.3 3.3 3.6
W C 07 -F eb -2000 5.5 2.2 4.4
W C 14-F eb-2000 4.6 1.5 3.7
W C 21 -F eb-2000 4.5 3.0 4.8
W C 28 -F eb-2000 5.3 4.0 5.0
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W C 06-M ar-2000 3.3 3.7 4.1
W C 13-Mar-2000 4.4 3.8 6.8
W C 20-M ar-2000 6.7 6.5 9.3
W C 27-M ar-2000 7.0 6.3 8.9
W C 03-Apr-2000 4.4 4.3 8.5
W C  10-Apr-2000 4.8 4.2 7.0
W C  17-Apr-2000 4.0 3.3 5.8
W C 24-Apr-2000 3.6 1.8 4.7
W C 01-M ay-2000 3.9 3.0 3.9
W C  08-M ay-2000 4.3 2.7 3.7
W C 15-M ay-2000 1.8 0.1 3.4
W C 22-M ay-2000 3.1 2.5 3.9
W C  29-M ay-2000 4.9 2.3 5.8
W C 05-Jun-2000 4.0 3.3 4.9
W C  12-Jun-2000 3.9 3.4 4.9
W C  19-Jun-2000 4.1 1.6 4.0
W C 26-Jun-2000 4.3 4.2 5.7
W C  03-Jul-2000 2.3 2.7 2.3
W C IO -Jul-2000 3.3 3.5 4.1
W C 17-Jul-2000 2.4 1.2 3.2
W C 24-Jul-2000 2.9 1.4 3.6
W C 31-Jul-2000 3.3 0.8 2.4
W C 07-Aug-2000 2.0 1.1 1.3
W C 14-Aug-2000 2.8 3.7 1.2
W C 21-Aug-2000 1.6 4.0 4.4
W C 28-Aug-2000 3.3 4.5 5.1
W C 04-Sep-2000 5.5 3.6 3.8
W C  11-Sep-2000 4.1 5.3 2.8
W C  18-Sep-2000 3.6 3.1 3.0
W C  25-Sep-2000 5.1 6.5 5.1
W C  02-0c t-2000 5.1 6.7 5.1
W C  09 -0c t-2000 4.6 7.7 5.7
W C  16-0ct-2000 1.6 3.7 4.4
W C  23-O ct-2000 3.6 5.1 5.9
W C  30 -0c t-2000 5.3 4.7 5.9
W C  06-NOV-2000 5.2 3.9 6.3
W C  13-NOV-2000 4.0 3.5 5.0
W C 20-NOV-2000 3.1 1.0 2.0
W C 27-NOV-2000 0.9 2.8 2.9
W C 04-Dec-2000 2.9 4.5 6.0
W C  11-Dec-2000 7.7 7.1 6.4
W C  18-Dec-2000 7.8 10.3 9.9
W C  25-Dec-2000 4.7 9.3 10.8
W C  01-Jan-2001 4.1 7.6 8.4
W C 08-Jan-2001 3.0 4.6 4.7
W C 15-Jan-2001 0.2 3.4 3.5
W C 22-Jan-2001 5.5 4.0 1.6
W C 29-Jan-2001 5.2 4.3 3.7
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W C 05-Feb-2001 4.8 3.7 4.4
W C 12-Feb-2001 5.4 4.2 5.3
W C 19-Feb-2001 5.7 4.5 4.8
W C 26-Feb-2001 3.1 2.5 5.7
W C 05-M ar-2001 4.5 4.8
W C 12-M ar-2001 2.7 3.9
W C 19-M ar-2001 4.6 2.8
W C 26-M ar-2001 4.4 5.9
W C 02-Apr-2001 4.1 4 .5
W C 09-Apr-2001 4.1 3.3
W C 16-Apr-2001 1.6 2.1
W C 23-Apr-2001 0.9 2.4
W C 30-Apr-2001 1.8 2.2
W C 07-M ay-2001 1.1 3.0
W C 14-M ay-2001 2.4 4.3
W C 21-M ay-2001 1.4 3.2
W C 28-M ay-2001 1.5 6.0
W C 04-Jun-2001 4.9 6.2
W C 1 1-Jun-2001 1.8 2.0
W C 18-Jun-2001 3.9 4.6
W C 25-Jun-2001 3.3 3.2
W C 02-Jul-2001 2.9 4.6
W C 09-Jul-2001 2.1 4.6
W C 16-Jul-2001 0.4 5.4
W C 23-Jul-2001 4.6 4.1
W C 30-ÜUI-2001 4.1 3.9
W C  06-A ug-2001 4.2 2 .3
W C 13-Aug-2001 3.7 2.4
W C 20-A ug-2001 3.2 3.8
W C 27-A ug-2001 2.3 3.6
W C 03-S ep-2001 3.2 1.5
W C 10-Sep-2001 0.5 2.8
W C 17-Sep-2001 0.0 4.2
W C 24-S ep-2001 4.1 7.7
W C 01 -0ct-2001 3.4 7.4
W C 08-0ct-2001 6.2 6 .5
W C 15-0ct-2001 5.8 6.5
W C 22-O ct-2001 6.7 6.3
W C 29-O ct-2001 5.4 5.2
W C 05-NOV-2001 3.7 5.3
W C 12-NOV-2001 5.8 3.8
W C 19-NOV-2001 7.8 5.7
W C 26-NOV-2001 7.6 4.2
W C 03-D ec-2001 7.5 3.1
W C 10-D ec-2001 5.1 4.6
W C 17-D ec-2001 6.7 5.4
W C 24-D ec-2001 4.2 1.3
W C 31-D ec-2001 4.5 3.5
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W C  07-Jan-2002 6.9 6.5
W C  14-Jan-2002 6.6 5.8
W C  21-Jan-2002 6.8 4.7
W C  28-Jan-2002 2.2 3.6
W C  04-Feb-2002 5.0 3.1
W C  11-Feb-2002 5.5 2.7
W C  18-Feb-2002 5.8 5.7
W C  25-Feb-2002 5.9 5.7
W C  04-M ar-2002 6.1 4.1
W C  11-M ar-2002 4.6 3.7
W C  18-M ar-2002 4.2 3.6
W C  25-M ar-2002 5.3 3.6
W C  01-Apr-2002 4.1 4.1
W C  08-Apr-2002 5.6 3.6
W C  15-Apr-2002 6.8 5.0
W C  22-Apr-2002 3.7 2.7
W C  29-Apr-2002 6.0 5.4
W C  06-M ay-2002 5.7 4.9
W C  13-M ay-2002 5.6 4.7
W C  20-M ay-2002 6.3 5.1
W C  27-M ay-2002 7.3 6.0
W C  03-Jun-2002 7.4 6.5
W C  10-Jun-2002 6.0 6.0
W C  17-Jun-2002 5.6 4.7
W C  24-Jun-2002 4.2 4.7
W C  01-Jul-2002 6.4 6.3
W C  08-Jul-2002 6.9 6.6
W C  15-Jul-2002 6.8 6.0
W C  22-ÜUI-2002 5.7 4.9
W C  29-Jul-2002 4.9 4.7
W C  05-Aug-2002 5.8 5.5
W C 12-Aug-2002 6.7 5.7
W C  19-Aug-2002 5.9 5.2
W C  26-Aug-2002 5.7 4.9
W C  02-Sep-2002 5.0 5.1
W C  09-Sep-2002 4.9 5.3
W C 16-Sep-2002 5.0 6.6
W C  23-Sep-2002 4.8 6.4
W C  30-Sep-2002 5.6 6.1
W C  07 -0c t-2002 7.0 7.1
W C  14-0ct-2002 8.0 7.5
W C  21-0c t-2002 6.8 7.4
W C 28-O ct-2002 8.1 7.9
W C 04-NOV-2002 8.3 8.5
W C 11-NOV-2002 8.7 8.2
W C 18-NOV-2002 8.8 8.0
W C 25-NOV-2002 7.8 7.4
W C 02-Dec-2002 8.1 6.8
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W C  09-Dec-2002 6.7 6.8
W C  16-Dec-2002 7.0 7.7
W C  23-Dec-2002 6.0 7.0
W C  30-Dec-2002 6.1 7.0
W C 06-Jan-2003 5.6 6.9
W C  13-Jan-2003 8.2 7.8
W C  20-Jan-2003 7.8 6.9
W C  27-Jan-2003 6.3 6.2
W C  03-Feb-2003 6.2 6.0
W C  10-Feb-2003 5.8 6.0
W C  17-Feb-2003 6.2 6.4
W C  24-Feb-2003 6.6 6.8
W C  03-M ar-2003 7.0 6.9
W C  10-M ar-2003 6.7 6.1
W C  17-M ar-2003 7.0 9.0
W C  24-M ar-2003 8.7 11.8
W C  31-M ar-2003 8.9 11.0
W C  07-Apr-2003 11.7 11.0
W C 14-Apr-2003 7.3 9.1
W C  21-Apr-2003 7.9 8.4
W C  28-Apr-2003 9.0 8.8
W C  05-M ay-2003 8.4 8.5
W C  12-M ay-2003 7.1 7.4
W C  19-M ay-2003 6.4 6.4
W C  26-M ay-2003 6.1 6.2
W C  02-Jun-2003 5.7 5.9
W C  09-Jun-2003 4.7 5.9
W C  16-Jun-2003 4.0 6.0
W C  23-Jun-2003 6.4 6.2
W C  30-Jun-2003 5.9 5.5
W C  07-Jul-2003 5.5 5.9
W C  14-Jul-2003 4.4 6.4
W C  21-ÜUI-2003 3.0 6.0
W C  28-Jül-2003 2.7 6.5
W C  04-Aug-2003 2.9 6.0
W C  11-Aug-2003 3.3 5.6
W C  18-Aug-2003 7.8 6.5
W C  25-Aug-2003 4.9 6.7
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Appendix 3: Correlograms of NIM
Table 29: Correlogram of Adelaide NIM
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.635 0.635 78.533 0.000
2 0.348 -0.091 102.30 0.000
3 0.323 0.236 122,89 0.000
4 0.310 0.032 141.94 0.000
5 0,329 0.170 163.50 0,000
6 0.420 0.217 198.87 0.000
7 0.346 -0,084 222.97 0.000
8 0.262 0 067 236.89 0.000
9 0.272 0,045 251,96 0.000
10 0.287 0.054 268.83 0.000
11 0,291 0.057 286.31 0.000
12 0.317 0.047 307.09 0.000
13 0.348 0,131 332.35 0.000
14 0.335 0.035 355.81 0.000
15 0.324 0.064 377,89 0.000
16 0.284 -0.038 394.92 0.000
17 0.293 0.097 413.23 0.000
18 0.239 -0.128 425.49 0.000
19 0.203 -0.002 434.39 0.000
20 0.260 0.091 449.01 0.000
21 0286 -0 006 466 81 0 000
22 0.224 -0.027 477.78 0.000
23 0.218 0,009 488.27 0,000
24 0.246 0.071 501.68 0.000
25 0.264 0.062 517.18 0.000
26 0.290 0.016 536.05 0.000
27 0.305 0.040 557.01 0.000
28 0.274 0.017 574.08 0.000
29 0,225 -0 031 585.65 0,000
30 0.201 -0.051 594.95 0.000
31 0.177 -0.037 602.20 0.000
32 0.194 0.031 610.93 0.000
33 0.154 -0.127 616.49 0.000
34 0.183 0.109 624.40 0.000
35 0.156 -0.124 630.21 0.000
36 0.127 0.044 634.05 0.000
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Table 30: Correlogram of Melbourne NIM
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.721 0.721 169.09 0.000
2 0.598 0.163 285.77 0.000
3 0.487 0.018 363.36 0.000
4 0.423 0.057 422.16 0.000
5 0.395 0,086 473.53 0.000
6 0.343 -0.010 512.37 0.000
7 0.366 0.141 556.64 0.000
8 0.356 0.042 598.64 0.000
9 0.324 -0.025 633.53 0.000
10 0.322 0.065 668.16 0.000
11 0,362 0,153 712.13 0.000
12 0.358 0.000 755.23 0.000
13 0.352 0.029 797,17 0.000
14 0.329 0.004 833.72 0.000
15 0.309 -0.005 866.09 0.000
16 0.285 -0.005 893.69 0.000
17 0.226 -0.065 911.10 0.000
18 0.214 0.005 926.85 0.000
19 0.222 0.049 943.85 0.000
20 0.204 -0.030 958.19 0.000
21 0 196 -0.001 971.57 0.000
22 0 195 0.020 984.85 0000
23 0,222 0.056 1002.0 0,000
24 0.234 0.027 1021.1 0.000
25 0.232 0.017 1040.0 0.000
26 0.220 -0.029 1057.0 0.000
27 0.157 -0.121 1065.7 0.000
28 0.119 -0.015 1070.8 0.000
29 0.073 -0.047 1072.7 0,000
30 0.036 -0.074 1073.2 0.000
31 0.080 0.120 1075.4 0.000
32 0.076 -0.013 1077.5 0.000
33 0.084 -0,015 1080.1 0.000
34 0.089 0.026 1082.9 0.000
35 0.068 -0.048 1084.6 0.000
36 0.082 0.014 1087.1 0.000
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Table 31: Correlogram of Sydney NIM
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation
I 1
1
AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0810 0 810 213.25 0.000
2 0.641 -0.043 347.36 0.000
3 0.525 0.051 437,34 0.000
4 0.460 0.087 506.77 0.000
5 0,413 0.032 562.91 0.000
6 0.408 0.128 617.92 0.000
7 0.378 -0.036 665.12 0.000
8 0.372 0.104 711.20 0.000
9 0.373 0.056 757.67 0.000
10 0.382 0.062 806.44 0.000
11 0.362 -0.017 850.41 0.000
12 0.370 0.099 896.39 0.000
13 0.366 0,021 941 68 0.000
14 0.376 0.070 989.66 0.000
15 0.358 -0,032 1033.1 0.000
16 0.352 0.050 1075.3 0.000
17 0.319 -0,044 1110 1 0.000
18 0.266 -0.092 1134.4 0.000
19 0.264 0.131 1158,4 0.000
20 0.306 0.094 1190.8 0.000
21 0.311 -0,035 1224,4 0.000
22 0.323 0.052 1260.7 0.000
23 0 310 -0 031 1294.4 0 000
24 0.287 -0 011 1323.2 0.000
25 0,295 0 094 1353.6 0,000
26 0 307 -0.008 1386 8 0.000
27 0.286 -0.024 1415.8 0,000
28 0 290 0.072 1445.7 0.000
29 0.288 -0.025 1475.2 0,000
30 0.249 -0,094 1497.3 0.000
31 0.247 0.108 1519.1 0.000
32 0.220 -0.110 1536 5 0.000
33 0.199 0.017 1550,8 0.000
34 0 176 -0.048 1561.9 0.000
35 0.167 -0.008 1572.1 0.000
36 0 190 0 082 1585 3 0 000
37 0.243 0 098 1606,8 0,000
38 0.262 -0.003 1632.0 0.000
39 0.268 0,013 1658,4 0.000
40 0.283 0 096 1688 1 0.000
41 0.252 -0.154 1711.7 0,000
42 0.209 -0.039 1728.0 0.000
43 0.196 0.063 1742 3 0.000
44 0.163 -0.063 1752.3 0.000
45 0.162 0.027 1762.2 0.000
46 0.164 0.020 1772.4 0 000
47 0.150 -0.062 1781,0 0.000
48 0.128 -0.056 1787.3 0.000
49 0.102 -0 031 1791,3 0,000
50 0.092 -0.004 1794.5 0 000
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Appendix 4: Specification of Dummy Variables
A4.1 Blockade of Melbourne Fuel Terminals in Late 
September 2000
On Sunday 24 September 2000, truck owner-drivers began a protest over high 
fuel prices by staging a blockade of the Mobil-BP terminal in Yarraville, the 
Caltex terminal at Spotswood and the Shell terminal at Newport. Truck owner- 
drivers parked their trucks outside fuel terminal facilities, and prevented fuel 
tankers from leaving the terminals.
Shell commented on Monday 25 September 2000 that the fuel blockades by 
truck owner-drivers were threatening Victorian fuel supplies.60'’ Mobil 
commented that it was “in a very serious position in terms of supply” and 
newspaper reports suggested that Victoria could start running out of fuel within 
days.6(,; Caltex threatened to take legal action by asking the Supreme Court in 
Victoria to force truck owner-drivers to end the blockade.610
The blockade was eventually lifted on Tuesday 26 September 2000, following 
discussions between the truck owner-drivers, the then Victorian Premier, Mr 
Steve Bracks, and the Transport Workers’ Union. A spokesman for the truck 
owner-drivers, Mr Jerry Brown-Sarre, said they decided to lift the blockade 
after accepting assurances from Mr Bracks that he would raise their concerns
608 The Shell Company of Australia Limited (2000) Victorian Fuel Blockade -  Shell. Media 
Release, 25 September.
609 The Age (2000) Petrol Supplies Start to Dwindle. 26 September: 3.
610 PM Program (2000) Petrol Blockade. ABC Radio, 25 September; The Oil Daily (2000) 
Truckers Block Fuel Supplies. 27 September.
348
with the Commonwealth Government at the Premiers’ Conference in November
2000.611
While fuel deliveries commenced immediately after the blockade was lifted, 
newspaper reports said that some service station sites had already run out of 
fuel supplies, with BP closing 12 sites before the blockade was lifted and
Caltex commenting that half of its 166 Melbourne sites would have run out of
61 ^at least one fuel product by Wednesday 27 September 2000.
The ACCC later commented that Melbourne petrol prices had been affected by 
the blockade of late September 2000.613 In the period following the blockade, 
the NIM stayed high for a further two weeks as possibly wholesalers sought to 
increase margins in order to make up for the period of lost sales and revenues.
A4.2 Christmas 2000
The Christmas and New Year holiday period during 2000 was a period of high 
retail petrol prices in Adelaide, Melbourne and Sydney coupled with an 
abnormally high NIM. This retail petrol price spike occurred against a backdrop 
of a higher Australian/US dollar exchange rate and a lower price for Singapore 
refined product, thus leading to an increase in the level of NIM recorded in all 
three cities.614 While explanations differ as to the reasons, the high level of
611 The Australian (2000) Bracks douses truckies’ fuel rage. 27 September: 28; Bracks, S. 
(2000) Bracks Government Slams Howard over Crisis Facing Owner Drivers. Media Release, 
Premier o f Victoria, 26 September.
612 Herald Sun (2000) State’s petrol flows again. 27 September 2000: 9.
613 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2000) Report on the Movement in Fuel 
Prices in the September Quarter 2000. Canberra.
614 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2000) ACCC continues to monitor 
petrol prices. Media Release, 21 December.
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retail petrol prices recorded during this period was highlighted by motoring 
organisations, as well as acknowledged by government officials and some of 
the oil majors at the time.
Both the NRMA and the RACV accused the oil companies of profiteering over 
the Christmas holiday period.615
On the other hand, several explanations were offered by the oil majors for the 
petrol price spike over the Christmas and New Year period and the consequent 
rise in the NIM. Caltex commented that supply had been restricted in Victoria 
and New South Wales due to a break in the Bass Strait crude oil pipeline and a 
problem at the Kumell refinery in Sydney. 616 It was further reported that 
Caltex had been experiencing problems with the supply of unleaded petrol in 
the Sydney market caused by technical problems at its Kumell refinery.617 Shell 
attributed the petrol price spike to production problems encountered at a 
number of refineries on the eastern seaboard of Australia:
We’ve had a number of refinery problems up and down the East Coast 
of Australia and there are some shortages of petrol around the place. So 
at the moment what you’re seeing is that prices were remaining high 
due to supply shortages at petrol stations and it is a very, very high 
demand period caused by the holidays.618
615 See: PM Program (2000) Petrol prices remain high over Christmas. ABC Radio, 22 
December; The Age (2001) Oil Companies Are Profiteers: RACV. 1 January: 3.
616 Australian Associated Press News Wire (2000) Fuel shortage could halt petrol price cuts. 15 
December.
61 The Australian (2000) City petrol still on a high. 22 December: 15.
6IS PM Program, op.cit.
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Another reason offered by Shell for the high retail petrol price over the 
Christmas 2000 holiday period was due to a “not a very strong” retail 
discounting cycle.619
According to a representative of Mobil, there were petrol shortages along the 
Australian seaboard over the Christmas 2000 period due to several unexpected 
refineries shutdown at this time, although Adelaide was spared from these 
shortages to some extent:
We had three or four refineries around Australia out, and we had a 
critical shortage that had to be met by imports. We failed to do that 
effectively on the eastern seaboard. Fortunately, Adelaide was spared 
some of those issues.620
During this period, the Prime Minister, Mr Howard, called on oil companies to 
cut the retail price of petrol due to the fall in world oil prices and because of the 
appreciation of the Australian dollar.621
619 The Age, op.cit.
620 House o f Assembly Select Committee on Petrol, Diesel, and LPG Pricing (2001) Official 
Hansard Report. Monday 28 May 2001 at 4.25pm, Parliament o f South Australia, Adelaide, p. 
56.
621 The Australian (2000) PM tells oil chiefs -  cut petrol prices. 30 December: 3.
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Appendix 5: Correlograms for Adelaide
Table 32: Correlogram of the Residuals and Q Statistics for Equation 1.
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.075 0.075 1.0818
2 *0.182 -0.189 7.5466 0.006
3 -0.033 -0.003 7.7639 0.021
4 -0.001 -0.034 7,7642 0,051
5 -0.054 -0.060 8.3430 0.080
6 -0.007 -0.004 8,3520 0.138
7 -0.016 -0.039 8.4007 0.210
8 -0.013 -0.013 8 4330 0.296
9 -0.064 -0.078 9.2680 0.320
10 -0.062 -0,064 10.043 0.347
11 -0.071 -0 095 11.082 0.351
12 -0.064 -0.090 11.935 0.369
13 0.083 0.057 13.368 0.343
14 -0.010 -0 074 13.391 0.418
15 -0.017 -0.002 13.450 0.491
16 -0,014 -0.049 13.492 0.564
17 0.135 0.125 17.337 0.364
18 -0.030 -0.076 17.528 0.419
19 -0.138 -0.114 21.584 0.251
20 0,017 0,011 21.650 0.302
21 0.123 0.053 24.929 0.204
22 -0.036 -0.050 25.215 0.238
23 -0.091 -0 084 27.020 0.210
24 -0.039 -0 050 27.354 0.241
25 -0.009 -0.033 27.371 0.287
26 0.035 0.016 27.639 0.325
27 0.056 0041 28.352 0.341
28 -0.041 -0.072 28,733 0.374
29 -0.038 -0.017 29.056 0.410
30 0.100 0.056 31.358 0.349
31 -0.069 -0.105 32.466 0.346
32 -0,009 0.040 32.486 0.393
33 -0.117 -0 197 35.661 0.300
34 0.081 0.073 37.198 0.282
35 0.056 -0.019 37.940 0.294
36 -0.113 -0 098 40.989 0.224
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Table 33: Correlogram of the Residuals and Q-statistics for Equation 2.
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation
: :
:V
1 ]i 
• I  I
AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.007 0.007 0.0105
2 -0.040 -0 040 0.3168
3 0.047 0.047 0 7413 0.389
4 -0.007 -0.010 0.7519 0.687
5 -0.074 -0.070 1.8236 0.610
6 -0 002 -0 004 1.8245 0.768
7 -0.025 -0.030 1.9463 0.857
S -0.033 -0.026 2,1638 0,904
9 -0.075 -0.078 3.2950 0.856
10 -0.056 -0 062 3,9407 0,862
11 -0 062 -0.067 4.7191 0.858
12 -0.086 -0.091 6,2195 0,796
13 0.073 0.067 7.3206 0.773
14 -0.016 -0,034 7.3714 0.832
15 0015 0.016 7.4179 0.879
16 -0,053 -0.081 8.0007 0.889
17 0 123 0.112 11.204 0.738
18 -0 039 -0,056 11.533 0775
19 -0.115 -0.124 14.358 0.642
20 0.019 -0,008 14.433 0.700
21 0.091 0062 16.205 0.644
22 -0 062 -0 046 17.038 0.650
23 -0 074 -0 097 18.243 0.634
24 -0.023 -0.047 18,360 0.684
25 -0.012 -0.007 18.394 0.736
26 0.009 0.010 18.410 0.783
27 0.054 0.045 19.054 0.795
28 -0.028 -0.065 19.227 0.827
29 -0.051 -0 048 19.824 0.838
30 0.102 0060 22.193 0.772
31 -0.105 -0.123 24.717 0.693
32 0038 0051 25.057 0.722
33 -0 131 -0 181 29 032 0.568
34 0.071 0.049 30.217 0,557
35 0.066 0.044 31.252 0.554
36 -0.101 -0.091 33.685 0.483
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Appendix 6: Correlograms for Melbourne
Table 34: Correlogram of the Residuals and Q-statistics for Equation 3.
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 - 0.032 - 0.032 0.3421
2 0.053 0.052 1.2431 0.265
3 0.058 0.061 2.3294 0.312
4 - 0.033 - 0.033 2.6955 0,441
5 0.053 0.045 3.6129 0.461
6 - 0.123  - 0.121 8.5672 0.128
7 - 0.011 - 0.020 8.6081 0.197
8 0.070 0,077 10.254 0,175
9 - 0.090 - 0.070 12.973 0.113
10 - 0.076  - 0.099 14.910 0.093
j 11 0.014 0.022 14.979 0.133
12 - 0.041 - 0.031 15.530 0.160
13 0.015 0.006 15.607 0.210
14 - 0.026  - 0.003 15.843 0,258
15 - 0.005 - 0.013 15.851 0.323
16 0.024  - 0.008 16.048 0.379
17 - 0.087 - 0.068 18.604 0.290
18 - 0.009  - 0.018 18,634 0.350
19 0.040 0.036 19 172 0 381
20  - 0.024 - 0.016 19.370 0,433
21 0.011 - 0.005 19.414 0.495
22 - 0,025  - 0.021 19.622 0.545
23 0.064 0.053 21.066 0.517
24 0.026 0.017 21.306 0.562
25 - 0.005 0.014 21.316 0.620
26 0.085 0.066 23.880 0.526
27 -0  097 - 0.118 27.180 0.400
28 0,004  - 0.012 27.186 0.454
29 - 0.065 - 0.052 28.698 0.428
30 - 0.160  - 0.155 37.798 0.127
31 0.006 - 0.014 37.810 0.155
32 - 0.093  - 0.050 40.937 0.109
33 - 0.028 - 0.036 41.226 0.127
34 0.005  - 0.006 41.236 0.154
35 - 0.070  - 0.042 43.023 0.138
36  - 0.029  - 0,075 43.328 0.158
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Table 35: Correlogram of the Squared Residuals and Q-statistics for Equation 3.
Autocorrelation
P
I;
Partial Correlation
>
AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.137 0.137 6 0974
2 0.031 0.012 6.4055 0.011
3 0.075 0.070 8.2334 0.016
4 0.051 0.032 9.0921 0.028
5 0028 0.015 9.3564 0.053
6 0.072 0.062 11.077 0,050
7 0.061 0.038 12.298 0.056
8 0.062 0045 13.573 0 059
9 0.063 0.040 14.908 0.061
10 0.085 0.062 17.300 0.044
11 0.025 -0.006 17.511 0.064
12 0.093 0.078 20.439 0.040
13 0.162 0.128 29.244 0.004
14 0.128 0.084 34.763 0.001
15 -0.057 -0.108 35.868 0 001
16 0.049 0.035 36.676 0,001
17 0.126 0.094 42.064 0 000
18 0,065 0.027 43.493 0 000
19 0.051 0.012 44.370 0.001
20 0.143 0.100 51.381 0.000
21 0.034 -0 019 51.771 0 000
22 0.075 0.044 53.744 0 000
23 -0.036 -0.100 54.198 0.000
24 0.005 -0 008 54.207 0.000
25 0.042 0.014 54.813 0.000
26 -0.017 -0.088 54.911 0,001
27 0.043 0.018 55.560 0.001
28 0.054 0.039 56.586 0,001
29 -0.024 -0.052 56.796 0.001
30 0.009 -0,052 56 825 0 002
31 0.088 0 066 59 602 0 001
32 - 0.000 -0.030 59.602 0 002
33 -0.021 -0.051 59.761 0.002
34 -0,010 -0.061 59.795 0.003
35 -0.042 -0.030 60.448 0 003
36 -0.038 -0.030 60.974 0.004
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Table 36: Correlogram of the Residuals and Q-statistics for Equation 4.
Autocorrelation
d
£
Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.004 0.004 0.0043
2 0,063 0.063 1.2804 0.258
3 0.069 0 0 6 8 2.8148 0.245
4 -0.034 -0,038 3.1916 0.363
5 0.061 0.053 4.3989 0.355
6 -0.098 -0.100 7.5576 0.182
7 -0.033 -0.035 7.9184 0.244
8 0.087 0.093 10.438 0.165
9 -0.083 -0.065 12.752 0.121
10 -0.079 -0.097 14.833 0.096
! 11 0.027 0.037 15.071 0.129
12 -0.047 -0.028 15.812 0.148
13 0.053 0.041 16.753 0.159
14 -0,054 -0.035 17.751 0.167
15 -0.023 -0.023 17.925 0.210
16 -0.006 -0,043 17.939 0.266
! 17 -0.116 -0.090 22.501 0.128
18 0.011 0.017 22.540 0.165
19 0.009 0.020 22.569 0.208
20 -0.019 -0.013 22.695 0.251
21 0.020 -0 001 22.833 0.297
22 -0.007 0 0 0 6 22.849 0.352
23 0.078 0.068 24.964 0.299
24 0,029 0.012 25.266 0.337
25 0.013 0.026 25.326 0.388
26 0,087 0.053 28.015 0.307
27 -0.083 -0.108 30.467 0.249
28 -0.007 -0.012 30.483 0.293
29 -0.071 -0.063 32.260 0.264
30 -0.127 -0.109 38.016 0.122
31 -0.025 -0.041 38.242 0.144
32 -0.084 -0.044 40.803 0.112
33 -0.030 -0.022 41.136 0.129
34 0.015 0,002 41.213 0.154
35 -0.094 -0.060 44.411 0.109
36 -0,011 -0.036 44.452 0.131
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Table 37: Correlogram of the Squared Residuals and Q-statistics for Equation 4.
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 -0.088 -0.088 2.5225
2 0.012 0.004 2.5688 0.109
3 0.079 0.081 4.5920 0.101
4 0.025 0,040 4.7997 0,187
I  5 -0.006 -0.003 4.8134 0.307
6 0,058 0,051 5.9362 0,312
7 -0.021 -0.016 6.0769 0.415
8 0033 0.028 6,4320 0.490
9 0.002 -0.000 6.4337 0.599
10 0.053 0.053 7.3591 0.600
11 -0.009 -0.003 7.3838 0.689
12 0.057 0.051 8,4835 0.669
j  13 0.065 0.070 99226 0.623
14 0.110 0.119 14.027 0.372
15 -0.091 -0.081 16.853 0.264
16 0.042 0.005 17.453 0,293
17 0.110 0.102 21.602 0.157
18 0.034 0056 22.007 0.184
19 0.003 0.005 22.009 0.232
20 0.145 0.121 29 290 0,062
21 0.058 0.089 30.441 0 063
22 0.034 0,030 30,839 0.076
23 -0.037 -0.065 31.316 0.090
24 0.002 -0.036 31.318 0.115
25 0.037 0.032 31.809 0.132
26 -0.018 -0.042 31.918 0.160
27 0.032 0.016 32.287 0.184
28 0.061 0.062 33.603 0.178
29 -0.041 -0.020 34.192 0.195
30 0.013 -0.051 34.254 0.230
31 0 032 -0.012 34.609 0.257
32 -0 007 -0,005 34.628 0.299
33 -0.036 -0.070 35.102 0.323
34 0.006 -0,071 35,116 0.368
35 -0.043 -0.047 35.796 0.384
36 0.001 0.009 35.796 0,431
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Appendix 7: Correlograms for Sydney
Table 38: Correlogram of the Residuals and Q-statistics for Equation 5.
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
0.022 0.022 
-0.033 -0.034 
- 0.001 0.000 
0.031 0.030  
-0.061 -0.062 
0.062 0.067 
-0.074 -0.082 
-0.040 -0,033 
-0.056 -0.056 
0.021 0.014  
-0.094 -0 088 
-0.035 -0,041 
-0.043 -0.041 
0.061 0.052  
-0.069 -0.070 
0.037 0,026  
0.014 0.013  
-0.110 -0.132 
-0.110 -0.103 
0.120 0.084 
-0.011 -0.013 
-0.007 -0.016 
0.035 0.026  
-0.109 -0.138 
-0.010 0.018  
0.105 0.054  
-0.061 -0.078 
0.016 0.033  
0.052 0.034  
-0.078 -0,124 
0.064 0.085  
-0.019 -0,047 
0.027 0.035  
-0.014 -0.021 
-0.069 -0.091 
-0.038 -0,043
0.1498
0.5142 0.473
0.5148 0.773
0,8322 0,842
2.0495 0.727
3.3072 0,653
5.0949 0.532
5.6340 0.583
6.6848 0.571
6.8359 0.654
9.7944 0.459
10.216 0.511
10.835 0.543
12.096 0.520
13.717 0.471
14,192 0.511
14.257 0.580
18,377 0.365
22.559 0.208
27.497 0.094
27.539 0.121
27.555 0.153
27.976 0.176
32.110 0.098
32.145 0.123
36.051 0.071
37.373 0.069
37.470 0,087
38.443 0.090
40.626 0.074
42.068 0.071
42.203 0,086
42.464 0.102
42.532 0.124
44.273 0.112
44.810 0.124
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Table 39: Correlogram of the Squared Residuals and Q-statistics for Equation 5.
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
s
l
i
IP
i
D
i 1 0.121 0.121 4.70692 0.206 0.194 18,516 0.000
3 0.106 0.065 22.145 0.000
4 0 119 0,067 26.786 0,000
5 0.107 0.063 30.568 0.000
6 0.079 0.027 32.632 0.000
7 0.071 0.021 34.304 0.000
8 0.135 0.097 40.326 0,000
9 0.061 0.010 41.573 0 000
10 0.073 0.011 43.328 0.000
11 0.024 -0.021 43.525 0.000
12 0.124 0.089 48,681 0.000
13 0.169 0.138 58.268 0.000
14 0 090 0,020 61,025 0,000
15 0.267 0.207 85.265 0.000
16 0.129 0.048 90.905 0.000
17 0.136 0.015 97.235 0 000
18 0.163 0.086 106,28 0.000
19 0.040 -0.052 106.84 0.000
20 0.169 0.081 11668 0.000
21 0.074 -0.003 118.58 0.000
22 0.088 0.003 121.29 0.000
23 0.158 0.096 129 93 0.000
24 0.148 0,094 137.56 0,000
25 0.154 0 070 145 84 0.000
26 0.069 -0.016 147.53 0.000
27 0.109 0.020 151.70 0.000
28 0.157 0.049 160,44 0.000
29 0.118 0.038 165.35 0.000
30 0.164 0,037 174.88 0.000
31 0.024 -0.094 175.09 0.000
32 0.013 -0.106 175,15 0.000
33 0.016 -0.100 175.25 0.000
34 0,049 0,039 176.13 0.000
35 0.105 0.049 180.11 0.000
36 0.091 0.018 183.15 0.000
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Table 40: Correlogram of the Residuals and Q-statistics for Equation 6.
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.017 0.017 0 0931
2 -0.059 -0.059 1.2087 0.272
3 -0.002 0.000 1.2095 0.546
4 0.084 0.081 3.5245 0.318
5 -0.054 -0.057 4.4649 0.347
6 -0.018 -0.007 4.5749 0.470
7 -0.032 -0.038 4.9196 0.554
8 -0.030 -0.038 5.2220 0.633
9 -0.061 -0.055 6.4511 0.597
10 -0.002 -0.005 6.4521 0.694
11 -0.042 -0.045 7.0375 0.722
12 -0.046 -0,045 7,7549 0.735
13 -0.046 -0.046 8.4648 0.748
14 0.043 0.032 9.0973 0.766
15 -0.073 -0.079 10.887 0.695
16 0.038 0.043 11.384 0,725
17 -0.014 -0.029 11.455 0.781
18 -0.074 -0.091 13.325 0.714
19 -0.090 -0.085 16.119 0.584
20 0.071 0.041 17.875 0.531
21 0.004 -0 013 17.881 0.595
22 -0.011 -0.006 17.924 0.654
23 0.005 0007 17.933 0.710
24 -0.050 -0 090 18.789 0.713
25 0.024 0.025 18.997 0.752
26 0,086 0 065 21,608 0,658
27 -0.004 -0.021 21.614 0.710
28 0.000 0,005 21.614 0,757
29 0.055 0.053 22.704 0.748
30 -0.093 -0.142 25.790 0,637
31 0.008 0.023 25813 0.685
32 -0.043 -0.060 26.480 0,698
33 0.067 0 065 28.113 0.664
34 -0.022 -0.017 28.281 0.701
35 -0.088 -0.082 31.063 0.612
36 -0.019 -0.033 31.200 0.652
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Table 41: Correlogram of the Squared Residuals and Q-statistics for Equation 6.
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.007 0.007 0.0168
2 -0,031 -0,031 0.3252 0.569
3 -0.028 -0.028 0.5876 0.745
4 0.046 0045 1.2657 0.737
5 -0.022 -0025 1.4304 0.839
6 -0.016 -0.014 1.5163 0.911
7 -0 038 -0 036 1.9840 0 921
8 0,022 0018 2.1409 0952
9 -0.058 -0 060 3.2746 0.916
10 -0.018 -0,017 3 3832 0,947
11 -0.060 -0.060 4.5908 0.917
12 0.041 0.034 5.1598 0,923
13 0.001 0 000 5.1601 0952
14 -0,024 -0.028 5.3603 0.966
15 0.100 0.108 8.7259 0.848
16 0.014 -0.001 8.7954 0,888
17 0.006 0 013 8.8093 0.921
18 0.023 0,026 8,9957 0,940
19 -0.048 -0.056 9.7880 0.939
20 0.049 0.048 10.600 0.937
21 -0.035 -0.037 11.023 0.946
22 -0.032 -0.027 11.379 0.955
23 0.039 0.047 11.914 0.959
24 0,062 0.063 13.269 0.946
25 -0.003 0 003 13.271 0.961
26 -0.032 -0.012 13.634 0.968
27 -0.030 -0.031 13.950 0.974
28 0.074 0.062 15.896 0955
29 0.038 0.050 16.413 0.959
30 0.098 0.088 19.811 0.899
31 -0.027 -0.013 20.068 0.915
32 -0,009 -0.015 20,096 0.934
33 -0.068 -0071 21.738 0.914
34 0,039 0.058 22.280 0,921
35 0.053 0.054 23.280 0.917
36 -0.023 -0.026 23.469 0.931
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Appendix 8: Sensitivity Analysis
Table 42: OLS Regression of Adelaide NIM without Autoregressive Terms (t-statistics in 
brackets)_____________ ________________________
Variable Equation A8.1
(HAC standard errors)
Constant 4.856
(26.541)*
Regulation 1.063
(3.800)*
Deregulation / 1.395
(4.485)*
Deregulation? 0.683
(2.893)*
exREAs -1.055
(-4.096)*
Merger 3.017
(15.755)*
Christmas200G 3.974
(21.667)*
R-squared 0.485
Adjusted
R-squared
0.469
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.211
AIC 2.956
SC 3.075
White’s
Heteroscedasticity Test
10.634
Durbin’s m test 29.708*
F-statistic 29.091*
^Statistically significant at the 5 per cent level.
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Table 43: OLS Regression of Melbourne NIM without the Autoregressive Term (t- 
statistics in brackets)_____ _______________ __________
Variable Equation A8.2 
(HAC standard errors)
Constant 3.283
(16.597)*
Regulation, 3.292
(8.007)*
Regulation2 1.760
(5.930)*
Deregulation, 2.234
(7.420)*
Deregulation2 1.549
(3.645)*
M erger 3.114
(15.591)*
Blockade 3.673
(13.926)*
Christmas2000 5.311
(16.243)*
TG 1.834
(3.925)*
ex RE As 1.468
(2.873)*
Iraq 3.188
(6.625)*
Coles -2.946
(-5.729)*
R-squared 0.549
Adjusted R-squared 0.533
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.089
AIC 3.411
SC 3.552
White’s Heteroscedasticity 
Test
25.054*
Durbin’s m test 66.534*
F-statistic 34.363*
^Statistically significant at the 5 per cent level.
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Table 44: OLS Regression of Sydney NIM without the Autoregressive Term (t-statistics in 
brackets)___________________________________________
Variable Equation A8.3 
(HAC standard errors)
Constant 4.385
(30.043)*
Regulation 2.693
(10.140)*
Deregulation / 2.853
(8.704)*
Deregulation2 1.850
(5.641)*
Merger 3.976
(14.007)*
Christmas2000 4.484
(9.700)*
exREAs 2.172
(7.403)*
Iraq 3.813
(10.780)*
R-squared 0.622
Adjusted
R-squared
0.614
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.013
AIC 3.077
SC 3.171
White’s Heteroscedasticity 
Test
20.653*
Durbin’s m test 78.398*
F-statistic 73.969*
^Statistically significant at the 5 per cent level.
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Table 45: OLS Regressions of Adelaide NIM with the GST explanatory variable (t- 
statistics in brackets)_________ ___________________________________________
Variable Equation A8.4 Equation A8.4
(White’s (HAC standard
heteroscedasticity-robust errors)
standard errors)
Constant 4.821 4.821
(26.243)* (26.018)*
Regulation 1.150 1.150
(4.728)* (4.121)*
Deregulationj 1.381 1.381
(4.080)* (4.115)*
Deregulation2 0.712 0.712
(2.737)* (2.975)*
ex RE As -0.704 -0.704
(-2.237)* (-2.769)*
Merger 2.523 2.523
(7.650)* (1 1.978)*
GST -0.499 -0.499
(-1.177) (-1.386)
Christmas2000 3.723 3.723
(9.267)* (11.079)*
AR(1) 0.481 0.481
(5.401)* (6.871)*
AR(2) -0.208 -0.208
(-2.757)* (-2.956)*
R-squared 0.590
Adjusted 0.570
R-squared
AIC 2.771
SC 2.942
White’s Heteroscedasticity Test 17.660*
F-statistic 28.833*
Inverted ,24..+39i
AR Roots .24 -39i
^Statistically significant at the 5 per cent level.
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Table 46: OLS Regressions of Melbourne NIM with the GST explanatory variable (t- 
statistics in brackets)_________ _________________________ ____________________
Variable Equation A8.5 Equation A8.5
(White’s (HAC standard
heteroscedasticity-robust errors)
standard errors)
Constant 3.488 3.488
(12.542)* (11.171)*
Regulation/ 2.950 2.950
(5.560)* (5.530)*
Regulation2 1.587 1.587
(4.084)* (3.905)*
Deregulation i 2.064 2.064
(6.117)* (5.300)*
Deregulation2 1.282 1.282
(2.471)* (2.531)*
Merger 2.567 2.567
(8.206)* (13.037)*
GST -0.225 -0.225
(-0.540) (-0.511)
Blockade 3.707 3.707
(9.650)* (15.268)*
Christmas2000 4.207 4.207
(4.291)* (8.531)*
TG 1.544 1.544
(3.161)* (2.721)*
ex RE As 1.532 1.532
(3.421)* (2.894)*
Iraq 3.117 3.117
(3.134)* (5.193)*
Coles -2.745 -2.745
(-3.028)* (-3.380)*
AR(1) 0.471 0.471
(7.813)* (7.815)*
R-squared 0.644
Adjusted 0.629
R-squared
AIC 3.186
SC 3.351
White’s Heteroscedasticity Test 30.652*
F-statistic 42.726*
Inverted .47
AR Root
^Statistically significant at the 5 per cent level.
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Table 47: OLS Regressions of Sydney NIM with the GST  explanatory variable (t-statistics 
in brackets)__________________ ___________________ ______________________
Variable Equation A8.6 
(White’s
heteroscedasticity- 
robust standard 
errors)
Equation A8.6 
(HAC standard 
errors)
Constant 4.957 4.957
(20.058)* (19.889)*
Regulation 2.096 2.096
(6.942)* (5.974)*
Deregulation / 2.145 2.145
(6.293)* (5.483)*
Deregulation2 1.178 1.178
(3.183)* (2.516)*
Merger 2.661 2.661
(3.670)* (6.632)*
GST -0.694 -0.694
(-1.717) (-1.775)
Christmas2000 3.111 3.111
(2.218)* (4.672)*
ex RE As 1.659 1.659
(5.168)* (4.309)*
Iraq 2.718 2.718
(3.195)* (3.666)*
AR(1) 0.550 0.550
(10.320)* (9.234)*
R-squared 0.725
Adjusted
R-squared
0.717
AIC 2.772
SC 2.889
White’s Heteroscedasticity Test 60.564*
F-statistic 91.036*
Inverted 
AR Root
.55
^Statistically significant at the 5 per cent level.
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Appendix 9: Test for Structural Change in Sydney
Table 48: OLS Regressions of Sydney NIM with TG explanatory variable (t-statistics in 
brackets)_____________________________________ ______________________
Variable Equation A9.1 Equation A9.2
(White’s (HAC standard
heteroscedasticity-robust errors)
standard errors)
Constant 4.504 4.504
(19.000)* (21.970)*
Regulation 2.549 2.549
(8.702)* (7.925)*
Deregulation / 2.597 2.597
(7.835)* (7.129)*
Deregulation: 1.592 1.592
(4.223)* (3.370)*
Merger 2.863 2.863
(3.543)* (6.144)*
Christmas2000 3.023 3.023
(2.163)* (4.549)*
TG -0.025 -0.025
(-0.051) (-0.055)
ex RE As 2.146 2.146
(4.893)* (4.596)*
Iraq 2.725 2.725
(3.214)* (3.702)*
AR( 1) 0.546 0.546
(10.232)* (9.310)*
R-squared 0.721
Adjusted R-squared 0.713
AIC 2.785
SC 2.902
White’s 43.558*
Heteroscedasticity
Test
F-statistic 89.401*
Inverted AR Roots .55
^Statistically significant at the 5 per cent level.
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